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This dissertation argues that works by authors including Gelli, Spenser, Milton, and Swift 
participate in a previously overlooked tradition of transformation stories, flourishing from the 
Renaissance to the eighteenth century and re-deploying representations of animals from natural 
histories. This tradition derives from the innovative re-telling of Homer’s Circe episode in 
Plutarch’s dialogue “Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti,” featuring Gryllus, a former human who 
prefers to be a pig.  
Comparing sixteenth-, seventeenth-, and eighteenth-century analogues of Gryllus with 
representations of animals in natural histories reveals that the Plutarchian literary tradition 
functions as a major vehicle for arguments about the human/animal relationship, from Gelli’s 
Circe (1549), through book 2 of Spenser’s Faerie Queene (1590) and Milton’s Comus (1634), 
until the parodic treatment of the Plutarchian tradition in Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels (1726). Often 
critiquing forms of anthropocentrism, the works of the Plutarchian tradition draw on 
representations of animals in natural histories in order to define the meaning of characters who 
desire transformation between human and animal states. Furthermore, new understandings of 
individual works can be achieved by locating them within the larger literary tradition in which 
they participate. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
RENAISSANCE ANIMALISM:  
A PLUTARCHIAN TRADITION OF TRANSFORMATIONS 
 
Expanding Plutarch’s dialogue “Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti” into a series of dialogues 
between Ulysses and eleven talking animals, Giovanni Battista Gelli’s Circe (1549) inaugurates, 
I argue, a Plutarchian tradition of transformation stories, distinct from a Homeric tradition of 
representing Circe’s transformations and further developed by many Renaissance works, 
including book 2 of Edmund Spenser’s Faerie Queene (1590) and John Milton’s Comus (1634).1 
Plutarch’s innovative dialogue adapts Homer’s Circe episode by imagining a conversation 
between Odysseus and Gryllus, a former human who refuses rescue from Circe’s island because 
he prefers his new existence as a pig. Gryllus’s desire to be an animal, I demonstrate, belongs to 
a larger constellation of Plutarchian motifs, which both imagine the disintegration of human 
identity and challenge the superiority of humans to animals. This Plutarchian constellation 
contrasts sharply with a constellation of motifs derived from the Circe episode in Homer’s 
Odyssey, which emphasizes the endurance of human identity in spite of bodily transformation 
and thus reinforces distinctions between humans and animals. 
My account reveals that stories about complete transformations of humans into animals 
have a subordinate role in the tradition of Circe stories until the Renaissance revival of Plutarch’s 
dialogue. Stith Thompson’s famous Motif-Index prioritizes stories of complete transformations 
                                                
1 For a survey of the Circean tradition that emphasizes issues of gender and sexuality, see Judith 
Yarnall, Transformations of Circe: The History of an Enchantress (Urbana and Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 1994). Yarnall’s book is a valuable reference on the history of stories 
about Circe, and allusions to her, from antiquity through the twentieth century. 
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by making “Transformation: man to animal” a major sub-heading under the category 
“Transformation” while listing “Partial transformation: animal with human mind” under the 
implicitly marginalized category “Miscellaneous transformation incidents.”2 In contrast to 
Thompson’s model, my account of the tradition of Circe stories shows that Homeric stories 
about exclusively bodily transformations have priority over Plutarchian stories about full 
transformations. Although both Homer’s Odyssey and Plutarch’s dialogue become new subjects 
of fascination in the Renaissance,3 Renaissance writers invert the earlier prioritization of 
transformation stories as they develop a Plutarchian tradition in opposition to Homer’s model. 
These literary innovations occur because of a shift in conceptions of human nature; thus, the 
development of a Plutarchian tradition of transformations relates intimately to the rise of 
humanist ideals, rejected by the literary descendants of Plutarch’s Gryllus. 
 
The Homeric Tradition of Transformations 
 
 As narrated in The Odyssey, Homer’s Circe episode emphasizes the disparity between the 
mental abilities of humans and animals. Odysseus describes Circe’s transformation of some 
members of his crew into pigs in the following manner: 
  She struck them with her wand and drove them into her pig pens, 
  and they took on the look of pigs, with the heads and voices 
                                                
2 Stith Thompson, Motif-Index of Folk-Literature: A Classification of Narrative Elements in 
Folktales, Ballads, Myths, Fables, Mediaeval Romances, Exempla, Fabliaux, Jest-Books and 
Local Legends, revised edition, vol. 2 of 6 (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1955), D100-D199, D0-D699, D682.3, D600-D699. 
3 Plutarch’s works re-enter European culture ca. 1400; Homer’s epics begin to circulate widely 
after the first printed edition of 1488. See Philip H. Young, The Printed Homer: A 3,000 Year 
Publishing and Translation History of the “Iliad” and the “Odyssey” (Jefferson, NC, and 
London: McFarland, 2003), 79 and 96. 
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  and bristles of pigs, but the minds within them stayed as they had been 
  before.4 
When Odysseus says that the crew “took on the look of pigs,” he implies that Circe changes the 
crew’s forms without altering their essential natures. The crew do not become pigs but rather 
acquire the false appearance of being pigs. Odysseus makes this point explicitly and 
unambiguously when he says, “the minds within them stayed as they had been / before.” 
Odysseus imagines the crew’s “minds” as cores of human identity, which survive unaltered 
beneath the physical exteriors that Circe has transformed. Except for bipedal locomotion, which 
the above passage neglects to mention, the only human capacity that the crew lose is articulate 
speech: they now have the “voices”—but emphatically not the “minds”—of pigs. 
 Other ancient versions of the Circe episode tend to follow Homer on this point and even 
exaggerate the motif of entrapment that already appears in the transformations of Homer’s Circe. 
Although Homer’s Circe keeps the transformed crew in “pig pens,” their physical confinement 
pales in comparison with their mental confinement, their inability to articulate their enduringly 
human thoughts or to participate fully in human community.5 In Virgil’s brief treatment of Circe 
in book 7 of The Aeneid, the poet describes Circe’s island as Aeneas sails by: 
Groans can be heard, and roars of angry lions 
Fighting against their chains in the late hours, 
                                                
4 Homer, The Odyssey of Homer, trans. Richmond Lattimore (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), 
page 158, lines 238-41. Subsequent citations appear in text by page and line number. 
5 Yarnall makes a related claim about the victims of Homer’s Circe when she discusses Circe’s 
“imprisonment of their human consciousness within bodies not capable of expressing it.” See 
Transformations of Circe, 43. Earlier, Yarnall writes, “Odysseus’s men are imprisoned in the 
bodies of swine with their human consciousness intact and deprived of expression, lacking 
language and choice” (20). While I regard entrapment as a crucial motif in Homeric 
transformations, I disagree with the latter statement’s suggestion that Odysseus’s men lose 
certain mental faculties. 
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And savage cries of bristly hogs and bears 
In pens, and howls from images of huge wolves, 
Once human: potent herbs from the fierce goddess 
Give them the faces and the fur of beasts.6 
The “angry” and “savage” displays of the transformed animals might seem to indicate that they 
have lost their human identities and become feral animals. Likewise, the phrase “Once human,” 
which presumably applies not just to the wolves but to all of the previously mentioned animals, 
seems to deny the humanity of these transformed creatures. The poet, however, carefully delimits 
the extent of their transformations by calling the wolves “images of huge wolves” rather than 
real wolves or simply wolves. Like the transformed crew of Homer’s Odyssey, who have “the 
look of pigs,” these creatures have the false appearance of being wolves. Virgil’s speaker also 
writes that Circe’s victims have “the faces and the fur of beasts,” which, along with Virgil’s 
“bristly hogs,” recall Odysseus’s emphasis on “heads” and “bristles.” By describing 
transformation as the bestowing of animal parts on humans, Virgil’s speaker recapitulates the 
idea that Circe’s transformations alter exterior shape without changing interior nature. The 
struggles of the transformed creatures are not the attempts of wild animals to escape “chains” or 
“pens” but the unrelenting protests of human minds that have been entrapped in animal bodies. 
 In a subsequent retelling, Ovid narrates the Circe episode from the perspective of a sailor 
who has undergone her transformations, from human to pig and back again. Ovid’s account of 
the experience of transformation develops Homer’s idea that the transformed creatures have  
swinish “voices” but human “minds” in a way that asserts even more emphatically—because it is 
a first- rather than second-hand account—that a human mind persists within the transformed 
                                                
6 Vergil, The Aeneid, trans. Sarah Ruden (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008), 
pages 144-5, lines 15-20. 
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body. In book 14 of Ovid’s Metamorphoses, which contains three different stories about Circe, 
Macareus describes his loss of human shape for his former companion Achaemenides, with 
whom he has just been reunited: 
  The goddess touched each of us with her wand 
atop our heads. It shames me, yet I’ll say it: 
  bristles began to sprout all over me, 
  and I lost my ability to speak: 
  instead of words I only managed grunts, 
  my face was turned completely to the ground, 
  and I could feel my mouth becoming hard 
  and turning into an extended snout— 
  my neck grew thick with wrinkles, and that part 
  which only recently had held the cup 
  was now creating hoof prints in the dirt!7 
According to Macareus’s retrospective narrative, he mentally observes the transformations of his 
body from a securely human vantage point. He describes many bodily changes that contribute to 
his loss of a recognizably human shape, but the persistence of his human mind is especially 
evident in the lines “I could feel my mouth becoming hard / and turning into an extended snout.” 
By calling his transformed mouth a “snout,” a word that is conventionally reserved for animals 
and only pejoratively applied to humans,8 Macareus unambiguously asserts that his body takes 
on the characteristic shape of an animal. The “I” that observes these changes to its “mouth,” 
                                                
7 Ovid, Metamorphoses, trans. Charles Martin (New York and London: Norton, 2004), pages 
492-3, lines 394-404. 
8 The Oxford English Dictionary, Online edition, s.v. “snout” (entry dated 1989). 
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however, remains human—just as human, in fact, as the “I” that narrates its story to 
Achaemenides. 
The persistence of Macareus’s humanity is likewise evident in the account of his shocked 
recognition that his hand has become a “hoof.” He portrays the moment of comparing the 
memory of having a hand, a body part that is almost unique to the bipedal human, with 
contradictory visual evidence: “that part” “was now creating hoof prints in the dirt!” He observes 
that he now has the hooves of an animal from his self-same human standpoint: the shock 
communicated by Macareus’s emphasis on the suddenness of the hand’s transformation (“only 
recently” vs. “was now”) is the shock of a human mind, bewildered by its inhabitation of a 
quadrupedal and animal—rather than bipedal and human—body. 
Macareus also emphasizes his enduring humanity by narrating his frustrated attempts to 
speak. He says, “I lost my ability to speak: / instead of words I only managed grunts.” Although 
Macareus “only managed grunts” upon his transformation, the fact the he continues to try to 
produce “words” indicates that his mind remains human, and that he continues to wish to be 
human. As an animal, Macareus lacks the “ability to speak,” but he observes everything that 
happens to his body from a human perspective and can narrate it in human language to 
Achaemenides after he regains human organs of speech. 
Although the early Christian writers Augustine and Boethius appropriate the Circe 
episode for their own purposes, their treatments of transformation are also consistent with 
Homer’s model. In his early fifth-century treatise The City of God against the Pagans, Augustine 
confronts ancient reports of metamorphoses, including the “incredible story of the celebrated 
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witch Circe, who transformed the companions of Ulysses into beasts.”9 Augustine dismisses such 
transformation stories as affronts to God, who alone has the power to create, including the power 
to alter bodies: 
Demons do not, of course, create real natures. If they do indeed accomplish 
anything of the kind which we are here considering, it is only in respect of their 
appearance that they transform beings created by the true God, so that they seem 
to be what they are not. I do not therefore in the least believe that either the body 
or the soul can be transformed into the members and lineaments of beasts by the 
art or power of demons. (843) 
Before making this theological point, however, Augustine compares ancient transformation 
stories to modern (that is, fifth-century) anecdotes about Italian witches. Augustine’s description 
of the witches’ victims seems to echo Odysseus’s account of the transformation of his crew: 
“their minds did not become bestial, but were kept rational and human” (843). Despite the 
unmistakable resemblance of this claim to the description of Circe’s transformations in Homer’s 
Odyssey, Augustine finds ancient precedent for these transformation stories in Apuleius’s Golden 
Ass: “This is what Apuleius, in the work inscribed with the title De asino aureo, says, or 
pretends, befell him: that, having taking a potion, he became an ass, while retaining his human 
mind” (843). Homer’s prototype seems to influence not only Apuleius’s Golden Ass but also 
anecdotes about transformation in Augustine’s time.10 Certainly, Circe, to whom Augustine 
                                                
9 Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans, trans. and ed. R. W. Dyson (Cambridge and 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 842. 
10 On the influence of Homer’s line “the minds within them stayed as they had been / before” on 
Augustine and on Renaissance writings about witchcraft, see Gareth Roberts, “The Descendants 
of Circe: Witches and Renaissance Fictions,” in Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe: Studies in 
Culture and Belief, ed. Jonathan Barry, Marianne Hester, and Gareth Roberts (Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 189-194. Roberts offers this account of a tradition 
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alludes at the beginning and the end of his theological treatment of transformation (842, 844), 
looms large in Augustine’s imagination, even though he ultimately rejects the possibility of 
transforming not only the mind but also the body. 
Boethius, meanwhile, appropriates the Circe episode in The Consolation of Philosophy in 
order to set in relief the moralistic Christian perspective of Lady Philosophy, who argues that sin 
transforms human nature into animal nature. She claims, “whatever departs from the good ceases 
to exist, so evil men cease to be what they had been before. Of course, the very appearance of the 
human frame which they still possess shows that they were men; thus, by resorting to wickedness 
they have lost their human nature as well.”11 Lady Philosophy then lists a variety of sins and the 
symbolically appropriate animals which sinners inwardly resemble. An example of particular 
relevance to the Circe episode reads: “The one who steeps himself in foul and unclean lusts 
lingers over pleasures like a filthy sow” (79). As though preparing a transition to the topic of 
Circe’s transformation of Odysseus’s men into pigs, Lady Philosophy saves the example about 
the pig for last. Indeed, only one sentence separates this example from Lady Philosophy’s poem 
about Circe’s transformations: “In this sense he who abandons goodness and ceases to be a man 
cannot rise to the status of a god, and so is transformed into an animal” (79). 
Mention of the pig in the context of an argument about transforming the human propels 
                                                                                                                                                       
based on Homer’s Circe episode: “A full structural analysis of Homer’s archetype in relation to 
its later and developing versions would be rewarding, but mention will be made only of some 
characteristic features. The stories begin with arrival by sea in a strange land: [...] As in the 
Odyssey, food is the agent of transformation. Men are transformed by a woman into very 
particular sorts of domestic animals. Although Homer’s Circe has changed men into wolves and 
lions, it is for transformations of men into swine she is chiefly remembered. Transformation into 
beasts of burden, especially asses, mark the later analogues and the transformed beasts are to be 
kept in servitude. These features may be suggested as constituting a Circean narrative 
configuration” (194). For Roberts’s treatment of Apuleius, see 191 and 193. 
11 Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. and ed. P. G. Walsh (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1999), 78. Subsequent citations appear in text. 
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Lady Philosophy toward the Circe episode, which she narrates in the form of a poem. In her re-
telling of the crews’ transformations, Lady Philosophy adheres closely to Homer’s model, even 
though her Christian argument about the moral transformation of the human differs sharply from 
the treatment of transformation in The Odyssey and in the works that it inspired. Indeed, the 
transformations of sin, as described by Lady Philosophy, represent the inverse of Circe’s 
transformations, for they affect the human mind but not the human body. The contrast does not 
escape Lady Philosophy; indeed, it motivates her recourse to the Circe episode; for the end of her 
poem explicitly dramatizes the difference between the two treatments of transformation in order 
to make the point that sin’s transformations are more dangerous than those of Circe. 
The moment that makes the adherence of Lady Philosophy’s poem to the Homeric model 
unmistakable is Lady Philosophy’s adaptation of Odysseus’s assertion that Circe’s 
transformations do not affect the mind. Lady Philosophy narrates the fortunes of the crew: 
 they had turned to swine. 
 True voices and true shapes were lost; 
 Bereft of human norms, 
 Their minds alone endured unchanged 
 To mourn their monstrous forms. (p. 80, ll. 28-32) 
When Lady Philosophy imagines that the crew “mourn” the transformation of their bodies, she 
participates in the tradition of representing the discrepancy between human mind and animal 
body in the distress of the crew: Virgil’s transformed humans rattle their chains; Ovid’s 
Macareus says that the story of his transformation “shames me.”  
Lady Philosophy also repeats two other motifs from the Homeric tradition: the 
representation of transformation as the acquiring of a deceptive animal appearance, and the 
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dramatization of the human’s frustrated attempts to produce articulate speech. As Lady 
Philosophy introduces Circe, Lady Philosophy tells the fate of one of Circe’s victims: “The 
likeness of a boar cloaked one” (p. 79, l. 11). When Lady Philosophy says that this human 
acquires an animal “likeness,” she asserts that his new shape falsifies his true identity, as Virgil’s 
poet does when describing “images of huge wolves” and Homer’s Odysseus does when saying 
that his transformed crew have “the look of pigs.” Lady Philosophy’s reference to a cloak, a 
garment particularly suited to concealing the wearer’s shape, reinforces the suggestion that the 
animal exterior disguises the human interior. 
Describing another of Circe’s victims, Lady Philosophy relates, “A third, now partner 
with the wolves, / Howled when he sought to cry” (p. 79, ll. 15-6). The dramatization of the 
human’s frustrated will to speak closely resembles the statement of Ovid’s Macareus. The 
inspiration, however, may come from Homer’s Odysseus, who notes that the transformed crew 
have animal “voices.” 
Having carefully observed the Homeric tradition for narrating Circe’s transformations, 
Lady Philosophy contrasts Circe’s transformations of the body with sin’s transformations of the 
mind. Lady Philosophy explains, 
 That hand of Circe was too weak, 
 Her plants less power impart, 
 Though human limbs they could transform, 
 They could not reach the heart. (p. 80, ll. 33-6) 
According to the concluding lines of Lady Philosophy’s poem, the physical transformations of 
Circe pale in comparison to the moral transformations of sin: 
  Man’s true strength dwells inside; 
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  The poisons which dehumanize 
  Within him now reside. 
  These potions deeply penetrate; 
  Though bodies feel no pain, 
  The deadly wounds which they inflict 
  Impact upon the brain. (p. 80, ll. 38-44) 
Lady Philosophy figures sins as “potions” to recall Circe’s “Cups charged with magic charms” 
(p. 79, l. 8), but only so that Lady Philosophy can contrast Circe’s transformations with those of 
sin, which, while affecting minds but not “bodies,” are comparatively “deadly,” in Lady 
Philosophy’s view, because they compromise the integrity of the human soul. 
 Although Lady Philosophy’s discussion of sin offers a significantly different treatment of 
transformation than the Circe episode, Lady Philosophy observes the Homeric tradition in her 
depiction of Circe’s transformations themselves. With the exception of Plutarch’s dialogue 
“Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti,” discussed below, revisions to the Circe episode would have to 
wait for the Renaissance, when some of the period’s most creative writers would become 
interested in telling stories about Circes who transform not only bodies but also minds—and 
humans who willingly choose animal existences. 
 
The Plutarchian Tradition of Transformations 
 
Plutarch’s “Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti,” dating approximately to the first century CE, 
offers an alternative representation of Circe’s transformations. In a study of Plutarch’s writings 
about animals, Stephen Newmyer claims that Plutarch is unique among ancient writers in “his 
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consistently positive attitude toward animals,” and that “Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti” is unique 
even within Plutarch’s idiosyncratic oeuvre for its estimation of animals above humans.12 George 
Boas, who coins the term “theriophily” for the philosophical and literary tradition of elevating 
animals above humans, traces Montaigne’s famous admiration of animals to Giovanni Battista 
Gelli’s Circe and ultimately to Plutarch, whom Boas regards as the origin of arguments about the 
superiority of animal intelligence.13 Considering Plutarch’s generally unconventional treatment 
of animals, it is no surprise that his treatment of Circe’s transformations of humans into animals 
remains unique until the rise of his Renaissance imitators. 
In Plutarch’s dialogue, Circe and Odysseus strike a bargain: if Odysseus can persuade 
one of the transformed creatures, whose linguistic capabilities Circe will restore, that humans are 
superior to animals, then Circe will return the creature to human form. Circe introduces 
Odysseus to Gryllus, a pig who has once been a Greek, but contrary to Odysseus’s expectations, 
Gryllus prefers being an animal and makes lengthy arguments to prove that animals surpass 
humans in the classical virtues.14 Defending the opinion of many transformed humans, Gryllus 
tells Odysseus, “I shall quickly make you see that we are right to prefer our present life in place 
of the former one, now that we have tried both” (499). Unlike members of the transformed crew 
in other ancient versions and their Renaissance translations—especially Macareus, who prefaces 
                                                
12 Stephen T. Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason in Plutarch and Modern Ethics (New York 
and London: Routledge, 2006), 8; 7 and 39. 
13 George Boas, The Happy Beast in French Thought of the Seventeenth Century (New York: 
Octagon Books, 1966), 1 (“theriophily”), 25 (Plutarch as origin), 28 (Montaigne’s reading of 
Gelli), but see 25-36. 
14 In the surviving fragment, Gryllus discusses primarily the virtues of fortitude and temperance. 
The section on prudence is badly damaged, and a conjectural section on justice is entirely 
missing. For relevant editorial comments on the manuscript, see William C. Helmbold, 
introduction and notes to “Beasts Are Rational,” by Plutarch, trans. and ed. William C. 
Helmbold, in Plutarch's Moralia, vol. 12, The Loeb Classical Library (London and Cambridge, 
Mass.: William Heinemann; Harvard University Press, 1957), 490, 525 n. f, 529 n. f, 532-3 n. a. 
Subsequent citations of this edition appear in text. 
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his tale with a confession of shame—Gryllus desires to be an animal. Indeed, he even justifies 
his choice by pointing out that the transformed crew “have tried both” human and animal states 
and therefore may know better than Odysseus which is best. 
 To Plutarch’s Odysseus, however, Gryllus’s preference for an animal existence represents 
a significant departure from—and vitiation of—his essential humanity. In response to Gryllus’s 
initial statements about the superiority of animals, Odysseus exclaims, “To me, Gryllus, you 
seem to have lost not only your shape, but your intelligence also under the influence of that drug. 
You have become infected with strange and completely perverted notions. Or was it rather an 
inclination to swinishness that conjured you into this shape?” (499). Odysseus entertains two 
distinct hypotheses about Gryllus: one speculates that transformation has warped Gryllus’s mind; 
the other, that pre-existing animalistic traits have rendered Gryllus susceptible to Circe’s 
transformations. Both hypotheses deny Gryllus’s humanity. In an unmistakable contradiction of 
his literary original’s assertion that “the minds within them stayed as they had been / before,” 
Plutarch’s Odysseus suggests to Gryllus that transformation has deprived him of “not only your 
shape, but your intelligence also.” To Odysseus, Gryllus’s expressions of admiration for animals 
are “strange and completely perverted notions,” which cast doubt upon Gryllus’s claim to human 
“intelligence.” Alternatively, Odysseus supposes that Gryllus may have already possessed “an 
inclination to swinishness” even before his transformation. Presumably, Odysseus intends this 
hypothesis, which he presents in the form of an insulting rhetorical question, to communicate his 
contempt for Gryllus, whom Odysseus deems unworthy of the human shape. Nevertheless, when 
Odysseus quips that Gryllus’s transformation merely makes manifest his essential animality, 
Plutarch departs from Homer’s model in the same manner as when Odysseus wonders if 
Gryllus’s transformation has entailed mental changes as well: while Homer’s Circe creates 
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discordance between minds and bodies, Plutarch imagines transformations that create 
concordance. 
The crucial innovation of Plutarch’s dialogue is the introduction of a formerly human 
character who prefers being an animal. Indeed, the dialogue is frequently called “Gryllus.”15 
Plutarch, however, foreshadows Odysseus’s perspective on Gryllus even before this famous 
character’s introduction, when Odysseus and Circe first make their bargain. To Circe’s 
implication that animals enjoy a happier existence than humans, Odysseus responds, “This is a 
new potion of words that you are stirring and drugging for me, Circe.  It will certainly transform 
me literally into a beast if I am to take your word for it that changing from beast to man spells 
ruin” (493-5).  In Odysseus’s formulation, believing that transformation from animal to human is 
undesirable would amount “literally” to transformation from human to animal.  Odysseus 
probably means “literally” in a hyperbolic sense; nevertheless, he equates, metaphorically if not 
“literally,” transformation into an animal with failure to acknowledge human superiority. From 
Odysseus’s perspective, preferring an animal existence to a human one betrays sub-human 
intellectual faculties. 
Plutarch’s dialogue remains unimitated until the Renaissance, when works inspired by 
Plutarch’s dialogue abruptly begin to proliferate.16 Renaissance interest in Plutarch’s dialogue is 
evident as early as 1510, when Desiderius Erasmus includes references to Plutarch’s dialogue in 
                                                
15 See, for instance, Helmbold, introduction to “Beasts Are Rational,” 490. On the dialogue’s 
Latin title, see Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason in Plutarch and Modern Ethics, 30.  
16 Detecting Plutarch’s influence on a variety of Renaissance writers, including Laurentius Valla, 
Machiavelli, William Browne, Edmund Spenser, Ascanio Grandi, and Juan Luis Vives, Merrit 
Hughes writes of “the tradition that descended from Plutarch and was running to seed.” Merritt 
Y. Hughes, “Spenser's Acrasia and the Circe of the Renaissance,” Journal of the History of Ideas 
4 (1943), 382, 382-5, cf. 394. 
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The Praise of Folly.17 The first Renaissance work to take Plutarch’s dialogue as its basis, 
however, is Giovanni Battista Gelli’s Circe, published in Italian in 1549 and translated into 
English by Henry Iden in 1557.18 Gelli expands Plutarch’s dialogue into a series of dialogues 
between Ulysses and eleven different animals, organized in ascending order generally according 
to the chain of being, from the oyster to the elephant.19 In a preface dedicating the work to 
Cosimo de’Medici, Gelli acknowledges his debt to Plutarch by imagining himself to be 
“folowing the steppes of the most learned Plutarche.”20 Plutarch’s dialogue gives Gelli not only 
the work’s central premise, the bargain between Ulysses and Circe, but also material for many 
passages, which Gelli borrows from Plutarch’s Gryllus and assigns to various talking animals.21 
Plutarch’s dialogue also dictates the sequence of topics over the final five dialogues, which 
feature fortitude (lion), temperance (horse), prudence (dog), justice (calf), and the human’s 
allegedly unique capacity for religion (elephant). Like Gryllus, Gelli’s lion, horse, dog, and calf 
argue that animals surpass humans in the classical virtues, and collectively, they treat the virtues 
in the same order as Gryllus. Furthermore, as the final (surviving) lines of Plutarch’s dialogue 
broach the topic of religion,22 so Gelli’s final dialogue asserts that animals, “not having the 
                                                
17 Desiderius Erasmus, The Praise of Folly, in “The Praise of Folly” and Other Writings, trans. 
and ed. Robert M. Adams (New York and London: Norton, 1989), 4, 35. 
18 On translations of La Circe into English, see Robert Adams, introduction to The Circe of 
Signior Giovanni Battista Gelli of the Academy of Florence, trans. Thomas Brown and Robert 
Adams, ed. Robert Adams (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), xlix. 
19 On the chain of being, see, of course, Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study 
of the History of an Idea (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1936). 
20 Giovanni Battista Gelli, Circes of John Baptista Gello, Florentine. Translated out of Italion 
into Englishe by Henry Iden (Imprinted at London in Poules Churchyarde, at the signe of the 
holy ghost by John Cawood, printer to the Quenes Majestie, 1557), 7. I have assigned numbers to 
the pages of this edition, beginning with the title page. Subsequent citations appear in text. 
21 Adams identifies some, but not all, of Gelli’s borrowings from “Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti” 
and other works by Plutarch. See his introduction to The Circe, xxiv-xxv. 
22 On the ending of Plutarch’s fragment, see editorial comments in Helmbold, ed., “Beasts Are 
Rational,” 532-3 n. a. 
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understanding, have no knowledge at all of the same firste cause, as he [man] hath” (293-4). 
The opening of La Circe plots its own departure from the Homeric tradition for 
representing Circe’s transformations. When Ulysses mentions his reluctance to allow his 
transformed compatriots “so wretchedlye to lede their lyfe in bodies of beastes” (12), his 
formulation allows for the interpretation that human minds endure within the animal “bodies,” as 
in Homer’s version of the Circe episode. “The Argument” to Gelli’s Circe likewise prepares this 
interpretation by explaining that transformed creatures refusing the offer of transformation 
“shoulde remayne, to ende theyr lyves there so in bodies of beastes” (9). When Circe tells 
Ulysses that she will return to humanity only those creatures who consent, a dialogue ensues that 
makes evident Gelli’s departure from Homer’s model: 
 Circe: I wyll not graunte thee this favour, except they also be contented therewith. 
Ulysses: Howe maye I knowe this of them, who beinge Beastes, understande not?  
nor yet canne speake? I doubt that thou mocke me. 
 Circe: Chaunge not thy mynd, for I shall graunte theym speache. 
 Ulysses: And shall they have the self same discourse that they had when they  
were men? 
 Circe: Yea for lyke as I chaunged them into beastes so shall I cause the  
knowledge of very men to come into them againe. (13)23 
Emphatically unlike Homer’s Odysseus, Gelli’s Ulysses presumes that Circe’s transformations 
have altered not only bodies but also minds. Ulysses not only points out that animals cannot 
speak but also believes that the transformed creatures can no longer “understande,” which 
suggests a deeper transformation of the human than the Homeric writers depict. Circe must 
                                                
23 For ease of reading, I have expanded abbreviated names and altered the layout of dialogue for 
long quotations from Iden’s translation. 
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explicitly promise to restore “the knowledge of very men,” in addition to the capacity for 
articulate speech, to the transformed creatures in order to assure Ulysses that they will be able to 
engage in productive conversation with him. Finally, Circe herself compares the magical act by 
which she gives the creatures human “knowledge” to the earlier magical act by which she has 
transformed them from humans into animals. Her implication seems to be that she now 
transforms minds from animal to human, just as she has previously transformed bodies and 
minds from human to animal. Thus, not only the appropriation of Plutarch’s idea of the bargain 
but also the structure of the initial exchanges between Ulysses and Circe serves to announce a 
departure from Homeric representations of Circe’s transformations. 
Like Plutarch’s Gryllus, Gelli’s transformed creatures also depart from Homeric 
precedents by using their newly restored speech to express the preference for animal existence. 
Instead of lamenting his transformation, the oyster rejects the opportunity to return to human 
form when he tells Ulysses, “I esteme more this my contentation then al that ever I mought hope 
to have at thy handes” (28). The mole, snake, hare, goat, and hind similarly find greater 
happiness as animals (37, 68, 76, 123, 130).24 Meanwhile, as the lion, horse, dog, and calf 
rehearse and expand Gryllus’s arguments that animals surpass humans in the classical virtues, 
they take pride in their animality, quite unlike Ovid’s ashamed Macareus. The lion, for instance, 
tells Ulysses, “I thinke once there is much more fortitude amonge us, then amonge you, and that 
we do the workes thereof, with far lesse difficultie then you do. So that perswade me no more 
that I should become man againe, for I will remaine thus a Lion” (174). The horse, dog, and calf 
                                                
24 Agreeing with Ulysses that reason makes humans superior to animals, but nevertheless 
refusing to return to humanity because of the subordination of women, the deer introduces 
unique complications into Gelli’s exploration of the human/animal distinction. For an excellent 
treatment of the dialogue with the deer, see Marilyn Migiel, “The Dignity of Man: A Feminist 
Perspective,” in Refiguring Woman: Perspectives on Gender and the Italian Renaissance, ed. 
Marilyn Migiel and Juliana Schiesari (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 211-32. 
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make similar declarations about animal temperance, prudence, and justice, respectively (188, 
223-4, 245). Even the elephant, who ultimately accepts Ulysses’s offer of transformation, 
initially feels not shame or sadness but ambivalence about his animal state. He tells Ulysses of 
his transformation by Circe: “I was by her transformd into an Elephante, of the which beinge I 
am not yet fully resolved, whether it be better then yours or not” (257-8). Since the shame of 
Macareus and the lamentations of Odysseus’s crew originate in certainty about the inferiority of 
animals, the elephant’s initial ambivalence belongs more to the Plutarchian model than to the 
Homeric one.25 
 Gelli’s transformed creatures also contradict Circe’s victims from the Homeric tradition 
in their attitude toward the faculty of speech. With the partial exception of the hind, none of 
Gelli’s characters experiences the frustration of the will to speak, as do many characters from the 
Homeric tradition. Although the hind says, “O thanked be the goddes, that I understand the 
voyce of man: and can speake as I was wont” (127), her enthusiasm for speech fades when 
Ulysses points out that she must become human to retain the faculty: “I also must be conversant 
onely with Deare, and we have other meanes to shewe our necessities one to an other, the which 
are so fewe, and so rare, that they trouble us little” (149). The return of speech excites the hind, 
but she willingly resigns herself to speechlessness, even suggesting that the advantages of human 
speech are overrated. In more direct opposition to the motif of frustrated speech in the Homeric 
tradition, the snake exclaims, “alas I understand and I speake, whether I be tourned againe into 
man, as I was heretofore: God forbyd this” (42). While Ovid and other writers dramatize Circe’s 
unfitting placement of human minds in animal bodies by portraying her victims in the act of 
failing to articulate their human thoughts, the snake does not wish to speak. Indeed, the snake 
                                                
25 The exceptional status of the dialogue with the elephant is the subject of my next chapter. 
 
19 
even fears that the return of speech may foreshadow that unwelcome event: a complete return to 
humanity. 
 In the succeeding dialogue, the hare makes a similar complaint: “Alas, what meaneth 
this? I have agayne the understanding of the signification of the speache of man: Oh my unhappy 
chaunce, why haste thou brought me agayne unto suche miserie?” (73). As with the snake’s 
reaction, the hare’s outcries reinforce the impression that Circe has transformed her victims fully 
into animals, unable to comprehend human speech until she restores the faculty by magic. The 
hare proceeds, however, to criticize the idea that speech makes humans superior to animals in a 
way that implicitly redounds on the role of the motif of frustrated speech in the Homeric 
tradition: 
  when those of mine owne kynd have any griefe, I knowe it streight by the voyce,  
for it is naturall to every beast, to shewe with the varietie of the sound of his 
voice, whether he be merry or sory. But these such natural voyces shewe me 
onely theyr griefe in generall: the whiche kinde of sorowinge, is farre easier to be 
borne, then the sorowinge of man, who, besides the lamentyng with syghtes and 
malincolie, and sorowfull accentes, increaseth with shewinge his myseries, and 
the occasion of his griefe, muche more the compassion, very ofte to them that 
heare it. (39v-39r) 
The hare’s disparagement of articulate speech in comparison to inarticulate utterances inverts the 
influential position of Aristotle, who writes that the capacity for rational speech elevates the 
human above other animals, who have the capacity for inarticulate utterance only: “A voice is a 
signifier of what is pleasant or painful, which is why it is also possessed by the other animals[. 
...] But speech is for making clear what is beneficial or harmful, and hence also what is just or 
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unjust. For it is peculiar to human beings, in comparison to the animals, that they alone have 
perception of what is good or bad, just or unjust, and the rest.”26 The Homeric writers offer a 
dramatization of Aristotle’s comments on human superiority when they portray the reduction of 
the speaking capacity of Circe’s victims to mere voice, which cannot express their enduringly 
human thoughts. As the hare points out, however, both the “natural voyces” of animals and the 
articulate speech of humans can express “griefe,” and animals do so without details that the hare 
finds superfluous or annoying. Since “griefe” is usually the precise emotion that Circe’s victims 
wish to express following their transformations in the Homeric tradition, the hare’s reflections on 
animal voices and human speech implicitly satirize the Homeric tradition for attempting to 
dramatize the superiority of human speech at a moment of suffering, in which the superiority of 
articulate speech to inarticulate speech, and of human form to animal form, is compromised. 
Even if the hare’s perspective is flawed, it contributes to delineating La Circe from the Homeric 
tradition on the quite specific point of human speech. 
 As he converses with the various transformed creatures, Gelli’s Ulysses repeats the view 
of Plutarch’s Odysseus that transformation from human to animal befits human beings who fail 
to appreciate human superiority, which represents a radical departure from the Homeric 
treatment of transformation. In response to the oyster’s disparagement of the human condition, 
for instance, Odysseus remarks, “Oh my Itacus, when thou loste the shape of man, it should seme 
thou lost reason also to saye thus” (15-6). Gelli’s Ulysses repeats almost exactly the words of 
Plutarch’s Odysseus on an analogous occasion: “To me, Gryllus, you seem to have lost not only 
your shape, but your intelligence also” (499). Using quite similar language, and calling attention 
to the repetition, Ulysses tells the mole, “O my Moule, it semeth thou shouldest also have done, 
                                                
26 Aristotle, Politics, trans. C.D.C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998), 4. 
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as I sayde to yonder Oyster, that at one time thou lost the shape of man and reason also” (35).  
 Gelli’s Ulysses also recapitulates the other interpretation that Plutarch’s Odysseus 
suggests: that an inherent “swinishness,” which Gryllus possesses already in human form, 
“conjured you into this shape” (499). He makes this point at length after he has spoken with five 
different animals: 
  Our wise menne of Gretia are wont to saye, that they, who can be counsailed by  
them selves, to live well and honestly, are put in the first degree of vertue. And 
they that can not of them selves, but beleve the counsell of those who are wiser 
then they, are put in the second degre: but he that can not of him selfe, nor yet will 
take counsell of others, is thought by them not worthy to be numbred among men. 
And of this sort are they with whom I have spoken: So that it is no marvaile, 
though they wyll not become men againe. (126-7) 
According to Ulysses, the five former humans with whom he has conversed have always had 
animalistic qualities; therefore, they deserve their respective transformations into oyster, mole, 
snake, hare, and goat. Ulysses repeats the sentiment in subsequent dialogues. For instance, in a 
soliloquy, Ulysses pronounces his judgment on the lion: “Let him then remaine thus a beast 
without reason, and I will seke, who [...] deserveth more to retourne man, then this felowe dothe” 
(175). As a final example, Ulysses chastises the horse for the horse’s preference of an animal 
existence: “If you then be fully thus determined, remaine thou so a beaste still: for truely thou 
deservest none other beyng then this” (199). The idea that a human can have animalistic 
qualities, such that the human merits transformation into an animal, is, of course, one of 
Plutarch’s most striking departures from Homer. 
Gelli’s adaptation of Plutarch is unique in its ambitious expansion of the dialogue’s scope 
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but not in its imitation of Plutarch. Geffrey Whitney’s 1586 Choice of Emblemes, for instance, 
contains an emblem of Circe’s transformations, entitled “Homines voluptatibus 
transformantur.”27 The poem accompanying the image instructs the reader: 
  See here Ulisses men, transformed straunge to heare: 
  Some had the shape of Goates, and Hogges, some Apes, and Asses weare. 
  Who, when they might have had their former shape againe, 
They did refuse, and rather wish’d, still brutishe to remaine. 
  Which showes those foolishe sorte, whome wicked love dothe thrall, 
  Like brutishe beastes do passe theire time, and have no sence at all.28 
Initially, the poem figures an animal form as a “shape” that humans “weare,” as in the tradition 
influenced by Homer. Likewise, the poem’s marginalia refer the reader to passages by Virgil and 
Ovid, who follow Homer in representing Circe’s transformations as physical but not mental. 
Nevertheless, the poem tells not Homer’s but Plutarch’s story of transformed creatures who 
reject the opportunity to return to human form, and the poem concludes by comparing these 
former humans to “brutishe beastes” without human “sence.”29 As in Gelli’s much longer La 
Circe, no character named Gryllus appears in this poem; however, it follows Plutarch’s model in 
suggesting that “wicked love” can cause human nature to become animal nature. 
 With the publication of book 2 of Edmund Spenser’s Faerie Queene in 1590, a character 
named after Plutarch’s Gryllus joins his less obvious literary analogues. The final canto 
introduces the infamous character Gryll, whose name explicitly identifies him as a literary 
                                                
27 Yarnall provides this translation: “Men are transformed by pleasure.” Transformations of 
Circe, 106. 
28 Geffrey Whitney, A Choice of Emblemes (Leyden: Imprinted by Francis Raphelengius, 1586), 
page 82, lines 1-6. 
29 Yarnall also argues that, in spite of Whitney’s marginalia, Plutarch’s influence is more 
decisive. See Transformations of Circe, 106. 
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descendant of Plutarch’s Gryllus.30 More importantly, Gryll shares his namesake’s preference for 
existence as a pig rather than a human. Upon restoration to human form, Gryll laments instead of 
rejoicing and thus becomes an object of contempt for the knight Guyon, who declares: 
See the mind of beastly man, 
That hath so soone forgot the excellence 
Of his creation, when he life began, 
That now he chooseth, with vile difference, 
To be a beast, and lacke intelligence.31 
Like Plutarch’s Odysseus, Guyon, who likewise desires to save transformed humans from 
animality, suspects that the preference for an animal form is symptomatic of the loss of human 
“intelligence.” The dialogue ends with the transformation of Gryll back into a pig, which, 
according to the judgment of the Palmer, brings Gryll’s bodily form into accordance with his 
ostensibly animalistic mental state: “Let Gryll be Gryll, and have his hoggish minde” (2.12.87.8). 
 John Milton’s work contains numerous allusions to Circe.32 Milton tends to follow 
Homer rather than Plutarch in his treatments of Circe; however, he creates a story of 
metamorphosis following Plutarch’s example in his 1634 masque, known as Comus. In the 
subsequent and more famous Paradise Lost, Milton’s speaker makes a brief allusion to Circe as 
he admires Eve’s God-given authority over Eden’s animals: Eve commands “every Beast, more 
                                                
30 Spenser’s adaptation of Gryllus’s name suggests that he read Plutarch’s original dialogue. 
Merrit Hughes reports, however, that since at least 1762, some critics have believed Iden’s 
translation of Gelli’s Circe to have introduced Spenser to Plutarch’s dialogue. See “Spenser's 
Acrasia,” 382, 382 n. 9. 
31 Edmund Spenser, The Faerie Queene, ed. A. C. Hamilton, Hiroshi Yamashita, and Toshiyuki 
Suzuki (Harlow, London, New York, et al.: Pearson Education, 2001), book 2, canto 12, stanza 
87, lines 1-5. Subsequent citations appear in text by book, canto, stanza, and line number. 
32 For another scholar’s discussion of Milton’s treatments of Circe, see Leonora Brodwin, 
“Milton and the Renaissance Circe,” Milton Studies 6 (1974), 21-83. 
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duteous at her call, / Than at Circean call the Herd disguis’d.”33 The comparison relies on the 
Homeric representation of transformation, according to which Circe changes bodies but not 
minds: Eve’s majesty exceeds Circe’s because Circe commands only humans “disguis’d” as 
animals. Eve, in contrast, commands true animals, beings who are relatively alien. 
 In Comus, too, Milton follows Homer’s example in his portrait of Circe’s 
transformations, but those of Circe’s son Comus betray the influence of Plutarch’s dialogue. 
Introducing Comus as the son of Circe and Bacchus, the Attendant Spirit explains that Comus 
transforms humans by giving them a magic drink: 
  Soon as the Potion works, their human count’nance, 
Th’ express resemblance of the gods, is chang’d 
Into some brutish form of Wolf, or Bear, 
Or Ounce, or Tiger, Hog, or bearded Goat, 
All other parts remaining as they were. 
And they, so perfect is their misery, 
Not once perceive their foul disfigurement, 
But boast themselves more comely than before, 
And all their friends and native home forget, 
To roll with pleasure in a sensual sty.34 
When Comus’s victims “boast themselves more comely than before,” they recapitulate the 
preference of Plutarch’s Gryllus for existence as a pig rather than a human. The Attendant Spirit, 
                                                
33 John Milton, Paradise Lost, in Complete Poems and Major Prose, ed. Merritt Y. Hughes 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003), page 390, lines 521-2. 
34 John Milton, Comus, in Complete Poems and Major Prose, ed. Merritt Y. Hughes 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003), page 91, lines 68-77. Subsequent citations appear in text by page 
and line number. 
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furthermore, claims that Comus “Excels his Mother at her mighty Art” (63), presumably because 
Comus, unlike Circe, depraves human minds. While Circe’s victims lament their transformations 
in the Homeric tradition, Comus’s victims rejoice at their new forms. 
 These two traditions of representing Circe’s transformations, Homeric and Plutarchian, 
coexist in the Renaissance. Translators of ancient Circe episodes, including George Chapman, 
Arthur Golding, and George Sandys, preserve the well-established tradition that the transformed 
crew retain their essential humanity.35 Milton observes the distinction between the stories of 
Homer and Plutarch as he differentiates the Plutarchian transformations of Comus from the 
Homeric transformations of Circe. As suggested especially by Milton’s example, Renaissance 
writers understand these two traditions in contrast to one another. 
Although Chapman’s translation of The Odyssey generally conforms to Homer’s model, 
it betrays signs of an effort to distinguish its treatment of transformation from that of Plutarch’s 
newly popular dialogue. In Homer’s version, Odysseus proceeds directly from the crucial 
assertion that “the minds within them stayed as they had been / before” (p. 158, ll. 240-1) to a 
narration of the crew’s entering Circe’s pig sties: “So crying they went in” (p. 158, l. 241). In 
contrast, Chapman’s Odysseus says that the crew “still retaind the soules they had before; / 
Which made them mourne their bodies change the more” before narrating, in the next line, 
Circe’s driving of the transformed crew into pens: “She shut them straight in sties” (p. 151). 
Chapman’s interpolation—the assertion that the crews’ enduringly human “soules” make their 
                                                
35 For the crucial passages, see George Chapman, trans., Homer's Odysses. Translated According 
to the Greeke By. Geo: Chapman (London: Imprinted by Rich: Field, for Nathaniell Butter, n.d.), 
page 151, no line numbers; Arthur Golding, trans., The. xv. Bookes of P. Ovidius Naso, Entytuled 
Metamorphosis, Translated Oute of Latin into English Meeter, by Arthur Golding Gentleman, a 
Worke Very Pleasaunt and Delectable (Imprinted at London, by Willyam Seres, 1567), page 
177, no line numbers; George Sandys, trans., Ovid's Metamorphosis. Englished, Mythologized, 
and Represented in Figures by G. S. (Imprinted at Oxford by John Lichfield, 1632), page 461, no 
line numbers. Subsequent citations appear in text by page number. 
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changes in forms “more” distressing—invites the reader to entertain the alternative possibility: 
the possibility that Circe’s victims might prefer animality. Chapman distances his Circe episode 
from Plutarch’s theme by emphasizing how much “more” the crew suffer than if they had lost 
their human “soules” or accepted their animal forms.  
Written long before Plutarch’s dialogue became popular or even existed, Homer’s 
Odyssey need not go to the same lengths as Chapman to clarify the nature of the crew’s 
transformation. Indeed, the rise of interest in Plutarch’s dialogue introduces a new imaginative 
possibility to portraits of Circe’s transformations: formerly human characters who become 
animals mentally as well as physically and who prefer animal existence. Of course, Homer’s 
Odysseus might not even need to say “the minds within them stayed as they had been / before” 
(p. 158, ll. 240-1) unless he suspects that his audience might otherwise assume the opposite. 
Nevertheless, the alternative possibility for representing Circe’s transformations, first explicitly 
entertained and developed in Plutarch’s dialogue, begins variously to fascinate, compel, and 
haunt the English imagination only in the Renaissance. 
 
Renaissance Views of Human Nature 
 
Plutarch’s dialogue becomes newly compelling as a model for literary works in the 
Renaissance because of increasing belief in the unique malleability of human identity. An 
influential source for this conception of the human is Giovanni Pico’s “Oration,” composed in 
1486.36 Pico advances his view of the human in the form of God’s explanation of human nature 
                                                
36 On the work’s influence, original title “Oration,” date of composition, and posthumous 
publication, see Paul Oskar Kristeller, introduction to “Oration on the Dignity of Man,” by 
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, ed. Ernst Cassirer, Paul 
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to Adam: 
 The nature of all other beings is limited and constrained within the bounds of laws  
prescribed by Us. [...] We have made thee neither of heaven nor of earth, neither 
mortal nor immortal, so that with freedom of choice and with honor, as though the 
maker and molder of thyself, thou mayest fashion thyself in whatever shape thou 
shalt prefer. Thou shalt have the power to degenerate into the lower forms of life, 
which are brutish. Thou shalt have the power, out of thy soul’s judgment, to be 
reborn into the higher forms, which are divine.37 
The figuration of the human’s unique freedom of will as a power of metamorphosis extends 
through Pico’s calling the human “our chameleon,” admiring the human’s “self-transforming 
nature,” and comparing the human to “Proteus” (225). 
As Thomas Greene argues, the point of view represented in Pico’s “Oration” departs 
significantly from Medieval philosophies, which declare human nature to be unchangeable.38 
Further illustrating this philosophical shift, Greene quotes Erasmus’s epigram “Homines non 
nascuntur, sed finguntur,” which he translates, “men are fashioned rather than born.” After 
proposing Erasmus’s epigram “as the motto of the Humanist revolution” (249), Greene declares, 
“For the first time in a millennium, man saw himself as basically malleable” (250).  
In his influential book Renaissance Self-Fashioning, Stephen Greenblatt agrees with 
                                                                                                                                                       
Oskar Kristeller, and John Herman Randall, Jr. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1950), especially 216-8 and 220-222. 
37 Giovanni Pico, “Oration on the Dignity of Man,” trans. Elizabeth Livermore Forbes, in The 
Renaissance Philosophy of Man, ed. Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and John Herman 
Randall, Jr. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950), 225. Subsequent citations appear 
in text. 
38 Thomas Greene, “The Flexibility of the Self in Renaissance Literature,” in The Disciplines of 
Criticism: Essays in Literary Theory, Interpretation, and History, ed. Peter Demetz, Thomas 
Greene, and Lowry Nelson, Jr. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), 243-5. 
Subsequent citations appear in text. 
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Greene’s assessment: “in the sixteenth century there appears to be an increased self-
consciousness about the fashioning of human identity as a manipulable, artful process.” 
Greenblatt also makes the relevant observation that “it is in the sixteenth century that fashion 
seems to come into wide currency as a way of designating the forming of a self.”39 
Greene tends to emphasize the optimistic consequences of the Renaissance conception of 
human nature: “the surpassing of human limitations” through “education” (250) and “the 
Humanist path of willed metamorphosis through intellectual discipline” (257). In addition to 
rendering ambiguous “the upper limits of the fashioning process” (251), however, Renaissance 
humanism also places the human precariously close to the animal. Greene acknowledges this 
corollary view, especially when he summarizes Machiavelli’s belief that “the vertical flexibility 
of man is very limited, and such as it is, leads downward to the brute rather than upward to the 
angel” (257). A more balanced picture of Renaissance humanism, however, would weigh the 
human’s potential for moral ascent in Pico’s “universal chain of Being” (223) more equally 
against the human’s potential for moral descent to the “brutish” state of “the lower forms of life” 
(Pico 225). Balancing the optimism of Renaissance humanism with the pessimism of an often 
overlooked Renaissance animalism,40 scholars should understand Erasmus’s epigram “Homines 
non nascuntur, sed finguntur,” which Greene calls “the motto of the Humanist revolution,” 
directly in relation to Geffrey Whitney’s emblem of Circe, which bears the quite similar title 
“Homines voluptatibus transformantur.” Circe’s haunting of Renaissance humanism’s 
                                                
39 Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare (Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 2. In the preface and in a footnote, Greenblatt 
mentions Greene’s essay as a particularly important influence on his own book (xiii, 258 n. 3). 
40 One emblem for the re-thinking of Renaissance humanism as Renaissance animalism might be 
Sydney Harris’s re-imagination of Leonardo da Vinci’s Vitruvian Man in the 1996 cartoon 
“Leonardo da Vinci’s Dog,” reproduced and discussed in Donna J. Haraway, When Species Meet 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 7-8. 
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aspirations, suggested by the seemingly parodic relation of Whitney’s emblem to Erasmus’s 
epigram, is no coincidence; for as Merrit Hughes writes, “When the humanists undertook the 
practical business of education, even the most liberal of them were apt to think in terms of the 
redemption of youth from the wiles of Circe.”41 Even as humanists celebrate the human’s unique 
potential to ennoble itself through education, they abhor the human’s potential to debase itself 
through indulgence in sensual pleasures, figured—with almost certain injustice to animals—as 
the transformation of human into animal. 
The shift in the conception of human nature occurs contemporaneously with the rise of 
interest in Plutarch’s dialogue about Gryllus, a former human whose arguments in favor of an 
animal existence challenge Renaissance humanism’s unapologetic denigration of animals. As 
Erica Fudge argues, Renaissance writers make the acknowledgment of human superiority a 
crucial manifestation of the human’s unique capacity to reason: “Without self-knowledge a 
human is living a life without use of the rational soul; is living, therefore, the life of an animal. 
And the incapacity to differentiate human from dog represents a failure to exercise the 
difference.”42 Plutarch’s Gryllus challenges precisely this tautological conception, that failing to 
recognize human superiority amounts to descending to the level of the animal, when he argues in 
defense of animal intelligence: “If you do not think that it should be called either reason or 
intelligence, it is high time for you to cast about for some fairer and even more honourable term 
to describe it” (527). With such comments, Gryllus appears directly to challenge the 
philosophical and educational values of the humanists, as Erasmus’s Folly also suggests when 
                                                
41 Hughes, “Spenser's Acrasia,” 386. 
42 Erica Fudge, Brutal Reasoning: Animals, Rationality, and Humanity in Early Modern England 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 27. 
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she mentions Gryllus approvingly in a critique of “formal learning.”43 Odysseus, meanwhile, 
anticipates the orthodox humanist position, as outlined by Fudge, when he suggests that failing to 
acknowledge human superiority is a manifestation of animality. Much of the interest of 
Plutarch’s dialogue for Renaissance writers emerges from its testing of the idea that only the 
acknowledgment of human superiority separates humans from animals, and its dramatic revision 
of Homer’s representation of transformation in order to make its points. 
Demonstrating that Gelli recognizes the peculiar appropriateness of Plutarch’s version of 
the Circe story to the Renaissance conception of the human, the dedication of La Circe opens 
with an unmistakable summary of the main argument of Pico’s “Oration”: 
Among al thinges that are in the universall worlde, moste vertuous and gentle 
prynce, it semeth that man onely can chose of him selfe, a state and ende after his 
owne mynde, and walkynge in that pathe, that most pleaseth him, canne rather 
rule his lyfe freely accordinge to tharbitremente of his owne will, then to 
thinclination of nature. For if the nature of thinges be diligently considered, to all 
the special kinds of them, there have bene appointed and wyth an invyolable lawe 
assigned, by him who is cause of all, certeine boundes, out of the whiche they 
canne by no possible meanes passe, chaunging into better or worse sort, that 
beinge, that at the beginning was graunted them. Whereas in the power of man 
there hath bene frely put an abilitie to chose a way wherin he mought lede his lyfe 
moste at his owne pleasure. And almost like a newe Prometheus, to transforme 
him selfe into what he most willed, takynge lyke a Cameleont the colour of al 
those thinges unto the whiche with thaffecte he is most nyghe. And finally to 
                                                
43 Erasmus, The Praise of Folly, 34-5. 
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make him selfe eyther earthly or divyne and to passe over to that state, that to the 
election of his free wil shalbe most agreable. Whereby it is plainely sene, that 
whiles men, either by their ill chaunce, or their noughtie choyse, lyve holy bent 
and occupied in worldly thinges, fixinge their eies in these sensible objectes, 
without any lifting them uppe to the heavens at all, their condition is verye litle 
better, then that of brute beastes, or rather they become almost like thother 
beastes, who whollye lacke reason. And contrary when they wythdrawe them the 
most they may from thence, and retourne to ther owne true and proper operation, 
and lifting themselves from things base and earthly, to things high and divine, are 
broughte to their owne trewe perfection, like unto those happie spirites, who out 
of this corruptible world, live in contemplation of divine thinges, their life is most 
happy and blessed. (6-7) 
Gelli repeats Pico’s assertions about the human’s unique power of self-transformation, 
comparison of the human to a chameleon, and allusion to “Prometheus,” which Robert Adams’s 
edition corrects to “Proteus.”44 After outlining the Renaissance theory of human nature, Gelli 
declares, “This is the thing most myghty and excellent prince, to helpe others the most that in me 
lieth, as the proper and true duetie of man is, folowing the steppes of the most learned Plutarche, 
that in these my present dialogues, I have sought as I have bene best able” (7). 
The extent to which Gelli’s dialogues undermine, rather than bolster, the humanist 
position will be the subject of my next chapter, but Gelli’s assertion of the relevance of his 
dialogues to the Renaissance conception of human nature is corroborated by scholarly reflections 
on Circe’s significance in the Renaissance. Merrit Hughes, for instance, writes, “If the distinction 
                                                
44 Robert Adams, ed., The Circe, 3. For an argument against the emendation, see Migiel, “The 
Dignity of Man,” 228-9. 
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between men and brutes was not absolute, and if human reason was not an essentially divine 
faculty, then men might only too easily lapse to brutal levels in conduct and even in character, 
and so—in simple though marvellous reality—Homer’s myth of Circe might assume a truly 
‘scientific’ as well as ‘historical’ validity.”45 In the introduction to his edition of La Circe, 
meanwhile, Robert Adams offers the following meditation on Gelli’s interest in Circe:  
As the high priestess of metamorphosis, Circe was bound to be a fascinating 
figure for the writers of the Renaissance, before whom the wonderful possibilities 
of psychic mobility were just opening up. The notion that man is inherently a 
Proteus, a chameleon, an amphibious, multiform creature who can make of 
himself what he will would have shocked Dante or St. Thomas. I think it would 
not have been very clear even to Ovid, whose metamorphoses illustrate changes 
imposed on humans beings by deities or magicians, [...] The characteristic 
Ovidian metamorphosis is from one fixed shape to another; [...] the new shape is 
somehow more fitting to the nature of things than the old one. But the idea of an 
inner election, free and unmotivated (except, maybe, by curiosity), is not, I think, 
familiar to antiquity.46 
My own argument takes some of these same contours. Indeed, Adams somewhat anticipates my 
argument about balancing Renaissance optimism about the human’s potential for transcendence 
with Renaissance pessimism about the human’s potential for animality when he compares Gelli’s 
I Capricci del Bottaio with La Circe: “Gelli’s dialogues between Giusto the cooper and his own 
soul are one characteristically Renaissance expression of man’s new sense of his flexible, 
extensible, divisible, transferable, optional ego; the Circe dialogues are another” (xli-xlii).  
                                                
45 Hughes, “Spenser's Acrasia,” 392. 
46 Adams, introduction to The Circe, xli. 
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I argue more particularly, however, that the shift to viewing human nature as uniquely 
flexible enables a new mode of representing Circe’s transformations, based on Plutarch, rather 
than on Homer, and never widely adopted until the Renaissance. Emphasizing the distinctiveness 
of human and animal states, the Homeric constellation of motifs includes the entrapment of a 
human mind in an animal body, the representation of the animal form as clothing for an 
enduringly human mind, and the dramatization of the former human’s frustrated attempts to 
speak. The Plutarchian constellation, in contrast, features humans who prefer being animals, who 
justify themselves by pointing out that they have experienced both human and animal states, who 
reject human speech, who have perhaps always had animalistic natures, and who may therefore 
deserve transformation from human into animal. Many Renaissance versions of the Circe 
episode differ strikingly from ancient and medieval versions in developing motifs originally 
derived from Plutarch’s dialogue about Gryllus, who faces a choice that Renaissance 
philosophers believe each human must make: the choice between human and animal existences. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
REMINDING THE ELEPHANT: 
ANIMAL RHETORIC, PATRIOTISM, AND RELIGION IN GELLI’S CIRCE 
 
 In the dedication of La Circe to Cosimo de Medici, Giovanni Battista Gelli claims that 
his series of dialogues between Ulysses and eleven talking animals adheres to the model of 
Gelli’s source text, Plutarch’s “Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti,” in demonstrating the superiority of 
humans to animals.1 According to Gelli, the human alone has the ability “to transforme him selfe 
into what he most willed.”2 Gelli elaborates, “it is plainely sene, that whiles men, either by their 
ill chaunce, or their noughtie choyse, lyve holy bent and occupied in worldly thinges, fixinge 
their eies in these sensible objectes, without any lifting them uppe to the heavens at all, their 
condition is verye litle better, then that of brute beastes, or rather, they become almost like 
thother beastes, who whollye lacke reason” (7). Gelli derives his view of the human, in part, 
from Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s “Oration” (1486), one of the most influential expositions 
of Renaissance humanism’s conception of human nature.3 Although Plutarch could not, of 
                                                
1 The original Greek title of Plutarch’s dialogue has been variously translated. On the Latin title, 
which this dissertation prefers, see Stephen T. Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason in 
Plutarch and Modern Ethics (New York and London: Routledge, 2006), 30. 
2 Giovanni Battista Gelli, Circes of John Baptista Gello, Florentine. Translated out of Italion 
into Englishe by Henry Iden (Imprinted at London in Poules Churchyarde, at the signe of the 
holy ghost by John Cawood, printer to the Quenes Majestie, 1557), 6. I have assigned numbers to 
the pages of this edition, beginning with the title page. Subsequent citations appear in text. 
3 On the work’s influence, original title “Oration,” date of composition, and posthumous 
publication, see Paul Oskar Kristeller, introduction to “Oration on the Dignity of Man,” by 
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, ed. Ernst Cassirer, Paul 
Oskar Kristeller, and John Herman Randall, Jr. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1950), especially 216-8 and 220-222. Thomas Greene has treated Pico’s “Oration” as an 
important departure from medieval views of human nature in “The Flexibility of the Self in 
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course, have read Pico’s “Oration,” Gelli implies that Pico’s views are endorsed by Plutarch’s 
text. Immediately after rehearsing Pico’s arguments about human and animal natures, Gelli 
declares, “This is the thing, most myghty and excellent prince, to helpe others the most that in 
me lieth, as the proper and true duetie of man is, folowing the steppes of the most learned 
Plutarche, that in these my present dialogues, I have sought as I have bene best able” (7). Gelli 
seems to mean that he intends for his dialogues to encourage readers to exercise reason in order 
to elevate themselves above a merely animal status. Furthermore, he presumes that Plutarch’s 
dialogue also has this effect. 
 Examining Plutarch’s dialogue, and especially comparing it with Gelli’s series of 
dialogues, suggest that Gelli’s comments on the similarities of La Circe and “Bruta Animalia 
Ratione Uti” may be mistaken or even disingenuous. In Plutarch’s text, Circe grants Gryllus, a 
Greek whom she has transformed into a pig, the ability to speak so that he may debate the merits 
of human and animal existences with Odysseus. Gryllus makes numerous arguments for the 
superiority of animals, especially arguments that animals surpass humans in the virtues of 
fortitude and temperance. Although the dialogue survives only as a fragment,4 Gryllus makes 
                                                                                                                                                       
Renaissance Literature,” in The Disciplines of Criticism: Essays in Literary Theory, 
Interpretation, and History, ed. Peter Demetz, Thomas Greene, and Lowry Nelson, Jr. (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), especially 242-9. For other discussions of 
Pico’s influence on Gelli, see Robert Adams, introduction to The Circe of Signior Giovanni 
Battista Gelli of the Academy of Florence, trans. Thomas Brown and Robert Adams, ed. Robert 
Adams (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), xxvii; and Marilyn Migiel, “The Dignity of 
Man: A Feminist Perspective,” in Refiguring Woman: Perspectives on Gender and the Italian 
Renaissance, ed. Marilyn Migiel and Juliana Schiesari (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 
227-9. 
4 On lacunae and possible lacunae, see William C. Helmbold, introduction and notes to “Beasts 
Are Rational,” by Plutarch, trans. and ed. William C. Helmbold, in Plutarch's Moralia, vol. 12, 
The Loeb Classical Library (London and Cambridge, Mass.: William Heinemann; Harvard 
University Press, 1957), 490, 525 n. f, 529 n. f, 532-3 n. a. 
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such lengthy and compelling arguments that it is doubtful that Plutarch’s text endorses human 
superiority as unproblematically as Gelli’s dedication to La Circe suggests. 
 A significant discrepancy in the endings of “Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti” and La Circe 
deepens the impression that Gelli has overstated, perhaps strategically, the similarity of his 
dialogues to Plutarch’s original. At least in the surviving fragment, Plutarch’s dialogue ends with 
an exchange about religion: 
ODYSSEUS. But consider, Gryllus: is it not a fearful piece of violence to grant 
reason to creatures that have no inherent knowledge of God? 
GRYLLUS. Then shall we deny, Odysseus, that so wise and remarkable a man as 
you had Sisyphus for a father? (531-3). 
William Helmbold, the editor of the Loeb edition, explains that this exchange may or may not 
represent the end of the dialogue. Indeed, he notes that the majority of scholars speculate that 
Plutarch’s original dialogue proceeds for some time. Helmbold, however, also relays Reiske’s 
paraphrase of Gryllus’s cryptic response, which reveals Gryllus’s comment to be offensive 
enough, in Helmbold’s opinion, to serve as a plausible end to the whole dialogue: “If those who 
do not know God cannot possess reason, then you, wise Odysseus, can scarcely be descended 
from such a notorious atheist as Sisyphus.”5 Whether Gryllus and Odysseus continue their 
arguments or not, Gryllus’s reference to a human atheist seems to undercut Odysseus’s incipient 
attempt to base an argument for human superiority to animals on the capacity for religion. 
 Gelli’s dialogues treat the subject of religion at several points, but despite Gelli’s avowed 
intentions of “folowing” Plutarch’s example, La Circe departs radically and unmistakably from 
“Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti” in the conclusion, when the eleventh and final talking animal, 
                                                
5 Helmbold, ed., “Beasts Are Rational,” 532-3 n. a. 
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Aglafemos, an elephant and former philosopher, accepts Ulysses’s arguments for human 
superiority, returns to human form, rediscovers an innately human knowledge of religion, and 
praises the creator for returning Aglafemos to humanity. Although Gelli’s text does adhere to the 
model of Plutarch’s fragment in foregrounding the topic of religion at the conclusion, the 
dialogue with the elephant departs radically from Plutarch’s dialogue and from Gelli’s preceding 
dialogues, which feature animal speakers who, like Plutarch’s Gryllus, refuse to return to 
humanity. Offering ten rewritings of Plutarch’s dialogue followed by a final, radically different 
dialogue, Gelli clearly has found Plutarch’s original plot inadequate to his purpose, which Gelli 
declares to be demonstrating human superiority. 
 Although comments from other Renaissance readers corroborate Gelli’s statements about 
the similar meanings of his and Plutarch’s dialogues, such comments reflect unpersuasive 
interpretations of the texts. In the preface to a 1603 translation of Plutarch’s “Bruta Animalia 
Ratione Uti,” Philemon Holland asserts,  
the intention of Plutarch was to shew that the intelligence and cogitation of God, 
is the onely true priviledge prerogative and advantage which men have above 
beasts: howbeit, left he hath this worke imperfect, even in that very point, which 
of all other is hardest, and impossible to be prooved by him or his like: for what 
sound understanding, apprehension, or conceit could they have of God, who knew 
not at all the true God?6 
Ignoring Gryllus’s aforementioned challenge to Odysseus’s conception of the innately religious 
human, Holland believes that Plutarch’s dialogue treats religion as the sole factor distinguishing 
                                                
6 Philemon Holland, introduction to “That Brute Beastes Have Use of Reason,” by Plutarch, in 
The Philosophie, Commonlie Called, The Morals Written By the Learned Philosopher Plutarch 
of Chaeronea, trans. Philemon Holland (London: Printed by Arnold Hatfield, 1603), 561. 
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humans from animals. Henry Iden, meanwhile, overlooks the possibility of a satirical 
interpretation of Gelli’s final dialogue when, in the dedication to his 1557 English translation of 
La Circe, Iden recapitulates Gelli’s platitudes about human superiority. Like Gelli, Iden expects 
readers may “see herein howe lyke the brute beast, and farre from his perfection man is, without 
the understanding and folowinge of dyvyne thynges.”7 In the formulations of Iden and Gelli (as 
translated by Iden), human superiority to animals seems more precarious than in Holland’s 
formulation, for Iden and Gelli, like Plutarch’s Gryllus, note that not all humans are religious. 
Nevertheless, Gelli, Iden, and Holland all agree that Plutarch’s dialogue dramatizes human 
superiority, and Gelli and Iden claim that Gelli’s Circe does so, as well. 
 Although Iden and Holland corroborate Gelli’s statements about the meaning of La Circe 
and its relationship to Plutarch’s dialogue, Gelli’s comments ignore important features of his 
own and Plutarch’s dialogues and overestimate the continuity between the forms of Gelli’s series 
of dialogues and their ancient model. Gelli has expanded Plutarch’s original dialogue into a 
series of eleven dialogues, with ten essentially Plutarchian dialogues and one concluding 
dialogue that is emphatically anti-Plutarchian in its plot and formal structure. Although the 
elephant, the featured animal of this final dialogue, departs from the model of Plutarch’s Gryllus 
in agreeing to return to human form, the elephant’s decision does not function as a simple 
endorsement of human superiority, as Gelli claims. Rather, the contrast between the structure of 
the final dialogue and the pattern established by the preceding dialogues highlights the features 
of the dialogue with the elephant that seem necessary, formally, in order to produce the 
conversion of the animal speaker. The predictability of the elephant’s conversion undercuts the 
                                                
7 Henry Iden, dedication to Circes of John Baptista Gello, Florentine. Translated out of Italion 
into Englishe by Henry Iden (Imprinted at London in Poules Churchyarde, at the signe of the 
holy ghost by John Cawood, printer to the Quenes Majestie, 1557), 3. I have assigned numbers to 
the pages of this edition, beginning with the title page. 
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arguments about human superiority that Ulysses makes and that the elephant—too 
enthusiastically, because too predictably—accepts. 
 The elephant’s enthusiastic return to humanity also satirizes notions of human superiority 
because contemporaneously influential natural histories regard elephants as quite close to 
humans in rationality, linguistic ability, persuadability, affiliating themselves with a native land, 
mnemonic ability, and religion. The concept of the elephant as the animal that most closely 
approaches—and perhaps matches—the mental abilities of the human provides a crucial context 
for the atypical formal features of Gelli’s final dialogue with the elephant. The fact that the 
elephant is the only animal in Gelli’s Circe to return to human form is no accident. Indeed, 
beliefs about the human-like qualities of elephants both determine Gelli’s decision to make the 
only animal to return to human form an elephant and undercut the significance of Aglafemos’s 
conversion from an animal into a human, since the human differs so little, according to natural 
historians, from an elephant. Natural historical concepts of elephants have clearly motivated 
many formal irregularities of the dialogue with the elephant, but Gelli also suppresses many 
important ideas or stories about elephants, such as their successful uses of rhetoric and their 
religious practices.8 Through this paradoxical invocation and disavowal of material from natural 
histories, Gelli seems not to dispute certain commonplaces about elephants but rather to 
dramatize the distortion of knowledge or beliefs about animals that is necessary to produce 
Renaissance humanism’s concept of the human as distinct from and superior to animals. When 
Gelli’s talking animal adopts Ulysses’s arguments about human superiority and returns to his 
human form, Gelli undermines—rather than endorses—the arguments that the elephant’s return 
to humanity is supposed, by both the elephant and Ulysses, to clinch. 
                                                
8 I am grateful to Ian Duncan for challenging the attempt of an earlier draft to assimilate Gelli’s 
elephant to the religious elephants of natural histories. 
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The Anti-Plutarchian Form of the Dialogue with the Elephant 
 
 The previous chapter places Gelli’s Circe firmly in the Plutarchian, as opposed to the 
Homeric, tradition for narrating stories of Circe’s transformations. Gelli’s dialogue with the 
elephant, like each of his other dialogues, is fundamentally indebted to Plutarch’s model, but it 
can be described as anti-Plutarchian in the sense that it deploys the conventions of “Bruta 
Animalia Ratione Uti,” observed in Gelli’s first ten dialogues, in inverted forms. Through these 
inversions, Gelli’s dialogue with the elephant represents the elephant’s conversion as depending 
not on Ulysses’s arguments but on authorial decisions in the characterization of the elephant and 
the plotting of the dialogue. In other words, Gelli foregrounds the fact that the elephant’s return 
to humanity is governed by the formal logic of La Circe, not by the logic of any claims about 
human superiority. Although these inversions turn out to have reference to contemporaneous 
beliefs about elephants and thus are overdetermined (not chosen by the whims of the author 
alone), a formal analysis of the dialogue with the elephant provides a necessary precursor to 
contextualization of the dialogue with other writing about elephants and illuminates Gelli’s own 
exploration of Plutarchian conventions through inversions, which have the effect of 
foregrounding the ways that those conventions shape expectations about predictable or otherwise 
plausible results to dialogues between Ulysses and the talking animals. Even before 
contextualization with beliefs about elephants, the dialogue with the elephant seems to undercut 
Aglafemos’s conversion by making Aglafemos easily persuadable and thus rendering the 
dialogue too predictable. 
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 The dialogue with the elephant has many formal features that distinguish it from the 
earlier dialogues and foreshadow Ulysses’s success in persuading the elephant to return to 
human form. The fact that the dialogue with the elephant is the final dialogue, which has the 
function of bringing the series to a satisfactory or unsatisfactory conclusion, already arouses 
suspicions that the dialogue may end exceptionally with the conversion of the elephant. 
Moreover, the opening of the dialogue portrays Ulysses on the brink of despair: he concludes, “it 
shall then be best since Circes hath alreadye restored my companions and shippes, and they tarye 
onely for me, that I returne home, and lose no more time, where I can not see that I might do any 
profit at all” (253-4). Just as Ulysses has despaired of winning his wager with Circe, he notices 
the elephant: “But what beast do I see of such unmesurable gretness walking on the se strond? it 
is an Elephant” (254). The elephant interrupts Ulysses’s defeated trudging toward his ships, and 
Ulysses’s use of the conjunction but suggests that his spotting of the elephant poses a 
contradiction to the despairing thoughts interrupted by the appearance of the elephant. When 
Ulysses resolves to talk with the elephant, he reasons, “if I could finde but even one onely who 
would by my meanes become man againe, I shuld not thinke to have spente these my travailes in 
vaine” (255). The remark about the possible futility of Ulysses’s “travailes” in debating with the 
transformed creatures redounds on the series of dialogues as a whole: La Circe may seem 
pointless if Gelli does not cause the final dialogue to depart from the pattern of the preceding 
dialogues, in which the transformed creatures adamantly refuse to return to humanity, especially 
since Gelli has declared in the dedication that he intends to dramatize the superiority of humans 
to animals. 
 Even before the elephant speaks, Ulysses suspects that the elephant has been human, a 
suspicion that seems to be dictated less by plausible inferences about the elephant than formal 
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demands. Ulysses hails the elephant, “Tell me Elephaunt, yf thou were a man, (as I thinke thou 
wer) before thou haddest this shape, what thou were” (255). Ulysses has anticipated the formerly 
human identities of animals in the previous dialogues only when Circe has directed Ulysses to 
specific creatures, as with the oyster and mole (13-4), snake (41), hare (73), and goat (84), or 
when the creature has displayed an interest in Ulysses’s talking aloud, as with the dog—who, at 
any rate, hails Ulysses first (201-2)—and the calf (227). On his own initiative, Ulysses hails 
groups of deer and lions, on the chance that one of them may have been a Greek (127, 152). With 
the remaining creature, the horse, Ulysses declares, “the beholdinge him hath taken me in such 
sort, that I would desier that he, who was chaunged into him, had ben a Gretian, that I might doo 
him this benefite” (182). Ulysses hopes—rather than suspects—that the horse has formerly been 
a Greek because he admires the horse’s beauty, which is odd, since returning the horse to human 
form would destroy the admirable equine traits that cause Ulysses to hope that the horse has been 
human. Ulysses has a similar thought about the elephant: “howe glad I would be, that he who 
was turned into him, had bene a Gretian, his countenaunce hath caused me to love him so much 
by beholdynge hym” (254). By the time that Ulysses hails the elephant, however, this hope 
inspired by the admiration of beauty has become a more strongly asserted suspicion that the 
elephant has once been human. The irrationality of this inference causes it to seem like a heavy-
handed intervention by the author, to foreshadow Ulysses’s victory, rather than a plausible 
development in Ulysses’s thought process. Ulysses admits to being desperate to find “but even 
one onely who would by my meanes become man againe” (255) immediately after noting the 
elephant’s beauty and immediately before hailing the elephant, but Gelli first gives this need to 
Ulysses and then answers it in order to conclude the dialogues in a manner satisfactory for 
readers. 
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 Another unique point of the dialogue with the elephant is that the elephant continues to 
identify with his former vocation, philosophy, even after his transformation. When he introduces 
himself as the philosopher Aglafemos of Athens, the elephant uses past-tense verbs, as though 
disavowing his former identity: “I was a Gretian, and of the most famous citie of Athenes, where 
I studied philosophye a very longe time, and my name was Aglafemos” (255). Immediately 
thereafter, however, the elephants asks Ulysses’s to explain his curiosity about the elephant’s 
former identity: “But tell me now why thou askest me this? for thou knoest that Philosophers 
seke none other thing then to knowe the occasion of all things, to quiet and satisfye that desire of 
knowing, that every one hath by nature” (255). The elephant claims still to have the 
philosopher’s characteristic inquisitiveness, which suggests that Aglafemos’s mind as an 
elephant is quite similar to his mind as a human. Ulysses’s response makes the suggestion 
explicit: “Oh thanked be the goddes infinitely, that at the last I have founde one lover of the 
truthe: and one that maye truelye call him selfe manne” (255). Because Aglafemos is a “lover of 
the truthe”—which, of course, is a translation of the Greek philosopher—Ulysses asserts that 
Aglafemos may already claim human status, even in his animal form. Moreover, Ulysses’s 
phrase “at the last” once again foreshadows that the elephant’s unique characteristics will lead to 
a successful conclusion, by Ulysses’s standards, to the dialogue. 
 Although the elephant’s introduction has already betrayed the endurance of a human self-
concept, the elephant asks Ulysses to explain his excitement about the elephant’s vocation and 
his belief that the elephant is different from the other animal interlocutors: “And what causeth 
thee to thinke that I should be better able to perceive then they? and why saiest thou that I 
deserve more then they to be called man?” (256). After citing Aglafemos’s “profession” (256), 
Ulysses provides a lengthy reflection on the special significance of a philosopher: 
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they with whom I have spoken, some being plowmen, some fishers, some 
phisitions, some lawyers, and some gentlemen, the ende of whom semeth to be 
chiefely profit and delight, will remaine thus bestes, in the which being they 
thinke to finde mo commodities, and mo delightes appertaining to the body, then 
they doo in the humaine being, though they greatly deceive them selves: wheras 
thou being a Philosopher, the ende of whom is only the knowledge of the truth, 
wilte make none accompt of the plesures of the body, to obtaine the plesure and 
perfection of the mind. The which thing is the very operation of human nature: 
wherby working as man, thou deservest to be so called: but not they that worke 
like beastes. (256-7) 
Ulysses’s conception of the human as a being devoted to mental rather than physical pursuits 
coincides with the philosopher’s dedication to contemplation, making the philosopher seem like 
the most human human, or perhaps the only truely human human. Since the elephant professes to 
have a philosophical mindset even following his transformation, Ulysses credits him with a 
“human nature,” in spite of his elephant form. Before the elephant accepts or even hears 
Ulysses’s arguments for human superiority, the elephant seems to have crucial attributes of the 
human. 
 These attributes, suggesting that the elephant is already in some ways human, create the 
expectation that the elephant will accept Ulysses’s offer to return to human form. The elephant 
also deviates from the examples of the earlier animals in other ways that affect his choice but 
that less obviously portray him as already human-like. (We shall see, however, that these traits 
find a crucial context in discourse comparing elephants to humans.) With the partial exception of 
the hind, who regards humans as superior to animals but nevertheless prefers being an animal to 
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being a woman,9 the animals before the elephant consistently express an inalterable preference 
for animal existence. The oyster, the first animal interlocutor, warns Ulysses of the futility of 
arguing near the beginning of their dialogue: “go not about to counsell me with thone, that I 
leave so many commodities, the which I now in this state so happely enjoye without any thought 
at al, nor to perswade me with thother that I shoulde retourne man, synce he is the most 
unhappye creature, that is in all the worlde” (15). Likewise, the calf, the animal immediately 
preceding the elephant, declares near the beginning of his dialogue, “I wil remaine in this state” 
(228), for transformation, the calf explains to Ulysses, has saved the calf from “a thousande 
evilles, of the whiche humaine lyfe, so much haboundeth, that it hath bene called by some of 
your wise men, the great see of miseries” (228-9). In contrast to these animals, who have already 
passed judgment on humanity and remain resolute in their unfavorable evaluations, the elephant 
tells Ulysses that he has not yet decided how his former human state compares to the animal state 
that Circe has given to him: “I was by her transformd into an Elephante, of the which beinge I 
am not yet fully resolved, whether it be better then yours or not” (257-8). Indeed, the elephant 
seems relatively eager for Ulysses to persuade him of the superiority of humans to animals, for 
he tells Ulysses, “I wil therfore harken by what reason thou thoughtest to do me a mooste greate 
benefitte in restoring me the humaine beinge: and if it shall be such as may prove unto me, that 
your being is better then ours, (as it semeth that thou thinkest them,) this nature lefte, and I 
becomen man againe, I will gladly retourne with thee into my countrye” (256). Perhaps in the 
spirit of fairness, Ulysses makes a promise that is symmetrical to that of the elephant: if the 
elephant persuades him of the superiority of animals to humans, Ulysses “will praye Circes, she 
                                                
9 The hind says, “Alas the being a reasonable creature is not the cause that I will not returne into 
my former state: but that I must become a woman againe” (130). For a compelling account of the 
exceptional dialogue with the deer, see Migiel, “Dignity of Man,” 211-32. 
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will transfourme me al so into one of these beastes” (258-9). The response of the elephant is 
unexpected and telling: “I will not binde my selfe hereunto, for though it seme that I much care 
not to become man againe, I felte so great an alteration and travaile in my transmutation, (an 
occasion that I now agre not so easelye to chaunge this state againe) I finde not yet in dede in this 
state so many commodities, that I may judge it better then yours” (259). Unlike the earlier 
animals, who offer many reasons for preferring animal states to human ones, the elephant’s only 
objection to returning to a human state is that he finds transformation unpleasant. He specifically 
says that he does not recommend an animal existence to Ulysses; and while the elephant has no 
desire to return to human form, it is not because of a resolute judgment against human existence, 
as with previous animals, but because of an objection to experiencing another transformation, an 
objection that seems and proves relatively easy for Ulysses to surmount. 
 While speeches by the talking animals account for most of the substance of the earlier 
dialogues (the dog is perhaps the most voluble), the elephant often simply listens to long 
speeches setting forth Ulysses’s views of human and animal natures. Occasionally, the elephant 
attempts a refutation, which Ulysses immediately counters. In general, the elephant speaks in 
order to ask Ulysses questions, prompting further speeches, and in order to assent to Ulysses’s 
arguments. Indeed, significantly before the elephant converts to Ulysses’s point of view, and thus 
to humanity, the elephant has already responded to Ulysses’s arguments about human nature 
with various forms of agreement, ranging from expressions of understanding to admiration of 
human nature, on six occasions. After Ulysses compares sensuous knowledge, shared by humans 
and animals, with reason, possessed only by humans, the elephant is clearly impressed: “Truely 
this way of knowinge, is very playne and distincte” (278). The elephant responds to subsequent 
speeches on human superiority with unambiguous expressions of admiration for the human, such 
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as “A mervellous propertie of the humaine understandinge” (282) and “O most happy condition 
of humain nature” (283). By the time that the elephant fully assents to Ulysses’s argument, he 
has come to regret that he has ever been an elephant: “No more, no more Ulisses, cause me nowe 
to leave this beastyshe nature, and to become man agayne, for my losse was to great, to have 
bene so longe tyme converted by Cyrces into an Elephante” (289). The uncertainty of the 
elephant about the comparison of the human and animal states makes it relatively easy for 
Ulysses to persuade the elephant and inculcate this feeling of remorse for his animal state. 
 The easy persuadability of the elephant leads directly to other unique features of the 
dialogue, but we shall see that many of these features are not merely logical corollaries of the 
elephant’s easy persuadability but rather find a context in writing about elephants. The elephant, 
of course, is the only animal to return to human form. Uniquely, and importantly, since the 
elephant is the last animal, the elephant ratifies Ulysses’s views of human superiority: “Oh, what 
a fayre thynge, Oh, what a marveylous thing it is to be a man! Oh how well I nowe knowe it 
better then I did before, for I have proved the one and the other” (290). This remark provides an 
example of the inverse and mirror-like relationship of the dialogues of oyster and elephant, for 
the oyster tells Ulysses, at the beginning rather than the end of their dialogue, that his knowledge 
of both human and animal states gives authority to his rejection of human existence: “let us 
reason frendly a little togethers, and thou shalt see yf I that have proved thone life and thother, 
can shewe thee that, that is trewe that I saye” (16). This argument, made by both oyster and 
elephant, but for contrary purposes and at opposite ends of their respective dialogues, originates 
in Gelli’s source text, Plutarch’s dialogue “Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti,” in which the talking pig 
Gryllus, speaking for all of the former humans, tells Plutarch’s Odysseus, “I shall quickly make 
you see that we are right to prefer our present life in place of the former one, now that we have 
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tried both.”10 Gelli anchors the dialogues with the oyster and the elephant in Plutarch’s dialogue 
by having both animal speakers appropriate Gryllus’s argument about the transformed creatures’ 
knowledge of human and animals states, but Gelli gives the reference an anti-Plutarchian 
significance in the dialogue with the elephant, who makes Gryllus’s argument at the end, not the 
beginning, of the dialogue and who uses the argument to endorse human, not animal, existence. 
While Gryllus and the oyster make the argument about having experienced both human and 
animal states in order to declare their uncompromising refusal to return to humanity, the elephant 
makes the argument after acknowledging human superiority and returning to his human state. 
 
The Elephant in Gelli’s Chain of Being 
 
 Already, exploration of unique formal features in the final dialogue, the dialogue with the 
elephant, has proved to be impossible without analysis of comparisons of humans and animals. 
The relationship between La Circe’s formal concerns and Renaissance beliefs about humans and 
animals seems even more profound after a study of Gelli’s adaptation of the chain of being to 
provide an order for the series of animal speakers: oyster, mole, snake, hare, goat, hind, lion, 
horse, dog, calf, and elephant. While the chain of being gives the order to the first half of this 
series, Gelli thwarts expectations based on the chain of being beginning with the lion, the first 
animal to base an argument for animal superiority on one of the cardinal virtues. At this point, 
the hierarchy of virtues, instead of proximity to the human, gives order to the animal speakers, 
until the dialogue with the elephant, who agrees to return to human form. By making the 
                                                
10 Plutarch, “Beasts Are Rational,” trans. and ed. William C. Helmbold, in Plutarch's Moralia, 
vol. 12, The Loeb Classical Library (London and Cambridge, Mass.: William Heinemann; 
Harvard University Press, 1957), 499. Subsequent citations appear in text. 
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elephant the final animal, and by making the elephant the only animal to return to human form, 
and by giving the elephant so many human-like properties (as discussed above), Gelli seems to 
place the elephant closest to the human in his version of the chain of being. 
 Other scholars have noted, though sometimes overestimated, Gelli’s reliance on the idea 
of the chain of being, but I provide a new account of the sequence of Gelli’s dialogues, 
especially by treating each of the final five animal speakers as having a unique claim to be the 
most human-like animal, based on conceptions of animals recorded in natural histories. Tillyard, 
for instance, has written of Gelli’s Circe,  
The whole work is based on the idea of the chain of being, and the question of the 
beasts’ metamorphosis is dependent on their position in it. Ulysses begins with 
the oyster (who had been a fisherman before his change), the lowest of the 
animals, and has of course the least chance of success. He goes up the scale of 
beasts with ever higher chances and in the end succeeds in persuading the king of 
the beasts, the elephant, to resume human form.11  
In general, I agree that Gelli uses the chain of being to set up a structure of increasing 
expectations that Ulysses will succeed in each successive dialogue. I depart from Tillyard, 
                                                
11 E. M. W. Tillyard, The Elizabethan World Picture (London: Chatto & Windus, 1967), 26. For 
my skepticism about Tillyard’s calling the elephant “king of the beasts,” see a subsequent note. 
Like Tillyard, George Boas overlooks the strangeness of the sequence of the last five dialogues 
in his comments about Gelli’s chain of being. See The Happy Beast in French Thought of the 
Seventeenth Century (New York: Octagon Books, 1966), 28. Robert Adams notices but 
dismisses, for the most part, the strangeness of the sequence of the last five dialogues: “He 
[Gelli] takes for granted that there is a scale of relative nobility among the creatures, from lowest 
to highest; and in the course of the dialogues Ulysses proceeds along this scale from oyster to the 
elephant, according to a broad if not exactly rigid progression. The dog and the bullock are 
brought in after, but not therefore in a position of intellectual or social superiority to, the lion. 
There seems to be no distinct rationale for this irregularity. (Perhaps, as man was to be 
demonstrated the supreme creature in the scale, Gelli had dramatic reasons for not making the 
scale too rigid, lest man’s place in it be too obviously assured beforehand.)” Adams, introduction 
to The Circe, xxvi. 
 
50 
however, by arguing that each of the final five talking animals has a plausible claim to be the 
most human-like animal and that Gelli implicitly renders a judgment in favor of the elephant by 
placing the elephant last and by making the elephant the only animal that already has enough 
human-like qualities to embrace Ulysses’s arguments about human superiority. 
 The order in which Ulysses converses with the first six animals conforms to the 
placement of animals in the chain of being and establishes the scale of increasing expectations 
that Tillyard has also described. After both the mole and the oyster have refused to return to 
human form, Ulysses has the following exchange with the mole: 
Ulysses: consyder what beastes you are, for yf you wer perfit in dede, I woulde  
saye that you hadde some reason. 
Mole: Why, what dooe we lacke? 
Ulysses: What do you lacke? Thoyster the sense of smellinge and hearynge, and  
that that is more, the abilitie to move frome one place to another: And thou the  
syghte. (35)12 
When Ulysses asserts that the mole and the oyster are not “perfit” animals, he draws on 
Aristotelian conceptions: “it is sense perception primarily which constitutes the animal. For, 
provided they have sense perception, even those creatures which are devoid of movement and do 
not change their place are called animals and are not merely said to be alive. Now the primary 
sense in all animals is touch.”13 The mole and even the oyster meet Aristotle’s minimal criterion 
for animal status, but Aristotle’s History of Animals mentions the mole and “the ostracoderms,” 
                                                
12 For ease of reading, I have expanded abbreviated names and altered the layout of dialogue for 
long quotations from Iden’s translation. 
13 Aristotle, De Anima, trans. R. D. Hicks, in Aristotle’s “De Anima” in Focus, ed. Michael 
Durrant (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 24. 
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the class including oysters, together as examples of “imperfect creatures” that lack sight.14 
Ulysses attempts to undermine the mole’s satisfaction with his animal state by pointing out that 
the mole and oyster lack capabilities of higher animals. The oyster and the mole are not “perfit,” 
in the sense of “Having all the essential characteristics, elements, or qualities” of the prototypical 
animal.15 Recapitulating and thus endorsing Ulysses’s point about the deficiencies of the oyster 
and the mole on a formal level, Gelli makes the oyster and the mole share the first dialogue, 
while assigning each of the other creatures a dialogue of their own. Indeed, Gelli’s pairing of 
oyster and mole may reflect the direct influence of Aristotle, who also treats these two animals 
together because of their blindness. 
 The third animal, the snake, is the first animal speaker in the dialogues that possesses the 
capacity for locomotion and all five senses. Because the snake lacks legs, however, Gelli places 
the snake lower in the chain of being than the quadrupeds, who make their debut in the 
immediately subsequent dialogue, featuring the hare. The lack of legs also causes Ulysses to 
classify the snake among the imperfect creatures, although the snake apparently occupies a high 
enough position, in Gelli’s mind, to merit a dialogue of his own. Following the dialogue with the 
snake, Ulysses beseeches Circe, “cause me to speake with some other, for I thinke not that all 
have so lost the true knowledge of resonne, as these three have, to whom I have spoken, whom 
truly thou hast not chaunged into such an unperfect kinde of beastes, without a cause, sins they 
lyke men have so imperfect a discourse” (72-3). Clearly, Ulysses expects that the so-called 
                                                
14 Aristotle, The History of Animals, trans. D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson (eBooks@Adelaide: 
The University of Adelaide Library, 2007), book 1, chapter 9, http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/a 
/Aristotle/history/. For Aristotle’s definition of “ostracoderms,” see book 4, chapter 1. On 
Aristotelian distinctions between imperfect and perfect animals, see Katharine Park, “The 
Organic Soul,” in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. Charles B. Schmitt, 
Quentin Skinner, Eckhard Kessler, and Jill Kraye (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), 467, 467 n. 5. 
15 The Oxford English Dictionary, Online ed., s.v. “perfect” (entry dated 2010). 
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perfect creatures, with whom he now proposes to speak, will have a proportionally greater ability 
to understand and to accept his arguments for human superiority. 
 The order of the dialogues with the hare, goat, and hind, seems relatively unremarkable 
and uncontroversial, except that the dialogue with the deer represents an important moment in 
the sequence not only because the deer, as the sixth of eleven animal speakers, represents the 
midpoint of the series, but also because the deer is the only animal, other than the elephant, to 
concede human superiority. The deer, however, refuses to return to humanity because she will 
not submit to patriarchy again: “I am thus an Hynde, of as much aucthoritie at the least as the 
male” (146). The placement of the deer above the goat, and the consequent implication that the 
deer is closer to the human, perhaps reflects a literary tradition of figuring women as deer—as in 
Wyatt’s “Whoso List to Hunt” and Petrarch’s sonnet beginning “Una candida cerva.” 
 Following the dialogue with the deer, the chain of being recedes in importance as an 
organizing structure for the dialogues, and Gelli arranges the ensuing dialogues according to the 
sequence of topics in Plutarch’s “Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti” and according to a hierarchy of 
cardinal virtues, each of which Gelli provides with an appropriate animal exponent, according to 
the representation of each animal in natural histories.16 In Plutarch’s original dialogue, Gryllus 
argues that animals surpass humans in the cardinal virtues, beginning with fortitude (501-11). 
After Gryllus concludes his arguments about animal fortitude, Odysseus prompts Gryllus to pass 
on to “temperance, the next in order” (511). Gryllus obliges (511-525) and then proceeds to a 
treatment of “Animal intelligence” (525), or prudence (525-31). The fragment ends with 
Gryllus’s skeptical comment on human religion (533). 
                                                
16 Compare my discussion with that of Marilyn Migiel, who writes that, because of the lion, 
horse, dog, and calf’s interest in the cardinal virtues, “these animals have even been seen as 
symbols of the four cardinal virtues. The reader is encouraged to see these animals as ones that 
are ‘higher up’ in the chain of being.” “Dignity of Man,” 218. 
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 Gelli divides Gryllus’s arguments by topic and delegates them to different animal 
speakers. Gelli also intercalates a treatment of justice, which is missing from the surviving 
fragment of Plutarch’s dialogue. The lion’s arguments for animal superiority primarily concern 
fortitude, the first virtue that Gryllus treats. Although Gelli gives the next animal, the horse, 
Gryllus’s argument that humans have conceded the superior fortitude of animals in metaphors, 
such as “lion-hearted” (Plutarch 509; cf. Gelli 186), Gelli’s horse proceeds to a much lengthier 
discussion of animal temperance, just as the section on temperance follows the section on 
fortitude in Plutarch’s fragment. The dog then adopts Gryllus’s strategy of citing anecdotes to 
demonstrate the superiority of animal prudence, although Gelli’s dog and Plutarch’s Gryllus 
choose different examples (Plutarch 525-31; Gelli 207-12). After the dialogue with the dog, Gelli 
inserts a treatment of justice, which the calf introduces to Ulysses as the preeminent virtue: 
“Saye not your wyse men, that Justice is an assemble of all vertues, and that she conteyneth 
theym all in her, gevyng to every thynge the rightnesse, and rule, with the which they shoulde 
use theym selves?” (231). Gelli’s calf perhaps thinks here of Plato, whose Republic asserts, “to 
cause justice to be present is to establish the parts within the soul as governing and being 
governed by each other according to nature.”17 Finally, Gelli adapts the conclusion of Plutarch’s 
fragment by making religion emerge as a seemingly decisive difference between human and 
animal near the end of the dialogue with the elephant. Gelli also prepares the transition from 
justice to religion near the end of the dialogue with the calf, when Ulysses admonishes the calf, 
“thou shalte see howe farre thou deceaveste thy selfe, to saye that you are more juste then we: for 
justice gevinge to every body, that that is his, yeldeth fyrste to the goddess, that honoure, that is 
                                                
17 Plato, The Republic, trans. R. E. Allen (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006), 
145-6. Tillyard claims that Renaissance writers generally regard justice as the preeminent virtue. 
Elizabethan World Picture, 28. 
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due unto them. And this, whether it be parte of her, or an especial virtue, appoynted and fastened 
unto her, is called by us religion” (246). Ulysses’s claims that justice, the preeminent virtue, 
begins in the relationship between the human and the divine and that religion should perhaps 
even be regarded as a virtue distinct from justice elevates religion to a unique position and 
creates an impression of ascending in a hierarchy of virtues as the calf’s treatment of justice 
gives way to the elephant’s re-discovery of religion.  
Only when the elephant agrees to return to human form does the chain of being return as 
an organizing principle, suggesting that the elephant is the closest animal to the human being. 
This last set of five animal speakers each function as plausible candidates for the position closest 
to the human, and Gelli seems to opine in favor of the elephant by placing the elephant last in the 
series, by giving the elephant many human-like traits, and by making the elephant the only 
creature to return to human form. 
 In the dialogues with the lion, horse, dog, and calf, Gelli has given each cardinal virtue an 
animal exponent that seems appropriate according to Renaissance natural history’s 
representations of the animal, eventually compiled in Edward Topsell’s English appropriation 
and expansion of Conrad Gesner’s natural history.18 In each case, the natural historical fact or 
theme that has motivated Gelli’s selection of a particular animal remains unremarked in Gelli’s 
text itself. Gelli has followed natural history’s representation of lions as animals who “excell in 
strength and courage” (Topsell 464) by making fortitude the predominant concern of his lion. 
                                                
18 Topsell acknowledges his debt to Gesner on the ninth page of the unpaginated prefatory 
materials, counting from the title page: “I have followed D. Gesner as neer as I could, I do 
professe him my Author in most of my stories.” Edward Topsell, The Historie of Foure-Footed 
Beastes (London: printed by William Jaggard, 1607). Subsequent citations appear in text. On the 
relationship of the natural histories of Topsell and Gesner, see William B. Ashworth, Jr., 
“Natural History and the Emblematic World View,” in Reappraisals of the Scientific Revolution, 
ed. David C. Lindberg and Robert S. Westman (Cambridge, England; and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 316. 
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Likewise, Gelli’s making a horse the mouthpiece of temperance matches Topsell’s regarding of 
temperance as one of the two primary principles of equine nature: “the naturall constitution of a 
Horsse, is whot and temperate. Whot, because of his Levity, and Velocity, and length of life; 
temperate because he is docible, pleasant, and gentle towardes his maister and keeper” (329). 
Gelli’s decision to make prudence the dominant concern of the dog is motivated by an 
influential, ancient anecdote about canine intelligence, known as “Chrysippus’s dog.” In this 
often repeated anecdote, a dog determines that its quarry has taken one of three paths by ruling 
out the other two.19 Montaigne re-tells this anecdote in his Apology for Raymond Sebond and 
claims that the dog’s choosing of a path by a process of elimination provides proof of animal 
rationality: “Convinced by this reasoned conclusion, it did not sniff at the third path; it made no 
further investigations but let itself be swayed by the power of reason. Here was pure dialectic.”20 
Although Topsell unambiguously calls the dog a “creature without reason” (141), he later on the 
same page rehearses the anecdote of Chrysippus’s dog, which he introduces, perhaps skeptically, 
by saying, “Aelianus thinketh that Dogges have reason, and use logick in their hunting” (141). 
 Confirming that this popular anecdote accounts for Gelli’s making the exponent of 
animal prudence a dog, Gelli has named his dog Cleantos. This name alludes unmistakably to 
Cleanthes, the ancient Greek philosopher who convinced Chrysippus to join the Stoics and who 
                                                
19 For a sketch of the place of “Chrysippus’s dog” in debates about animal intelligence from 
antiquity through the early modern period, see Simon Blackburn, “animal thought,” in The 
Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Online ed. (Oxford University Press, 2008). On Chrysippus’s 
original anecdote, see Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the 
Western Debate (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 21. On references to Chrysippus’s dog 
among Renaissance writers, see Erica Fudge, Brutal Reasoning: Animals, Rationality, and 
Humanity in Early Modern England (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 96, 101-3, 182. 
20 Michel de Montaigne, An Apology for Raymond Sebond, in The Complete Essays, trans. and 
ed. M. A. Screech (London: Penguin, 2003), 517. 
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preceded Chrysippus as their leader.21 In short, Gelli names his dog after the mentor of 
Chrysippus, who gives his name to the famous anecdote about canine logic. Gelli does not 
suggest that the transformed Cleanthes is the original of Chrysippus’s anecdote, for Gelli’s 
Cleantos becomes a dog only upon arriving on Circe’s island, from which Cleantos never returns 
to be noticed by his former compatriots. Nevertheless, the name “Cleantos” provides evidence 
that the anecdote about Chrysippus’s dog motivates Gelli’s selection of a dog to discuss 
prudence. 
 Gelli’s dog provides a particularly interesting, but by no means unique, example of 
Gelli’s tendency to use commonplaces about animals, especially from natural history, to 
motivate his creative decisions while simultaneously omitting explicit references to these 
motivating beliefs, themes, and anecdotes. Gelli’s dog mentions numerous examples of animal 
prudence, in the following order: ants, spiders, wasps, bees, birds in general, cuckoos, eagles, 
cranes, partridges, swallows, magpies, storks, elephants, camels, deer, bears, horses, dogs, 
snakes, and fishes (207-12). Gelli’s Cleantos provides specific examples of behaviors 
exemplifying prudence for each of these animal groups, with six exceptions. Because humans 
hold snakes while prophesying, “when you will sette foorthe wisedome” (211), as Cleantos says 
to Ulysses, Cleantos considers that humans themselves have conceded the prudence of snakes. In 
the cases of bees, elephants, camels, horses and dogs, Cleantos claims that their prudence is so 
familiar to humans that he need not provide specific examples (208, 210, 211). Thus, Cleantos 
omits the anecdote about Chrysippus’s dog, even though this anecdote probably springs to mind 
                                                
21 For basic information about Cleanthes and Chrysippus, see Simon Blackburn, “Chrysippus” 
and “Cleanthes,” in The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Online edition (Oxford University 
Press, 2008); and Julia Annas, “Chrysippus” and “Cleanthes,” in The Oxford Classical 
Dictionary, ed. Simon Hornblower and Anthony Spawforth, Online edition (Oxford University 
Press, 2009). 
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as an important example, or perhaps even the crucial example, of canine prudence for many of 
Gelli’s readers and for Gelli himself, who has made the exponent of prudence a dog because of 
this influential anecdote.  
The omission of this anecdote seems especially ironic because Gelli has Cleantos 
emphasize his canine identity in the very moment of omitting reference to Chrysippus’s dog. 
Cleantos mentions dogs by using a first-person plural pronoun, emphasizing his membership in 
the canine group: “Of the wisedome of the horse, and of ours, I will not speake: because I am 
sure it is most knowen unto you, havinge continuall conversation amongest you” (211). Glossing 
over the most famous anecdote of canine wisdom while emphasizing his canine identity, Gelli’s 
dog indirectly increases the impression that that the anecdote about Chrysippus’s dog has 
motivated Gelli to give arguments about animal prudence to a dog. It is possible that Gelli means 
for readers to understand that Cleantos does not know about Chrysippus’s famous anecdote 
because Chrysippus has not yet recorded it when Cleantos leaves Greece, but the fact remains 
that Gelli has both relied upon and suppressed Chrysippus’s anecdote in composing the dialogue 
with the dog. 
The calf’s concern with justice is likewise motivated by a suppressed theme, which 
Topsell not only records but reserves for an especially important moment: the conclusion of his 
entry on the ox. Recourse to Topsell’s entry on the ox is appropriate for contextualizing Gelli’s 
dialogue with the calf, for as Topsell explains, “A Calfe, is a young or late enixed Bull or Cow” 
(88). As he concludes his entry on the ox, Topsell relates the following anecdote, which he 
attributes to Vegetius: “on a time Justice was so offended with men because they imbrewed 
every altar with the bloud of Oxen and cattell, that therefore she lefte the earth, and retired back 
againe to dwell among the starres” (88). This fable suggests that the practice of sacrificing oxen 
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does not comport with human dependence on oxen laborers, which Topsell remarks at the 
beginning of his entry on the ox (84). Sacrifices of oxen offend rather than appease the goddess 
Justice, for she presumably believes that humans have failed to show proper gratitude to and 
respect for their animal laborers. This myth explains Gelli’s choice of an ox as an exponent for 
justice. Indeed, the myth even exemplifies the calf’s claim that, among humans, “the more part 
do unjustly” (234), making Gelli’s calf himself an implied rebuke to human morals. Since the 
calf never tells this specific story, however, Gelli has once again suppressed explicit reference to 
the commonplace that has led to his identification of an animal with a particular virtue. 
In addition to featuring the cardinal virtues, the dialogues with the lion, horse, dog, and 
calf, along with the final dialogue with the elephant, each offer a different criterion according to 
which the featured animal becomes plausible as a candidate for the position closest to the human. 
The foregrounded characteristics structure the individual dialogues, each of which begins with 
Ulysses’s remarking on the special attributes of an animal in ways that draw upon, without 
explicitly acknowledging, natural historical material. The animal characteristics also structure an 
argument that emerges over the sequence of dialogues; for as the animal speakers refuse to return 
to human form, Gelli rejects the corresponding criteria for proximity to humanity, until the 
elephant’s unprecedented decision to return to humanity establishes the elephant as the animal 
that most closely approaches the human. 
 Anticipation of the lion’s return to humanity is higher than with any of the previous 
animals because of the lion’s reputation for preeminence among the quadrupeds. In Topsell’s 
entry on the lion, Topsell says that the lion is “justly stiled by all writers the King of beastes” 
(456) and remarks that lions exhibit “in al things a Princely majesty” (463). This view places the 
lion near the human because of the Renaissance belief, described by Tillyard, “that within every 
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class there was a primate.” Examples of primates include “the dolphin among the fishes, the 
eagle among birds, the lion among the beasts.”22 These primates occupy transitional points in the 
chain of being and have symbolic relationships to other primates: “a primate in one class of 
creation must be an important link in the chain as being closest to the class above it and must 
also correspond to a primate in another class” (Tillyard 79). Thus, if the quadrupeds are 
immediately beneath humans in the chain of being, then calling the lion the “King of beastes” 
positions the lion most closely to the human. 
 Gelli invokes the lion’s characteristic majesty by making the lion the only animal whom 
Ulysses fears to approach, but significantly, Gelli never uses the phrase “king of beasts,” even 
though it motivates Gelli’s representation of the lion and creates the impression that Ulysses has 
encountered an animal who quite closely approaches human status. On the point of asking if any 
among a lion pride come from Greece, Ulysses momentarily loses heart: 
peradventure there maye be some one amongest these Liones that I see come 
towardes me. But what doo I? Who knoweth, troublinge them, whether they will 
hurte me, or not: the which they would not do, yf I disturbe them not, yf they be 
not provoked thereunto by hunger? And althogh Cyrces hath tolde me, that I 
should have no feare of any beast, that is within thys her Island: I can not yet but 
have some feare of these, theyr countenaunce is so horrible, and fearefull. (152) 
Ulysses’s dread of the lions registers the majesty of the “king of beasts” without giving the lion 
that familiar title. Gelli’s omission of this common representation of lions is all the more 
significant because Gelli adheres so closely to the natural historical tradition for representing the 
                                                
22 Tillyard, Elizabethan World Picture, 27. Subsequent citations appear in text. Tillyard claims 
that some Renaissance writers favor the whale over the dolphin and the elephant over the lion 
(26-7), but Tillyard’s main example of the conception of the elephant, rather than the lion, as 
“king of beasts” is Gelli’s Circe (26-8), which never attributes that title to any animal. 
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lion in another respect. Ulysses’s speculations about the impact of hunger on the likely behavior 
of the lions almost exactly resemble claims about the impact of hunger on lions in Topsell’s 
natural history: “A Lyon while hee eateth is most fierce and also when he is hungry, but when he 
is satisfied and filled, hee layeth aside that savage quality, and sheweth himselfe of a more 
meeke and gentle nature, for that it is lesse danger to meete with him filled then hungry, for he 
never devoureth any till famine constraineth him” (462). The similarity between this quotation 
and Ulysses’s own meditations proves that Gelli has drawn on natural historical material about 
lions and corroborates my claim that Gelli has deliberately suppressed the most distinctive 
attribute of the lion, while expecting readers to take this attribute into account as they anticipate 
that Ulysses may make his first rhetorical victory. 
 After the lion refuses to return to humanity and thwarts the expectations created by the 
lion’s status as “king of beasts,” Gelli presents a series of animal speakers who each possess a 
unique claim to proximity to the human and who function as plausible claimants to the lion’s 
usual position in the chain of being, until they all, with the exception of the elephant, refuse to 
return to humanity. The first animal after the lion, the horse, lays claim to the position closest to 
the human because of a reputation for unsurpassed nobility. Topsell declares the horse “the most 
noble and necessary creature of all foure-footed beasts, before whom no one for multitude and 
generality of good qualities is to be preferred, compared or equaled” (281). This use of noble in 
the sense of “Having qualities or properties of a very high or admirable kind” is characteristic in 
two ways: it exemplifies The Oxford English Dictionary’s claim that noble, in this usage, appears 
“Freq. in the comparative and superlative, denoting superiority to other things of the same 
name,” and it conforms to several sample quotations in applying specifically to the horse.23 Thus, 
                                                
23 The Oxford English Dictionary, Online ed., s.v. “noble” (entry dated 2010). 
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Topsell, not idiosyncratically, singles the horse out among the quadrupeds for special distinction 
and implicitly places the horse immediately beneath the human in the chain of being. Gelli’s 
Ulysses makes similar remarks about the uniqueness of the horse: “Se yonder coming towardes 
me a very fayre horse: oh what a fayre beast it is: truely nature besides man, hath put all her 
knowledge in this” (182). Although Gelli’s Ulysses does not call the horse noble, at least in 
Iden’s translation, he admires the horse in terms that place the horse second only to the human. 
 The next animal, the dog, has a uniquely loyal relationship to the human. For Topsell, the 
dog is special among animals for unconditional obedience and devotion to a human master:  
There is not any creature without reason, more loving to his Maister, nor more 
serviceable (as shall appeare afterward) then is a Dogge induring many stripes 
patiently at the hands of his maister, and using no other meanes to pacifie his 
displeasure, then humiliation, prostration, assentation, and after beating, turneth a 
revenge into a more fervent and whot love. [...] They meete their maister with 
reverence and joy, crouching or bending a little, (like shamefast and modest 
persons:) and although they know none but their maister and familiars, yet will 
they help any man against another Wilde beast. (141) 
Gelli adapts such conceptions of dogs by making the dog the only animal deliberately to 
approach Ulysses and initiate conversation with him. As Ulysses reasons aloud about human 
superiority to other animals, he interrupts himself at three moments to note the progress of the 
dog, who begins to speak immediately after Ulysses’s third remark, reversing the roles of human 
and animal in the other dialogues, in which Ulysses greets the animals and asks them to identify 
themselves: 
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But what would this Dogge, that commeth thus towardes me? and beyng by lyttle 
and lytle commen nigh me, standeth then so styll? Truely he should have done it 
willingly, folowing his nature, the which is very frendly to man, and for that he 
should see them very seldome in this place. (201) 
 
Alas see howe this Dogge taketh pleasure in beholding me, and marke if it seme 
not, by the gestures that he maketh, whyles I reason thus with my selfe, that he 
understandeth all that I saye, truely he canne not have donne it for any other 
cause. (201-2) 
 
But what will this Dogge with me, that he maketh so much of me? ha, ha. O howe 
frendely and faythfull is this beaste to man. (202) 
Twice, Ulysses remarks on the dog’s unique friendliness to humans, and his first remark 
imagines that the dog craves human company. Gelli’s dog distinguishes himself from the other 
animals in his curiosity about Ulysses and overtures of friendship toward him. When the dog 
“maketh so much of” Ulysses, causing Ulysses to laugh, it seems plausible that Gelli intends 
readers to infer that the dog has licked Ulysses, or performed some other characteristically 
canine antic.24 In the subsequent dialogue, the calf also approaches Ulysses, who observes that 
the calf “commeth so safelye feding towardes me” (226), but the calf’s approach seems 
incidental: the calf happens to meander toward Ulysses as the calf grazes. Furthermore, while 
Ulysses notes that the calf “hath stande still to harken unto me, even as thoughe he understode 
                                                
24 Robert Adams’s edition also infers that the dog licks Ulysses, for Ulysses wonders, “what 
designs has this dog upon me that he’s licking and caressing me so?” Robert Adams, ed., The 
Circe of Signior Giovanni Battista Gelli of the Academy of Florence, trans. Thomas Brown and 
Robert Adams (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), 124. 
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me” (227), much like the dog, the calf does not initiate conversation. The dog, in contrast, 
deliberately approaches Ulysses and engages him in conversation. The seeming interest of the 
dog in Ulysses’s monologue about human superiority, and the dog’s affection for humans, even 
strangers—as in Topsell’s claim that dogs will defend unfamiliar humans—creates an 
expectation that the dog may also depart from the patterns of other animals by accepting 
Ulysses’s offer of transformation. 
 The calf makes another claim on the position closest to the human because of its service 
to humans as a beast of burden. The horse does not become England’s primary beast of burden 
until the eighteenth century; both oxen and horses commonly serve as beasts of burden in the 
sixteenth century.25 Accordingly, Topsell praises the horse as “the most noble and necessary 
creature of all foure-footed beasts” (281) but asserts the importance of oxen at greater length and 
more emphatically: 
The morall uses of this beast, both in labour and other things doth declare the 
dignity and high account our forefathers made heereof, both in vintage, harvest, 
plowing, carriage, drawing, sacrificing, and making Leagues of truce and peace; 
in somuch as, that if this fayled, al tilage and vintage must in many places of the 
world be utterly put down; and in truth, neither the Foules of the aire, nor the 
Horsse for the battaile, nor the Swine and Dogges could have no sustenance but 
by the labor of Oxen: for although in some places they have Mules, or Cammels, 
or Elephants, which help them in this labour, yet can there not be in any Nation a 
neglect of Oxen. (84) 
                                                
25 Peter Edwards, Horse and Man in Early Modern England (London: Continuum, 2007), 183-5, 
209. 
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Gelli betrays that he conceives of the ox, more than the horse, as a beast of burden when the 
oyster calls physical labor “an arte of oxen, who alwaies laboure, and when they can no more, 
are then knocked on the hed with a betell” (22-3). 
Likewise, Gelli’s Ulysses regards the calf primarily in terms of the ox’s special role as a 
laborer: 
But alas see what a faire Calfe this is that commeth so safelye feding towardes 
me: O, what fiercenes sheweth this beast in his forehead? and notwithstanding 
howe gentle yet he is, and how he suffereth man to handle him: surely we are not 
little bounde to nature, that she hath made this beast, for it is plainely sene, that 
she hath made hym for that he should take from man a great parte of his paines, 
he beinge of suche strength, and therewith so easye to be handled. (226-7) 
Gelli’s drawing upon natural history’s portrait of the ox in order to have Ulysses deliver a speech 
on the unique qualities of the ox, which also happen to give the ox a uniquely important 
relationship to humans, creates anticipation that the ox may also differ from the preceding 
animals by accepting Ulysses’s offer of a return to human form. 
 Gelli likewise introduces the elephant with Ulysses’s reflections on its uniqueness among 
animals. Topsell writes, “There is no creature among al the Beasts of the world which hath so 
great and ample demonstration of the power and wisedome of almighty God as the Elephant: 
both for proportion of body and disposition of spirit” (190). Topsell also compares the elephant 
to “a living Mountain” (190). Ulysses likewise remarks the elephant’s size and regards it with 
awe: “what beast do I see of such unmesurable gretnes walking on the se strond? it is an 
Elephant, if I through the farre distaunce, that is betwene us, be not deceived. O howe great is the 
varietie of nature, in the production of beastes” (254). 
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 More crucial than the belief that “Of all earthly creatures an Elephant is the greatest” 
(Topsell 192) is the elephant’s reputation for intelligence exceeding that of other animals and 
approaching that of the human. Of the elephant, Aristotle declares, “It is very sensitive, and 
possessed of an intelligence superior to that of other animals.”26 Pliny’s natural history, which 
was widely read in the Renaissance,27 ranks the elephant above all other terrestrial animals in 
both size and intelligence: “the Elephant is the greatest, and commeth neerest in wit and 
capacitie, to men.”28 Accordingly, Pliny discusses the elephant immediately after the human. 
Topsell, meanwhile, writes, “There is not any creature so capable of understanding as an 
Elephant” (196). 
 The elephant’s reputation for human-like intelligence motivates Gelli’s decision to make 
the only animal to return to human form an elephant. This decision seems especially significant 
because Ulysses’s arguments in favor of human superiority turn on the human’s unique 
intellectual abilities. In the dialogues with the lion, horse, dog, and calf, the other creatures who 
seem to be plausible candidates for the position nearest to the human, Ulysses repeatedly tells the 
animals that their seemingly virtuous behaviors do not indicate true virtue because animals lack 
reason. For instance, Ulysses tells the lion, “fortitude is a meane, determined with reasonne, 
betwene boldenes and feare, for cause of the good and the honest. Howe can it then be founde 
among you, synce you have not the judgement of reason, that can fynde this meane?” (167).29 
                                                
26 Aristotle, History of Animals, book 9, chapter 46. 
27 On the popularity of Pliny’s natural history during the Renaissance, see Brian Cummings, 
“Pliny’s Literate Elephant and the Idea of Animal Language in Renaissance Thought,” in 
Renaissance Beasts: Of Animals, Humans, and Other Wonderful Creatures, ed. Erica Fudge 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 171. 
28 Pliny, The Historie of the World, trans. Philemon Holland (London: Printed by Adam Islip, 
1601), volume 1 of 2, book 8, chapter 1, page 192. Subsequent citations of this volume appear in 
text. 
29 Cf. 193 (horse/temperance), 219 (dog/prudence), and 243-4 (calf/justice). 
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With the elephant, who has once been a philosopher, Ulysses makes an elaborate argument about 
the superiority of human reason to animal intelligence. At the crucial moment of his argument, 
Ulysses presents a conception of human nature obviously though anachronistically derived from 
Pico’s “Oration.” That is, Ulysses presents the former philosopher with Renaissance 
philosophy’s position on the human. Ulysses even remarks the particular relevance of his 
forthcoming arguments to the elephant’s former identity by saying, “because thou art a 
Philosopher, I will procede with thee philosophically” (259). Ulysses’s use of the present-tense 
“art” is telling and problematic; for he credits the elephant with a command of philosophy even 
though Ulysses has previously reserved reason for humans exclusively. The elephant agrees to 
return to human form after Ulysses answers an objection about the potential for the human’s 
unique power of self-determination to go wrong. According to Ulysses, “all our errours, depende 
finally, by those partes of nature: that we have without reason, together and in common with you: 
and not by those by the which we are men.” (289). According to Ulysses, Pico’s “self-
transforming” human would only choose an animalistic existence because of animalistic qualities 
that the human has. Uniquely human reason, in contrast, leads a human to choose a higher form 
of life. 
 This paradoxical definition of the human is characteristic of Renaissance humanism. 
Erica Fudge describes the contradictions in Renaissance understandings of the human in the 
following way: 
If an animal is the thing that a human is not, and yet a human can cease to be (or 
never become) the thing it is, then an animal is something much more than other: 
it becomes kin. In early modern England, writers offered a way around this 
conundrum, but the solution did not clarify human status, it clouded it. Already 
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confusingly both born and made, natural and cultural, now humans emerge not as 
superior to animals, not even as animals, but as beings who are simultaneously 
human and animal.30 
Similarly, in a chapter on Pico’s “Oration,” Giorgio Agamben writes, “The anthropological 
machine of humanism is an ironic apparatus that verifies the absence of a nature proper to Homo, 
holding him suspended between a celestial and a terrestrial nature, between animal and human—
and thus his being always less and more than himself. […] The humanist discovery of man is the 
discovery that he lacks himself.”31 
 When Gelli’s elephant accepts Ulysses’s arguments, which are indebted to Pico, and 
expresses the desire to return to humanity, Gelli produces a version of this paradoxical 
Renaissance definition of the human, but with especially ambiguous consequences. On the one 
hand, Ulysses convinces the elephant, who has been a philosopher, to adopt, or re-adopt, the 
Renaissance view of the human as the creature with the unique ability for self-determination. 
This seems to endorse Pico’s view of man, as Gelli suggests that he intends to do in his 
dedication. Indeed, immediately upon his return to human form, Aglafemos exclaims, “Oh, what 
a fayre thynge, Oh, what a marveylous thing it is to be a man! Oh how well I nowe knowe it 
better then I did before, for I have proved the one and the other” (290). Aglafemos not only 
expresses enthusiasm for humanity in these lines but also inverts a motif from earlier dialogues 
and from Plutarch’s “Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti,” the model for Gelli’s series of dialogues. In 
Plutarch’s dialogue between Ulysses and Gryllus, a Greek whom Circe has transformed into a 
pig, Gryllus tells Ulysses that Gryllus and his fellow transformed creatures can best evaluate the 
                                                
30 Fudge, Brutal Reasoning, 60. 
31 Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004), 29-30. 
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merits of human and animal existences because they have experienced both states: “I shall 
quickly make you see that we are right to prefer our present life in place of the former one, now 
that we have tried both” (499). Gelli’s oyster adapts Gryllus’s words to express to Ulysses the 
oyster’s own conviction in the superiority of animal existence to human existence: “thou shalt 
see yf I that have proved thone life and thother, can shewe thee that, that is trewe that I saye” 
(16). Similarly, Gelli’s horse declares, “so much as I loved the beyng man, and not a beast, 
whiles I was a man: so much it woulde greve me, now that I have proved this other lyfe, to 
retourne from a horse to a man” (183). Regardless of whether a transformed creature explicitly 
voices such a sentiment, however, the oyster’s initial recapitulation of Gryllus’s argument 
informs each of the dialogues in which a transformed creature compares humans unfavorably 
with animals. Aglafemos, meanwhile, invokes the argument about knowing both human and 
animal states not at the beginning of his dialogue with Ulysses, as with the oyster and horse, but 
at the end of the dialogue, after Aglafemos has returned to human form. By inverting the 
Plutarchian convention in the final dialogue, Gelli seems to use Aglafemos to challenge the 
judgments that Gryllus, the oyster, the horse, and other transformed creatures have made about 
humans and animals. 
 On the other hand, by making the only animal to agree to return to human form an 
elephant, Gelli also seems to endorse ideas that elephants approach the human in intelligence, the 
faculty in which humans supposedly distinguish themselves most markedly from animals. 
Indeed, if we read the dialogue with the elephant in the contexts of the history of writing about 
elephants and the Circean tradition of transformation stories, we see that Gelli’s treatment of the 
elephant may undermine the notion of the unique human, despite Gelli’s declared intentions and 
the overt representation of the elephant in the final dialogue. As we shall see, elephants were 
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supposed to approach humans in three capacities that are crucial to both Renaissance conceptions 
of human nature and the themes of transformation stories in the Circean tradition: rhetoric, 
memory (especially of one’s native country), and religion. As we shall see, bipedal form is the 
only human-like characteristic that elephants are supposed in the Renaissance unambiguously to 
lack, but Gelli treats bipedalism in such a manner that he makes it inseparable form the human 
capacity for religion. Gelli suppresses, satirizes, or otherwise rejects these human-like 
characteristics of elephants in his dialogue with the elephant; but they motivate him to make 
Aglafemos an elephant; and he surely knew that readers would be familiar with contemporary 
conceptions of elephants. Thus, Gelli’s dialogue with the elephant, far from endorsing 
Renaissance views of human superiority, may use the example of the remarkably human-like 
elephant in order to dramatize the falsifications to beliefs about elephant nature that are 
necessary in order to continue believing that the human has points of uniqueness that make the 
human unambiguously superior to other animals. 
 
Elephant Orators 
 
In his version of the Circe episode, Gelli draws on the traditional characterization of 
Ulysses as an exceptionally persuasive orator. For instance, in The Odyssey, Athena praises 
Odysseus’s rhetorical skill: “you are fluent, and reason closely, and keep your head always.”32 
Like Plutarch, Gelli gives Ulysses the rhetorical challenge of defending human superiority. As 
we shall see, Gelli puts this rhetorical scene within the context of claims in Renaissance 
rhetorical manuals that the capacity for rhetoric itself distinguishes humans from the other 
                                                
32 Homer, The Odyssey of Homer, trans. Richmond Lattimore (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), 
page 206, line 332. 
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animals. Ulysses is particularly qualified to appear as the hero of the dialogues because he excels 
in this most properly human pursuit of rhetoric. His persuasion of the elephant to return to 
human form, however, tends rather to undermine notions of human superiority than to bolster 
them, for Ulysses’s ability to triumph over the elephant depends upon conceptions of elephants 
in natural histories as creatures who posses the rhetorical capacity, which is supposed by the 
rhetoricians to be exclusively human. By making the only character convinced to return to 
human form an elephant, Gelli dramatizes the distance between the rhetoricians’ definitions of 
humans and the natural historians’ claims for the similarity of elephants to humans. In the very 
act of conceding the superiority of humans to animals, Gelli’s elephant character dramatizes the 
proximity of elephants to humans, and thus the fragility of the notions of human superiority that 
Gelli’s elephant has accepted. 
The bargain between Circe and Ulysses turns upon persuading the transformed creatures 
to return to human form, and Gelli explicitly invokes the traditional characterization of Ulysses 
as a skilled orator at significant structural moments in the series of dialogues. When Ulysses 
initiates conversation with the oyster, his first animal interlocutor, he proposes that the oyster 
return to human form and receives this response: “Folowe that no farther Ulisses, for this thy 
wisdome and eloquence, for the which thou art so much praysed amongest thy Grecians, have no 
force at al with me” (15). Ulysses’s famous “wisdome and eloquence,” which perhaps create 
expectations that he will ultimately succeed in persuading the transformed creatures to return to 
humanity, are invoked just after the salutations of Ulysses and the oyster in the very first 
dialogue. Of course, the oyster warns Ulysses that his “wisdome and eloquence” will not succeed 
in convincing the oyster to return to human form, and this warning foreshadows the failures of 
ancient epic’s heroic orator to persuade most of the transformed creatures to return to their 
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former lives as humans. The oyster’s warning also introduces the theme that rhetoric alone may 
be insufficient to bring the transformed creatures back to humanity. 
At the end of the first dialogue, which contains the conversations with both the oyster and 
the mole, Ulysses reflects upon his own reputation as an orator. He doubts his own rhetorical 
abilities but then blames his failures with the oyster and the mole upon the intellectual 
deficiencies of those creatures: 
I know not wel whether I wake, or dreme: yf I wake truely I am no more the same 
Ulisses that I was wont to be, sins I have bene able to cause neyther of these 
twayne to beleve the trueth. And I heare tofore was wonte to perswade to my 
Gretians, what so ever I my selfe listed. But I think the default to come of them: 
for I have chaunced on two, who are not able to understand reason. (38) 
This passage constitutes yet another structurally significant moment—the end of the first 
dialogue—at which Gelli invokes the traditional characterization of Ulysses as a skilled orator. 
Gelli’s Ulysses defines himself so thoroughly in terms of the rhetorical abilities for which he is 
reputed in epic that he questions his self-sameness upon his failures with the oyster and the mole. 
(Interestingly this self-doubting comparison causes Gelli’s Ulysses to differ significantly from 
Homer’s Ulysses.) The failures of Gelli’s Ulysses are all the more disturbing because he believes 
that he has failed in spite of having “trueth” on his side, whereas in the past he has easily 
convinced his countrymen to adopt an arbitrary viewpoint—“what so ever I my selfe listed”—
regardless of its truth. It is a crisis for Ulysses because he now finds himself unable to convince 
others of what he believes to be the truth, which should presumably be easier than compelling 
assent to an arbitrary or self-interested perspective, as Ulysses claims to have done with great 
facility in the past. Ultimately, however, Ulysses explains the outcome of the dialogues not by 
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doubting his rhetorical powers but by inferring that the oyster and the mole lack the capacity “to 
understand reason.” 
 The characterization of Ulysses as an exemplary orator recurs in the final dialogue, after 
the elephant has returned to human form. In contrast to the oyster, who acknowledges Ulysses’s 
rhetorical skill but asserts his imperviousness to it, the elephant gratefully attributes his return to 
humanity to Ulysses’s rhetorical skill: “Ulisses I thanke thee moost highlye, that thou haste with 
thy learning caused me to knowe the trueth, and with thine eloquence hast allured me to folowe 
it” (290). The comments of the oyster and the elephant have an inverse and mirror-like 
relationship: the oyster, the first animal interlocutor, announces his imperviousness to Ulysses’s 
rhetorical ability near the beginning of their dialogue; the elephant, the last animal interlocutor, 
attributes his return to humanity to Ulysses’s rhetorical ability near the end of their dialogue. The 
elephant’s different response does not so much undercut the validity of the oyster’s perspective 
as expose the logic that governs the organization of Gelli’s dialogues and the formal elements 
that are necessary to produce different but plausible results in each dialogue. 
One essential formal element is the characterization of the transformed creatures as 
amenable or impervious to persuasion. As in Ulysses’s earlier comments about the influence of 
rhetoric on the talking animals, the elephant regards human superiority as “the trueth,” but 
according to the elephant, his recognition of that truth depends on Ulysses’s “eloquence,” as 
Ulysses suggests when he doubts himself, not on the creature’s own intellectual capabilities, as 
Ulysses suggests when he blames the oyster and the mole for their recalcitrance. Although the 
elephant exclusively credits Ulysses’s “learning” and “eloquence” for his transformation, the 
elephant’s transformation also depends upon his characterization as a uniquely persuadable 
creature, a characterization corroborated in natural history’s treatments of elephants. 
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Both Ulysses and Gelli’s elephant, once persuaded, define truth and reason in ways that 
assume the superiority of humans to animals. After failing to persuade five creatures to return to 
humanity, Ulysses accuses Circe of tricking him by not returning all of the mental faculties of 
the transformed creatures, as she has promised to do at the outset of the debates (13):  
I doute, that thou hast not restored to them with whom I have spoken, the power 
holely to discourse, as thou hast done the speache, accordinge as thou promisedst 
me, I have found them so farre distaunt from the truthe: and yf thys were soo, I 
should thinke thou haddest much deceyved me. For there is none of them that 
judgeth it not better, to be a beast then a man, the whiche I would never beleve 
they would saye, yf they coulde use reason truelye. (125-6) 
Paraphrasing Ulysses’s complaint as a syllogism exposes the circularity of his reasoning: reason 
is uniquely human; reason, as both a fact and an act of thinking, dictates that humans are superior 
to animals; the transformed creatures refuse to return to human form; therefore, they lack the 
reason that is proper to humans. Ulysses’s suspicion that Circe has lied is less significant than his 
taking for granted the idea that reasonableness depends upon recognizing the superiority of 
humans to animals because humans alone have reason. This conception of reason suggests that 
no transformed creature could accept Ulysses’s offer to return to human form without already 
possessing human reason, which would, in this view, qualify the transformed creature as already 
human by the most crucial criterion for humanity. 
 The elephants’ acceptance of this view of reason is a crucial moment in his conversion 
back to humanity, but the above analysis suggests that the elephant must already have uniquely 
human qualities, by Ulysses’s logic, in order to be persuaded. Ulysses tells the elephant: 
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he who knoweth that man is none other thing, then a reasonable creature, knoweth 
that every man is reasonable: and he who knoweth that a beast is none other then 
a corporall substaunce, animate of a sensitive soule: knoweth that every Dogge, 
and every Horse beyng a beast perceiveth. And besides this he is sure, that that, 
that he knoweth, is so: and he can not be deceyved: for he knoweth it by hys 
proper cause, forasmuche as the being man is cause, that this and the other 
perticuler man understandeth: and the beyng a beaste is occasion that this Dogge 
and that Horse perceiveth. (277) 
Once again, the tautology of Ulysses’s perspective becomes especially apparent through 
paraphrase: being human, as opposed to animal, means being reasonable, which means knowing 
that all humans are reasonable, and knowing it by the infallible workings of reason, which 
humans have by virtue of being human.  
To Ulysses’s claims, the elephant responds, “Surelye I beginne to knowe, that this your 
intellective knowledge, is far more noble, for the certeyntie thereof, then our sensitive knowledge 
is” (277). However, this response, and the elephant’s ultimate conversion, have the effect of 
satirizing rather than endorsing human superiority, for the tautology of Ulysses’s claims 
undercuts their plausibility even as the elephant claims, often enthusiastically, to be convinced. 
Two explanations seem possible: either the elephant, alone among the transformed creatures, 
possesses reason, which is supposed to be uniquely human; or the elephant, alone among the 
transformed creatures, is easily duped by Ulysses’s rhetoric. Both explanations, we shall see, 
draw upon contemporaneous beliefs about elephants; and both explanations compromise belief 
in the unique qualities of the human. 
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Comparing statements about Ulysses’s characterization as an effective orator by the 
oyster, the elephant, and Ulysses himself, and comparing comments by Ulysses and the elephant 
about the role of rhetoric in persuading audiences of the so-called truth of human superiority, 
suggest that the ability to be persuaded represents an important characteristic of the human. The 
role that Gelli gives to rhetoric in La Circe matches treatments of rhetoric in influential rhetorical 
manuals of the sixteenth century. These manuals repeatedly make the claim that rhetoric elevates 
humans above other animals, both defining the human in terms of supposedly unique intellectual 
abilities and imagining that rhetoric has played a crucial role in the founding of human 
civilization. Examining these rhetorical manuals suggests that Gelli has assimilated the 
preeminent orator of Greek epic to the ideal Renaissance orator, who persuades humans to 
become human. By convincing the elephant to return to human form, Gelli’s Ulysses reenacts the 
foundational victory of orators in establishing humans as fully human, but in a new context in 
which inconsistencies in beliefs about humans and animals add further difficulties to the logical 
problems already afflicting the idea that a creature must already have crucial human qualities in 
order to become fully human. 
The conception of eloquence as a faculty that distinguishes humans from the other 
animals and enables humans to overcome their own animal natures appears in numerous 
rhetorical manuals of the sixteenth century. For instance, in his 1523 Praise of Eloquence, Philip 
Melanchthon declares, “For my part, I do not see how people are even going to seem human to 
others if they cannot explain what they are thinking or follow that which is spoken correctly.”33 
In this view, the capacity for language is not enough to distinguish humans from animals, just as 
talking does not make the transformed creatures of La Circe human. In addition to speaking, 
                                                
33 Philip Melanchthon, The Praise of Eloquence, in Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric, trans. and 
ed. Wayne A. Rebhorn (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000), 101. 
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humans must be able to speak persuasively and to recognize when others have done so. Without 
these rhetorical skills, humans risk confusion with animals. 
The construction of rhetoric as humanizing also provides the basis, in many rhetorical 
manuals, for narratives about the origin of human civilization. Thomas Wilson’s 1553 Art of 
Rhetoric, for example, relates that post-lapsarian humans “lived brutishly in open fields” until 
divinely inspired orators “called them together by utterance of speech and persuaded them what 
was good, what was bad, and what was gainful for mankind.”34 Thanks to their capacity to be 
persuaded by eloquent speech, post-lapsarian humans rise above their animal existences: Wilson 
writes, “they became through nurture and good advisement, of wild, sober; of cruel, gentle; of 
fools, wise; and of beasts, men” (176). For Wilson, rhetoric distinguishes humans from animals: 
post-lapsarian humans live immorally, which supposedly makes them like animals, but the 
capacity to persuade and to be persuaded enables post-lapsarian humans to acknowledge and 
pursue a better, properly human way of life. 
George Puttenham’s 1589 Art of English Poesy contains a similar account of the origin of 
human civilization. Before the advent of eloquent speech, Puttenham writes, “the people 
remained in the woods and mountains, vagrant and dispersed like the wild beasts, lawless and 
naked, or very ill-clad, and of all good and necessary provision for harbor or sustenance utterly 
unfurnished, so as they little differed for their manner of life from the very brute beasts of the 
field.”35 Shared appreciation for and responsiveness to eloquent speech, however, enables 
humans to differentiate themselves from the animals that they would otherwise resemble. Poetry, 
                                                
34 Thomas Wilson, The Art of Rhetoric, in Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric, ed. Wayne A. 
Rebhorn (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000), 175. Subsequent citations appear 
in text. 
35 George Puttenham, The Art of English Poesy, in Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric, ed. Wayne 
A. Rebhorn (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000), 204. Subsequent citations 
appear in text. 
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which Puttenham calls “the first rhetoric of the world” (206), unites humans in “their first 
assemblies” (204). These gatherings, in which poets recite compositions for an audience, are 
incipient civilizations, and Puttenham claims, “The profession and use of poesy is most ancient 
from the beginning, and not as many erroneously suppose, after, but before any civil society was 
among men” (204). Once again, the capacities to deliver and to respond to eloquent speech not 
only are uniquely human but also play crucial roles in a narrative about how human beings 
overcome their animality. 
This conception of rhetoric is far from unique to Wilson or Puttenham. As Wayne 
Rebhorn notes, Wilson and Puttenham derive their narratives from ancient texts by Cicero, 
Quintilian, and Horace.36 These narratives can be seen to exemplify Fudge’s and Agamben’s 
claims about the paradoxes of Renaissance understandings of the human, in addition to providing 
a crucial context for the debates between Gelli’s Ulysses and the eleven talking animals. 
By persuading the transformed creatures to acknowledge human superiority and to return 
to human form, Ulysses hopes to repeat the narratives according to which primeval orators have 
convinced humans to abandon animal existences in favor of properly human ways of life. After 
Ulysses has futilely advanced his case to five creatures, his explanation of the intractability of the 
creatures resembles an incipient version of rhetoricians’ narratives of the origin of human 
civilization: 
Our wise menne of Gretia are wont to saye, that they, who can be counsailed by 
them selves, to live well and honestly, are put in the first degree of virtue. And 
they that can not of them selves, but believe the counsel of those who are wiser 
then they, are put in the second degree: but he that can not of him selfe, nor yet 
                                                
36 Wayne A. Rebhorn, ed., Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 2000), 175 n. 5, 204 n. 3. 
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will take counsel of others, is thought by them not worthy to be numbred among 
men. And of this sort are they with whom I have spoken: So that it is no marvaile, 
though they wyll not become men againe. (126-7) 
Although Gelli’s Ulysses does not tell a fully developed origin story, his arguments provide the 
basic materials for a script that closely resembles the subsequent narratives of Wilson and 
Puttenham. Ulysses explains the transformed creatures’ desires to remain animals by reflecting 
that amenability to persuasion distinguishes humans from animals. The creatures refusing 
transformation into humans lack the crucial trait that enables the creation of human civilization 
in Wilson’s and Puttenham’s narratives. Ulysses imagines himself, meanwhile, as a member of 
an elite class of humans, like Wilson’s inspired orators and Puttenham’s poets, who are agents 
rather than patients of persuasion. Allowing oneself to be persuaded, however, is an adequate 
criterion for human status for Ulysses, Wilson, and Puttenham. When Gelli’s dialogues 
repeatedly give not-quite-human creatures the opportunity to accept or to refuse humanity, they 
play out rhetoricians’ stories of the origin of humanity at the level of individual characters. 
 Of course, to consent to return to humanity, the transformed creatures must already be 
amenable to persuasion, and only the elephant, who still seems human in many ways, possesses 
the persuadability that is supposed to distinguish human from animal. As I argue above, only the 
elephant is willing, and even eager, to hear Ulysses’s arguments. At the moment of his 
persuasion, the elephant declares, “No more, no more Ulisses, cause me nowe to leave this 
beastyshe nature, and to become man agayne, for my losse was to great, to have bene so longe 
tyme converted by Cyrces into an Elephante” (289). Since Aglafemos agrees to return to 
humanity because of a newfound appreciation of the “losse” that he has suffered, his conversion 
to humanity ostensibly confirms Ulysses’s arguments about human superiority. However, in the 
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elephant’s amenability to persuasion, the elephant already possesses a supposedly crucial 
attribute of the human—an attribute that decides the difference between human and animal not 
only in common constructions of rhetoric but also in the bargain that Ulysses strikes with Circe. 
Further undermining the elephant’s endorsement of human superiority, natural historians 
frequently portray the elephant as an animal with rhetorical capabilities. Thus, the trait that 
enables Aglafemos to accept Ulysses’s arguments turns out not to be properly human, which 
compromises the hierarchy of human over animal envisioned by the rhetoricians and Ulysses. 
Indeed, Gelli has arguably made the only animal to return to humanity an elephant with the 
awareness of this natural historical tradition and with the intention of dramatizing the conflict 
between rhetoricians’ celebration of rhetoric as uniquely human and natural historians’ 
recognition of rhetorical capacities in elephants. 
The elephant’s responsiveness to rhetoric emerges unmistakably in an anecdote that 
Topsell borrows from Plutarch. Topsell relates, “Plutarch affirmeth, that in Rome a boy pricking 
the trunke of an Elephant with a goad, the beast caught him, and lift him up into the aire to 
shoote him away and kill him: but the people and standers by seeing it, made so great a noise and 
crye thereat, that the beast set him downe again faire and softly without any harme to him at all; 
as if he thought it sufficient to have put him in feare of such a death” (210). Although the 
humans in this anecdote address the elephant with only inarticulate sounds, they succeed in 
communicating their objections to the elephant’s manifest intention to kill the boy. For Topsell, 
the elephant’s change of mind testifies to the elephant’s sense of justice: the elephant overcomes 
his initial outrage and settles on a punishment that is proportionate to the boy’s crime. Indeed, 
Topsell has earlier affirmed that elephants have a conception of justice when he writes, 
“Antipater supposeth that they have a kinde of divination or divine understanding of law and 
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equity” (208). (Interestingly, the religiosity of the elephant is also apparent in this sentiment.) 
Since the crowd convinces the elephant not to kill the boy, however, Plutarch’s anecdote also 
testifies to the elephant’s human-like capacity to be persuaded to abandon one course of action 
for another. 
Pliny’s natural history contains an anecdote in which humans and elephants switch roles 
in the rhetorical scene. According to Pliny, Pompey hopes to impress the Romans with the 
spectacle of elephants slain by human gladiators, but the elephants, on the point of death, do 
something that Pompey does not expect. Realizing the futility of continuing to fight for their 
lives, the elephants address the audience: 
But those Elephants of Pompey being past all hope of escaping and going cleere 
away, after a most pittifull manner and rufull plight that cannot be expressed, 
seemed to make mone unto the multitude, craving mercie and pitie, with greevous 
plaints and lamentations, bewailing their hard state and wofull case: in such sort, 
that the peoples hearts earned againe at this piteous sight, and with teares in their 
eies, for very compassion, rose up all at once from beholding this pageant, 
without regard of the person of Pompey that great Generall and Commaunder, 
without respect of his magnificence and stately shew, of his munificence and 
liberalitie, where he thought to have woon great applause and honour at their 
hands; but in lieu thereof fell to cursing of him, and wishing all those plagues and 
misfortunes to light upon his head; which soone after ensued accordingly. (bk. 8, 
ch. 7, p. 196) 
In Cicero’s account of this combat, he says that the crowd experiences “an impulse of 
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compassion, a feeling that the monsters had something human about them.”37 Cicero claims that 
the crowd attributes human characteristics to the elephants; as Martha Nussbaum explains, 
Cicero specifically says that the humans acknowledge “societas,” which Nussbaum translates as 
“a relation of commonality,” between themselves and the elephants.38 Cicero, however, does not 
figure the elephants as agents who actively solicit or arouse the crowd’s empathy. In contrast, 
Pliny’s account makes the elephants orators who not only move the crowd by expressions of 
their suffering but also succeed in turning the crowd against the tyrant Pompey, who has 
arranged a spectacle that the crowd now regards as unjust for its exploitation of human-like 
beings. The alleged impact of these elephant orators on human politics drives home the point that 
their command of rhetoric approaches or equals that of human orators. 
 Gelli’s elephant, who attends to Ulysses’s arguments and assents to them too easily, 
possesses an exaggerated version of the elephant’s characteristic persuadability but lacks the 
rhetorical prowess of Pliny’s elephant orators. Gelli, nevertheless, uses the elephant’s name to 
make an implicit and ironic reference to elephant orators. The name “Aglafemos” derives from 
two ancient Greek words: the prefix derives from the word for “splendid”; the suffix, from the 
word for “utterance prompted by the gods,” or more generally, “speech.”39 Aglafemos’s name 
thus means something like “splendid speaker,” with the suggestion that Aglafemos speaks with 
divine inspiration, as he supposedly does when he gives thanks to the creator immediately upon 
                                                
37 Cicero, “Letter 24,” in Letters to Friends, trans. and ed. D. R. Shackleton Bailey, The Loeb 
Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press,  
2001), 1:175-7. 
38 Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership 
(Cambridge, Mass.; and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 325. 
39 Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ed. Sir Henry Stuart Jones 
and Roderick McKenzie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 11, 1925. For assistance with 
translating this name, I am grateful to an anonymous library patron at the University of 
California, Berkeley, and to Lindsay Sears. 
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his return to human form. 
Viewed in the context of natural history’s rhetorical elephants, however, Aglafemos’s 
name becomes ironic, for Gelli has made his elephant not an agent of persuasion but an 
exceptionally tractable patient. Gelli intends for his readers to notice the difference between 
Aglafemos and the intelligent and rhetorically skilled elephants of natural histories, to whom 
Aglafemos’s name alludes. Calling attention to Aglafemos’s departure from typical 
representations of elephants, Gelli suggests that Aglafemos’s transition from elephant to human 
only becomes impressive if beliefs about the considerable intelligence and rhetorical abilities of 
elephants are suppressed, as they are in the rhetorical manuals of the sixteenth century. As Gelli 
produces his subtle critique of Renaissance humanism, such rhetorical manuals become objects 
of satire. 
 
Elephant Memory and Homelands 
 
 Ulysses’s bargain with Circe not only gives rhetoric a primary role in deciding the 
difference between animal and human but also equates the desire to return to human form with 
the desire to return home. In his opening speech, Ulysses declares to Circe, “the love of my 
country, and the desyre, (after soo long wandring) to see my most dere frendes, stirre me 
continually to depart from the, and to retourne to mine owne house” (11). Ulysses opens the 
dialogues by claiming that he has recalled his homeland and friends “continually,” and he 
expects that the transformed creatures retain their sense of belonging to their native country and 
share his desire to return home. Ulysses says to Circe, “But before my departure, I would gladly 
knowe yf amonge those, whome thou hast transfourmed into Lyons, Wolves, Beares, and other 
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beastes, there be anye Gretian?” (11). Subsequently, he explains the reason for this question: 
“The cause whye I have asked thee mooste faire Circes, yf amongest those whom thou haste 
transfourmed into beastes, there be anye Gretian, is for that I would desyre to obtaine by my 
requeste at thy hande, that they myghte be restored unto their humayne beynge, and I lede them 
agayne with me into their owne countrey” (12). In both of these quotations, the verb tense in the 
phrase “there be anye Gretian” reveals that Ulysses still counts the transformed Gretians as his 
compatriots. Ulysses’s ambition is not merely to restore his compatriots to human shape but also 
to return them to Greece, where they can once again participate in a human national community. 
Accordingly, the dialogues conclude only after Ulysses finds a transformed Gretian willing to 
return to his former shape and eager to return to his country.40 Addressing Aglafemos, Ulysses 
speaks the work’s closing lines: “Then let us go, for I desier no thing else: and I perceive alrely 
[sic] that the goddes (alwayes favourable unto him, that seketh after the beste sorte he can to be 
lyke unto them) geue us newe windes, very apte and prosperous for our navigation” (295). 
Gelli’s dialogues are complete not upon a transformed creature’s return to humanity, but only 
upon the commencement of the return voyage, which Ulysses has desired since the opening of 
the dialogues. 
 As we shall see, Gelli’s Circe treats patriotic sentiment as a crucial aspect of humanity. 
Aglafemos, the only animal who displays this sentiment, is also the only animal who receives 
transformation into a human. As with rhetorical ability, however, elephants are imagined to 
possess a concept of a native country and to be able to remember their native country after 
departing from it, so traits that are supposed to be uniquely human once again turn out to be 
                                                
40 I follow Iden’s text in using the now obsolete term “Gretian” to mean “A native or inhabitant 
of Greece; a Greek.” See The Oxford English Dictionary, Online ed., s.v. “Grecian” (entry dated 
1989). For clarity, I use “Greek” only to refer to the Greek language. Occasionally, I use 
“Gretian” as an adjective, but always to refer to a national, not linguistic, community. 
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shared by elephants, undermining the significance of Aglafemos’s physical transformation from 
elephant to human. 
While Ulysses regards the transformed Gretians as compatriots, the animals generally 
introduce themselves in ways that indicate that national affiliation presupposes humanity and that 
the temporarily restored ability to speak the Greek language does not qualify them as members 
of the Gretian community. To identify himself, the oyster declares, “A Gretian I was, before I 
was chaunged into an Oyster” (15). Although the mole subsequently describes the oyster as “this 
other Gretian” (29), which implies that the mole conceives of not only the oyster but also himself 
as Gretian, the mole introduces himself to Ulysses unambiguously, and with nearly the same 
language as the oyster: “A Gretian I was whiles I was man” (29). The goat subsequently 
introduces himself to Ulysses in the same words: “A Gretian I was whyles I was man” (104). 
Except for altering the syntax and adding an indefinite article, the horse repeats the statement 
again: “I was a Gretian whiles I was a man” (185). The hind introduces herself somewhat 
differently, but she nevertheless agrees that she has lost her membership in the Gretian 
community upon her transformation. After Ulysses reveals his nationality, the hind says, “I 
lykewise was of Gretia, but I was a woman, before I was thus chaunged by Circes into an hynde” 
(128).41 Less emphatically than these animals, but no less clearly, the lion tells Ulysses, “I was a 
Gretian” (153), and the elephant says, “I was a Gretian, and of the most famous citie of Athenes, 
where I studied philosophye a very longe time, and my name was Aglafemos” (255). In all of 
these cases, the use of the past-tense “was” indicates that the animals no longer identify 
themselves as Gretians. Moreover, the oyster, mole, goat, hind, and horse explicitly declare what 
                                                
41 The word “woman” can only describe a human; throughout its history, it has meant “An adult 
female human being.” The Oxford English Dictionary, Online ed., s.v. “woman” (entry dated 
1989). 
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the lion and the elephant also imply: they have lost their national affiliations at the moment of 
their transformations. According to the animals, national affiliation is a human prerogative. 
Gelli elaborates the distinction between speaking Greek and being Gretian particularly in 
the dialogues with the lion, dog, and calf. The lion tells Ulysses, “I was a Gretian, as thou also 
shouldest be, yf the speach that thou speakest be naturall to thee” (153). The understanding of 
Greek that the lion has temporarily regained enables him to recognize Ulysses as a Gretian. Even 
though Greek is “naturall” to both Ulysses and the lion in the sense that it is their native 
language, the talking lion still does not believe that his affiliation with the Greek linguistic 
community qualifies him for membership in the Gretian national community. Indeed, the lion’s 
use of the past tense in the phrase “was a Gretian” disavows his former Gretian identity. The dog 
and the calf similarly recognize Ulysses as a Gretian based on his speech while disavowing their 
former affiliations as Gretians. The dog confides, “I knewe thee by thy tongue” (202), but then 
expresses his desire for Ulysses to join him in an animal existence, to be “transfourmed by 
Cyrces into some beaste as I am” (203), which would entail the loss of both Greek speech and 
Gretian status. The calf identifies himself to Ulysses as being “of the selfe same countrye that 
thou also art, yf that that thou speakest be thine owne proper language” (226), but then refuses to 
return to Gretia by saying, “where one is well there is hys countrye” (227). With this re-
definition of “countrye” in relation only to the calf’s own contentment, the calf utterly rejects 
membership in—and responsibility to—a wider community, which is crucial to Ulysses’s 
understanding of “countrye,” the ideal that motivates him to converse with the transformed 
creatures before he leaves Circe’s island for Greece. 
Ulysses counts the transformed creatures as Gretians, in spite of their animal forms, until 
the middle of the dialogues, when he accepts the perspective of the transformed creatures on 
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their national identity: that they no longer count as Gretians. Ulysses perseveres, nevertheless, in 
his attempt to return the transformed creatures to humanity and the Gretian community. Prior to 
the dialogue with the lion, Ulysses’s invitations for animals to identify themselves by their 
countries of origin almost always use forms of to be assuming that the transformed creatures 
retain their national affiliations. When Ulysses meets the oyster, he says, “I also woulde call thee 
by thy name yf I knewe it. But if thou be a Gretian as Cyrces hath tolde me, it may please thee to 
tell it me” (14-5). Ulysses’s use of the subjunctive form “be” implies that the oyster is a Gretian 
even now that he has become an oyster. Likewise, Ulysses addresses the mole: “I may cause thee 
to retourne man, and deliver the from this place and to leade thee agayne with me, into thy 
countrye, so that thou be a Gretian as she [Circe] tolde me” (29). Ulysses tells the snake, “it is in 
my power to make thee retourne man, for Cyrces whom I have praied, for the love I beare unto 
you, because we are of one country, hath graunted it me” (43). When the hare asks what 
motivates Ulysses’s questions about the hare’s human past, Ulysses answers, “The love that one 
naturallye beareth unto those that are of hys Countrey, and this hath caused me to desyre of 
Cyrces, to restore unto all my Gretians, the shape of man. And for that I understode by her, that 
thou were one of them, I would do the this pleasure: because I also am a Gretian, and am called 
Ulisses” (75-6). Ulysses uses the past-tense “were” to refer to the hare’s national identity, but 
only so that the verb tense of the subordinate clause agrees with the tense of the main clause, 
which reports a past event, Circe’s comments about the hare. More indicative of Ulysses’s view 
of the hare is his declaration “I also am a Gretian,” which affirms that Ulysses and the hare share 
a national affiliation. The significance of the phrase emerges especially clearly by contrast with 
the hind’s subsequent statement to Ulysses that she “lykewise was of Gretia” (128). With 
“lykewise” or “also,” the hind and Ulysses compare animal and human, but the hind’s “was” 
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indicates that she no longer identifies herself as a Gretian, whereas Ulysses’s “am” indicates that 
he regards the hare as no less Gretian than himself. Ulysses continues to assume that Gretian 
status survives transformation when he calls to the goat: “Goate, O Gote, harken I praye thee, yf 
thou be a Gretian as Circes hath tolde me” (104).  
 Repeatedly in these statements, Ulysses attributes the information that the animals are 
Greek to Circe, but in each case, he misconstrues what Circe has intimated about the animals. At 
the beginning of the dialogues, Ulysses tells Circe, “I would gladly knowe yf amonge those, 
whome thou hast transfourmed into Lyons, Wolves, Beares, and other beastes, there be anye 
Gretian?” (11). Although Circe’s response, “Yea there are manye my most dere Ulisses” (11), 
uses a present-tense form of to be and thus implies that transformation has not altered the 
animals’ identities as Greeks, Circe is generally quite clear that the animals have lost their claims 
to membership in a national community. When Circe directs Ulysses to the oyster and the mole, 
she very specifically says that they “heretofore were men and Gretians” (14; my italics). Linking 
humanity and Gretian identity but placing “Gretians” after “men,” the zeugma in this clause 
makes humanity a pre-condition for national affiliation, though Ulysses misses the suggestion. 
Of the snake, Circe similarly says, “as I remember me, he whome I chaunged into her, was a 
Gretian” (41). Circe recalls the nationality of Cleomenes, who has become a goat, with even 
greater confidence: “he also (as I well remember) was a Gretian” (104). As she encourages 
Ulysses to speak to each of these creatures, Circe consistently uses past-tense forms of to be and 
implies that the animals have lost their former national affiliations. Circe even distinguishes the 
snake from “he whome I chaunged into her,” as though the snake and the Greek physician 
Agesimus have entirely different identities. A similar but implicit distinction between human and 
animal underlies each of Circe’s remarks about the former nationalities of the transformed 
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creatures, but Ulysses repeatedly misunderstands Circe and assumes that the transformed 
creatures continue to be Gretians.  
In the case of the hare, Ulysses’s misunderstanding is particularly dramatic. Circe says 
only, “I have graunted him to speake” (73); she does not even mention the hare’s nationality. 
Ulysses, nevertheless, assumes that Circe’s remark means that the hare numbers among “all my 
Gretians” (75). While Circe merely means to convey to Ulysses that the hare speaks Greek, 
Ulysses misunderstands Circe’s remark to mean that the hare has continued to belong to the 
Gretian national community in spite of his loss of human form. Ulysses has not yet learned to 
distinguish the animals’ command of Greek from their former Gretian identities, a topic 
broached in the pivotal dialogue with the lion and pursued further in the dialogues with the dog 
and the calf. 
In the first five dialogues, Circe directs Ulysses to his animal interlocutors, and Ulysses 
mistakenly assumes that Circe thinks of them as Gretians. When the oyster answers Ulysses’s “if 
thou be a Gretian as Cyrces hath tolde me” (14-5) with “A Gretian I was, before I was chaunged 
into an Oyster” (15), the oyster may intend to correct Ulysses, especially if a reader of the 
dramatic dialogues imagines emphasis on the oyster’s “was,” as might plausibly occur in staging 
the dialogues or reading them aloud. The mole and goat similarly seem to correct Ulysses in their 
introductions, making the contrast between the perspectives of Ulysses and these animals 
particularly stark. 
In the remaining dialogues, Ulysses meets his animal interlocutors without any directions 
from Circe, but beginning with the dialogue with the lion, Ulysses adopts the perspective, shared 
by Circe and the animals themselves, that national membership depends upon humanity. The 
dialogue with the hind follows the dialogue with the goat; but since the hind rather than Ulysses 
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broaches the topic of nationality by asking, “Arte thou a Gretian” (128), Ulysses makes no 
statement revealing his own preconceptions about animal nationality in this dialogue. When 
Ulysses addresses a pride of lions in the ensuing dialogue, however, he says, “tell me is here 
anye of you, who, whiles he was man, was a Gretian?” (152). When Ulysses has previously 
asked animals to identify themselves as Gretians, he has used forms of to be indicating that he 
identifies the animals as Gretians in the present. The meeting with the lions is the first occasion 
in which Ulysses uses a past-tense form of to be to talk about a transformed creature’s national 
affiliation. The clause “who, whiles he was a man, was a Gretian” even resembles quite closely 
the earlier statements of the mole and goat and the subsequent statement of the horse. After one 
lion answers, “I was a Gretian, as thou also shouldest be, yf the speach that thou speakest be 
naturall to thee” (153), Ulysses lapses into his prior mode of thinking by responding, “Yea, I am 
also a Gretian” (153). Although the lion distinguishes his former status as a Gretian quite 
explicitly from Ulysses’s current status as a Gretian, Ulysses’s “am also” overlooks the 
difference between the animal and human and repeats an error that Ulysses has made when he 
tells the hare, “I also am a Gretian” (76). 
Despite this lapse in his conversation with the lion, Ulysses clearly distinguishes animal 
from human in the subsequent dialogues with the horse, calf, and elephant. Awestruck by the 
beauty of the horse, Ulysses remarks, “the beholdinge him hath taken me in such sort, that I 
would desier that he, who was chaunged into him, had ben a Gretian” (182). Ulysses not only 
uses the past-tense “had ben” to describe the horse’s status as “a Gretian” but also explicitly 
differentiates the horse from the human “who was chaunged into him.” The resemblance of 
Ulysses’s remark about the horse to Circe’s earlier remark about the snake—“he whome I 
chaunged into her, was a Gretian” (41)—drives home the point that Ulysses has converted to 
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Circe’s view that animals do not have national identifications. Ulysses also adopts Circe’s 
language as he resolves to approach the calf—“I will see, if he, who was chaunged into him, was 
by chaunce a Gretian” (227)—and as he contemplates the elephant—“howe glad I would be, that 
he who was turned into him, had bene a Gretian” (254). Carefully differentiating between animal 
and human identities, Ulysses now understands that transformation into an animal eliminates 
national affiliation. 
Providing further evidence of the change in Ulysses’s perspective, he uses past-tense 
forms of to be when he asks the horse, calf and elephant to identify themselves by nationality. 
Addressing the horse, he asks, “what countrieman were thou, before thou wer thus made by 
Cyrces?” (182-3). He similarly inquires about the calf’s nationality: “who were thou, and of what 
place, before thou haddest this shape?” (227). Ulysses implores the elephant, “Tell me 
Elephaunt, yf thou were a man, (as I thinke thou wer) before thou haddest this shape, what thou 
were” (255). In addressing these three creatures, Ulysses specifically inquires about their 
identities “before” their transformations. Moreover, he uses past-tense forms of to be and thus 
discontinues his earlier practice of asking an animal, such as the oyster, “if thou be a Gretian” 
(12). This shift in Ulysses’s perspective becomes apparent in the dialogue with the lion and is 
evidenced in every subsequent dialogue, except for the dialogue with the dog, who hails Ulysses, 
takes the lead in making introductions, and thus prevents Ulysses from framing a question about 
the dog’s country of origin.  
Considering the dialogues as a whole, it seems likely that Gelli has deliberately structured 
them so that Ulysses changes his perspective in the dialogue with the lion. In the first five 
dialogues, Ulysses believes that the transformed humans may still be Gretians. This is certainly 
true of the dialogues with the oyster, mole, and goat, and it is arguably true of the third and 
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fourth dialogues, which feature the snake and the hare, respectively. In the dialogue with the 
hind, which represents the midpoint of La Circe, the hind divulges her nationality before Ulysses 
can question her about it. Therefore, this dialogue cannot be categorized among the preceding or 
subsequent dialogues with certainty. The ambiguity of this dialogue, however, enables Gelli to 
balance, approximately, the number of dialogues in which Ulysses assumes the transformed 
humans are Gretians with the number of dialogues in which Ulysses doubts that an animal can 
belong to a national community. Although Ulysses does not ask about nationality in the dialogue 
with the dog, he specifically asks if the transformed animals have formerly been Gretians in the 
other dialogues from the last half of La Circe. Ulysses does lapse into his former way of thinking 
in the dialogue with the lion, but that fact reinforces the interpretation that Ulysses develops a 
new way of thinking about nationality near the middle of La Circe: judging by the questions that 
he poses to the animals, Ulysses reverts to his old view only in the seventh dialogue, when he has 
just begun to test his new hypothesis that nationality is an exclusively human prerogative. 
Two dialogues, in similar structural positions, address the topic of national affiliation at 
length, and they both highlight the importance of the desire to return home, which is the goal of 
both Homer’s Odysseus and Gelli’s Ulysses and which is eventually recognized as a criterion of 
humanity by Gelli’s Ulysses. When Ulysses hails the goat, the following dialogue ensues: 
Ulysses: Goate, O Gote, harken I praye thee, yf thou be a Gretian as Circes hath 
tolde me. 
Goat: A Gretian I was whyles I was man, and my name was Cleomenes of 
Corinthe: but nowe am I not, neyther yet would I be. 
Ulysses: What, arte thou perchaunce ashamed of thy contrye? 
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Goat: Not so: For there is none peradventure more honorable then that, in all the 
worlde. 
Ulysses: What is that then, that thou wouldeste not. 
Goat: Become man agayne. (104-5) 
Using the past-tense verb “was,” the goat no longer claims membership in the Gretian nation. 
Indeed, the goat quite specifically declares that his identity as a Gretian has ended 
simultaneously with his humanity. He disavows both his personal human name and the 
designation “of Corinthe,” which has previously affiliated him with a specific civic community. 
The goat’s denials of his past identifications become especially emphatic when he says, “nowe 
am I not,” a statement distinguishing the speaking goat from his former identity as “Cleomenes 
of Corinthe.” Although the goat has temporarily regained the ability to speak Greek, the goat 
uses that ability to disavow his membership in the Gretian national community, which depends 
upon belonging to the human species, as the goat makes clear in the excerpt. Declaring, “neyther 
yet would I be,” the goat has no desire to become a Gretian once again. In response to Ulysses’s 
inquiries, the goat clarifies that his statements are motivated not by any special animosity toward 
Greece—indeed, he admires Greece more than any other country—but rather by his absolute 
refusal to “Become man agayne.” Despite his admiration for Greece, the goat has no desire to be 
a Gretian because national affiliation requires a return to humanity, which the goat refuses. 
The calf occupies a structural position analogous to that of the goat: in both cases, the 
dialogues precede an exceptional dialogue (the dialogue with the only former woman, in the case 
of the goat; the dialogue with the only creature to return to human form, in the case of the calf). 
Moreover, the fifth dialogue, the dialogue with the goat, is the last dialogue in which Ulysses 
clearly mistakes the animal speaker for a Gretian, and the tenth dialogue, the dialogue with the 
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calf, is the last dialogue in which the animal speaker refuses to return to Greece. Ulysses and the 
calf discuss patriotic affiliation, and the reasons that the calf does not wish to return home, at 
length: 
Ulysses: Calfe, tell me, (as he who may do it, geve thee that thou most desirest) 
who were thou, and of what place, before thou haddest this shape? 
Calf: Even of the selfe same countrye that thou also art, yf that that thou speakest 
be thine owne proper language. 
Ulysses: Then thou shouldest desire alsoo to returne to see Gretia thy countrye 
againe, aswell as I doo, 
Calf: No truelye. For where one is well there is hys countrye: but this commeth of 
the beinge that I nowe have, that thoughe I might well, I woulde in no wise 
become manne agayne, and havynge to remaine thus as I am, this is so fruitfull 
and so pleasaunt a place, that I wil in no wise chaunge it. 
Ulysses: Doeth no remembraunce at all move the, either of kindred, or of frendes, 
that thou lefte there in the countrye, to desyre to se them againe, or at the least the 
country it selfe, the love wherof is so great, that there have benne manye, who for 
cause thereof, have not pardoned anye thinge, even unto their owne life. 
Calf: And thys is one of the bourdens that man hath, to have almost alwaies mo 
thoughtes, and mo cares in his mind, because of his kindred, of his frendes, or of 
his country, then he hath of him selfe: the whiche causeth that I wil remaine in 
this state, where I thinke not, or most litle, but for my selfe, whereby I live 
without any thought at al, togethers with thothers of my kind, never being 
troubled by them. (227-8) 
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The calf identifies himself to Ulysses as being “of the selfe same countrye that thou also art,” but 
the calf’s use of the present-tense form of to be departs only superficially from the practice of 
many other animals, who use past-tense forms of to be to distance themselves from their 
identities as humans and Gretians. The question that Ulysses poses asks specifically about the 
calf’s human past, and the calf uses the present-tense “art” to acknowledge that Ulysses currently 
belongs to the national community to which the calf has originally belonged. The calf 
emphasizes the similarity between himself and Ulysses when the calf says that he and Ulysses 
come from “the selfe same countrye,” but it is only the calf’s former self that is Gretian. 
From this common origin, Ulysses incorrectly infers that the calf also shares his wish to 
return to Greece, and two conflicting perspectives on national affiliation emerge in the following 
exchange. Ulysses’s patriotism entails, first, a wish “to returne to see Gretia.” Memory of human 
fellowship and “the country it selfe” motivate that wish. Finally, patriotic affiliation manifests 
itself as selfless commitment to an ideal, to such an extent that humans risk or sacrifice their 
lives for their countries. The calf offers an alternative perspective on homeland: it is “where one 
is well.” Because he is content on Circe’s island, the calf has no desire to return to Greece with 
Ulysses. As Ulysses questions the calf, Ulysses hypothesizes that a deficient memory may 
explain the calf’s refusal to return to Greece. If Ulysses is correct, the full implications of that 
fault of memory become clear as the calf describes concern for others and for country as “one of 
the bourdens that man hath.” Having lost memory of his compatriots, the calf regards affiliation 
with a community as unpleasant; indeed, the calf’s ironic use of the word “bourdens” suggests 
that the calf may prefer the physical burdens with which humans load cattle to the psychological 
burdens of caring about others. Accordingly, the calf’s conception of home refers only to the 
well-being of the isolated individual—it is “where one is well” (my italics)—while Ulysses’s 
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conception of home refers to the relationships of the individual to other human beings and to the 
abstraction “country,” which defines a community of humans living in proximity to one another 
and sharing a language as well as social and political institutions. The calf has the company of 
“thothers of my kind,” a phrase that acknowledges the calf’s sense of belonging to a species, but 
otherwise the calf imagines himself as an isolated individual: “I thinke not, or most litle, but for 
my selfe, whereby I live without any thought at al, togethers with thothers of my kind, never 
being troubled by them.” The calf denies not only his former national affiliation but also any 
kind of affective identification with other creatures, including his human family and friends as 
well as his animal fellows. From the perspective of Ulysses, the calf has an insufficiently vivid 
memory, especially of his human past, but the calf views the lack of communal affiliations as an 
advantage of an animal existence: as a calf, he never worries about “being troubled” by the 
plights of others. To Ulysses, though, the calf does not have merely a different concept of home; 
the calf no longer has a home at all: “even as you have not made anye distinction of thine, and 
mine, so also have you no country” (247). 
 The Circe episode of Homer’s Odyssey offers a precedent for treating the lack of a desire 
for homecoming as a fault of memory, but not as a crucial component of humanity. In 
Chapman’s translation of The Odyssey, Circe offers food and drink to members of Odysseus’s 
crew, “But harmefull venoms, she commixt with these; / That made their Countrey vanish from 
their thought.”42 Richmond Lattimore’s modern translation of The Odyssey agrees that Circe 
gives the crew “malignant drugs, to make them forgetful of their own country.”43 Preceding their 
                                                
42 George Chapman, trans., Homer's Odysses. Translated According to the Greeke By. Geo: 
Chapman (London: Imprinted by Rich: Field, for Nathaniell Butter, n.d.), page 151, no line 
numbers. Subsequent citations appear in text by page number. 
43 Homer, The Odyssey of Homer, trans. Richmond Lattimore (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), 
page 158, line 236. Subsequent citations appear in text by page and line number. 
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transformation into pigs, the vitiation of the crew’s memories represents a significant alteration 
of their normal faculties but not a loss of their essential humanity. Chapman is quite specific that 
the transformed crew “still retaind the soules they had before” (151). Chapman’s translation 
accurately represents the original text’s assertion that the crew have become animals only in 
bodily form: “the minds within them stayed as they had been / before” (Lattimore p. 158, ll. 240-
1). Furthermore, to corrupt the memories of the crew, Circe uses a magical agent distinct from 
the “rod that wrought / Their transformation” (Chapman p. 151). Circe’s use of one magical 
agent to corrupt the crew’s memories and another to transform them into animals supports the 
interpretation that the first change remains distinct from—and incomparable to—the subsequent 
change, which makes a profound alteration in the crew’s bodies.44 Since the crew never lose their 
human “soules” (Chapman) or “minds” (Lattimore), the alteration of their memory does not 
deprive them of their human ontological status, as their transformations deprive them of their 
human forms. When Gelli uses the lack of a desire to return to Greece to figure the talking 
animals’ loss of humanity, and makes the loss of national affiliation concurrent with the loss of 
humanity, he adapts the treatment of memory in The Odyssey in a way that reflects the 
intervening influence of Plutarch’s dialogue, which, as the previous chapter argues, innovates the 
Circe episode by imagining that humanity is precariously close to animality. 
Gelli’s treatment of memory also relates to early modern commonplaces about the 
differences between the mnemonic faculties of humans and animals. As Erica Fudge explains, 
                                                
44 Leonora Leet Brodwin offers a similar account of the distinction between forgetting 
homelands and becoming animals in Homer’s Circe episode: “The brutish transformation is the 
result of a drugged condition which enslaves but does not destroy the human mind. The drug 
causes its victims to forget their native land, but the subsequent brutish enslavement, symbolized 
by the wand, does not destroy all human remorse over their condition, however powerless their 
wills may be to effect a return to their native freedom.” See “Milton and the Renaissance Circe,” 
Milton Studies 6 (1974), 23. 
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early moderns follow Aristotle in distinguishing between “sensitive memory” and “intellective 
memory.” While both humans and animals have sensitive memory, only humans have 
intellective memory, which enables recall “in the absence of a sensory prompt,” involves the use 
of reason, requires an act of will, and relates to the capacity for religion. A perhaps surprising 
entailment of the volitional nature of intellective memory is that the human has a moral 
obligation to remember its points of superiority to animals: “part of the responsibility of all 
individuals is not only to use memory it is also to know themselves. […] Without self-knowledge 
a human is living a life without use of the rational soul; is living, therefore, the life of an animal. 
And the incapacity to differentiate human from dog represents a failure to exercise the 
difference.”45 Thus, in a circular fashion, the human is distinct from and superior to other 
creatures to the extent that the human believes in this definition of the human and perpetuates it 
in the human’s uniquely intellective memory. In viewing the calf’s disavowal of national 
affiliation as a fault of memory, Ulysses places the calf’s egocentrism within a broader discourse 
about the differences between human and animal mnemonic faculties. 
Indeed, this treatment of memory is typical of Renaissance Circe stories belonging to the 
Plutarchian tradition, to the extent that it should be regarded as one of the primary elements in 
the constellation of motifs inspired by Plutarch’s Gryllus. In regards to Spenser’s Gryll, Guyon 
declares, 
See the mind of beastly man, 
That hath so soone forgot the excellence 
Of his creation, when he life began, 
That now he chooseth, with vile difference, 
                                                
45 Fudge, Brutal Reasoning, 24-7. 
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To be a beast, and lacke intelligence.46 
Likewise condemning victims of transformation for forgetfulness of their human pasts, the 
Attendant Spirit of Milton’s Comus describes Comus’s animal-headed hybrids: 
they, so perfect is their misery, 
Not once perceive their foul disfigurement, 
But boast themselves more comely than before, 
And all their friends and native home forget, 
To roll with pleasure in a sensual sty.47 
The Attendant Spirit likens Comus’s victim to pigs specifically because they do not desire to 
return to “their friends and native home.” Similarly, when Spenser’s Palmer pronounces, “Let 
Gryll be Gryll, and have his hoggish minde; / But let us hence depart, whilest wether serves and 
winde.” (2.12.87.8-9), the Palmer distinguishes himself and Guyon from the “hoggish” Gryll, 
who does not share their desire to return home. Indeed, Spenser ends book 2 with the Palmer’s 
pronouncement about the weather for the return journey, which recalls the final lines of Gelli’s 
Circe, spoken by Ulysses to Aglafemos: “Then let us go, for I desier no thing else: and I perceive 
alrely that the goddess (always favourable unto him, that seketh after the beste sorte he can to be 
lyke unto them) geve us newe windes, very apte and prosperous for our navigation” (295). Alone 
among Gelli’s talking animals and in contrast to Spenser’s Gryll, Aglafemos recalls his human 
past and joins his rescuer on the voyage home. 
 The fact that only the elephant returns to humanity and to his homeland in Gelli’s Circe 
                                                
46 Edmund Spenser, The Faerie Queene, ed. A. C. Hamilton, Hiroshi Yamashita, and Toshiyuki 
Suzuki (Harlow et al.: Pearson Education, 2001), book 2, canto 12, stanza 87, lines 1-5. 
Subsequent citations appear in text by book, canto, stanza, and line numbers. 
47 John Milton, Comus, in Complete Poems and Major Prose, ed. Merritt Y. Hughes 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003), page 91, lines 73-7. 
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ends up undercutting Aglafemos’s acceptance of human superiority, however, because natural 
historians credit elephants with the concept of a native country and with exceptional memory, 
including memory of their homeland. For Topsell, elephants are remarkable for their patriotic 
attachments: “They have a wonderfull love to their owne Countrey” (196). This patriotic 
attachment extends not only to a particular place but also to the community to which an elephant 
belongs, for Topsell claims, “They are so loving to their fellowes, that they will not eat their 
meat alone, but having found a prey, they go and invite the residue to their feastes and cheere, 
more like to reasonable civill men, then unreasonable brute beasts” (196). As Gelli does by 
making the elephant the only transformed creature to return to humanity, Topsell affiliates 
elephants more closely with humans than with other animals. Topsell furthermore writes, 
“Cicero affirmeth that they come so neare to a mans disposition, that their small company or 
Nation seemeth to overgoe or equall most men in sence and understanding” (209). The statement 
not only acknowledges elephants as a “Nation” but also aggrandizes elephant intelligence 
beyond the human average. 
 Writings about elephants frequently describe their exceptional intelligence as a matter of 
memory. As an example of the human-like intellectual powers of elephants, Pliny writes, “they 
remember what duties they be taught” (bk. 8, ch. 1, p. 192). The use of the word “remember” in 
Philemon Holland’s Renaissance English translation makes it clear that the elephant’s 
intellectual powers are framed specifically in terms of memory. Similarly, Topsell writes of 
elephants, “they are apt to learne, remember, meditate, and conceive such things, as a man can 
hardly performe” (206). When Topsell refers to “this beast, who hath such a memory as is 
attributed unto him” (209), he not only notes the elephant’s reputation for memory but also 
affirms that the reputation is deserved. As an example of elephant memory, Topsell relates, 
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“Antipater affirmeth that he saw an Elephant that knewe againe and tooke acquaintance of his 
maister which had nourished him in his youth, after many yeares absence” (209). 
 Most importantly for interpreting Aglafemos’s role in Gelli’s Circe, the elephants of the 
natural histories remember and long for their homelands if they depart them. Topsell relates the 
following fact about elephants: “Pliny and Solinus affirme, that they will not goe on shipboord, 
untill their keeper by some intelligible signe of oath, make promise unto them of their returne 
backe againe” (198). Pliny’s natural history, to which Topsell refers, emphasizes the idea that 
elephants’ requiring oaths testifies to their religious capacities: “they are thought to have a sense 
and understanding of religion and conscience in others; for when they are to passe the seas into 
another countrey, they will not embarke before they be induced thereto by an oath of their 
governours and rulers, That they shall returne againe” (bk. 8, ch. 1., p. 192).48 
 Throughout Gelli’s work, lack of desire to return home indicates that a transformed 
creature has become an animal completely. Indeed, forgetting in general is one of Gelli’s favorite 
ways for describing what has occurred to the former humans upon transformation, for Ulysses 
tells the intractable horse, “If thou be then fully thus determined, remaine thou so a beaste still: 
for truly thou deserves none other being then this, synce thou sufferest thy selfe to be so much 
guided by the sence, that thou remembrest no more the lighte of reason” (199). In this passage, 
Ulysses frames the loss of humanity as a loss of memory. As with persuadability, however, 
memory—including memory of and longing for a native land—turns out to be a capacity that 
humans share with elephants, according to natural histories. Gelli counts on readers to think of 
                                                
48 Of course, the idea that elephants require oaths also depends on beliefs that elephants possess 
linguistic faculties. Pliny writes of elephants, “they understand the language of that country 
wherein they are bred” (bk. 8, ch. 1, p. 192). Topsell similarly remarks, “they grow to understand 
the Indian language” (205). For a discussion of elephant language, see Cummings, “Pliny’s 
Literate Elephant,” 164-85. 
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portraits of elephants in these natural histories as Aglafemos returns to humanity and then 
embarks on his journey home, and to realize that La Circe’s overt celebration of supposedly 
unique traits of the human, including memory and patriotic affiliation, is made possible only by 
suppressing contemporaneously held beliefs about elephants. 
 
Elephant Religion and the Bipedal Human 
 
 When Aglafemos returns to humanity, the capacity that he most conspicuously regains is 
the religious capacity. After thanking Ulysses for persuading Aglafemos to return to human 
form, Aglafemos declares,  
for that it semeth to me that nature hath shewed me that it apperteyneth unto man 
so to doo, turning me unto that first mover of this whole worlde, who being the 
cause of all thinges, must also be the fyrste, and principall cause of that, that hath 
chaunsed of me: and that I finally having knowen the imperfection of al other 
creatures, and the perfection of the humaine nature, am become man againe: I 
geve him infinite thankes. (290-1) 
After Aglafemos says a prayer of thanksgiving, he and Ulysses discuss Aglafemos’s religious 
promptings: 
Ulysses: Thou hadst not this knowledge of the first cause of this hole world, 
whiles thou livedst in that body of a beast. 
Aglafemos: No: but as sone as I was become man againe I felt it spring in my 
mind, almost as my natural propertie: or rather to say better, I felt it return into me 
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againe. For before I was transformed by Circes into an Elephante, I remember that 
I had it. (293) 
When Aglafemos declares that religious feelings, which he has forgotten while an elephant, 
return simultaneously with his transformation into a human, as though religion were a “natural 
propertie,” inseparable from the human, Aglafemos establishes religion as a crucial difference 
between animal and human. 
 Aglafemos’s claim becomes problematic, however, when his conversation with Ulysses 
is compared with the terms of the bargain that Ulysses and Circe have previously established and 
with Renaissance beliefs about elephants. After Circe proposes to change the transformed 
creatures back into humans if Ulysses can persuade them of the superiority of a human existence, 
Circe promises to restore the mental faculties of the transformed creatures so that Ulysses may 
engage them in debate: 
  Circe: I shall graunte theym speache. 
 Ulysses: And shall they have the self same discourse that they had when 
they were men? 
  Circe: Yea for lyke as I chaunged them into beastes so shall I cause the  
knowledge of very men to come into them againe. (13) 
When Circe compares the magical act by which she has transformed humans into animals to the 
magical act by which she will now restore human mental faculties to the transformed creatures, 
she implies that the transformed creatures will become human again according to every criterion 
but shape. Throughout the dialogues, however, the transformed creatures lack such essential 
attributes of the human as persuadability and national affiliation. Furthermore, while Circe 
promises to return “the knowledge of very men” to the transformed creatures, Ulysses’s careful 
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questioning of Aglafemos reveals that Aglafemos has lacked “knowledge of the first cause” as an 
elephant. The repetition of the word “knowledge,” the same word that Circe has used in her 
earlier promise, drives home the point that the transformed creatures do not, in fact, regain every 
aspect of their humanity when Circe enables them to speak, reason discursively, and recall their 
former “knowledge.” Likewise, Aglafemos’s sense that religious awareness returns like a 
“natural propertie” of the human conflicts with Circe’s unambiguous statement that she will 
return “the knowledge of very men” to the transformed creatures. 
 One plausible interpretation of this discrepancy is that Circe has deliberately tricked 
Ulysses. Ulysses himself confronts Circe with suspicions of her honesty after he has spoken with 
five creatures: 
I doute, that thou hast not restored to them with whom I have spoken, the power 
holely to discourse, as thou hast done the speache, according as thou promisedst 
me, I have founde them so farre distaunt from the truthe: and yf thys were soo, I 
shoulde thinke thou haddest much deceived me. For there is none of them that 
judgeth it not better, to be a beast then a man, the whiche I would never believe 
they would saye, yf they coulde use reason truelye. (125-6) 
Ulysses takes human superiority too much for granted; however, Circe’s assurances do not, 
ultimately, allay suspicions of her honesty because she repeats the problematic word 
“knowledge”: 
Truelye thou shouldest have reason to thinke I had deceived thee, yf I had so 
done. For those thinges should never be promised, that one eyther would not, or 
could not do: For thone commeth of noughtines, and the other of foolyshnes. And 
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therefore knowe thou Ulysses, that whyles thou spakest with them, they had the 
selfe same knowledge, that they had whiles they were men. (126) 
Aglafemos, unmistakably, does not have the “selfe same knowledge” as a talking elephant that 
he has had as a human. Thus, Aglafemos’s evaluation of Circe as a “noughtie inchauntrire” (295) 
and his fear of “some newe deceite” (295) may be justified, even by Circe’s own, earlier remarks 
about “noughtines.” Alternatively, Aglafemos may conceive of religiosity as a form of 
“knowledge” only because of the leading questions of a paranoid Ulysses, or Aglafemos may be 
otherwise mistaken in contrasting the mental states of human and elephant. 
 Aglafemos’s claim to have recovered the religious capacity upon his return to humanity 
is problematic regardless of Circe’s honesty, however, because of the religious faculties 
attributed to elephants in natural histories. Pliny’s natural history remarks that elephants “have in 
religious reverence (with a kind of devotion) not only the starres and planets, but the sunne and 
moone they also worship” (bk. 8, ch. 1, p. 192). The religious capacity of elephants is one of 
many examples of Pliny’s claim that, of animals, “the Elephant is the greatest, and commeth 
neerest in wit and capacitie, to men” (bk. 8, ch. 1, p. 192). In accordance with this view of the 
elephant, Pliny places the entry on the elephant first among the entries on animals, which begin 
immediately after book 7, a book on the human. Sharing Pliny’s admiration for the elephant, 
Topsell writes, “There is not any creature so capable of understanding as an Elephant” (196). 
Once again, religion is a particularly important example of the uniqueness of elephants: “They 
have also a kinde of Religion, for they worshippe, reverence, and observe the course of the 
Sunne, Moone, and Starres” (207). In addition to elephants’ religious interest in astronomy, 
Topsell describes other religious behaviors of elephants, including supplications, in which 
elephants seem “to pray for a devine blessing” (207), and funeral rites, in which elephants “bury 
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and cover the dead carkases of their companions, or any other of their kind” (208). Aglafemos’s 
claim that religion is uniquely human is ironic not only because of his status as a former 
elephant, an animal supposed to have religious practices, but also because of the statement that 
he now, as a human, can “remember” that he has been religious “before I was transformed by 
Circes into an Elephante.” Not only religion but also memory is a faculty in which the elephant is 
imagined, by natural historians, to excel, but Aglafemos presents his time as an elephant as a 
period of forgetfulness—especially of religion. 
Gelli alludes to religion at several points in his dialogues, even before the elephant’s 
return to humanity, at which point religion emerges as a supposedly crucial, but actually 
spurious, distinction between humans and animals. The snake, for instance, explains to Ulysses 
that what deters humans from suicide is “The fearing to go into a worser state, for the feare that 
many have put you in, by writing of the kingedome of Pluto” (65). Ulysses responds, “I see thou 
art so obstinate, that thou wilt never be hable to perceive reason: wherefore I will dispute no 
more wyth thee, and chiefely because I have sene in this laste, that thou haste altogether lost thy 
knowledge, begynning to doubte of religion, thynges even convenyente to a beaste as thou arte” 
(65-6). To Ulysses, the snake’s implication that accounts of the afterlife have been fabricated 
signals the snake’s lack of religion, which Ulysses interprets as a deficiency in the snake’s 
“knowledge”—specifically, a deficiency in memory—and as a sign that this former human 
deserves his new animal form. 
Religion also becomes a conspicuous topic at the end of the dialogue with the calf, where 
it receives much the same treatment as at the end of the dialogue with the snake. Advancing an 
argument for the superiority of humans to animals, Ulysses claims that animals lack religion, that 
they “not onely know not the goddess, but also have no thought or beliefe at all that they be, not 
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having the discourse of reason” (246). Ulysses adopts the perspective that he has previously 
taken in the dialogue with the snake: religion is a manifestation of reason, which humans but not 
other animals possess. After the calf attempts to rebut Ulysses’s arguments, Ulysses maintains 
that animals have “no knowledge” (247), thus repeating the configuration of religion as a matter 
of knowledge from the dialogue with the snake and anticipating the configuration of religion in 
the dialogue with the elephant. 
 Insisting that animals do have religious practices, the calf’s rebuttal draws unmistakably 
upon natural history’s accounts of elephant religiosity, yet the calf never names elephants 
explicitly, even though the calf does mention birds and, recognizing religion in beings more 
distant from humans, plants:  
there are amongst us of those, who do reverence to the sonne, every mornynge 
when they aryse, acknowledgynge hym for the greatest minister of nature: and 
amonge the berdes, of those that as sone as the mornynge appeareth to them upon 
our Orizon, thanking him, and tourning them selves towards him, put forth theyr 
notes: but what speake I of us that are animate, fyndinge also amonge herbes, of 
those who honouring him, tourne theyr leaves continuallye, and theyr flowers 
towards his sighte. (246-7) 
This account of solar worship conforms quite closely to descriptions of elephants in natural 
histories, such as Topsell’s account that elephants “reverence the Sunne rysing, holding up their 
trunke or hand to heaven, in congratulation of her rising” (207). While Gelli’s calf uses birds to 
exemplify animal religion, his argument is shaped by natural history’s treatments of elephants as 
animals with exceptional and human-like religious practices. 
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 Aglafemos’s enthusiastic celebration of his return to humanity exaggerates the 
differences between elephant and human: in the natural histories, the elephant lacks almost 
nothing of humanity except for bipedal form. Refusing to separate the human form from certain 
capabilities of the human, especially the religious faculty, Gelli departs from the natural history’s 
portraits of elephants and expects readers to notice the ironizing effects of those departures. His 
treatment of the elephant’s return to humanity dramatizes the falsifications of natural history that 
are necessary to create the idea of a human who has unique capacities distinguishing the human 
from animals. In particular, Gelli renders ironic the idea that the human’s bipedal form is 
inseparable from the human’s religious faculty—an idea that looms large in Aglafemos’s 
reflection on his return to humanity, in a long literary tradition of transformation stories, and in 
Renaissance philosophies of human nature, which Ulysses anachronistically rehearses and which 
Aglafemos can be presumed to have studied during his human past as a philosopher. 
 The creation story in Plato’s Timaeus, which is also a story of transformations, provides 
an early and influential example of the treatment of religiosity as inextricable from the human’s 
bipedal form.49 I call this configuration “the fetishization of the human form” because it 
attributes symbolic significance to the human shape in a way that seems unwarranted by natural 
history’s assertions about animals, especially elephants. Near the end of Timaeus, the title 
character declares,  
We should think of the most authoritative part of our soul as a guardian spirit 
                                                
49 Keith Thomas writes, “Since Plato a great deal had been made of man’s erect posture.” Man 
and the Natural World: A History of the Modern Sensibility (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), 
31. Commenting on a Renaissance appropriation of Plato’s views of human bipedalism, Erica 
Fudge argues that the Renaissance recognized only “invisible differences” between humans and 
animals: “The body, then, was not a central source of difference, and even when the human 
physique was invoked to reiterate distinction this physical difference was always merely a sign 
of the other, more significant, mental division.” Brutal Reasoning, 7-8. This essay offers a 
different perspective. 
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given to each of us by god, living in the summit of the body, which can properly 
be said to lift us from the earth towards our home in heaven, as if we were a 
heavenly and not an earthbound plant. For where the soul first grew into being, 
from there our divine part attaches us by the head to heaven, like a plant by its 
roots, and keeps our body upright.50 
By “the most authoritative part of our soul,” Timaeus means the rational soul, the highest of the 
three varieties of soul—the others are the sensitive and the vegetative souls—and the one that 
distinguishes humans from animals in classical thought.51 For Timaeus, the human’s possession 
of a rational soul accounts for its uniquely bipedal posture. Imagining that the head houses the 
rational soul, Timaeus entertains two complementary notions: the rational soul draws the human 
form “upright” as it aspires toward its heavenly place of origin, or the rational soul anchors the 
head in the heavens, just as the “roots” of a “plant” secure it to the earth. In either case, the 
relationship between the unique properties of the human, bipedal posture and rational soul, is no 
coincidence for Timaeus: the rational soul actually causes the human form to stand “upright.” 
Because the rational soul is inseparable from bipedal posture in Timaeus’s account of the 
origin of the universe, humans also lose their distinctive shapes and become various kinds of 
animals when they fail to exercise their uniquely human intellectual capacities. After a 
misogynist description of the degeneration of some men into women, Timaeus places birds 
immediately next to humans: “The race of birds was produced by a process of transformation, 
whereby feathers grew instead of hair, from harmless, empty-headed men, who were interested 
                                                
50 Plato, Timaeus, in Timaeus and Critias, trans. and ed. Desmond Lee and T. K. Johansen 
(London and New York: Penguin, 2008), 88. Subsequent citations appear in text. 
51 This model of the three souls, associated especially with Aristotle, is well known and widely 
recognized as influential. See Thomas, Man and the Natural World, 30-1; and Fudge, Brutal 
Reasoning, 8. 
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in the heavens but were silly enough to think that the most certain astronomical demonstrations 
proceed through observation” (90). These humans lose their human shape because of intellectual 
deficiencies: they are “empty-headed” and “silly.” However, they retain an approximately 
bipedal body type and gain wings that enable them to fly, presumably because, as humans, they 
have remained “interested in the heavens” and have therefore forsaken the heavenward 
aspirations of the human in a minimal, though decisive, way: their interest in astronomy has 
nothing of religion. 
The terrestrial animals deviate even more dramatically from the human: 
Wild land animals have come from men who made no use of philosophy and 
never in any way considered the nature of the heavens because they had ceased to 
use the circles in the head and followed the leadership of the parts of the soul in 
the breast. Because of these practices their fore-limbs and heads were drawn by 
natural affinity to the earth, and their fore-limbs supported on it, while their skulls 
were elongated into various shapes according to the particular way in which each 
man’s circles had been crushed through lack of use. (90) 
Timaeus’s discussion of animals fetishizes the human form because it explains the quadrupedal 
forms of animals with reference to their loss of human intellectual powers, which occurs 
especially through neglect of “philosophy.” The implication that philosophy is a special vocation 
of the human recurs in Gelli’s Circe, in which only the philosopher returns to human form. 
After discussing the land animals, Timaeus treats the aquatic animals, which he regards 
as the lowest forms of animal life: “they live in the depths,” Timaeus claims, “as a punishment 
for the depth of their stupidity” (91). Once again, properties of human and animal bodies—in this 
case, the properties that suit fishes and other aquatic creatures for their habitat—originate in 
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mental properties, such as degrees of intelligence. Timaeus emphasizes this integral relation 
between mind and body when he concludes, “These are the principles on which living creatures 
change and have always changed into each other, the transformation depending on the loss or 
gain of understanding or folly” (91). Transformations that bring bodies into symbolic accordance 
with minds explain the existence of various human and animal species.  
This logic, of course, characterizes the Plutarchian tradition, as opposed to the Homeric 
tradition, of transformation stories, for one of the innovations of Plutarch’s “Bruta Animalia 
Ratione Uti” is to imagine the relationship between mind and body of a transformed creature as 
concordant rather than discordant. Plutarch’s Odysseus tells Gryllus, “you seem to have lost not 
only your shape, but your intelligence also under the influence of that drug. You have become 
infected with strange and completely perverted notions. Or was it rather an inclination to 
swinishness that conjured you into this shape?” (499). Comparing Plutarch’s dialogue with other 
treatments of transformation suggests that the distinction between biped and quadruped may be 
especially important. 
 Another creation myth, the story of Prometheus’s creation of humans in Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses, makes claims about the human form similar to those of Plato’s Timaeus. In 
Arthur Golding’s Renaissance translation, the relevant verses read: 
  And where all other beasts behold the ground with grovelling eye, 
He gave to man a stately look replete with majesty 
And willed him to behold the heaven with count’nance cast on high, 
To mark and understand what things were in the starry sky. 
And thus the earth, which late before had neither shape nor hue, 
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Did take the noble shape of man and was transformèd new.52 
In this passage, the physical difference between human and animal forms reflects the difference 
in their intellectual vocations and places in a divinely ordained hierarchy. When the poet says 
that “beasts behold the ground with grovelling eye,” he constructs animals as beings whose 
quadrupedal posture tends to direct their gaze downward. The object of the quadrupedal gaze, 
“the ground,” represents the realm of sensory experience to which animals are confined by their 
lack of a rational soul.53 The “grovelling eye” of the quadrupeds both expresses their servility, 
their subordination to the human, and represents their inability to engage in philosophical 
speculation, which the poet, like Plato’s Timaeus, associates with contemplation of “the heaven.” 
 The human, in contrast, has a bipedal posture that allegedly directs the human’s gaze 
towards this symbolic realm of reason. The poet explicitly says that Prometheus both has 
designed the human to stand upright and has charged the human to “understand what things were 
in the starry sky.” The relationship between the human’s bipedal form and the mandate to 
“understand” is no mere coincidence: in the poem, the human’s upright posture both enables and 
represents the capacity for rational thinking, which the poet figures as the contemplation of “the 
starry sky.” The poet describes “the shape of man” as “noble” and attributes “majesty” to the 
human appearance because the bipedal form cannot be divorced from the human’s capacity to 
reason, which elevates humans above animals. 
Gelli’s Ulysses reflects similarly on the distinction between quadruped and biped before 
conversing with the dog: 
Yf nature (as our wyse men of Gretia saye) desyer that every thinge should come 
                                                
52 Arthur Golding, trans., Ovid's Metamorphoses, ed. Madeleine Forey (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2002), book 1, lines 97-102. 
53 Erica Fudge discusses early modern beliefs about animal consciousness; in particular, 
“animals exist only in the present.” Brutal Reasoning, 24, but see 7-38. 
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to his ende and perfection: from whence then commeth it, that she hath geven so 
great power, to these our senses, that they drawe continually unto the earthe, this 
our mynde? and kepe it almooste always occupied in these earthlye thinges (as it 
is with this fellowe that was changed into an horse, with whom I spake even 
nowe) so that we are lytle different from brute beastes: who, for that they have 
theyr ende in the earth, wer all made by nature, with theyr face tourned towardes 
the same, and man onely with the face tourned towardes heven, to geve him to 
understand, that he shoulde continually lyft up him selfe thereunto: and beholding 
the operations of those devine substaunces, to obteyne a felicitie that maketh him 
more then a man. (200-1) 
As with Ovid’s verses, from which this passage is almost certainly derived, the distinction 
between quadrupedal and bipedal forms is also a distinction in mental capabilities. Furthermore, 
the bipedal form is treated not merely as a symbol of the human’s intellectual potential but as an 
integral part of it. 
After Aglafemos’s return to humanity, he also remarks on the significance of the human’s 
special shape: “I begin to thinke that this firste cause having loved him, above all other thinges, 
as the making him more noble then any other beast doth plainely declare, that his ende, shall not 
be like unto thend of other beastes [illegible word] not having the understanding, have no 
knowledge at all of the same firste cause, as he hath” (293-4). Comparing Aglafemos’s finding 
the human “more noble” than animals with Ovid’s passage about “the noble shape of man,” 
which Ulysses has rehearsed in an earlier dialogue, suggests that Aglafemos means that the 
human’s unique bipedalism is the physical manifestation of the human’s unique “knowledge” of 
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religion.54 Of course, Aglafemos’s status as a former elephant, a creature supposed by natural 
historians to have religion, undermines Aglafemos’s claim to have recovered religion upon 
transformation into a human and, consequently, the construction of bipedalism that Aglafemos 
repeats from other transformation stories. 
Aglafemos’s ironic rehearsal of the commonplace about the human’s bipedal shape 
mocks not only a tradition of transformation stories but also Renaissance philosophy’s definition 
of the human, in which transformation figures conspicuously. Elaborating the view that the 
human, unlike any other creature, has a “self-transforming nature” (225), Pico writes, 
if you see one abandoned to his appetites crawling on the ground, it is a plant and 
not a man you see; if you see one blinded by the vain illusions of imagery, as it 
were of Calypso, and, softened by their gnawing allurement, delivered over to his 
senses, it is a beast and not a man you see. If you see a philosopher determining 
all things by means of right reason, him you shall reverence: he is a heavenly 
being and not of this earth. If you see a pure contemplator, one unaware of the 
body and confined to the inner reaches of the mind, he is neither an earthly nor a 
heavenly being; he is a more reverend divinity vested with human flesh. (226) 
Gelli’s Ulysses draws unmistakably upon this passage as he makes the arguments that finally 
convince Aglafemos to return to human form: 
If he [the human] will geve him selfe wholy unto the belly: holding his 
countenaunce, and face continually fixed on the earth, he shall become as one that 
perceiveth nothinge, and like to the plantes: and if he shal drowne him selfe to 
much in the sensitive pleasure, he shall become like the brute beastes: but yf he 
                                                
54 Instead of “as the making him more noble then any other beast doth plainely declare,” 
Adams’s edition has “as his nobler posture sufficiently declares.” Adams, ed., The Circe, 178. 
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lyfting his face towards heaven, playing the philosopher, shal consider the beautie 
of the heavens, and the marveylous order of nature, he shall change him self from 
an erthly beast, unto an hevenly creature: and if he, dispising all the impediments 
of the body, shall attende to beholde the divine thinges, he shall make him selfe 
almost a god. (288) 
This account of Pico’s “self-transforming” human conflates several activities: raising the eyes, 
engaging in philosophy, contemplating the stars, and aspiring toward divinity, all of which are 
frequently said to be enabled by the human’s uniquely bipedal posture. In the natural histories, 
however, elephants not only have the capacity for religion but also the interest in celestial 
bodies—Topsell says, “they worshippe, reverence, and observe the course of the Sunne, Moone, 
and Starres” (207)—that is characteristic of the human intellect according to Timaeus, Ovid’s 
speaker, Gelli’s Ulysses, and Pico. By making the elephant a former philosopher and the only 
talking animal to return to human form, Gelli invokes the natural histories’ accounts of human-
like elephants in a way that makes ironic Aglafemos’s enthusiasm for the unique attributes of 
humanity, especially the bipedal form, which Aglafemos has perhaps (anachronistically) learned 
to view as inseperable from the capacity for religion under the influence of Renaissance 
humanism and the ancient transformation stories which Renaissance humanism adapted. 
 
Conclusion 
 
To convince Aglafemos to return to human form, Ulysses must remind Aglafemos of 
unique capacities of the human, such as rhetoric, national affiliation, religion, and philosophy. 
By making Aglafemos an elephant, a former philosopher, and the only animal to return to human 
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form, Gelli draws on natural histories that credit elephants with human-like capacities but uses 
the implied reference to this material, which Gelli expects his audience to recognize, to render 
ironic those arguments about human superiority that Ulysses advances and Aglafemos accepts. 
Furthermore, the ideas that Ulysses reminds Aglafemos of religion, and that Ulysses restores 
Aglafemos’s uniquely human intellect, are themselves problematic as accounts of Aglafemos’s 
transformation from elephant to human, for the natural histories admire elephants for their 
memory and intelligence. Thus, Gelli’s series of Plutarchian conversations with ten animals and 
an anti-Plutarchian conversation with an eleventh animal uses contemporaneous conceptions of 
elephants to expose the problems with positing a symbolic accordance between human form and 
intelligence, as do transformation stories, including Plutarch’s influential dialogue, and 
Renaissance philosophy, especially as elaborated by Pico. Gelli’s Circe thus adopts Plutarchian 
conventions, but only ironically, in order to criticize some key tenets of Renaissance humanism. 
Before endorsing the elephant as the most human-like animal by having only the elephant 
return to human form, Gelli’s La Circe considers several other animal candidates for that 
position: the lion, horse, dog, and calf, who are each human-like according to a different 
criterion. Gelli makes not one of his eleven talking animals an ape, nor do any of the animals 
mention apes, despite relating anecdotes about numerous animal species that resemble humans or 
seem to surpass them in some capacity. Gelli’s story of human-animal transformations belongs to 
a period before the rise of interest in the similarities in the forms of human and ape. Indeed, the 
ape would not become the object of European interest until the eighteenth century, when the 
revolutionary work of anatomist Edward Tyson illuminated the especially close resemblance of 
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humans to apes.55 The ape would not be officially classified in immediate proximity to the 
human until Linnaeus’s Systema Naturae of 1735.56  
Because the conception of the ape as the most human-like animal is relatively modern, 
the ape’s absence from La Circe is conspicuous to modern—but not early modern—readers. The 
following chapter, however, features an animal that is conspicuously absent from Gelli’s Circe 
even by early modern standards: the pig. For while Plutarch’s Gryllus, the original of Gelli’s 
animal speakers, is a pig, that animal appears nowhere among the animal speakers of Gelli’s 
Circe, with consequences to be explored in the following chapter on Spenser’s Faerie Queene 
and Milton’s Comus. 
 
                                                
55 On the revolutionary role of Tyson’s work, see H. W. Janson, Apes and Ape Lore in the 
Middle Ages and the Renaissance (London: The Warburg Institute, The University of London, 
1952), 336. For more information about the new and increasing prominence of the ape in 
eighteenth-century conceptions of the human/animal relation, see Laura Brown, Fables of 
Modernity: Literature and Culture in the English Eighteenth Century (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2001), 225-31; and Laura Brown, Homeless Dogs and Melancholy Apes: Humans and 
Other Animals in the Modern Literary Imagination (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 
especially 27-63. 
56 On Linnaeus’s taxonomic innovations, see Phillip Sloan, “The Gaze of Natural History,” in 
Inventing Human Science: Eighteenth-Century Domains, ed. Christopher Fox, Roy Porter, and 
Robert Wokler (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1995), 121. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE MANY CREATURES IN CIRCE’S STIES: 
PIGS IN SPENSER’S FAERIE QUEENE AND MILTON’S COMUS 
 
 Giovanni Battista Gelli’s Circe is remarkable among adaptations of the Circe episode for 
its diverse cast of animals. The animals with whom Ulysses speaks include, in order, an oyster, 
mole, snake, hare, goat, hind, lion, horse, dog, calf, and elephant. Two animals, nevertheless, are 
conspicuously absent from this cast of animal speakers. Gelli’s early modern readers may have 
been undisturbed by the ape’s absence, and may have been less likely than modern readers to 
think it anomalous, because of the aforementioned fact that apes become prominent in European 
comparisons of humans with animals only after the publication of Edward Tyson’s Anatomy of a 
Pygmie in 1699.1 Already in the early modern period, however, the pig’s absence would have 
been striking to readers because of the role of pigs in Gelli’s most important source texts: 
Homer’s Odyssey and Plutarch’s “Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti.”2 In The Odyssey, of course, each 
transformed member of Odysseus’s crew becomes a pig. In “Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti,” the 
only talking animal with whom Odysseus converses is likewise a pig. Gelli’s omission of a pig 
                                                
1 On the revolutionary role of Tyson’s work, see H. W. Janson, Apes and Ape Lore in the Middle 
Ages and the Renaissance (London: The Warburg Institute, The University of London, 1952), 
336. On the new and increasing prominence of the ape in eighteenth-century conceptions of the 
human/animal relation, see Laura Brown, Fables of Modernity: Literature and Culture in the 
English Eighteenth Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 225-31; and Laura Brown, 
Homeless Dogs and Melancholy Apes: Humans and Other Animals in the Modern Literary 
Imagination (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), especially 27-63. 
2 Iden’s translation of Gelli’s Circe has no references to apes and only three references to pigs. 
See Giovanni Battista Gelli, Circes of John Baptista Gello, Florentine. Translated out of Italion 
into Englishe by Henry Iden (Imprinted at London in Poules Churchyarde, at the signe of the 
holy ghost by John Cawood, printer to the Quenes Majestie, 1557), 61, 136, 229. I have assigned 
numbers to the pages of this edition, beginning with the title page. 
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speaker thus constitutes an arresting departure from these two ancient models, despite their other, 
significant differences. This departure calls out for explanation, which this chapter provides as it 
addresses the decisive, though not always obvious, role of pigs in two other early modern Circe 
episodes: book 2 of Spenser’s Faerie Queene and Milton’s Maske Presented at Ludlow Castle, 
more commonly known as Comus. 
 Explaining Gelli’s departure from his ancient sources is all the more urgent because the 
absence of a pig speaker is not unique to his re-telling of the Circe episode. Jean de La 
Fontaine’s fable “Les Compagnons d’Ulysse” (“The Companions of Ulysses”), which resembles 
Gelli’s Circe in expanding Plutarch’s dialogue between Odysseus and Gryllus into a series of 
dialogues with multiple animal speakers, betrays more particular debts to Gelli in its featured 
animals. Of Circe’s victims, La Fontaine’s speaker relates, 
    leur corps et leur visage 
  Prennent l’air et les traits d’animaux différents: 
  Les voilà devenus ours, lions, éléphants; 
   Les uns sous une masse énorme, 
   Les autres sous une autre forme; 
  Il s’en vit de petits: exemplum, ut talpa. 
 
    every body and face, furthermore, 
   Of divers beasts took on the looks and features, 
   Bears, lions, elephants among the creatures. 
   Some possessed enormous mass; 
   Others formed a different class. 
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  Some were small; for example, like the mole.3 
References to the mole and elephant indicate that La Fontaine’s “Companions of Ulysses” 
revises material from Gelli’s Circe, which unusually numbers a mole and elephant among 
Circe’s transformed creatures. Furthermore, for the animal speakers of “The Companions of 
Ulysses,” La Fontaine chooses a lion, bear, and wolf (p. 314-5), the same three animals that 
Gelli’s Ulysses explicitly mentions at the opening of La Circe, when Ulysses asks Circe, “yf 
amonge those, whome thou hast transfourmed into Lyons, Wolves, Beares, and other beastes, 
there be anye Gretian?”4 Unlike Gelli’s Circe, however, “The Companions of Ulysses” has no 
creature who chooses to return to human form, even though La Fontaine mentions the elephant, 
the only animal to return to human form in Gelli’s Circe. This oblique reference to Gelli’s 
elephant calls attention to an important discrepancy between “The Companions of Ulysses” and 
its literary predecessor. 
 Regarding the Circe of The Odyssey, Gareth Roberts has written, “it is for 
transformations of men into swine she is chiefly remembered.” In elaborating his definition of “a 
Circean narrative configuration,” however, Roberts broadens the category of animals that he 
deems appropriate to a Circe story beyond pigs to include other “domestic animals”: he writes, 
“Transformation into beasts of burden, especially asses, mark the later analogues.”5 
My own analysis of Circe stories, which distinguishes between Homeric and Plutarchian 
constellations of motifs, does not suggest that any animal, or class of animals, is uniquely or 
                                                
3 Jean de La Fontaine, “The Companions of Ulysses,” in The Complete Fables of Jean de La 
Fontaine, trans. and ed. Norman B. Spector (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 
1988), page 592, lines 35-40 (French); page 593, lines 35-40 (English). 
4 Gelli, Circes of John Baptista Gello, trans. Iden, 11. 
5 Gareth Roberts, “The Descendants of Circe: Witches and Renaissance Fictions,” in Witchcraft 
in Early Modern Europe: Studies in Culture and Belief, ed. Jonathan Barry, Marianne Hester and 
Gareth Roberts (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 194. 
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particularly appropriate to Circean transformation stories. Indeed, my survey of the Homeric and 
Plutarchian traditions in chapter one has already introduced a wide variety of non-humans 
featured in Circe stories, including not only an array of animals but also the animal-headed 
creatures of Milton’s Comus. Nevertheless, I argue that avoidance of the pig, as in Gelli’s Circe 
and in La Fontaine’s “Companions of Ulysses”—or conversely, significant emphasis on the pig, 
as in Plutarch’s dialogue and in book 2 of Spenser’s Faerie Queene, which reinvents Plutarch’s 
Gryllus as the infamous Gryll—tends to shape a work’s overall implications about the 
relationship between humans and animals. In particular, I argue that Renaissance Circe episodes 
that focus on pigs incline readers to form negative interpretations of human-to-animal 
transformations, and disapproving judgments about formerly human characters who now prefer 
animal existences. It is easier to condemn a human who desires to be a pig than one who desires 
to be any other animal, because of the extent to which the pig functions as the inverse of the 
human in early modern thought. Thus, I argue, Renaissance works that focus on pigs tend to 
uphold the anthropocentric doctrines of Renaissance humanism to a much greater degree than 
works that omit pigs. 
Indeed, the omission of pigs often coincides with, and arguably contributes to, a work’s 
overall agenda of challenging anthropocentric views. As the previous chapter argues, Gelli’s 
elephant ultimately opines in favor of human superiority, but that decision seems ironic because 
it is made possible by capacities believed, by natural historians but not Renaissance 
philosophers, to belong jointly to humans and elephants. When Gelli’s Ulysses uses humanist 
arguments to persuade the elephant to return to humanity and to philosophy, the elephant’s 
former profession, readers familiar with natural histories may detect an ironic implication that 
Renaissance philosophers must falsify views of elephants in order to construct their concept of 
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the unique, superior, philosophical human. Comparisons of humans and pigs, we shall see, 
function quite differently from comparisons of humans and elephants: while comparisons of 
humans and elephants—in Gelli, the natural historians, and Montaigne6—lend themselves to 
critiquing humanist theories, comparisons of humans and pigs have tended to bolster them. 
The anti-anthropocentric implications of “The Companions of Ulysses,” meanwhile, have 
been explored in an ingenious essay on fables by Frank Palmeri. Palmeri’s essay identifies a sub-
class of “anti-allegorical fables” or “autocritical fables,” which “turn away from representing 
animals as allegorical figures of humans” and thus seem to criticize the role of animals in most 
fables.7 Citing a fable recorded by Plutarch and featuring a talking wolf “as the prototype of the 
autocritical fable,” Palmeri lists the main features of fables in this class: a human and animal 
converse with one another; the animal character is not merely “an allegorical representation of a 
human being”; and the animal voices a perspective critical of humans (86). These unusual 
features contribute to an implied critique of “most of the conventional workings of fable” (86). 
Palmeri traces versions of this fable from Aesop to eighteenth-century writers, including La 
Fontaine, whose “Companions of Ulysses,” Palmeri notes, contains not only the prototypical 
wolf but also two other anti-allegorical animal speakers (88-91). Palmeri argues, “this fable, like 
the others, resists converting animals into emblems of humans, and contests the presumptions of 
an anthropocentric vision” (91). 
                                                
6 Montaigne develops one of his most frequently quoted anti-humanist assertions in relation to 
observations about elephants: “But so many of their actions bring elephants close to human 
capacities that if I wanted to relate in detail everything that experience has shown us about them, 
I would easily win one of my regular arguments: that there is a greater difference between one 
man and another than between some men and some beasts.” Michel de Montaigne, An Apology 
for Raymond Sebond, in The Complete Essays, trans. and ed. M. A. Screech (London: Penguin, 
2003), 520. 
7 Frank Palmeri, “The Autocritique of Fables,” in Humans and Other Animals in Eighteenth-
Century British Culture: Representation, Hybridity, Ethics, ed. Frank Palmeri (Aldershot, 
England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 83, 84. Subsequent citations appear in text. 
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Palmeri suggests that part of the power of anti-allegorical fables comes from their 
“elevating of the wolf, in conventional fables the most violent and brutal animal, to the same 
moral level as” Pythagoras or other human philosophers (94). The talking wolf’s perspective is 
especially compelling because of its plausibility: Palmeri explains that the animals of anti-
allegorical fables “do not speak as human beings might in a comparable situation; rather, they 
express what might be the moral judgments of the animals about their treatment by humans” 
(84). Moreover, the talking wolves base their arguments on comparisons of humans with wolves: 
humans take the same actions for which they condemn wolves, or even commit worse versions 
of these actions, such as eating sheep, whom “shepherds claim to protect” from predators, 
particularly wolves (88, but see 86-9). 
I suggest that it is significant that none of Palmeri’s anti-allegorical animal speakers are 
pigs,8 especially since the pig seems to be a good candidate for the rehabilitation that the anti-
allegorical fables accomplish for the wolf. As the remainder of this chapter demonstrates, 
perspectives imagined to be generated by pigs—or by the allegedly pig-like natures of some 
humans—have humanist rather than anti-humanist functions because of the irredeemably 
negative significance of comparisons of humans to pigs in the early modern imagination. 
 
Early Modern Interpretations of the Pig 
 
The pig’s presence or absence in early modern Circe stories seems especially 
conspicuous and significant because of evidence that early modern people recognized the pig as 
                                                
8 The pig occurs in one of Palmeri’s anti-allegorical fables, Jonathan Swift’s “Beasts’ Confession 
to the Priest.” But as Palmeri argues, that fable carries out its anti-anthropocentric agenda 
without employing animal speakers who are themselves anti-allegorical (95-6). 
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the animal with the greatest degree of physical similarity, at least internally, to the human. In An 
Apology for Raymond Sebond, Michel de Montaigne writes, 
The animals most like us are the worst and the ugliest of the bunch: the one with 
an outward appearance and face closest to ours is the baboon; 
   Simia quam similis, turpissima bestia, nobis!  
the one with inwards and vital organs closest to ours is the pig.9 
In an edition of Montaigne’s works, M. A. Screech attributes the Latin quotation to Ennius and 
gives a translation: “That vilest of beast, the monkey—how like us!”10 Using the same quotation, 
Edward Topsell also juxtaposes pig and ape in the entry on the pig in The Historie of Foure-
Footed Beastes: 
Now concerning the severall partes of Swyne, it is most certaine that inwardly 
they do more resemble a mans body then an Ape, for as al writers do affirme, that 
outwardly the proportion of Apes come nearest to men, according to the Poet’s 
verse;  
Simia quam similis turpissima bestia nobis. 
So on the other side a Swynes Anatomy doth more lively expresse the inward 
members and seate of life, and therefore our predecessours did first of all dissect a 
Swyne, and then a man, for the Swine was an example or introduction to the 
other.11 
The similarity of the two passages gives the impression that Montaigne and Topsell are 
                                                
9 Montaigne, Apology for Raymond Sebond, 539. 
10 M. A. Screech, trans. and ed., An Apology for Raymond Sebond, in The Complete Essays, by 
Michel de Montaigne (London: Penguin, 2003), 539. 
11 Edward Topsell, The Historie of Foure-Footed Beastes (London: printed by William Jaggard, 
1607), 665. Subsequent citations appear in text. 
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rehearsing commonplace understandings of pigs and apes, and of the different modes of physical 
similarity to the human that each creature represents. Topsell even acknowledges the 
commonness of these views by introducing them as things that “al writers do affirme.” Although 
the presence of Ennius’s quotation comparing humans and simians in the passages of both 
Montaigne and Topsell might suggest a cultural foregrounding of the ape, both writers assert that 
pigs resemble humans internally more closely than apes do. The impression that Topsell, 
especially, is more interested in the similarity of humans and pigs than in the similarity of 
humans and apes is strengthened by his claim that the pig has offered the best anatomical 
“introduction” to the human and by the fact that the passage occurs in Topsell’s entry on the 
pig—not in his entry on the ape. 
 The idea that, of all the animals, the pig—not the ape—is the best anatomical analogue 
for the human may seem strange to modern readers. H. W. Janson has argued, however, that the 
conception of the ape as the animal that most closely resembles the human gains currency only 
after the 1699 publication of Edward Tyson’s Anatomy of a Pygmie: “The publication of Tyson’s 
book marks the formal entry of the anthropoid ape into the consciousness of Western 
civilization. As Tyson’s biographer, M.F. Ashley Montagu, has pointed out, the importance of 
the work is such that its author deserves to be placed on a par with Vesalius and Darwin.”12 
When Topsell dismisses the resemblance of the ape to the human as superficial and treats the pig 
as the animal with the greatest anatomical similarities to the human, Topsell voices a perspective 
that seems to have been widespread in western Europe before Tyson revolutionized natural 
history with his anatomical study of the ape. 
 As early moderns believed that the internal anatomy of the pig quite closely resembled 
                                                
12 Janson, Apes and Ape Lore, 336. 
 
125 
that of the human, they also used the pig as a metaphor for corporeal vices, particularly dirtiness, 
intemperance, and gluttony. From this summary statement, which I justify with examples below, 
it might seem that the pig is a particularly reviled animal in early modern culture. Topsell, 
however, carefully distinguishes the pig’s behavior, which is appropriate to the pig, from pig-like 
behavior, which is inappropriate to the human. In making this distinction, Topsell exemplifies 
Erica Fudge’s claim that Renaissance writers generally evaluate the actions of humans, but not 
animals, according to moral criteria. “Virtue requires reason,” Fudge explains,  
and vice results from the failure to be reasonable; in humans this is not because 
there is no reason to operate but because the human has been seduced by passion, 
by desire, and has abandoned the reasonable faculties. The logical outcome of this 
understanding of vice is that animals are different from humans because animals 
never had reason to abandon in the first place. Because of this, animals cannot be 
vicious. This declaration of human inferiority is a product, paradoxically, of the 
logic of human superiority.13 
Even though Topsell compares immoral humans to pigs, he conforms to this general Renaissance 
trend of differentiating rational and morally culpable humans from irrational and thus amoral 
animals when he implies that the traits for which the pig is infamous suit the animal but not the 
human. 
 Another helpful framework for understanding early modern treatments of pigs can be 
derived from Mary Douglas’s famous anthropological study of dirt. To understand the 
significance of dirt, Douglas explains, we must overcome our modern tendencies to 
conceptualize dirt in medical terms, shaped by knowledge of germs that does not arise until the 
                                                
13 Erica Fudge, Brutal Reasoning: Animals, Rationality, and Humanity in Early Modern England 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 66. 
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nineteenth century: 
If we can abstract pathogenicity and hygiene from our notion of dirt, we are left 
with the old definition of dirt as matter out of place. This is a very suggestive 
approach. It implies two conditions: a set of ordered relations and a contravention 
of that order. Dirt then, is never a unique, isolated event. Where there is dirt there 
is system. Dirt is the by-product of a systematic ordering and classification of 
matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements. This idea 
of dirt takes us straight into the field of symbolism and promises a link-up with 
more obviously systematic systems of purity.14 
Douglas’s argument provides a way of understanding early modern treatments of the pig, in 
particular, as a categorically different kind of creature than the human. As we shall see, when 
Topsell describes repulsive behaviors or characteristics of pigs, he nevertheless tends to view 
these behaviors and characteristics as appropriate to a pig, in a way that they can never be for the 
human. 
 As the above paragraphs indicate, my ensuing argument about comparisons of humans 
with pigs treats the pig itself as a quite unambiguous creature, unlike the arguments of some 
other scholars. Peter Stallybrass and Allon White have discussed the limitations of treatments of 
pigs as hybrid figures by Mikhail Bakhtin and Edmund Leach. Stallybrass and White write, 
“Bakhtin’s major advance in ‘thinking pigs’ was to recognize that the pig, like the fair itself, had 
in the past been celebrated as well as reviled.”15 Stallybrass and White also explain that, for 
Leach, “the pig transgresses major oppositions and co-ordinates in the cultural grid” (46-7). 
                                                
14 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concept of Pollution and Taboo (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2003), 44. 
15 Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, The Politics and Poetics of Transgression (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1986), 44. Subsequent citations appear in text. 
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After noting that Leach assumes a rural setting for pigs when, in fact, pigs have been 
increasingly prominent in cities since the sixteenth century (48), Stallybrass and White 
summarize the work of Fraser Harrington, who demonstrates, in Stallybrass and White’s words, 
that “the pig was symbolically shifted from the ambivalent law of the fair to the unambivalent 
law of the slum” (49). While Harrington’s work helps to illuminate the limitations of treatments 
of pigs as ambiguous creatures by Bakhtin and Leach, Stallybrass and White ultimately depart 
from Harrington’s thesis, as well: “we would suggest that the pig, like the fair, is a site of 
competing, conflicting and contradictory definitions. It is not that pigs go to town and lose their 
rural ambivalence. It is rather that, in different domains of discourse, ‘pigs’ are constructed 
according to different grids or sets which, in the social ensemble taken as a whole, are often 
brought into conflict with each other” (49). Stallybrass and White further remark “how often 
aspects of the human world are coded through perceived homologies with the pigs’ world, 
particularly those qualities which are denied or negated as being supposedly antithetical to the 
civilized world (dirt, greed, indiscriminate appetite)” (59). My own argument likewise treats 
humans and pigs as oppositional figures in early modern discourse and maintains awareness that 
such oppositions are created discursively—by natural history, for example. Furthermore, my 
readings of The Faerie Queene and Comus call attention to the pejorative function of 
comparisons of humans to pigs, as Stallybrass and White do when they discuss the ways in 
which “the pig could be the symbolic instrument, and even the victim, of demonization” (56, but 
see 53-6). At least in the sources that I examine, however, comparisons of humans to pigs 
condemn humans but not pigs themselves, who remain beyond reproach for reasons mentioned 
above. 
 Moralistic comparisons of humans to pigs threaten human identity especially because of 
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beliefs, evident in Topsell and Montaigne, that the pig is the closest anatomical analogue for the 
human. Michael C. Schoenfeldt has argued that Galen’s influential theories of the four humors 
gave early modern Europeans a paradigm in which body and soul are not entirely separate, as 
they become for Descartes and his successors.16 Schoenfeldt indicates that temperance, in 
particular, is a term that tends to elide corporeal status and moral or spiritual status for early 
modern thinkers: 
In its emphasis on temperance as a central strategy for the maintenance of 
physiological and psychological health, locating both at the mid-point of 
unhealthy extremes, Galenic physiology provides a compelling model of just how 
good health could emerge from good living. As temperance became a central 
ethical virtue for the Renaissance, health assumed the role of a moral imperative, 
just as it still is in many ways for us. Illness in turn was perceived as a symptom 
of immorality. (7) 
In a chapter on Spenser, Schoenfeldt further explains that humoral theory promotes “an 
aggressively materialist notion of self”: “In the most literal way, you are what and how you eat. 
Under this regime, temperance assumes a double urgency: it is a virtue that not only exhibits 
proper ethical conduct, but also actively alters the moral condition of the self that practices it” 
(60). I suggest that the anatomical resemblance of humans and pigs would have been particularly 
troubling, from a Galenic Renaissance perspective, because the resemblance suggests that 
humans may also have other qualities deemed appropriate or natural in pigs but intemperate or 
otherwise immoral in humans. For the Renaissance, it is the human, not the pig, that is an 
                                                
16 Michael C. Schoenfeldt, Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England: Physiology and 
Inwardness in Spenser, Shakespeare, Herbert, and Milton (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 2-3, 8-11. Subsequent citations appear in text. 
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ambiguous creature. As A. O. Lovejoy explains in a chapter on eighteenth-century treatments of 
the chain of being, the human “is, in a sense in which no other link in the chain is, a strange 
hybrid monster.”17 Giorgio Agamben identifies a similar view of the human in the Renaissance 
philosophy of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. According to this view, not unique to Pico, the 
human is “suspended between a celestial and a terrestrial nature, between animal and human.”18 
Even though the pig itself is not the object of moral condemnation, various early modern beliefs 
conspire to make the human seem precariously close to a pig-like existence, which is regarded as 
contemptible for the human. 
Although Topsell’s treatment of the pig emphasizes its reputation for dirtiness, he gives 
dirtiness a moral significance only when it is a characteristic of humans. Establishing the 
dirtiness of pigs explicitly in opposition to the cleanliness expected of humans, Topsell writes, 
“even as a man is delighted in washing or bathing, so doth swine in filthy wallowing in the mire; 
therein is their rest, joy, and repose” (670). The analogy amounts to a strikingly clear 
demonstration of Douglas’s point that definitions of dirt depend upon categorization. While 
Topsell contrasts the cleanliness of the human with the “filthy wallowing” of the pig, he also 
compares the human’s experience of “bathing” to the pig’s experience of “wallowing,” 
suggesting that the pig needs mud to experience the healthful emotions of “rest, joy, and repose.” 
Indeed, Topsell makes his point about pigs and humans to explain the immediately preceding 
advice about the treatment of older sows: “at that time it is good to let them go to rivers, fennes, 
or miery places” (670). Topsell’s use of the word “good,” whether in reference to the humans 
who allow pigs to wallow or in reference to the effect of wallowing on pigs, drives home the 
                                                
17 Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1936), 199. 
18 Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004), 29. 
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point that Topsell has no moral objections to the dirtiness of pigs: indeed, humans’ mud is their 
bath water. Topsell similarly prevents a moralistic interpretation of the pig’s dirtiness when he 
writes, “The nature of this beast is to delight in the most filthy and noisome places” (675). 
Despite the emphasis on the extreme dirtiness of the pig’s favorite environments, attributing the 
wallowing of pigs to their “nature” treats the pig’s dirtiness as a matter of fact, not morality. 
Admittedly, Topsell also makes a remark suggesting that the pig’s reputation for dirtiness may 
be at least slightly exaggerated: “Another point of a good swineheard, is to sweepe oftentimes 
the sty, for although such be the nature of the beast that it defileth all things, and will be 
wallowing in the mire, yet will she also be very desirous of a cleane lodging, and delight much in 
the same” (673). Even as Topsell acknowledges that pigs are capable of appreciating cleanliness, 
however, he reiterates the pig’s reputation for dirtiness. 
 When Topsell discusses the swine’s indiscriminate and voracious eating habits, he 
likewise avoids passing unfavorable moral judgments. For instance, Topsell remarks the 
indiscriminate eating of pigs: “They eat also flesh, and abstain not from fat Bacon, and herein 
they differ from most of the ravening creatures, for Dogges will not taste of Dogges flesh, and 
Beares of Beares, yet will Hogges eat of Swines flesh, yea many times the damme eateth hir 
younge ones: And it is found that swine have not abstaind from the flesh of men and children” 
(667). Although Topsell seems to criticize the pig as an especially intemperate and 
indiscriminate eater by listing meats from which pigs do not “abstain” and by comparing pigs 
unfavorably with other animals, Topsell concludes the paragraph by writing, “we ought not to 
marvel as at a monstrous or prodigious thing, but rather acknowledge a naturall voracity, 
constrained in them thorough famine and impatience” (667). Topsell makes this remark most 
directly in reference to sows’ eating their children, a behavior that he normalizes by attributing it 
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also to hens; but because of the comment’s placement at the end of the paragraph, it seemingly 
applies to all of the previously described eating habits of pigs. Explaining that the pig obeys “a 
natural voracity,” Topsell regards the eating habits of the pig as inevitable and thus unsusceptible 
to moral judgments. 
 Topsell does not condemn pigs even when he provides graphic examples of eating so 
immoderate that it endangers a pig’s health. When Topsell writes, “such is the ravening 
intemperancy of this beast to swil in whatsoever is pleasant to his taste, that many times in 
drinking of Whaye their bellies grow extended above measure, even to death” (669), Topsell 
emphasizes the excessiveness of pigs’ eating: pigs display “ravening intemperancy,” 
indiscriminately and self-indulgently eat “whatsoever is pleasant,” and consequently become 
distended “above measure.” This description is the occasion for recommending the salutary 
intervention of the pig-keeper: pigs who have consumed too much whey must “bee dieted by a 
wise keeper, and driven up and downe not suffered to rest till it flow foorth againe backeward” 
(669). 
 Topsell also frames the pig’s capacity to become grotesquely fat as an advantage for the 
humans who eat pigs. Topsell writes that pigs “grow so fat, that many times they cannot stand on 
their own legs their bodies be so heavy, nor go any whit, so that if they are to be removed, they 
are not to be droven but to be carried in a cart” (668). While grotesque, the image of pigs too fat 
to walk is actually less nauseating than anecdotes, related by Topsell, of notoriously fat pigs, 
especially the two that follow:  
Crescentiensis reporteth of an other Lusitenian Swine, which after the death, 
weighted five hundred seventy and five pounds, and the Lard of that Hogge was 
one foot and three fingers broad. And the like may be said of a Hogge at Basill, 
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nourished by a certaine Oile-man, in whose Larde or fatte, after his death were 
found manie passages of mice too and fro, which they had gnawed into his body 
without the sence of the beast. (668) 
Particularly the pig fat enough to be oblivious to an infestation of mice is unforgettable. 
Predictably, Topsell explains the pig’s fatness as a product of its indiscriminate eating, 
but considering the grotesque quality of his descriptions of fat pigs, Topsell’s turning of the pig’s 
fatness to the advantage of humans is less predictable: 
There is not any beast that can better or more easilie be accustomed to al kinds of 
food, and therefore doeth verie quicklie grow fat, the quantitie and stature of their 
bodie considered, for whereas an Oxe or Cowe, or Hart, and such like Beasts aske 
long time, yet a Swine which eateth of all sorts of meate, doth very quickely even 
in a moneth or two or three at the most, prove woorthye the knife and also his 
maisters table. (668) 
Topsell’s appreciation of the pig’s exceptional capacity for fatness resembles Topsell’s more 
explicit gratitude for a sow’s large litter: “it seemeth a speciall worke of God which hath made 
this tame beast so fruitefull, for the better recompence to man for her meate and custody” (671). 
Despite Topsell’s images of grotesquely fat pigs, Topsell appreciates the pig’s ability to become 
fat quickly because it makes the pig a valuable source of food for humans. Indeed, comparison 
with Topsell’s comments on large litters suggests that he regards the pig’s fatness as a sign of 
God’s providence. 
Despite the pig’s disgusting habits, Topsell suggests that the pig plays an important, even 
miraculous, function in the natural world. Addressing concern that the pig’s indiscriminate eating 
and poor hygiene make the pig unsuitable for human consumption, Topsell writes, 
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And if any man aske how it commeth to passe, that swine which both feed and 
live so filthily, should be so norishable to the nature of man; some make answere, 
that by reason of their good constitution of body, they turne ill nutriment to a 
good flesh: for as men which be of a sounde, perfect, and healthy disposition or 
temperature, are not hurt by a little evil meat, which is hard of digestion; even so 
is it with well constituted and tempered swine, by continuall feeding upon evill 
things, they grow not onely to no harme, but also to a good estate, because nature 
in process of time draweth good out of evill. (679) 
Topsell repeats the idea that pigs eat indiscriminately—he acknowledges that they eat many 
“evill things”—but Topsell claims that the pig converts repulsive foods into “good flesh,” which 
conduces to their health and ultimately makes them suitable for human consumption. The moral 
drawn by Topsell—that “nature in process of time draweth good out of evill”—may seem 
incongruously lofty in comparison with the disgusting eating habits that the moral explains. 
Nevertheless, when Topsell marvels at the pig’s ability to convert “evill things” into “good 
flesh,” he views the pig’s admittedly disgusting habits as objects of not reproach but amazement. 
Ironically, the pig’s intemperate eating demonstrates the remarkably “tempered” nature of the 
pig’s body, which derives sustenance from an indiscriminate diet. 
 Although Topsell does not censure pigs for their characteristic habits, he does 
unambiguously condemn humans by comparing them to pigs. Of the pig, Topsell writes, “This 
beast is a most unpure and uncleane beast, and ravening; and therefore we use (not improperly) 
to call Obscæne and filthy men or women, by the name of Swyne or Sowes” (674). The first 
clause remarks ways in which the pig is an exceptional animal: “a most unpure and uncleane 
beast, and ravening.” Outside of the context, in which Topsell repeatedly expresses admiration 
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for the capabilities of pigs, the adjectives certainly sound condemnatory. The second clause does 
contain a condemnation, but one directed not at pigs but at the “Obscæne and filthy” humans 
who allegedly resemble them. A common etymology, dating to antiquity, traces the Latin 
obscaenus to caenum, which means “mud, filth.”19 Topsell clearly has this etymology in mind as 
he discusses the convention by which pigs, who notoriously wallow in the mud, serve as figures 
for obscene humans. Although the formulation “we use (not improperly) to call” acknowledges 
that the comparison between humans and pigs is a matter of convention, the parenthetical aside 
“(not improperly)” asserts the justness of the comparison.  
Indeed, Topsell has previously claimed that the Christian god himself has authorized the 
comparison. Instructions for the proper care of pigs give way to moralizing about human 
behavior: 
turn your Hogs to moist places where they may picke up worms, and suck up fat 
fenny water, which thing is above al other things gratefull to this beaste, for which 
cause it pleased the Holi-ghost in scripture to compare the pleasure that beastely 
men take in sinning to the wallowing of swine in the mire. The Dogge (saith S. 
Peter) is returned to his vomit, and the Sow that was washed to wallow in the 
mire. (667) 
As in the other excerpt comparing humans and pigs, Topsell begins by noting the pig’s penchant 
for dirtiness: nothing pleases the pig more than mud. Far from condemning the pig for this 
predilection, Topsell encourages humans to bring their pigs to the muddy locations that they 
enjoy. Then, Topsell considers comparisons of humans to pigs, at which point “the wallowing of 
swine in the mire,” which is healthy and desirable for the pigs themselves, becomes a figure for 
                                                
19 The Oxford English Dictionary, Online ed., s.v. “obscene” (entry dated March 2004). 
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“the pleasure that beastely men take in sinning.” Derived from a bible verse, the comparison has 
no lesser authority behind it, for Topsell, than “the Holi-ghost.” In its biblical context, the verse 
especially condemns sinners who have repented only to sin again: 
if after they have escaped the pollutions of the world through the knowledge of 
the Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, they are againe intangled therein, overcome, 
the latter end is worse with them then the beginning. For it had bin better for them 
not to have knowen the way of righteousnesse, then after they have knowen it, to 
turne from the holy commandement delivered unto them. But it is happened unto 
them according to the true proverb: The dog is turned to his own vomit againe, 
and the sowe that was washed, to her wallowing in the mire.20 
Loving sin too much to abstain from it, these recalcitrant sinners supposedly resemble pigs, who 
naturally and habitually “wallow in the mire” (Topsell 667). That behavior is unobjectionable in 
the pig, but the metaphorically analogous behavior in humans receives the highest and most 
unambiguous censure imaginable for early modern Europeans—the censure of the Christian 
deity, who also endorses the comparison of sinful humans to pigs. 
Such comparisons inform Topsell’s interpretation of the Circe episode from Homer’s 
Odyssey. By treating the Circe episode in the entry on the pig, Topsell bears out the claim of 
William B. Ashworth that “knowledge of animal symbolism was considered an essential aspect 
of natural history” between 1550 and 1650.21 Topsell broaches the subject of the Circe episode in 
a desultory manner: 
And there are many fictions of the transforming into swine. Homer faineth that 
                                                
20 2 Pet. 2:20-2 (Authorized Version, 1611). 
21 William B. Ashworth, Jr., “Emblematic Natural History of the Renaissance,” in Cultures of 
Natural History, ed. Nicholas Jardine, James A. Secord, and E. C. Spary (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 21, 36. 
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the companions of Ulisses were all by Circes turned into swine, which is 
interpreted in this manner; Circe to signifie unreasonable pleasure, Ulisses to 
signifie the soule, and his companions the inferior affections thereof, and so were 
the companions of Ulisses turned into swine by Circe, When unreasonable 
pleasures do overcome our affections and make us like swine in following our 
appetites. (675) 
Topsell provides an early modern precedent for my argument’s emphasis on the particular 
significance of the pig, which is variously present and absent, in re-tellings of the Circe story. 
By way of contrast, consider interpretations of the Circe episode by Servius and Natale 
Conti, who overlook the significance of pigs. Servius’s interpretation, as summarized by George 
Sandys in his commentary on book 14 of Ovid’s Metamorphoses, maintains that Circe “by her 
lascivious arts drew many from a morall life to a brutish; and therefore said to have changed 
them.”22 Like Topsell’s interpretation, this interpretation gives Circe’s transformations moral 
significance, but it accords no special meaning to the pig. Indeed, in Servius’s interpretation, as 
relayed by Sandys, the pig does not even receive mention: attention is focused on the transition 
“from a morall life to a brutish,” not on the transition from a human form to a specifically 
swinish form.  
Conti’s discussion of Circe in his Mythologiae (1567) also minimizes the significance of 
pigs. Conti writes, 
each one of Ulysses’ men was turned into a different kind of brute animal, 
depending on the repulsive vice he embraced. Those who lusted after sensual 
                                                
22 George Sandys, trans., Ovid's Metamorphosis. Englished, Mythologiz'd, and Represented in 
Figures by G. S. (Imprinted at Oxford, by John Lichfield, 1632), 480. I have reversed the original 
document’s use of regular and italicized typeface. Subsequent citations appear in text. 
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pleasure became pigs, the angry types became lions or bears, and the rest also 
became animals matched to their vices. We can tell from what Homer wrote about 
Ulysses that these were the ideas the ancients wanted to convey when they made 
up these stories.23 
Although Conti claims to adhere closely to the text of Homer’s Circe episode, Conti deviates 
from Homer in suggesting that Odysseus’s crew become many kinds of creatures, instead of pigs 
only. Conti, moreover, does not appreciate that transformations of humans into pigs may 
represent a special case, one that differs consequentially from transformations of humans into 
other animals. Most importantly, Conti provides a decidedly non-Homeric interpretation of the 
significance of human-animal transformations when he insists upon the correspondence between 
each human’s individual “vice” and the animal that the human becomes. 
Relaying Conti’s views of Circe immediately after those of Servius, Sandys makes sense 
of a passage from Conti’s chapter “On Circe” (bk. 6, ch. 6) that otherwise seems to digress from 
the chapter’s subject. As Sandys explains, Conti writes that Circe 
deformes our soules with all bestial vices; alluring some to inordinate Venus; 
others to anger, cruelty, and every excesse of passion: the Swines, the Lyons, and 
the Wolves, produced by her sensuall charms; which are not to bee resisted, but 
by the divine assistance, Moly, the gift of Mercury, which signifies temperance. 
So the fortitude and wisedome of Ulisses, preserves him in the midst of vices 
against their strongest invasions; when some of his Companions are devoured by 
the Cyclops, some destroyed by the Læstrigonians, and others converted into 
                                                
23 Natale Conti, Mythologiae, trans. and ed. John Mulryan and Steven Brown, vol. 2 (Tempe: 
Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2006), book 6, chapter 6, page 476. 
Subsequent citations appear in text. 
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beasts by Circe: their head strong appetites, which revolt from the soveraignty of 
reason (by which wee are onely like unto God, and armed against our depraved 
affections) nor ever returne into their Country (from whence the soule deriveth 
her cælestiall orginall) unlesse disenchanted, and cleansed from their former 
impurity. (480) 
Treating a variety of animal forms similarly as symbols of “excesse of passion” or lack of 
“temperance,” Sandys accurately repeats Conti’s demotion of the pig from its prominent position 
in Homer’s Circe episode. Sandys’s condensed discussion of Conti, however, helps to illuminate 
the significance of the section of Conti’s chapter “On Circe” in which Conti discusses other 
episodes from The Odyssey (bk. 6, ch. 6, pp. 476-7). Sandys’s summary makes it clear that Conti 
overlooks the significance of not only the pig but also transformation, for Conti finds the same 
moral in the Circe episode, Sandys explains, as in other episodes from The Odyssey that do not 
feature transformation. Although Sandys seems not to find Conti’s interpretation objectionable, a 
satisfactory account of Circe stories must address what I would argue is their central, distinctive 
element: transformation of humans into animals. 
In spite of Conti’s own claims, not Homer but Plutarch provides the precedent for Conti’s 
treatment of transformation, in which the moral state of humans can qualify them for 
transformation into animals. After Plutarch’s Gryllus declares pigs superior to humans, Odysseus 
responds, “To me, Gryllus, you seem to have lost not only your shape, but your intelligence also 
under the influence of that drug. You have become infected with strange and completely 
perverted notions. Or was it rather an inclination to swinishness that conjured you into this 
 
139 
shape?”24 Plutarch’s Odysseus outlines two ways of regarding Gryllus and his later analogues, 
who prefer to be animals rather than humans. Odysseus’s first suggestion is that these creatures 
have begun to prefer animal existences concurrently with transformation. This suggestion 
provides the basis for accusations that Gryllus’s Renaissance analogues have forgotten their 
humanity. Such accusations occur frequently in Gelli’s Circe, discussed in the previous chapter. 
The second suggestion of Plutarch’s Odysseus is that Gryllus has always had “an inclination to 
swinishness.” The Greek word rendered here as “swinishness” is “συηνíας” (498), which does 
indeed refer to actual, not merely metaphorical, piggishness: it relates to συηνος (“swinish”), συς 
(“a swine, pig, a hog, boar or sow”), and υς (“a swine, pig, both boar and sow, esp. of the tame 
kind”).25 The English words swine and sow derive from the Greek word υς, as well as from the 
similar Latin word sus, which has become the scientific name for the genus including the 
familiar pig (Sus scrofa).26 
William Helmbold, the Loeb editor, emphasizes the superficiality of Gryllus’s change in 
a note that paraphrases Odysseus’s insult: “That is, you were always a swine. It is only your 
shape that it is altered.”27 My argument, in contrast, emphasizes Plutarch’s innovative suggestion 
that Gryllus’s shape has finally been brought into accordance with his nature, which, according 
to Odysseus, is that of a pig. 
Philemon Holland gives an interestingly misleading version of Odysseus’s theories about 
                                                
24 Plutarch, “Beasts Are Rational,” trans. and ed. William C. Helmbold, in Plutarch's Moralia, 
vol. 12, The Loeb Classical Library (London and Cambridge, Mass.: William Heinemann; 
Harvard University Press, 1957), 499. Subsequent citations appear in text. 
25 Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1861), 1405, 1448, 1583. 
26 The Oxford English Dictionary, Online ed., s.v. “sow” and “swine” (entries dated 1989). 
27 William C. Helmbold, ed. and trans., “Beasts Are Rational,” in Plutarch's Moralia, vol. 12, 
The Loeb Classical Library (London and Cambridge, Mass.: William Heinemann; Harvard 
University Press, 1957), 499 n. a. 
 
140 
Gryllus in his 1603 translation of Plutarch’s dialogue. Holland seems to misunderstand 
Odysseus’s second hypothesis, and the way in which it turns on Gryllus’s status as a pig: 
It seemeth Gryllus that the potion which you dranke at Circes hands, hath not 
onely marred the forme and fashion of your bodie, but also spoiled your wit and 
understanding; having intoxicate your braine, and filled your head with corrupt, 
strange, and monstrous opinions for ever; or els some pleasure that you have 
taken by the acquaintance of this body so long, hath cleane bewitched you.28 
In this translation, Odysseus’s second theory becomes another version of the first theory, that 
Gryllus has changed mentally as well as physically. The second theory of Holland’s Odysseus 
differs from the first theory only in imagining mental transformation to have taken a longer 
amount of time and in attributing that transformation to a different cause: sensual indulgence 
instead of a magic drink. Holland’s Gryllus becomes pig-like in mind either upon or after 
transformation; he has never been pig-like before. Furthermore, Holland’s Odysseus refers only 
obliquely to Gryllus’s status as a pig when Odysseus mentions “this body.” In contrast, 
Plutarch’s Odysseus explicitly asserts that Gryllus may have always been a pig, even when 
Gryllus has had a human shape. Holland’s error affiliates his translation with Renaissance 
interpretations of the Circe episode that likewise underestimate the particular significance of the 
pig. 
The second suggestion of Plutarch’s Odysseus provides a precedent for treatment of the 
pig in the Circe stories of Renaissance writers, who develop the idea that Gryllus figures have 
always been pigs more fully. Plutarch’s Odysseus does not pursue the theory. Indeed, Gryllus 
                                                
28 Plutarch, The Philosophie, Commonlie Called, the Morals Written by the Learned  
Philosopher Plutarch of Chaeronea, trans. Philemon Holland (London: Printed by Arnold 
Hatfield, 1603), 564. 
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rejects both of Odysseus’s theories and rebukes him for interrupting their debate by resorting to 
insults: “if it is your pleasure to discuss the matter instead of hurling abuse, I shall quickly make 
you see that we are right to prefer our present life in place of the former one, now that we have 
tried both” (499). Even though the suggestion that Gryllus has always been a pig can probably 
not be dismissed so easily from the minds of readers, Odysseus never mentions the theory again. 
For Spenser and Milton, in contrast, the idea that a human may have an essentially animalistic 
nature—specifically, a swinish one—becomes the core of their Circe stories. 
 
Gryll’s “hoggish minde”: Spenser’s Paradigm of Intemperance 
 
 Book 2 of Spenser’s Faerie Queene, which features the virtue of temperance, closes 
shortly after a character, named Gryll after Plutarch’s Gryllus, expresses his desire to live as a 
pig rather than a human. I argue that Spenser’s portrait of Gryll retrospectively shapes nearly 
every example of intemperance in book 2: intemperate characters are repeatedly condemned by 
comparisons to pigs, although some of those comparisons are implicit or otherwise subtle. To 
support this argument, I first examine the relationship of book 2 to Plutarch’s dialogue, and to 
Renaissance definitions of human nature that make Plutarch’s dialogue newly compelling for 
Renaissance writers, including Spenser. I focus especially on Spenser’s re-invention of Gryllus 
as Gryll. Then, I analyze other episodes from book 2 that mention pigs or transformation 
explicitly, or relatively explicitly: episodes involving the Idle Lake, the episode about Malegar’s 
army, and the episode in which Amavia recounts the degradation and murder of Mordant. I argue 
that Spenser’s treatment of Gryll orients readings of these scenes, in which intemperate creatures 
either become pigs or occupy the place of the pig. Finally, I discuss examples that do not invoke 
 
142 
pigs in obvious ways but nevertheless turn out to rely on comparisons of humans to pigs to 
condemn intemperate humans: the Mammon episode, Belphoebe’s brief but significant 
chastisement of Braggadocchio and Trompart, and the narrator’s characterization of Archimago. 
Archimago’s characterization in the first canto is probably the example that seems most 
peripheral to book 2, but I demonstrate that even this example needs to be understood in relation 
to the treatment of Gryll in the final canto. 
The narrator’s account of intemperance’s ability to transform the human affiliates book 2 
with Plutarchian treatments of transformation and with the Renaissance theories of human nature 
that happen to coincide with the Plutarchian precedent. In the opening stanza of the ninth canto, 
Spenser’s narrator assumes the pulpit: 
  Of all Gods works, which doe this world adorne, 
  There is no one more faire and excellent, 
  Then is mans body both for power and forme, 
  Whiles it is kept in sober government; 
  But none then it, more fowle and indecent, 
  Distempred through misrule and passions bace: 
  It growes a Monster, and incontinent 
  Doth loose his dignity and native grace. 
  Behold, who list, both one and other in this place.29 
The idea that immoral or improper conduct changes the human physique repeats and develops 
the theory, originally suggested by Plutarch’s Odysseus, that Circe’s transformations give her 
                                                
29 Edmund Spenser, The Faerie Queene, ed. A. C. Hamilton, Hiroshi Yamashita, and Toshiyuki 
Suzuki (Harlow, London, New York, et al.: Pearson Education, 2001), book 2, canto 9, stanza 1, 
lines 1-9. Subsequent citations appear in text by book, canto, stanza, and line numbers. 
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victims forms that suit their natures. Plutarch’s Odysseus suggests this possibility when he 
sarcastically remarks, “To me, Gryllus, you seem to have lost not only your shape, but your 
intelligence also under the influence of that drug. You have become infected with strange and 
completely perverted notions. Or was it rather an inclination to swinishness that conjured you 
into this shape?” (499). Insinuating that Gryllus’s transformation has brought his shape into 
accordance with a preexisting “swinishness,” Odysseus’s final, sarcastic question proposes an 
interpretation of Circe’s transformations that departs markedly from that of Homer’s Odysseus, 
who insists that Circe changes only the shapes of his crew: “they took on the look of pigs, with 
the heads and voices / and bristles of pigs, but the minds within them stayed as they had been / 
before.”30 Homer’s Circe creates discordant combinations of animal body and enduringly human 
mind; Plutarch’s Circe, at least as imagined in Odysseus’s insult, harmonizes an already 
animalistic mind with an animal body, more appropriate to Gryllus’s nature than the human 
shape. Imagining that the body “growes a Monster” to match a human’s moral status, Spenser’s 
account of the effects of intemperance treats transformation according to a Plutarchian, not 
Homeric, model. 
 Like other Plutarchian treatments of transformation by Renaissance writers, the opening 
stanza of the ninth canto also participates in the theories of human nature that render Plutarch’s 
Circe episode newly compelling in the Renaissance. The exposition of Giovanni Pico della 
Mirandola’s concept of the human takes the form of a speech that God delivers to Adam: 
Neither a fixed abode nor a form that is thine alone nor any function peculiar to 
thyself have we given thee, Adam, to the end that according to thy longing and 
according to thy judgment thou mayest have and possess what abode, what form, 
                                                
30 Homer, The Odyssey of Homer, trans. Richmond Lattimore (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), 
page 158, lines 239-41. 
 
144 
and what functions thou thyself shalt desire. The nature of all other beings is 
limited and constrained within the bounds of laws prescribed by Us.31 
In his own voice, Pico describes the human’s uniquely “self-transforming nature” (225) and 
proceeds to define other creatures according to their distinctive, fixed attributes: 
For it is not the bark that makes the plant but its senseless and insentient nature; 
neither is it the hide that makes the beast of burden but its irrational, sensitive 
soul; neither is it the orbed form that makes the heavens but their undeviating 
order; nor is it the sundering from body but his spiritual intelligence that makes 
the angel. (226) 
Although Pico regards physical form as inconsequential throughout this passage, the 
immediately subsequent passage catalogues the myriad discrepancies that can exist between a 
being’s human form and its nature: 
For if you see one abandoned to his appetites crawling on the ground, it is a plant 
and not a man you see; if you see one blinded by the vain illusions of imagery, as 
it were of Calypso, and, softened by their gnawing allurement, delivered over to 
his senses, it is a beast and not a man you see. If you see a philosopher 
determining all things by means of right reason, him you shall reverence: he is a 
heavenly being and not of this earth. If you see a pure contemplator, one unaware 
of the body and confined to the inner reaches of the mind, he is neither an earthly 
nor a heavenly being; he is a more reverend divinity vested with human flesh. 
(226) 
                                                
31 Giovanni Pico, “Oration on the Dignity of Man,” trans. Elizabeth Livermore Forbes, in The 
Renaissance Philosophy of Man, ed. Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and John Herman 
Randall, Jr. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950), 224-5. Subsequent citations 
appear in text. 
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Especially because of the allusion to Calypso, accused of proffering visual “illusions,” the 
passage treats physical shapes as misleading appearances that disguise the true natures of 
seemingly human beings. In the Plutarchian transformation stories, however, Circe’s role is to 
rectify one class of discrepancies, discrepancies between human form and animal nature, by 
giving seeming humans the animal forms that suit their animalistic natures. While sharing a 
Pico-like premise that human nature is malleable, the Plutarchian stories do not dismiss physical 
form as inconsequential. Instead, they use magical figures, inspired by Plutarch’s Circe, to bring 
physical forms into accordance with the natures of allegedly animalistic human characters. 
 Although the first stanza of the ninth canto of Spenser’s Faerie Queene does not 
unambiguously state that the human is the only “self-transforming” creature, the stanza’s 
assertion that human form and nature is malleable across an exceptionally wide range seems 
adequate to affiliate the stanza with Pico’s views. The narrator declares that, among god’s 
creatures, “There is no one more faire and excellent” than the temperate human; conversely, 
there is “none” “more fowle and indecent” than the self-indulgent human. Imagining extremes of 
behavior as well as form, the narrator specifically says that “mans body,” which has “dignity and 
native grace,” “growes a Monster” through intemperate comportment. This account adapts Pico’s 
theory of human nature’s malleability by varying a human’s physical form in accordance with its 
nature. Admittedly, the narrator’s most explicit comparison of humans with animals emphasizes 
the creator’s special regard for human welfare: 
And is there care in heaven? and is there love 
In heavenly spirits to these creatures bace, 
That may compassion of their evilles move? 
There is: else much more wretched were the cace 
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Of men then beasts. (2.8.1.1-5) 
Nevertheless, the opening stanza of the ninth canto explicitly remarks the wide range over which 
human form and nature are malleable, in a way that recalls and adapts Pico’s views. Since 
Spenser’s narrator never describes animal form or nature as malleable, it is moreover possible—
even probable—that Spenser’s narrator, like Pico, regards malleability as an exclusively human 
attribute. 
The crucial passage on Acrasia’s transformations occurs in book 12, when animals 
assault Guyon and the Palmer as they escort the captive Acrasia out of her bower. Guyon and the 
Palmer have previously encountered these animals upon their arrival at the bower, but on that 
occasion, the Palmer, wielding his magical staff, pacifies the animals without commenting on 
their nature. Upon encountering the animals a second time, the Palmer explains to Guyon, 
   These seeming beasts are men indeed, 
  Whom this Enchauntresse hath transformed thus, 
  Whylome her lovers, which her lustes did feed, 
  Now turned into figures hideous, 
  According to their mindes like monstrous. (2.12.85.1-5) 
An earlier passage, introducing the reader to Cymochles, makes Acrasia’s culpability in 
depraving humans even more explicit: 
  His dearest Dame is that Enchaunteresse, 
  The vyle Acrasia, that with vaine delightes, 
  And ydle pleasures in her Bower of Blisse, 
  Does charme her lovers, and the feeble sprightes 
  Can call out of the bodies of fraile wightes: 
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  Whom then she does transforme to monstrous hewes. (2.5.27.1-6) 
While Homer’s Circe alters only bodies, Spenser’s Acrasia alters both “bodies” and “sprightes,” 
in this passage, or “mindes,” in the prior passage. Noting this departure from Homer, A. C. 
Hamilton claims that Acrasia “is worse than Homer’s Circe” and attributes Spenser’s deviation 
from Homer to the influence of the already quoted passage in which Conti writes, “each one of 
Ulysses’ men was turned into a different kind of brute animal, depending on the repulsive vice 
he embraced” (bk. 6, ch. 6, p. 476).32 Questioning this judgment of Acrasia in comparison to 
Circe, I prefer to suggest that the transformations of these two figures are differently 
objectionable. Circe’s transformations are objectionable because they unfittingly place a human 
mind in an animal body. George Chapman emphasizes the unpleasantness that presumably 
attends such an existence in his translation of The Odyssey, which relates that the transformed 
crew “still retaind the soules they had before; / Which made them mourne their bodies change 
the more.”33 Acrasia’s transformations, in contrast, are objectionable because they entirely, or 
almost entirely, change humans into animals, which amounts, in Spenser’s terms, to moral 
degradation of the human. Since Acrasia creates beings whose bodies accord with their minds, 
however, it is possible to argue that Acrasia’s transformations are less objectionable than those 
of Circe. Indeed, Acrasia’s transformations ultimately keep distinct the categories of human and 
                                                
32 A. C. Hamilton, ed., The Faerie Queene, by Edmund Spenser (Harlow, London, New York, et 
al.: Pearson Education, 2001), page 200, note to 2.5.27; page 286, note to 2.12.85.5. 
33 George Chapman, trans., Homer's Odysses. Translated According to the Greeke By. Geo: 
Chapman (London: Imprinted by Rich: Field, for Nathaniell Butter, n.d.), page 151, no line 
numbers. Judith Yarnall makes a similar but somewhat problematic point about the 
transformations of the crew by Homer’s Circe: “The imprisonment of their human consciousness 
within bodies not capable of expressing it seems a particularly vindictive twist.” See 
Transformations of Circe: The History of an Enchantress (Urbana and Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 1994), 43. Subsequent citations appear in text. Yarnall elsewhere emphasizes the 
ultimately helpful—even decisive—role of Circe in Odysseus’s safe homecoming. See especially 
21-2. 
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animal—believed, by characters like Plutarch’s Odysseus, to be confounded in creatures who 
prefer animal existences to formerly human existences. Perhaps for this reason, the Palmer 
endorses at least one of Acrasia’s acts of transformation, as we shall see in the following 
discussion of Gryll. Spenser’s inclusion of a character named Gryll, obviously derived from 
Plutarch’s Gryllus, justifies the second way in which I would revise Hamilton’s view. I suggest 
not that Spenser derives his treatment of transformation from Conti, but rather that Spenser, like 
many Renaissance authors including Conti, writes under the influence of Plutarch’s recently re-
discovered dialogue “Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti,” the first Circe story to introduce the 
emphatically un-Homeric idea of a fitting transformation from human to animal.  
 Spenser all but announces a more particular relationship between book 2 of his Faerie 
Queene and Plutarch’s dialogue “Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti” by naming a character Gryll, after 
Plutarch’s Gryllus. Like Plutarch’s Gryllus, Spenser’s Gryll is a human who finds, after 
transformation, that he would rather be a pig than a human. While Plutarch’s Gryllus expresses 
his preference for existence as a pig by refusing the opportunity to return to human form, 
Spenser’s Gryll expresses his similar preference after being returned to human form against his 
will. After relating how the Palmer uses his magical staff to restore the many victims of 
Acrasia’s transformations to human forms, Spenser’s narrator not only introduces Gryll but also 
singles him out for further consideration:  
  But one above the rest in speciall, 
  That had an hog beene late, hight Grylle by name, 
  Repyned greatly, and did him miscall, 
  That had from hoggish forme him brought to naturall. (2.12.86.6-9) 
By imagining that Gryll laments his return to human form, Spenser deploys a motif that I have 
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previously identified in surveying the Homeric tradition of Circe stories, but Spenser gives the 
motif the opposite function. In chapter 1, I have argued that Homeric stories routinely affirm the 
continuing humanity of transformed creatures by narrating that those creatures attempt to express 
grief in human language yet produce only animal sounds. When Spenser’s narrator says that 
Gryll “Repyned greatly,” Spenser has Gryll perform the characteristic lamentations of the 
victims of Circe’s transformations—but upon transformation into human shape instead of upon 
transformation into animal shape, and thus with human language instead of with animal 
vocalizations. As in the Homeric stories, lamentation registers the discrepancy between physical 
form and inward identification, but the preference expressed in Gryll’s lamentations inverts the 
preference of Homeric protagonists like Ovid’s Macareus. Even if Gryll, along with the narrator, 
recognizes the human shape as the “naturall” one, Gryll still longs for a “hoggish forme.” 
In a Homeric story, Gryll’s desire to have the shape of a pig would be perverse, in 
comparison with the desire of Macareus, for instance, to return to human form, but it would not 
necessarily represent a departure from humanity, imagined as a mental quality that endures in 
spite of bodily transformations. In book 2 of The Faerie Queene, however, Spenser places 
Gryll’s desire for transformation in the context of the Plutarchian tradition, in which mental 
changes correlate with physical changes. Spenser invokes the Plutarchian tradition not only by 
naming Gryll after Plutarch’s Gryllus but also by writing a moralistic condemnation of Gryll that 
develops themes originating with Plutarch’s Odysseus. Book 2 ends with Guyon and the 
Palmer’s conversation about Gryll: 
  Saide Guyon, See the mind of beastly man, 
  That hath so soone forgot the excellence 
  Of his creation, when he life began, 
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  That now he chooseth, with vile difference, 
  To be a beast, and lacke intelligence. 
  To whom the Palmer thus, The donghill kinde 
  Delightes in filth and fowle incontinence: 
  Let Gryll be Gryll, and have his hoggish minde; 
  But let us hence depart, whilest wether serves and winde. (2.12.87.1-9) 
Just as Plutarch’s Odysseus speculates that Gryllus prefers existence as a pig because Gryllus has 
already evinced “συηνíας,” or “swinishness,” as a human (498, 499), the Palmer suggests that 
Gryll wants to be a pig because of “his hoggish minde.” Guyon, too, condemns Gryll’s choice, 
but in a way that develops the first of the two theories of Plutarch’s Odysseus: the theory that 
Gryllus has lost his human mentality upon transformation. Unlike the Palmer, who suspects that 
Gryll has always been essentially pig-like, Guyon suggests that Gryll has “forgot the excellence” 
of his former humanity. Additionally, the “vile difference”—difference here means 
“discrimination”34—for which Guyon condemns Gryll is an example of what Erica Fudge has 
identified as a widespread tendency in the Renaissance to conflate claims to human ontological 
status with belief in a hierarchy of human over animal. Fudge explains, “Without self-knowledge 
a human is living a life without use of the rational soul; is living, therefore, the life of an animal. 
And the incapacity to differentiate human from dog represents a failure to exercise the 
difference.”35 In these remarks, which refer particularly to a quotation from Robert Burton’s 
Anatomy of Melancholy, Fudge emphasizes the paradoxical Renaissance conception of reason 
both as the quality that elevates humans above animals and as a quality that consists in regarding 
                                                
34 The Oxford English Dictionary, Online ed., s.v. “difference” (entry dated 1989). See also 
Hamilton, ed., Faerie Queene, page 286, note to 2.12.87.4. 
35 Fudge, Brutal Reasoning, 27. 
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humans as superior to animals. Guyon declares Gryll unworthy of human status by the latter 
criterion when Guyon contemns the “vile difference” that Gryll reveals in desiring to be a pig.  
 Although the comments of both Guyon and the Palmer contribute to placing Gryll within 
a Plutarchian tradition in which some apparently human creatures have animal natures and 
therefore deserve animal forms, the Palmer, who develops the second hypothesis of Plutarch’s 
Odysseus, seems to correct Guyon, who develops the first hypothesis of Plutarch’s Odysseus. By 
putting the Palmer’s authority behind the second hypothesis, Spenser emphasizes the role of 
Gryll’s piggishness in making him contemptible. While Guyon discusses Gryll with the general 
terms “beast” and “beastly,” the Palmer says that Gryll has a specifically “hoggish minde.” 
Moreover, the Palmer’s declaration that “The donghill kinde / Delightes in filth and fowle 
incontinence” invokes images of dirtiness and indulgence that are quite specific to pigs.  
Even the clause “Let Gryll be Gryll,” while seemingly personal to Gryll, refers to the pig 
because of a complex relationship with the details of Plutarch’s “Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti.” In 
Plutarch’s dialogue, Gryllus is not the original name of Odysseus’s interlocutor. When Odysseus 
asks Circe for the name of the pig with whom Odysseus will converse, Circe says, “What’s that 
to do with the issue? Call him Gryllus, if you like” (497). According to the editor of the Loeb 
edition, “Gryllus”—“Γρυλλον,” in the original Greek (496)—means “Grunter” or “swine.”36 
Stephen Newmyer, meanwhile, has suggested the translation “Oinker,” as well as “Grunter.”37 
Corroborating these translations, Liddell and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon defines γρυ, the first 
three letters of Gryllus’s name, as “a grunt, like that of swine” and Γρυλλος as “a pig, porker,” 
though it also notes a few other uses of Γρυλλος, including its use by Diogenes Laertius as the 
                                                
36 Helmbold, ed. and trans., “Beasts Are Rational,” 497 n. b. 
37 Stephen T. Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason in Plutarch and Modern Ethics (New York 
and London: Routledge, 2006), 2. 
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“name of father and son of Xenophon.”38 In sum, Plutarch’s Circe gives Odysseus’s interlocutor 
a name that refers to the type of animal that he has become. In spite of evidence that “Gryllus” 
was used at least occasionally as a name for humans, Plutarch’s Circe withholds the original, 
human name of her talking animal and provides Odysseus instead with a name that clearly refers 
to the creature’s new status as a pig.  
 Spenser not only modifies “Gryllus” to “Gryll” but also allows readers to believe that the 
creature known as Gryll has always had that name, as perhaps he has. While the name of 
Plutarch’s Gryllus, translated as “Oinker” by Newmyer, unmistakably identifies Gryllus as a pig 
for an audience that reads ancient Greek, the name Gryll indicates piggishness only to those 
members of Spenser’s audience who know ancient Greek or who recognize Gryll as an analogue 
of Plutarch’s Gryllus. If Spenser had named his Gryllus figure “Oinker,” Spenser would have 
adhered more closely to Plutarch’s model and indicated more clearly, for an English audience, 
that the name had been applied to the Gryllus figure only after transformation. Instead, Spenser 
also allows an alternative view: that the creature known as Gryll has always had that name. 
When the Palmer says, “Let Gryll be Gryll,” the Palmer can thus be understood to say both “Let 
this human be the kind of creature that he has always been” and “Let a pig be a pig.”39  
The ambiguity of the Palmer’s declaration develops the theme introduced by Plutarch’s 
Odysseus when he asks Gryllus, “Or was it rather an inclination to swinishness that conjured you 
into this shape?” (499). In this sarcastic question, Odysseus makes not Circe but Gryllus’s 
“inclination to swinishness” the agent of his transformation. Likewise, Spenser’s Palmer 
ultimately attributes Gryll’s transformation into a pig to Gryll’s own essentially swinish nature. 
                                                
38 Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1861), 301. 
39 Compare my paraphrases with that of Hamilton: “let Grille be himself, i.e. a hog.” Hamilton, 
ed., Faerie Queene, page 286, note to 2.12.87.8. 
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In regard to the Palmer’s pronouncement, Schoenfeldt has claimed that the Palmer treats “what 
appears to be a magical metamorphosis form a man to a beast” as “a simple act of predication.”40 
I agree that the Palmer’s formulation downplays the Palmer’s agency in Gryll’s transformation. 
Indeed, I regard this disavowal as crucial to the Plutarchian nature of book 2 of Spenser’s Faerie 
Queene, since Plutarchian transformations bring outward shape into accordance with inner 
nature.  
I further suggest that the Palmer’s pronouncement develops Plutarch’s own treatment of 
Gryllus in a way that intensifies the moralistic assertion that the transformed creature has always 
had a swinish nature. Although Plutarch’s Odysseus makes a similar comment about Gryllus, 
Spenser strengthens this interpretation, in part by changing Gryll(us) from a name that Circe 
assigns after Gryllus’s transformation into a name that, while referring to pigs, has always 
belonged to Gryll. In other words, Spenser’s treatment of the name Gryllus increases suspicions 
that the transformed creature has always been contemptible—suspicions that Plutarch introduces, 
but then undercuts by having Gryllus reprimand Odysseus for making insults. Furthermore, by 
saying, “Let Gryll be Gryll, and have his hoggish minde,” the Palmer declares Gryll to be 
reprobate, and this quality has particular relevance to the pig because of the biblical verse, 
quoted by Topsell, that compares recalcitrant sinners to wallowing pigs: “The dog is turned to his 
own vomit againe, and the sowe that was washed, to her wallowing in the mire.”41 This 
moralistic formulation elaborates the significance of Gryll’s incorrigible desire to be a pig, since 
incorrigibility itself is a characteristic that provokes comparisons of humans with pigs—
                                                
40 Schoenfeldt, Bodies and Selves, 72. 
41 2 Pet. 2:2 (Authorized Version, 1611). Hamilton notes the relevance of this bible verse to 
Gryll. See Faerie Queene, page 286, note to 2.12.87.8. By showing that the verse figured 
prominently in natural history’s view of the pig, my account provides additional justification for, 
and enables fuller appreciation of, the verse’s relevance. 
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particularly dirty pigs—in the early modern period. The obstinacy of Gryll’s desire—above and 
beyond the fact that his desire is to be a pig—corroborates interpretations that Gryll is essentially 
swinish.42 Gryll’s ineradicable piggishness, then, sustains Guyon and the Palmer’s contempt for 
Gryll even as it favors the Palmer’s view over that of Guyon. 
After the Gryllus episode, which, I argue, retrospectively shapes every episode in book 2, 
the episodes involving the Idle Lake most obviously use the connotations of the pig to condemn 
intemperate characters. Although Phaedria reveals the lake’s name simultaneously to Cymochles 
and the reader quite early in canto 6 (2.6.10.2), the fullest description of the lake occurs at the 
end of the canto, when Atin jumps into the lake to prevent his master Pyrochles from madly 
drowning himself. As the narrator describes the lake, both Atin and Pyrochles become laughable, 
largely because they occupy the position of the wallowing pig: 
  Into the lake he lept, his Lord to ayd, 
  (So Love the dread of daunger doth despise) 
  And of him catching hold him strongly stayd 
  From drowning. But more happy he, then wise 
  Of that seas nature did not him avise. 
  The waves thereof so slow and sluggish were, 
  Engrost with mud, which did them fowle agrise, 
  That every weighty thing they did upbeare, 
  Ne ought mote ever sinck downe to the bottom there. (2.6.46.1-9). 
The lake, it turns out, contains not water but mud, and the narrator creates an especially vivid 
                                                
42 The word “pigheaded,” though, enters the English language by 1637, some time after the 
publication of The Faerie Queene but only shortly after the composition of Comus. The Oxford 
English Dictionary, Online ed., s.v. “pigheaded” (entry dated 2006). 
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image of the condition of Pyrochles and Atin by saying that that the Idle Lake “did them fowle 
agrise.” The resemblance of Pyrochles and Atin to pigs seems particularly strong because of this 
vivid image of dirtiness and because idleness, for which the lake is named, is a commonly 
remarked characteristic of pigs. Moreover, once the narrator has explained the impossibility of 
drowning in the Idle Lake’s mud, the most accurate word for the activity of Atin and Pyrochles 
in the lake may well be wallowing. Thus, Spenser condemns Pyrochles’s self-destructive rage 
and Atin’s rash decision to jump into the lake by subjecting both characters to a mud bath, which 
inevitably associates them with pigs, especially but not only because of Gryll’s prominent role in 
the final canto of book 2. 
 Although Spenser never places Cymochles, Pyrochles’s brother, in the Idle Lake, the Idle 
Lake provides a crucial referent for the narrator’s negative judgments of Cymochles in canto 5, 
just before Cymochles becomes the first character to reach the Idle Lake in canto 6. Believing 
that Guyon has killed Pyrochles, Atin travels to Acrasia’s bower in search of Cymochles. The 
narrator’s descriptions of Cymochles draw on the constellation of images surrounding the pig. 
For instance, the narrator relates, “Atin fownd Cymochles sojourning” (2.5.28.1). Cymochles’s 
“sojourning” is especially remarkable because “ydle pleasures” (2.5.27.3) figure conspicuously 
among Acrasia’s temptations and because Cymochles’s idleness anticipates the Idle Lake. 
Continuing to describe Cymochles, the narrator declares, 
   he has pourd out his ydle mynd 
  In daintie delices, and lavish joyes, 
  Having his warlike weapons cast behind, 
  And flowes in pleasures, and vaine pleasing toyes, 
  Mingled emongst loose Ladies and lascivious boyes. (2.5.28.5-9) 
 
156 
The narrator does not mention mud explicitly, but wallowing, as if in mud, describes the situation 
of Cymochles as he “flowes in pleasures.” Indeed, The Oxford English Dictionary explains that 
wallow, in the sense “To roll about, or lie prostrate and relaxed in or upon some liquid, viscous, 
or yielding substance,” also carries suggestions of “sensual enjoyment or indifference to 
defilement.” This definition relates to the more abstract use of wallow to mean “to take delight in 
gross pleasures or a demoralizing way of life.”43 
 A subsequent stanza strengthens the association of Cymochles with the pig by continuing 
to picture his idle wallowing and adding excessive consumption to a growing list of Cymochles’s 
pig-like behaviors. The narrator catches Cymochles in voyeuristic enjoyment of half-naked 
women: 
  He like an Adder, lurking in the weedes, 
  His wandring thought in deepe desire does steepe, 
  And his frayle eye with spoyle of beauty feedes; 
  Sometimes he falsely faines himself to sleepe, 
  Whiles through their lids his wanton eies do peepe. (2.5.34.1-5) 
I do not mean to dismiss entirely the overt comparison of Cymochles to a snake, but it is 
important not to miss the stanza’s references to characteristics of the pig. The line imagining 
Cymochles to “steepe” his “thought in deepe desire” continues earlier intimations of wallowing. 
Furthermore, pretending “to sleepe” is another form of idleness, though it is exacerbated by 
“deceipt,” associated with snakes (as in a story too famous to mention) rather than pigs and 
explicitly condemned by the narrator later in the stanza (2.5.34.8). Finally, when the narrator 
says that Cymochles “feedes” his eye, the narrator broaches the topic of excessive consumption, 
                                                
43 The Oxford English Dictionary, Online ed., s.v. “wallow” (entry dated 1989). 
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a phenomenon commonly associated with pigs. Indeed, Spenser devotes the stanza’s final line to 
the idea of gluttonous consumption: the narrator deems Cymochles “dronke with drugs of deare 
voluptuous receipt” (2.5.34.9). The word “dronke,” in particular, condemns Cymochles by 
likening his self-indulgence to excessive drinking. 
 What clinches the association of Cymochles with the pig is a line that unmistakably 
anticipates the Idle Lake. When Atin reaches Acrasia’s bower, Cymochles is said “in still waves 
of deepe delight to wade” (2.5.35.2). The following book echoes the image of “still waves” in 
descriptions of the Idle Lake, especially the reference to its “slouthfull wave” (2.6.18.7) and the 
description of it as an “ydle flood” (2.6.41.9). The mud of the Idle Lake thus comes to represent 
the “deepe delight” that Cymochles enjoys, and construction of Cymochles as wallowing, like 
the pig, becomes nearly inevitable.44 
 Cymochles wallows metaphorically, not actually in the mud of the Idle Lake, like his 
brother Pyrochles at the end of canto 6. Spenser has already abased Pyrochles in a similarly 
concrete manner when the narrator introduces Pyrochles and uses implicit comparisons of 
Pyrochles to a pig in order to condemn his excessive anger, which remains the cause for 
condemnation of Pyrochles as he attempts to drown himself in the Idle Lake. When Occasion 
incites Furor and Pyrochles to quarrel with one another, Furor subjects Pyrochles to an indignity: 
“He cast him downe to ground, and all along / Drew him through durt and myre without 
remorse” (2.5.23.3-4). Furor characteristically treats his victims in this manner, for at Furor’s 
first appearance, Furor drags the vengeful Phaon through the dirt: “A mad man, or that feigned 
mad to bee, / Drew by heare along upon the grownd, / A handsom stripling with great crueltee” 
                                                
44 The meaning of Cymochles’s name is another relevant, though not crucial, detail. Hamilton 
explains that Cymochles’s “name derives from κυµα, wave.” See Faerie Queene, page 194, note 
to 2.4.41. 
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(2.4.3.5-7). The language of these passages suggests a comparison of Furor’s victims to pigs, 
since Furor’s victims are covered in dirt and are led—dragged, actually—by someone who, like a 
human keeper, walks upright. Topsell suggests an even deeper connection between pigs and 
angry humans when he writes, “They which have foreheads, eyelids, lips, mouth, or Necke, like 
Swyne, are accounted foolish, wicked, and wrathful” (674). The association of anger with a 
swinish appearance in humans corroborates the argument that Spenser’s allegorical 
representations of Furor suggest a (damning) comparison of Furor’s victims to pigs. Moreover, 
after Pyrochles succumbs to Furor, the Palmer advises Guyon not to rescue Pyrochles because he 
“Deserves to taste his follies fruit, repented payne” (2.5.24.9). The Palmer’s judgment—that 
Furor’s dragging Pyrochles through the mud is fit punishment—anticipates the judgment that the 
Palmer passes on Gryll when he suggests that a swinish existence is a fit punishment for Gryll’s 
intemperance. The Palmer’s judgments make the case of Gryll, whose swinishness is 
unmistakable, parallel the case of Pyrochles, whose swinishness is less manifest. 
Although the besiegers of Alma’s castle, led by the spectral general Malegar, do not 
uniformly resemble pigs in their physical forms, the pig nevertheless provides an apt analogue 
for these intemperate creatures, as well. The physical forms of most of the besiegers of Alma’s 
castle combine parts of humans with parts of a variety of animals, including owls, dogs, deer, 
snakes, apes, birds, and toads (2.11.8-13). Among the creatures that assault the bulwark of 
hearing are “Some like wilde Bores late rouzd out of the brakes” (2.11.10.5). The besiegers of 
the bulwark of taste include “some fashioned in the waste / Like swine” (2.11.12.5-6). Although 
wild and domestic pigs receive explicit mention, Spenser’s narrator does not explicitly accord the 
pig-like creatures any special status among Alma’s enemies. Hamilton, however, has regarded 
the pig as the crucial figure in the stanza in an editorial note explicating a pun in the following 
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clause: “so deformd is luxury, / Surfeat, misdiet, and unthriftie waste” (2.11.12.7). According to 
Hamilton, Spenser writes “unthriftie waste” in reference to the fact that “the vice [luxury] is 
embodied in the waistless swine.”45 Thus, the pig, and particularly its characteristic fatness, turns 
out to be crucial to the stanza’s condemnation of luxury.  
In addition to being the dominant figure in this stanza, the pig may represent those 
intemperate creatures who have forms resembling other animals. The narrator begins the stanza 
introducing assailants of the bulwark of taste with a comparison that redounds on Malegar’s 
entire army: “And that fourth band which cruell battry bent, / Against the fourth Bulwarke, that 
is the Taste, / Was as the rest a grysie rablement.” (2.11.12.1-3). The Oxford English Dictionary 
cites these lines as an example of the use of the now obsolete word grisy to mean “Horrible; 
grim; grisly.”46 The word “grysie,” however, also recalls “that great griesy lake” (2.6.18.7)—that 
is, the Idle Lake. Here, “griesy”—or, with modernized spelling, greasy—refers to the Idle Lake’s 
muddiness.47 The “grysie rablement” that assaults Alma’s castle may well be an army covered in 
mud, like bathers in the Idle Lake or wallowing pigs. Strengthening this suggestion, the narrator 
calls Malegar’s army “grysie” in the same stanza that mentions the domestic pig. Although the 
narrator says that the assailants of the bulwark of taste, including the pig-like creatures, resemble 
the other dirty members of Malegar’s army, I speculate that the pig originally generates the 
                                                
45 Hamilton, ed., Faerie Queene, page 263, note to 2.11.12.4-8. 
46 The Oxford English Dictionary, Online ed., s.v. “grisy” (entry dated 1989). 
47 In an editorial note, which acknowledges that the 1596 edition of book 2 has “griesly” instead 
of “griesy,” Hamilton nevertheless defends the interpretation that “griesy” refers to the lake’s 
muddiness, as well as its “horrible” nature. See Faerie Queene, page 206, note to 2.6.18.7. For 
Hiroshi Yamashita and Toshiyuki Suzuki’s remarks on the greater reliability of the 1590 edition, 
see their “Textual Introduction,” in The Faerie Queene, ed. A. C. Hamilton, Hiroshi Yamashita, 
and Toshiyuki Suzuki (Harlow, London, New York, et al.: Pearson Education, 2001), 21-2. The 
Oxford English Dictionary gives Spenser’s description of the Idle Lake as an example of a use of 
grisy—“Horrible; grim; grisly”—while acknowledging the discrepancy between the 1590 and 
1596 editions. Online ed., s.v. “grisy” (entry dated 1989). 
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conception of Malegar’s intemperate army as dirty. That is, the narrator, claiming that pig-like 
creatures resemble other dirty members of Malegar’s army, inverts the direction of the 
comparison without entirely concealing the pig’s role in generating it.  
Mordant, the first of Acrasia’s victims to come to Guyon’s attention, also resembles—
and may even have temporarily become—a pig. In canto 1, Amavia provides an account of her 
redemption of Mordant from Acrasia’s vices: 
  Him so I sought, and so at last I fownd 
  Where him that witch had thralled to her will, 
  In chaines of lust and lewde desyres ybownd 
  And so transformed from his former skill, 
  That me he knew not, nether his owne ill; 
  Till through wise handling and faire governaunce, 
  I him recured to a better will, 
  Purged from drugs of fowle intemperaunce: 
  Then meanes I gan devise for his deliverance. (2.1.54.1-9) 
When Amavia claims to have cured Mordant through purgation, she may offer not merely a 
metaphor for Mordant’s moral redemption but a description of a medical intervention necessary 
to restore Mordant to “a better will.” As Schoenfeldt has explained, Renaissance thinkers, relying 
on Galen’s theory of the four humors, tend to conflate morality and health.48 Several examples of 
treatments through purgation corroborate Schoenfeldt’s subsequent claim that “most illness in 
the period is imagined to derive from the body’s inability to rid itself of excess humors” (13-4, 
31). Although Schoenfeldt’s reading of the scene with Amavia and Mordant does not discuss her 
                                                
48 Schoenfeldt, Bodies and Selves, 7. Subsequent citations appear in text. 
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treatment of Mordant through purgations (44-5, but see also 46, 47-8), the scene provides further 
evidence for Schoenfeldt’s point that temperance “not only exhibits proper ethical conduct, but 
also actively alters the moral condition of the self that practices it” (60). Because humoral 
imbalance is associated with both pathology and immorality, the purgations by which Amavia 
cures Mordant can be understood as interventions necessary, both morally and medically, to 
bring Mordant from a state of overindulgence—compared to inebriation, since Amavia says that 
Acrasia “makes her lovers dronken mad” (2.1.52.1)—to a state of proper moderation. 
 I suggest, more particularly, that Amavia’s account of her redemption of Mordant renders 
him comparable to a pig, an animal supposed to have an appetite so unrestrained that it 
endangers the pig’s own health. Of the pig, Topsell writes, “such is the ravening intemperancy of 
this beast to swil in whatsoever is pleasant to his taste, that many times in drinking of Whaye 
their bellies growe extended above measure, even to death, except that they bee dieted by a wise 
keeper, and driven up and downe not suffered to rest till it flow foorth againe backeward” (669). 
Like the pig, Mordant indulges in sensual pleasures without restraint. Even though his behavior 
is detrimental to his well-being, he seems unable to regulate his appetites. No less than the pig, 
who requires the intervention of “a wise keeper,” Mordant needs the “wise handling” of Amavia 
in order to recover. In the cases of both Mordant and the pig who has consumed too much whey, 
the cure takes the form of a purgation. Moreover, Topsell’s image of the pig-keeper driving his 
pigs “up and downe” until they vomit seems like an apt description of Amavia’s treatment of 
Mordant: she seeks him out in Acrasia’s bower; takes charge of his behaviors, ultimately driving 
him toward their home; and induces vomiting in the process. What generates this coincidence in 
imagery is the implication that Mordant, like the pig, lacks the will to temper his own desire for 
pleasure.  
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Spenser drives home the comparison of Mordant to a pig by having Amavia say that he 
has been “transformed.” In the passage, the word refers most immediately to Mordant’s shocking 
loss of self-mastery, but the word also demands that Mordant’s intemperance be understood in 
the terms of the first stanza of canto nine, which asserts that intemperate behavior causes 
physical transformations. Moreover, the assertion that Acrasia has “transformed” Mordant 
inevitably recalls the humans whom she is revealed to have transformed into animals in the final 
canto, especially the only individuated victim of Acrasia’s transformations, Gryll, who has 
been—and still wishes to be—a pig. Because the pig figures especially prominently in the 
representation of Acrasia’s transformations, it seems likely that Mordant’s transformation can be 
understood to make him comparable to the pig, and to place him and Amavia in the relation of 
pig and keeper. 
 Having treated episodes that refer relatively explicitly to pigs, I now propose to 
demonstrate that the pig underlies many other and seemingly disparate images of intemperance. 
For instance, the constellation of images for greed in the Mammon episode evokes the pig, 
though not explicitly. When Guyon meets Mammon, the narrator describes Mammon as both 
dirty and gluttonous: the mail that Mammon wears is “darkned with filthy dust” (2.7.4.3), and in 
counting his money, Mammon is said “to feede his eye / And covetous desire with his huge 
threasury” (2.7.4.8-9). Refusing Mammon’s temptations, Guyon declares that wealth defiles its 
possessor: “Regard of worldly mucke doth fowly blend, / And low abase the high heroicke 
spright” (2.7.10.5-6). These lines adapt the pig’s characteristic wallowing in the mud to condemn 
human materialism. The association of greed with mud continues when Guyon compares wealth 
to “mucky filth” (2.7.15.8) in a river. The narrator also condemns Pilate by describing him as 
dirty, a judgment with which Pilate concurs. After the narrator relates that Pilate has “hands most 
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filthy feculent” (2.7.61.4), Pilate memorably laments, “The whiles my hands I washt in purity, / 
The whiles my soule was soyld with fowle iniquity” (2.7.62.8-9). Spenser’s representation of 
Pilate adapts material from the gospel of Matthew. Doubting that Jesus has committed any crime 
yet desiring to placate those demanding Jesus’s crucifixion, Pilate, Matthew relates, “tooke 
water, and washed his hands before the multitude, saying, I am innocent of the blood of this just 
person: see yee to it.”49 By giving Pilate hands that are not merely dirty but “feculent” and by 
having Pilate remark that his symbolic hand-washing “soyld” his “soule,” Spenser condemns 
Pilate for disavowing moral and legal responsibility for Jesus’s case. As Spenser juxtaposes the 
image of Pilate’s hand-washing with the image of soul-staining, he gives greater weight to the 
latter image by reserving it for the stanza’s final alexandrine. Although “feculent” causes Pilate’s 
dirtiness to exceed that of many other intemperate or otherwise immoral characters, Pilate does 
not surpass the dirtiness expected of pigs. In Topsell’s entry on the pig, he writes, “they love the 
dung of men” (669). Thus, in addition to inverting the biblical image of hand-washing, Spenser’s 
images of Pilate’s dirtiness condemn Pilate by likening him to the quintessentially dirty pig. 
The image of gluttonous eating recurs, as well, especially when Guyon contrasts an 
idealized age of moderation with “later ages,” when 
   pride, like corn-fed steed, 
  Abusd her plenty, and fat swolne encreace 
  To all licentious lust, and gan exceed 
  The measure of her meane, and naturall first need. (2.7.16.6-9). 
Explicitly, the passage represents pride as a horse,50 but the reprehensible behaviors of this horse, 
                                                
49 Matt. 27:24 (Authorized Version, 1611). 
50 The Oxford English Dictionary offers no other plausible referents for “steed” in this passage. 
Online ed., s.v. “steed” (entry dated 1989). 
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such as overeating and growing fat, are characteristic behaviors of the pig. The passage’s 
evocation of the pig is strengthened by its proximity to Guyon’s comparison of wealth to “mucky 
filth,” which occurs in the immediately preceding stanza. Likewise, Guyon meets Tantalus, 
whose punishment involves perpetual hunger and thirst (2.7.58), immediately before Pilate, 
whose punishment involves perpetual dirtiness. Indeed, throughout the Mammon episode, 
frequent alternations between images of mud and images of eating adumbrate the pig, even when 
the metaphors explicitly refer to seemingly distant objects or creatures, such as a river or a horse.  
 Although Belphoebe makes only a brief appearance in book 2, she delivers a lecture 
condemning sybarites by comparing them to pigs. Her speech, especially its beginning, is 
eloquent and memorable:  
  Who so in pompe of prowd estate (quoth she) 
  Does swim, and bathes him selfe in courtly blis, 
  Does waste his dayes in darke obscuritee, 
  And in oblivion ever buried is. (2.3.40.1-4) 
My theory that Belphoebe compares sybarites to pigs explains an oddity of the quatrain. In the 
first two lines, Belphoebe imagines “pompe of prowd estate” and “courtly blis” as liquids in 
which the sybarite “Does swim” or “bathes him selfe,” respectively. In the quatrain’s final line, 
however, Belphoebe chooses the word “buried,” not drowned, and thereby imagines the sybarites 
covered with earth, not immersed in liquid, as in the first two lines of the quatrain. If Belphoebe 
means, however, to compare sybarites to wallowing pigs, then her use of both liquid and solid 
imagery seems appropriate to mud, like the mud that composes the Idle Lake. The verb “bathes” 
turns out to be ironic, and in its inversion of cleanliness and dirtiness, draws on the idea, 
recorded by Topsell, that mud is to pigs as water is to humans in order to suggest that humans 
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should not indulge in the pleasures, compared to mud, that Belphoebe describes. Moreover, 
Belphoebe delivers this speech in rebuttal of Braggadocchio’s misguided admiration of her: “The 
wood is fit for beasts, the court is fitt for thee” (2.3.39.9). As Belphoebe inverts Braggadocchio’s 
hierarchy of “court” over “wood,” she also associates “court,” rather than “wood,” with 
“beasts”—specifically pigs—in order to condemn humans who live in luxury. Belphoebe’s 
formulation anticipates the association, noted by Hamilton and discussed above, of pig-like 
creatures with luxury in the description of Malegar’s army. 
 Finally, I close my analysis of Spenser’s Faerie Queene with an example featuring 
Archimago, a major villain in book 1 but a relatively minor villain in book 2. Spenser’s narrator 
gives the following description of the evil wizard: 
  For all he did, was to deceive good knights, 
  And draw them from pursuit of praise and fame, 
  To slug in slouth and sensuall delights, 
  And end their daies with irrenowmed shame. (2.1.23.1-4) 
If a modern reader imagines any animal referent for this passage, it is more likely the slug than 
the pig. The Oxford English Dictionary, however, can help to illuminate the anachronism of such 
a reading and the urgent relevance of the pig. As used by Spenser in the above passage, slug 
means “to lie idly or lazily.” Etymologists have associated this verb with two Norwegian nouns, 
slugg and sluggje, meaning “a large heavy body” and “a heavy slow person,” respectively. 
Adhering closely to the Norwegian usage, the English noun slug means “A slow, lazy fellow.” 
The noun slug begins to denote “A slow-moving slimy gasteropod or land-snail” only in the 
early eighteenth century.51 Thus, Spenser’s “slug” would not cause early modern readers to think 
                                                
51 The Oxford English Dictionary, Online ed., s.v. “slug, n.1” and “slug, v.1” (entries dated 1989). 
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of the familiar slimy pest, but they might think of the wallowing pig, the type of idleness and 
immobility, due to excessive fatness, for early moderns.  
Likewise, the earliest documented use of the noun sloth to name the now familiar 
“arboreal mammal of a sluggish nature” occurs in 1613.52 This meaning of sloth not only 
postdates the publication of The Faerie Queene, if only slightly, but also seems unlikely in the 
context of Spenser’s passage. The Oxford English Dictionary records, however, the fifteenth-
century use of sloth and slothe, possibly forms of the more common slough, to mean “A miry or 
muddy place.”53 Considering Spenser’s frequent use of archaic words, he may have intended 
“slouth” to conflate the moral vice with mud, in which pigs characteristically wallow. Even 
without this possible linguistic connection, however, Spenser’s Lake of Idleness explicitly 
connects sloth with mud. Furthermore, the line “To slug in slouth and sensual delights” bears 
some resemblance to lines from a poem by Alexander Montgomerie: “let me not sleep in sleuth, / 
In stinking sty with Satans sinfull swyn.”54 These lines make explicit the association of sloth and 
the pigsty, which remains implicit in Spenser’s line about Archimago. Incidentally, 
Montgomerie’s lines also provide further evidence for the affiliation of Cymochles, who 
pretends to sleep so that he can spy on naked women, with the pig. 
Finally, the narrator’s description of Archimago matches a later description of Phaedria, a 
villain who sails the Idle Lake and who plays a more central role in book 2. The narrator 
comments on Phaedria’s flirtation with Guyon in her boat: “So did she all, that might his 
constant hart / Withdraw from thought of warlike enterprize, / And drowne in dissolute delights 
                                                
52 The Oxford English Dictionary, Online ed., s.v. “sloth, n.1” (entry dated 1989). 
53 The Oxford English Dictionary, Online ed., s.v. “sloth, n.2” and “slough, n.1” (entries dated 
1989). 
54 Alexander Montgomerie, “A godly Prayer,” in Alexander Montgomerie: Poems, ed. David J. 
Parkinson (Edinburgh: The Scottish Text Society, 2000), 1:8, lines 41-2. 
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apart” (2.6.25.5-7). It is almost impossible not to think of the Idle Lake under Phaedria’s boat 
when the narrator says that Phaedria wishes to “drowne” Guyon in pleasures. Thus, these 
pleasures become comparable to mud, submersion in which becomes tantamount to wallowing, 
like a pig. Because of the similarities in the villainous agendas of Phaedria and Archimago, the 
Idle Lake colors the characterization of Archimago and strengthens implications that he 
assimilates his victims to pigs. Spenser thus condemns the knights whom Archimago tempts 
away from their quests by imagining them in the place of the wallowing pig. 
As these numerous and widely varying examples indicate, to be intemperate in book 2 of 
Spenser’s Faerie Queene is almost always either to become a pig, or otherwise to occupy the 
place of the pig. Gryll, though treated only briefly and in the final canto, orients Spenser’s 
treatments of intemperance throughout book 2. 
 
“To roll with pleasure in a sensual sty”: Comparisons of Comus and his Creatures to Pigs 
 
 Unlike Spenser’s Faerie Queene, Milton’s Comus never alludes to Plutarch’s Gryllus by 
name. Nevertheless, Comus belongs to a tradition of transformation stories based upon Plutarch’s 
“Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti,” and represents another example of the reception and adaptation of 
Plutarch in the Renaissance. Milton’s Plutarchian story, however, features Comus rather than 
Circe and attempts to distinguish Comus from earlier Circe figures, especially in the expository 
material presented by the Attendant Spirit. As we shall see, a primary way in which Milton 
attempts to distinguish his Comus story from the Circe stories of Homer and Plutarch is by 
decentralizing the role of the pig, which is prominent in The Odyssey and “Bruta Animalia 
Ratione Uti.” Ultimately, however, comparisons of humans to pigs underlie most of the 
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masque’s pronouncements about Comus and his transformed creatures, which suggests that the 
pig, or the symbolism of the pig, remains crucial to the masque. 
The older brother’s speech about transformations caused by sin implicitly affiliates 
Comus with Plutarchian treatments of transformation. After explaining that “oft converse with 
heav’nly habitants” can alter “th’outward shape” and render it “immortal” (p. 101, ll. 459, 460, 
463), the older brother tells his younger brother, 
       when lust 
  By unchaste looks, loose gestures, and foul talk, 
  But most by lewd and lavish act of sin, 
  Lets in defilement to the inward parts, 
  The soul grows clotted by contagion, 
  Imbodies and imbrutes, till she quite lose 
  The divine property of her first being. (p. 101, ll. 463-9) 
The older brother’s speech is, of course, indebted to Pico’s account of the human’s “self-
transforming nature.”55 As though recognizing the older brother’s adaptation of Pico’s views, the 
younger brother responds, “How charming is divine Philosophy!” (p. 101, l. 476). Pico also 
provides a precedent for negative evaluations of humans who lead animal existences; Pico 
writes, “if you see one blinded by the vain illusions of imagery, as it were of Calypso, and, 
softened by their gnawing allurement, delivered over to his senses, it is a beast and not a man 
you see” (226). Milton’s Comus, however, features not Calypso but Circe’s son Comus as an 
agent of animalization, and animalization affects not only a creature’s nature, as in Pico, but also 
a creature’s physical form, as in other Plutarchian transformation stories. When the older brother 
                                                
55 Pico, “Oration on the Dignity of Man,” 225. Subsequent citations appear in text. 
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says that sin “Imbodies and imbrutes” the soul, he suggests that these changes are corporeal and 
amount to a transition from human to animal. 
Although the Attendant Spirit introduces Comus by comparing him to his mother Circe, 
the Attendant Spirit also differentiates Comus from Circe in ways that place Comus’s 
transformations in the Plutarchian tradition that appealed to so many Renaissance writers, 
beginning with Giovanni Battista Gelli. Upon first mentioning Circe, the Attendant Spirit asks, 
“Who knows not Circe / The daughter of the Sun?” (p. 91, ll. 50-1).56 In contrast, the Attendant 
Spirit has begun his biography of Comus by promising, “I will tell ye now / What never yet was 
heard in Tale or Song / From old or modern Bard, in Hall or Bow’r” (p. 91, ll. 43-5). These lines 
frame the character Comus as Milton’s original creation, in contrast to the Circe figures of earlier 
writers. The inspiration for Comus certainly derives from Homer’s Circe; the Attendant Spirit 
even emphasizes the similarity between Comus and Circe by calling Comus “a Son / Much like 
his Father, but his Mother more” (p. 91, ll. 56-7). Milton, however, contrasts Circe and Comus 
by having the Attendant Spirit remark on the fame of Circe and the anonymity of Comus. Comus 
turns out to differ from Circe in some profound ways, many of which indicate that Milton relies 
on the Plutarchian tradition as he invents his character Comus. Circe and Comus may even be 
considered to represent the Homeric and Plutarchian traditions, respectively. 
Sean Keilen has provided a wider context for the Attendant Spirit’s differentiation of 
Milton “From old or modern Bard”—and indeed, a wider context for Comus as a whole—in an 
essay about Milton’s adaptation and revision of literature by ancient and early modern 
predecessors, especially Virgil and Shakespeare. Claiming that ancient writers use Circe “to 
depict the process of imitation as a confusion of things that should be kept apart,” Keilen writes, 
                                                
56 Gareth Roberts uses this quotation as evidence that “Circe is ubiquitous in Renaissance 
culture.” “Descendants of Circe,” 187-8. 
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“I intend to show that for Milton the myth of Circe may have illuminated not only the practice of 
imitation but also the hybridity of England’s vulgar eloquence in a similar way.”57 Although 
Keilen claims that Circe plays a central role in Comus, and that Milton’s Circe episode “follows 
Homer and Virgil in putting the most basic distinctions into question” (160), the final section of 
Keilen’s essay emphasizes Milton’s deviations from earlier works. After quoting the Attendant 
Spirit’s claim for Milton’s originality (161), Keilen introduces “two scenes in which Milton is 
remarkably ingenious in his efforts to differentiate the Maske from its classical and vernacular 
models” (163). While I admire Keilen’s ensuing discussion of the Lady (163-70), which entails 
an insightful and compelling account of the replacement of Homer’s moly with Milton’s 
haemony (170-1), my argument about Plutarch’s influence on Milton and the role of the pig in 
Comus provides examples of ways in which earlier Circe stories shape Milton’s Comus story—
in spite of Milton’s attempts to differentiate his work from earlier Circe stories. 
 One difference between Comus and Circe is that Comus transforms only the heads of 
humans into those of animals, while Circe transforms the entire human body. The Attendant 
Spirit explains that each of Circe’s victims “lost his upright shape, / And downward fell into a 
groveling Swine” (p. 91, ll. 52-3). The lines indicate that Circe changes the human form 
completely into the form of an animal, specifically a pig, and they emphasize that Circe’s 
transformations make a bipedal creature—with “upright shape”—into a quadrupedal one. Indeed, 
the lines recall the treatment of bipedalism in the account of Prometheus’s creation of humans in 
Ovid’s Metamorphoses: 
  And where all other beasts behold the ground with grovelling eye, 
He gave to man a stately look replete with majesty 
                                                
57 Sean Keilen, Vulgar Eloquence: On the Renaissance Invention of English Literature (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006), 155. Subsequent citations appear in text. 
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And willed him to behold the heaven with count’nance cast on high, 
To mark and understand what things were in the starry sky.58 
When the Attendant Spirit contrasts the “upright shape” of the human with the “groveling” form 
of animals, the Attendant Spirit suggests that Circe’s transformations should be understood in the 
terms of Ovid’s speaker, who regards the bipedalism of the human, no less than the human’s 
mandate to “understand” unearthly “things,” as an integral part of humanity. Milton’s adoption 
of the word “groveling” from Arthur Golding’s translation of Ovid’s Metamorphoses drives 
home the relevance of Ovid’s treatment of bipedalism. After establishing that Circe’s 
transformations change bipedal creatures into quadrupedal ones, the Attendant Spirit describes 
Comus’s transformations, which change only the head and thus create human-animal hybrids 
that remain bipedal. The Attendant Spirit explains the transformations of Comus’s victims: 
     their human count’nance, 
  Th’ express resemblance of the gods, is chang’d 
  Into some brutish form of Wolf, or Bear, 
  Or Ounce, or Tiger, Hog, or bearded Goat, 
  All other parts remaining as they were. (p. 91, ll. 68-72) 
Because Comus’s transformations only affect the head, his victims remain bipedal. His 
transformations thus contrast starkly with those of Circe, whose transformations, as the 
Attendant Spirit very specifically explains, change bipedal humans into quadrupedal pigs. 
 The Attendant Spirit explicitly contrasts Circe and Comus when he says that Comus 
“Excels his Mother at her mighty Art” (p. 91, l. 63). The reason that the Attendant Spirit 
                                                
58 Arthur Golding, trans., Ovid's Metamorphoses, ed. Madeleine Forey (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2002), book 1, lines 97-100. Subsequent citations appear in text by 
book and line numbers. 
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estimates Comus’s powers above those of Circe becomes clear as the Attendant Spirit provides 
further information about Comus’s transformations, implicitly placing them in the Plutarchian 
tradition as opposed to the Homeric one. Immediately after explaining that Comus’s 
transformations affect only the head, the Attendant Spirit says the following of Comus’s victims: 
  And they, so perfect is their misery, 
  Not once perceive their foul disfigurement, 
  But boast themselves more comely than before, 
  And all their friends and native home forget, 
  To roll with pleasure in a sensual sty. (p. 91, ll. 73-7) 
Unlike Circe’s victims in The Odyssey, Comus’s victims delight in their changed forms. When 
they “boast themselves more comely than before,” they repeat the preference for a non-human 
form and existence that characterizes Plutarch’s Gryllus. Like Gelli, Milton also has his 
transformed characters forget their human pasts upon or soon after transformation, whereas 
Homer’s Circe episode has Odysseus’s crew become “forgetful of their own country” before 
their transformation and without suggesting that such forgetfulness erodes the crew’s essentially 
human mentalities, which not even Circe’s transformations vitiate.59 When Milton and Gelli 
move the forgetting of the past to make it concurrent with or subsequent to transformation, they 
revise Homer’s Circe episode along Plutarchian lines. The Attendant Spirit declares the “misery” 
of Comus’s victims “perfect”—that is, the Attendant Spirit can imagine no worse state—because 
                                                
59 Homer, Odyssey of Homer, trans. Lattimore, p. 158, l. 236. Leonora Leet Brodwin also 
recognizes the distinction between forgetting homelands and becoming animals in Homer’s 
Circe episode: “The brutish transformation is the result of a drugged condition which enslaves 
but does not destroy the human mind. The drug causes its victims to forget their native land, but 
the subsequent brutish enslavement, symbolized by the wand, does not destroy all human 
remorse over their condition, however powerless their wills may be to effect a return to their 
native freedom.” See “Milton and the Renaissance Circe,” Milton Studies 6 (1974), 23. 
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Comus’s victims have changed to such an extent that they regard their animal-headed forms as 
superior to their original human forms and embrace a life of heedless “pleasure.” Comus “Excels 
his Mother at her mighty Art” (p. 91, l. 63), in the Attendant Spirit’s opinion, because Circe 
works Homeric transformations that alter only forms, while Comus works Plutarchian 
transformations that alter both forms and mental attributes, such as values and morals. Comus’s 
ability to cause inner transformations makes him more powerful than Circe, and more 
threatening, in the eyes of the Attendant Spirit. 
 Another way in which Comus seemingly differs from Circe is that he creates a variety of 
new forms, instead of a single type. As the Attendant Spirit narrates the meeting of Bacchus and 
Circe, Comus’s parents, the Attendant Spirit asks, 
  Who knows not Circe 
The daughter of the Sun? Whose charmed Cup 
Whoever tasted, lost his upright shape, 
And downward fell into a groveling Swine.60 
This summary ignores an interpretative tradition imagining Circe to have transformed humans 
into not only pigs but also other animals, especially wolves and lions. In Homer’s Odyssey, 
Eurylochos fears that Circe “will / transform the lot of us into pigs or wolves or lions.”61 
Odysseus, in contrast, describes the lions and wolves near Circe’s home simply as “lions, and 
wolves of the mountains, / whom the goddess had given evil drugs and enchanted” (p. 157, ll. 
                                                
60 John Milton, Comus, in Complete Poems and Major Prose, ed. Merritt Y. Hughes 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003), page 91, lines 50-3. Subsequent citations appear in text by page 
and line numbers. 
61 Homer, Odyssey of Homer, trans. Lattimore, page 163, lines 432-3. Subsequent citations of 
this translation appear in text by page and line numbers. 
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212-3). Roberts takes for granted that “Homer’s Circe has changed men into wolves and lions.”62 
Yarnall, more convincingly, maintains that the status of the wolves and lions “is left ambiguous” 
by Homer (82) but not by subsequent imitators, especially Virgil (82, cf. 11). Virgil’s brief Circe 
episode includes humans who have been transformed into pigs, lions, and wolves, as well as 
bears, a species not mentioned by Homer.63 Plutarch’s dialogue also imagines that Circe 
transforms humans into a variety of animals, even though Plutarch eventually foregrounds the 
pig. At the opening of the dialogue, Plutarch’s Odysseus asks Circe, “whether there are any 
Greeks among those whom you have changed from the shape of men into wolves and lions” 
(493). When Circe proposes a debate between Odysseus and the transformed creatures, Odysseus 
asks, “How can they argue with me or I with them so long as they are asses and hogs and lions?” 
(495). Gryllus subsequently accuses Odysseus of being “frightened that she [Circe] may, before 
you know it, turn you into a pig or a wolf” (499). Three animals other than pigs are mentioned in 
these quotations, the first of which does not mention the pig at all. 
Milton’s Attendant Spirit, thus, misconstrues Circe as someone who transforms humans 
exclusively into pigs. Furthermore, the Attendant Spirit frames his account of Circe’s 
transformations in the form of a rhetorical question, as though he expects or permits no 
disagreement with his account’s prioritization of the pig.  
 The Attendant Spirit’s description of Comus’s transformations, meanwhile, emphasizes 
their variety. When the Attendant Spirit says that Comus gives humans “some brutish form of 
Wolf, or Bear, / Or Ounce, or Tiger, Hog, or bearded Goat” (p. 91, ll. 70-1), he lists many 
different animals and, by repetition of “or,” implies that the list could go on. The pig appears as 
                                                
62 Roberts, “Descendants of Circe,” 194. 
63 Vergil, The Aeneid, trans. Sarah Ruden (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
2008), pages 144-5, lines 15-20. 
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one among many examples of an animal shape that Comus bestows upon humans, but awarding 
the pig no special prominence, the Attendant Spirit mentions the pig in the penultimate position 
in the list, not first or last. Milton’s stage directions for the first appearance of Comus and his 
transformed minions likewise describe them as “a rout of Monsters, headed like sundry sorts of 
wild Beasts” (p. 80). Neither the pig nor any other animal receives special mention. Indeed, 
Milton’s adjective “wild” presumably excludes the domesticated pig, which figures so 
prominently in the Circe episode, at least as retold by the Attendant Spirit. The Attendant Spirit 
may even use the word “Hog” to raise questions about whether he means to refer to domesticated 
pigs at all, for in the seventeenth century, “hog” ambiguously names both wild and domesticated 
varieties.64 
Despite the contrast that Comus establishes between the animal forms created by Circe 
and Comus, characters repeatedly describe Comus’s transformations with language associated 
with the pig—specifically, the domesticated pig. Although the Attendant Spirit compares 
Comus’s crew to “stabl’d wolves, or tigers at their prey” (p. 102, l. 534), in conversation with the 
Lady’s brothers, the Attendant Spirit prefers to compare Comus’s crew to pigs in his crucial 
introduction of readers to Comus. After the Attendant Spirit has listed the variety of human-
animal forms created by Comus, and after the Attendant Spirit has explained that Comus 
transforms heads but not bodies, the Attendant Spirit concludes his description of Comus’s 
victims: 
 And they, so perfect is their misery, 
 Not once perceive their foul disfigurement,  
 But boast themselves more comely than before, 
                                                
64 The Oxford English Dictionary, Online ed., s.v. “hog” (entry dated Nov. 2010). 
 
176 
 And all their friends and native home forget, 
 To roll with pleasure in a sensual sty. (p. 91, ll. 73-7) 
Although Comus’s minions have the heads of a variety of animals, the Attendant Spirit declares 
that each individual’s preference for a no-longer-human form is accompanied by a heedless 
pursuit of “pleasure,” comparable to the abandon represented specifically by the wallowing pig. 
The proverbially dirty pig—Topsell, for instance, notes, “it pleases the holy ghost in scripture to 
compare the pleasure that beastly men take in sinning to the wallowing of swine in the mire” 
(667)—provides the privileged figure for the moral depravity of all of Comus’s victims. While 
they have the heads of many different creatures, the pig in its sty represents them all. The 
implied comparison of the transformed humans to domestic pigs is especially significant in the 
case of any creature with a head like that of a “wild” rather than domesticated “Hog.” According 
to Topsell, wallowing in mud is more characteristic of domesticated pigs than wild boars: “they 
love not so much to wallow in the mire, as the tame and Domestical swine” (696). Therefore, the 
Attendant Spirit’s use of the “sensual sty” as a homogenizing image for the moral depravity of 
the transformed creatures undermines attempts by the Attendant Spirit and Milton’s stage 
directions to differentiate Comus’s transformations from those of Circe by decentralizing the 
domesticated pig. 
 Not only the Attendant Spirit but also Comus assimilates the victims of his 
transformations to pigs. Upon hearing the approach of the Lady, Comus predicts, “I shall ere 
long / Be well stock’t with as fair a herd as graz’d / About my Mother Circe” (p. 93, ll. 152-3). 
Comus’s lines recall the lines from Homer’s Odyssey in which Circe locks the newly 
transformed members of Odysseus’s crew into pigsties and feeds them the characteristic diet of 
pigs: “So crying they went in, and before them Circe / threw down acorns for them to eat, and 
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ilex and cornel / buds, such food as pigs who sleep on the ground always feed on” (p. 158, lines 
241-3). As he conjures this image, Comus represents his minions, who have the heads of myriad 
creatures, as domesticated pigs. Moreover, he emphasizes the likeness of his creations to those of 
Circe, even though his animal-headed hybrids could never be mistaken for pigs, while Circe’s 
victims do become indistinguishable in appearance from pigs in both The Odyssey and in the 
Attendant Spirit’s somewhat misleading account. Homer’s Odysseus relates that his crew “took 
on the look of pigs, with the heads and voices / and bristles of pigs” (p. 158, ll. 239-40); 
similarly, the Attendant Spirit says that each of Circe’s victims “downward fell into a groveling 
Swine” (p. 91, l. 53). Comus’s victims do not resemble pigs in appearance, but he nevertheless 
makes the comparison. 
 The Lady also assimilates Comus’s human-animal hybrids to pigs as she condemns their 
morals and refuses to join Comus’s band. When the Lady calls Comus’s victims “ugly-headed 
Monsters” (p. 106, l. 695), she acknowledges their weird status as neither humans nor animals. 
The Lady’s most emphatic condemnation of Comus and his minions, however, compares them 
all to pigs for their transgressions against the “holy dictate of spare Temperance” (p. 108, l. 767), 
the same virtue embodied by Spenser’s Guyon, who must allow the unrepentant Gryll to remain 
a pig on Acrasia’s island: 
      swinish gluttony 
  Ne’er looks to Heav’n amidst his gorgeous feast, 
  But with besotted base ingratitude 
  Crams, and blasphemes his feeder. (p. 108, ll. 776-9) 
As Topsell’s natural history makes clear, “gluttony” is one of the most distinctive characteristics 
of pigs, as imagined by Renaissance writers and readers, and the Lady makes the comparison of 
 
178 
Comus and his friends to pigs explicit and unmistakable with the qualifier “swinish.” Indeed, this 
word directs readers to imagine the personification “gluttony” as not a human but a pig, as does 
the positioning of “gluttony” in a dependent yet ungrateful relation to a human “feeder.” This 
human-pig relation provides an apt metaphor, according to the Lady, for the hedonistic lifestyle 
of Comus and his crew, who lack appreciation for the provisions of the creator.  
The figure of the pig does not disappear, however, with the metaphor’s application to 
Comus and his crew. While the line “Ne’er looks to Heaven amidst his gorgeous feast” 
condemns those humans who do not give thanks to the creator for their meals, it also recalls the 
distinction that Ovid’s speaker makes between bipedal humans, who “behold the heaven” (1.99), 
and quadrupedal animals, who “behold the ground with grovelling eye” (1.97). In an earlier 
appropriation of the same Ovidian passage, the Attendant Spirit establishes the pig as the most 
properly “groveling” animal by saying that Circe deprives each of her human victims of his 
“upright shape” (p. 91, l. 52) and turns him “into a groveling Swine” (p. 91, l. 53). When Comus 
and his minions refuse religion, they refuse something imagined by Ovid to be possible for the 
human specifically because of the human’s bipedal form. Thus, in the Lady’s moral terms, 
Comus and his minions are quite like—and perhaps might as well be—the most 
characteristically “groveling” type of quadruped: the pig. 
Comparisons of Comus and his crew to pigs underlie other disapproving statements of 
the Lady. Upon overhearing the seemingly drunken revelry of Comus and his crew, the Lady 
says, “I should be loath / To meet the rudeness and swill’d insolence / Of such late Wassailers” 
(p. 94, ll. 177-9). The “swill’d insolence” that the Lady abhors refers quite explicitly to pigs. 
Since the sixteenth century, the noun swill has meant “Liquid, or partly liquid, food, chiefly 
kitchen refuse, given to swine; hog-wash, pig-wash.” Accordingly, the verb swill has meant “To 
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drink freely, greedily, or to excess, like hogs devouring ‘swill’ or ‘wash’,” as well as “to tipple, 
booze.”65 Topsell uses the verb swill to name a mode of consumption characteristic of pigs when 
he writes, “such is the ravening intemperancy of this beast to swill in whatsoever is pleasant to 
his taste” (669). Topsell connects the unrestrained, eager drinking of pigs quite directly to the 
drinking of alcohol when he says that pigs “will drink wine or beer unto drunkenness” (668). 
Even before the Lady has met Comus and his crew, her inference that they are drunk leads her to 
compare them with pigs. 
The “rudeness” that the Lady attributes to Comus and his crew also refers to the pig, 
though less obviously. Topsell records a proverb in which the pig represents the epitome of 
ignorance: “in Latin they say Sus minervam, when an unlearned dunce goeth about to teach his 
better or a more learned man, then doth the Hog teach Pallas, or as we say in English, the foule 
Sow teach the faire Lady to spin” (676). The phrase “Sus Minervam” means “A pig (teaching) 
Minerva.”66 This Latin proverb and its vernacular English analogue both imagine an incongruous 
encounter between a pig and a female figure, in which the pig comically attempts to instruct the 
goddess or “faire Lady,” whose knowledge surpasses that of the pig. William Helmbold suggests 
that the Greek version of this proverb has a “possible application” to Plutarch’s “Bruta Animalia 
Ratione Uti”: “We have here, then, a Boetian pig instructing the favourite of Athena.”67 It could 
be argued, however, that this proverb gives a fundamental structure to Plutarch’s dialogue, on 
which Milton’s Comus, in turn, is based. 
                                                
65 The Oxford English Dictionary, Online ed., s.v. “swill, n.2” and “swill, v.” (entries dated 
1989). 
66 H. T. Riley, ed., Dictionary of Latin Quotations, Proverbs, Maxims, and Mottos, Classical and 
Medieval, including Law Terms and Phrases (London: Henry G. Bohn, York Street, Covent 
Garden, 1856), 450. 
67 William C. Helmbold, introduction to “Beasts Are Rational,” by Plutarch, trans. and ed. 
William C. Helmbold, in Plutarch's Moralia, vol. 12, The Loeb Classical Library (London and 
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Milton’s Lady resembles “the faire Lady” of the proverb in more than name, for she also 
understands herself to be harassed by ignorant, pig-like creatures. She upbraids Comus, 
  Thou hast nor Ear nor Soul to apprehend 
  The sublime notion and high mystery 
  That must be utter’d to unfold the sage 
  And serious doctrine of Virginity, 
  And thou art worthy that thou shouldst not know 
  More happiness than this thy present lot. (p. 108, ll. 784-9) 
As a virgin, the Lady also resembles the Minerva of the original Latin proverb, and the Lady’s 
oldest brother compares the Lady to Minerva in an earlier speech about “wise Minerva,” the 
“unconquer’d Virgin” (p. 100, l. 448). Thus, the “rudeness” for which the Lady condemns 
Comus and his minions, and the Lady’s contempt for Comus for attempting to convert her to his 
allegedly foolish hedonism, fit the paradigm of the proverb about the pig who presumes upon 
Minerva or an English lady. 
 The Lady’s contemptuous attitude emerges especially in response to Comus’s offers of 
food and drink, the latter of which would transform the Lady into an animal-headed creature. 
Scornfully, the Lady asks, “And wouldst thou seek again to trap me here / With lickerish baits fit 
to ensnare a brute?” (p. 106, ll. 699-700). Although the Lady mentions no specific “brute,” the 
pig’s reputation for gluttony would presumably make it particularly susceptible to “lickerish 
baits.” When the Lady rejects Comus’s offer of food and drink, she thus rejects a form of 
indulgence that she tends to regard as characteristic of pigs, as with her already cited phrase 
“swinish gluttony.” The Lady also lectures Comus on the appropriate comportment toward food: 
“And that which is not good, is not delicious / To a well-govern’d and wise appetite” (p. 106, ll. 
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704-5). The restraint that the Lady advocates is established in stark contrast to the behavior of 
pigs, for nothing could be further from indiscriminate, pig-like consumption—Topsell remarks 
the pig’s “continual feeding upon evil things” (679)—than the Lady’s “well-govern’d and wise 
appetite.” 
 Driving home the extent to which the pig represents immoral sensuality in Comus, 
imagery related to pigs is conscripted to represent the entire material world, in opposition to the 
heavens. In the Attendant Spirit’s opening speech, he contrasts his home in the heavens with 
       this dim spot, 
  Which men call Earth, and with low-thoughted care 
  Confin’d and pester’d in this pinfold here, 
  Strive to keep up a frail and Feverish being, 
  Unmindful of the crown that Virtue gives 
  After this mortal change, to her true Servants 
  Amongst the enthron’d gods on Sainted seats. (p. 90, ll. 5-11) 
The Oxford English Dictionary lists Milton’s use of pinfold as an example of an “extended use” 
of the word to mean “a place of confinement,” “pen,” or “trap.” More properly, the word denotes 
“a pound for animals.”68 The prevalence of references to pigs throughout Comus, and especially 
the Attendant Spirit’s subsequent use of the phrase “sensual sty” (p. 91, l. 77), make it almost 
inevitable that the figuration of Earth as a “pinfold” conjures the image of a pigsty, specifically. 
Likewise, a reference to pigs can be detected in the phrase “low-thoughted care” because the 
Attendant Spirit’s subsequent claim that Circe changes each human victim’s “upright shape” into 
                                                
68 The Oxford English Dictionary, Online ed., s.v. “pinfold” (entry dated June 2006). Merrit Y. 
Hughes gives the following definition for pinfold in his edition of Comus: “literally, a pen for 
animals.” See Complete Poems and Major Prose, by John Milton (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003), 
90 n. 
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the form of “a groveling Swine” (p. 91, l. 53) invokes the Ovidian distinction between bipedal 
humans, who “behold the heaven with count’nance cast on high” (1.99), and quadrupedal 
animals, who “behold the ground with grovelling eye” (1.97). To be “low-thoughted,” in the 
symbolism of Milton’s Comus, is to be like a “groveling Swine.” Accordingly, the Lady indicts a 
personified “swinish gluttony” for “besotted base ingratitude” (p. 108, ll. 776 and 778; my 
italics). Finally, the Attendant Spirit says that, in descending to Earth, he must “soil these pure 
Ambrosial weeds / With the rank vapors of this Sin-worn mold” (p. 90, ll. 16-7). Dirt and “rank 
vapors,” of course, loom large in descriptions of the pigsty, providing further, corroborating 
evidence that the Attendant Spirit regards Earth as a pigsty, specifically. 
 Refusing the offer of a non-human shape and existence, Milton’s Lady represents the 
antithesis of Comus’s band, who seem like pigs to her, and of Plutarch’s Gryllus, who prefers to 
be a pig rather than a human. Unlike Gryllus and his literary descendants, the Lady cannot claim 
to base her decision on firsthand experience of both human and animal states, but the Lady’s 
decision seems justified to the extent that Milton succeeds in persuading readers to acknowledge 
similarities between Comus’s band and the reviled pig. Plutarch’s Odysseus pioneers but then 
abandons this ad hominem strategy. Milton, in contrast, emphasizes the reviled status of the pig 
and assimilates Comus’s band to pigs throughout Comus, with the result that Comus’s band seem 
incontrovertibly deluded and depraved in preferring non-human forms. Ironically, Milton departs 
most from his ancient sources not in diversifying the cast of animals, as the Attendant Spirit’s 
exposition suggests, but rather in unrelentingly emphasizing the piggishness of his transformed 
creatures. 
William Browne’s Inner Temple Masque (1614), which features Circe, provides an 
instructive contrast to Milton’s Comus, for not merely a pig but specifically Gryllus, identified 
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by name and attributed to Plutarch, plays a conspicuous role. Circe’s victims, who have been 
transformed fully or partially into a variety of creatures, make their first appearance to the 
accompaniment of a song, which begins, 
  Come yee whose hornes the cuckold weares, 
  The whittoll too with asses eares, 
   Let the Wolfe leave howling, 
   The Baboone his scowling, 
   And Grillus hye 
   Out of his stye.69 
The following stanza uses another couplet, with a new pair of rhyming words, to reinforce the 
association of Gryllus with the pigsty: “Nor Grillus scoffe / From the hogge troughe” (p. 18). 
The song’s fourth and final stanza expresses a wish for any audience member who disapproves 
of the antimasque: “May he still lye / In Grillus stye / Or weare for ever the Asses eares” (p. 19). 
That is, the song hopes that any disapproving audience member will himself come to resemble an 
animal, either by placement in Gryllus’s characteristic abode or by partial transformation into an 
ass, like Midas. The stage directions, however, seem ignorant of a crucial distinction between 
Homer’s and Plutarch’s treatments of transformation as they identify the creatures of the 
antimasque as “such as by Circe were supposed to have been transformed (havinge the mindes of 
men still)” (19). Indeed, even as the stage directions carefully identify the source of the character 
Gryllus, they continue to assimilate Gryllus to the Homeric model, in which transformation 
affects bodies only, by including “Grillus (of whom Plutarch writes in his Moralles) in the shape 
                                                
69 William Browne, Circe and Ulysses: The Inner Temple Masque, ed. Gwyn Jones (Great 
Britain: The Golden Cockerel Press, 1954), page 18, no line numbers. Subsequent citations 
appear in text by page number. 
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of a hogge” (21) among the cast for the antimasque. After dancing with the other creatures, 
Gryllus abruptly disappears and then becomes the subject of a new song, making him an even 
more conspicuous character in Browne’s masque: 
  Grillus is gone, belike he hath hearde 
  The dayry-maid knocke at the trough in the yearde. 
   Through thicke and thinne he wallowes, 
   And weighes nor depthes nor shallowes. 
  Harke how he whynes: 
  Run all ‘ere he dines, 
   Then serve him a tricke 
   For being so quicke, 
  And lette him for all his paines 
   Behold you turne cleane off 
     His troughe, 
  And spill all his wash and his grains. (21) 
Despite the stage directions’ implication that Gryllus is a human in an animal body, the song 
gives Gryllus the pig’s qualities, especially gluttony, and characteristic behaviors, especially 
wallowing. The song then develops comparisons of humans to Gryllus, continuing earlier 
implications that some audience members may deserve transformation into pigs: 
  And now ‘tis wish’d that all such as hee 
  Were rootinge with him at the trough or the tree. 
   Fly, fly, from our pure fountains 
   To the dark vales or the mountaines. 
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  Liste some one whynes 
  With voice like a swines, 
   As angry that none 
   With Grillus is gone, 
  Or that he is lefte behinde. 
   O let there be no staye 
     In his waye, 
  To hinder the Boare from his kinde. (22) 
The song urges any pig-like humans to follow Gryllus’s example and depart. Undesirable 
behavior in the audience is condemned not only by calling upon images of pigs in general but 
also by comparing humans with Plutarch’s Gryllus in particular.  
 Milton’s Circean masque, in contrast, distinguishes clearly between Homeric and 
Plutarchian motifs, associating the former with Circe and the latter with Comus. In this way, 
Milton seems to have been a more astute reader and adapter of Homer’s and Plutarch’s Circe 
episodes. Unlike Browne, however, Milton offers no clues that explicitly affiliate his masque 
with Plutarch’s dialogue. Whereas Browne’s admittedly less sophisticated adaptation of the 
Circe episode foregrounds the pig Gryllus and acknowledges, in stage directions, Gryllus’s 
provenance, the expository matter delegated to Milton’s Attendant Spirit underestimates the role 
of the pig in Milton’s masque. Readers who trust the Attendant Spirit to provide guidance for 
comparing the transformations of Comus with those of Circe miss the crucial, unacknowledged 
role of Plutarch’s Gryllus in generating the central concepts and moralistic judgments of 
Milton’s masque. 
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Conclusion 
 
Although Milton seems interested in distinguishing Comus’s transformed creatures from 
the pigs that, according to the Attendant Spirit, are typical of Circe’s transformations, Milton, no 
less than Spenser, compares immoral humans, including Comus’s transformed creatures, to pigs. 
These comparisons of immoral humans to pigs decide debates about the relative merits of human 
and animal existences in favor of humans and thus bolster humanist philosophy. Indeed, 
comparisons of immoral humans to pigs can even be said to foreclose such debates, which 
occupy the majority of Plutarch’s dialogue and Gelli’s Circe but which barely occur at all in 
book 2 of The Faerie Queene and Comus. 
The absence of pigs is not adequate, of course, to create a critique of humanist 
philosophy. Because of the irredeemably negative significance of comparisons of humans to pigs 
in early modern thought, however, avoiding pigs may be necessary in order to produce and 
sustain the critiques of humanism in transformation stories such as Gelli’s Circe and La 
Fontaine’s “Companions of Ulysses.” 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE NATURAL HISTORY OF THE HOUYHNHNM:  
ETHICAL TREATMENT FOR HORSES IN GULLIVER’S TRAVELS 
 
While the next chapter treats Gulliver as an ironic Gryllus figure, this chapter 
acknowledges that Gulliver’s Travels broaches the topic of the ethical treatment of animals more 
urgently than earlier transformation narratives in the Plutarchian tradition. At a few moments, 
Gelli’s Circe does consider the human treatment of animals. For instance, the oyster, a former 
fisherman, remarks, “I would have willyngly put my selfe to any more heinous occupation, so 
that I mought not have labored, esteminge it to be an arte of oxen, who alwaies laboure, and 
when they can no more, are then knocked on the hed with a betell.”1 Although the oyster’s 
remark resembles an observation that Swift’s Gulliver makes about horses, Gulliver’s Travels 
develops a complex argument about the human treatment of horses, whereas Gelli’s Circe 
addresses the human treatment of animals in a relatively desultory way. 
As Swift’s Gulliver concludes his travelogue, he promises “To lament the Brutality of 
Houyhnhnms in my own Country, but always treat their Persons with Respect, for the sake of my 
noble Master, his Family, his Friends, and the whole Houyhnhnm Race, whom these of ours have 
the Honour to resemble in all their Lineaments, however their Intellectuals came to degenerate.”2 
As this quotation indicates, Gulliver’s experiences among the houyhnhnms, the rational equines 
                                                
1 Giovanni Battista Gelli, Circes of John Baptista Gello, Florentine. Translated out of Italion 
into Englishe by Henry Iden (Imprinted at London in Poules Churchyarde, at the signe of the 
holy ghost by John Cawood, printer to the Quenes Majestie, 1557), 22-3. I have assigned 
numbers to the pages of this edition, beginning with the title page. 
2 Jonathan Swift, Gulliver's Travels, ed. Albert J. Rivero (New York: Norton, 2002), 249. 
Subsequent citations appear in text. 
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that he encounters on his final voyage, prompt him to extend ethical treatment to horses upon his 
return to England. According to Christian theology, Cartesian philosophy, and other influential 
contemporary European perspectives, unique attributes of the human, such as ensoulment, 
reason, and language, justify the exploitation of other animals.3 Gulliver departs significantly 
from these perspectives by regarding the “Brutality” of English horses as a subject for “lament” 
and by suggesting that horses are entitled to “Respect.” Furthermore, when Gulliver uses the 
word “Persons” in reference to horses, he attributes to them a subjective status that is usually 
reserved for humans alone.4 
Gulliver’s unorthodox attitude toward horses originates in his confusion of horses with 
houyhnhnms, whom Gulliver frequently describes as “Noble” (225) or “admirable” (218). 
Although Gulliver notes the discrepancy between the intellectual abilities of horses and 
houyhnhnms, he considers horses and houyhnhnms members of one species because of their 
physical similarities. He remarks that horses “resemble” houyhnhnms “in all their Lineaments” 
and accounts for their intellectual differences with a theory of degeneration. Gulliver does not 
even refer to houyhnhnms and horses by different names; he uses the word “Houyhnhnms” for 
both types of equine. He resolves to respect horses “for the sake of” the houyhnhnms, as though 
admiration for the houyhnhnms entails a new comportment toward horses—and as though horses 
                                                
3 Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: A History of the Modern Sensibility (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1983), 30-6. 
4 Two definitions of “person” seem relevant to Gulliver’s use of the word: “The self, being, or 
individual personality of a man or woman” and “the body regarded as distinct from the mind or 
soul.” The Oxford English Dictionary includes both definitions under the heading “A human 
being, and related senses.” See Online ed., s.v. “person” (entry dated June 2010). Mary Midgley 
points out that the modern conception of a person as “a rational being, capable of choice and 
therefore endowed with dignity, worthy of respect, having rights” derives from Kant. See 
Utopias, Dolphins, and Computers: Problems in Philosophical Plumbing (London; New York: 
Routledge, 1996), 111. Gulliver’s pre-Kantian usage of “person” nevertheless seems both to give 
horses a human-like status and to imply that this status entitles them to ethical treatment. 
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participate in houyhnhnm nobility by virtue of the equine form that they share. 
Gulliver’s equation of houyhnhnms and horses is problematic not only because his theory 
about equine degeneration is conjectural but also because the assertion that the resemblance of 
horses to houyhnhnms ennobles horses is arbitrary. Gulliver might just as plausibly have made 
the opposite claim: that the resemblance of houyhnhnms to horses degrades the houyhnhnms. 
Indeed, in the analogous case of the relationship between humans and the intellectually inferior 
yahoos, whom the houyhnhnms believe to have degenerated from humans (249), the physical 
resemblance of the two species degrades humans instead of ennobling yahoos. Further 
illustrating the asymmetry in attitudes toward the two pairs of physically similar species, no 
character in Gulliver’s Travels ever suggests better treatment of yahoos because of their 
similarity to humans. 
Such problems and inconsistencies indicate that Swift means to satirize the conflation of 
horses with houyhnhnms that motivates Gulliver’s newfound “Respect” for horses; however, part 
4 of Gulliver’s Travels ultimately recommends better treatment for horses in another way. In 
imagining the houyhnhnms, Swift draws upon traditional representations of the horse as the 
noblest animal and dramatizes their incongruity with the contemporary treatment of horses as 
beasts of burden. Considering part 4 in terms of the particularly problematic place of the horse in 
European culture not only demonstrates that part 4 undermines common justifications for the 
exploitation of horses but also provides an explanation for Swift’s decision to model his rational 
non-humans on horses, rather than any other animals. Furthermore, an analysis of part 4 in these 
terms reveals an unusual, pre-modern perspective on animal welfare, for the ethical claims of 
horses in part 4 are generated primarily by a critique of inconsistencies in discourse about 
horses—not by assertions about the ontological status of horses, which Swift satirizes Gulliver 
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for making.5 
Modern arguments for animal welfare almost invariably begin from premises about the 
ontological status of animals.6 This pattern is evident already in Jeremy Bentham’s influential 
assertion that, with animals, “the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can 
they suffer?”7 Continuing the utilitarian tradition, Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation (1975) 
belabors an ontological distinction between animals and objects after citing Bentham’s famous 
question: “A stone does not have interests because it cannot suffer.”8 In The Case for Animal 
Rights (1983), meanwhile, Tom Regan proposes that a creature has “inherent value” if it meets 
his “subject-of-a-life criterion,” which requires a creature to have certain psychological 
faculties.9 Addressing limitations of earlier theories of animal welfare, Martha Nussbaum’s 
Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (2006) continues to emphasize 
the ontological status of animals: her neo-Aristotelian “capabilities approach,” she writes, “wants 
to see each thing flourish as the sort of thing it is.”10 Despite significant differences among these 
                                                
5 For a different account, see Sarah Wintle, “If Houyhnhnms Were Horses: Thinking with 
Animals in Book IV of Gulliver's Travels,” The Critical Review 34 (1994): 3-21. Wintle’s essay 
considers part 4 of Gulliver’s Travels “a prototypical text in the animal rights movement” (17) 
because confusion of horses with houyhnhnms tends to recommend better treatment for horses 
(see especially 12-3, 17). 
6 Throughout, I use “animal welfare” as a general term for all philosophies advocating ethical 
treatment of animals. For a more typical use of “animal welfare” to name the utilitarian 
perspective, understood in opposition to the rights-based perspective, see Tom Regan, “The 
Rights of Humans and Other Animals,” Ethics & Behavior 7.2 (1997), 107. 
7 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Printed in the 
Year 1780, and Now First Published (London: Printed for T. Payne, and Son, at the Mews Gate, 
1789), cccix n. Thomas discusses Bentham’s question as an influential example of the eighteenth 
century’s “new emphasis on sensation and feeling as the true basis for a claim to moral 
consideration.” See Man and the Natural World, 176, 180. 
8 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1990), 8. 
9 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1983), 243. 
10 Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership 
(Cambridge, Mass.; and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 349. 
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approaches, they all begin from premises about the ontological status of animals, as though such 
premises are fundamental to the modern engagement with animal welfare. 
Over 50 years before Bentham poses his famous question, Jonathan Swift broaches the 
topic of the ethical treatment of horses in part 4 of Gulliver’s Travels. Swift’s satire of human 
attitudes toward horses anticipates later interest in the ethical treatment of the horse, which 
becomes one of the first non-human species to receive legal protection in England in 1822.11 
Swift, however, avoids the ontological premises that become inevitable for the modern animal-
welfare movement, from Bentham to the 21st century. Instead, Swift focuses on hypocrisies 
specific to the human-horse relationship, suggesting that human beliefs about equine nobility do 
not accord well with the exploitation of horses as menial laborers. In the following discussion, I 
argue that the horse is uniquely placed in European culture not only to motivate Swift to model 
his society of rational non-humans on horses, rather than on any other animals, but also to 
generate Swift’s pre-modern engagement with animal welfare, which satirizes inconsistencies in 
representations of the horse in particular instead of making claims about the ontological status of 
animals in general. To position Swift’s distinctive approach, I analyze representations of the 
noble horse in natural histories and an equestrian manual by William Cavendish before offering a 
reading of part 4 of Gulliver’s Travels. In the conclusion, I speculate on the potential value of 
this reading not only for literary critics but also for the animal-welfare movement’s historians 
and activists. 
 
The Natural History of the Horse 
 
                                                
11 Thomas, Man and the Natural World, 149. 
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R. S. Crane has already offered a persuasive but nevertheless incomplete explanation of 
the significance of horses in part 4 of Gulliver’s Travels. He argues that Swift’s portrayal of the 
houyhnhnm/yahoo relationship, which inverts the human/horse relationship, is motivated by the 
logic books that Swift studied at Trinity College, in which the horse appears as the favored 
example of the irrational animals and the primary foil of the human, the rational animal.12 Crane 
detects a direct statement of Swift’s intent to challenge these textbook definitions of humans and 
horses in two of his letters to Alexander Pope.13 In a letter dated 29 September 1725, Swift 
writes, “I have got Materials Towards a Treatis proving the falsity of that Definition animal 
rationale, and to show it should be only rationis capax. Upon this great foundation of 
Misanthropy (though not Timons manner) the whole building of my Travells is erected.”14 In a 
letter dated 26 November 1725, Swift also mentions the definition of the human as the rational 
animal: “I tell you after all that I do not hate Mankind, it is vous autr[e]s who hate them because 
you would have them reasonable Animals, and are Angry for being disappointed. I have always 
rejected that Definition and made another of my own.”15 Since Swift writes these letters in the 
months prior to the publication of Gulliver’s Travels, Crane persuasively argues that Swift 
intends to invert the commonplaces of logic textbooks as he creates his society of talking equines 
and domesticated anthropoids.16 
As Crane suggests, the logic textbooks provide an important context for the prominent 
                                                
12 R. S. Crane, “The Houyhnhnms, the Yahoos, and the History of Ideas,” in Reason and the 
Imagination: Studies in the History of Ideas, 1600-1800, ed. Joseph Anthony Mazzeo (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 243-9. 
13 Crane, “The Houyhnhnms, the Yahoos, and the History of Ideas,” 250. 
14 David Woolley, ed., The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift, D.D. (New York: P. Lang, 1999), 
2:607. 
15 Woolley, ed., Correspondence of Jonathan Swift, 2:623. I reproduce the bracketed “e” from 
Woolley’s edition. 
16 Crane, “The Houyhnhnms, the Yahoos, and the History of Ideas,” 250. 
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role of horses in Gulliver’s Travels, but his argument can be extended on two fronts. First, the 
logic textbooks pose the same interpretative dilemma that they supposedly solve for the literary 
text. Crane cites the logic textbooks to explain why Swift explores human nature in relation to 
the horse rather than another animal, but the deployment of horses in the logic textbooks also 
demands explication.17 The logic textbooks cannot provide a simple answer to questions about 
the significance of horses in Gulliver’s Travels because all of these texts participate in a broad 
and complex cultural phenomenon: the exploration of human identity specifically in relation to 
horse identity. Second, the range of sources that Crane cites suggests that he believes that the 
horse has had a timeless significance in Western culture. Crane derives his earliest example of 
the comparison of humans with horses from Porphyry’s Isagoge, dating to the 3rd century CE, 
and his latest example from Narcissus Marsh’s Institutio logicae, originally published in 1679.18 
While the similarity of these chronologically distant texts is striking, the relationship between 
humans and horses has varied over time; and the deployment of the comparison of humans with 
horses has a different meaning depending on its historical context. To understand the 
significance of Swift’s houyhnhnms, readers need to understand the history of the human 
relationship to horses in England around the publication of Gulliver’s Travels in 1726.   
That history is complex, but five developments seem particularly important. First, as 
Keith Thomas explains, Europeans exploited animals for labor to a far greater extent than the 
peoples of other continents, and even among European countries, England was notable for its 
exploitation of animal labor.19 Thomas writes, “Nowhere in Europe was this dependence upon 
                                                
17 For a helpful discussion of the problems with using historical documents to explain features of 
literary texts, see Jean E. Howard, “The New Historicism in Renaissance Studies,” English 
Literary Renaissance 16.1 (1986), especially 18, 24-7. 
18 Crane, “The Houyhnhnms, the Yahoos, and the History of Ideas,” 247-51. 
19 Thomas, Man and the Natural World, 25. 
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animals greater than in England, which, certainly by the eighteenth century and probably much 
earlier, had a higher ratio of domestic beasts per cultivated acre and per man than any other 
country, save the Netherlands.”20 Second, English monarchs, beginning with Henry VIII, 
deliberately cultivated England’s horse stock for their military campaigns, and Elizabeth I even 
established a Special Commission for the Increase and Breed of Horses in 1580.21 As a result, 
England’s horses, which were below international standards in 1500, improved noticeably in 
strength and size by 1700.22 Third, these changes, though small in the history of the horse’s 
evolution,23 altered patterns of animal exploitation in England: while both oxen and horses 
commonly served as animal laborers around 1500, improvements in horse stock caused the horse 
to emerge as England’s primary beast of burden by 1750.24 Fourth, the introduction of coaches to 
England in the 1550s led to revolutions in transportation that expanded the exploitation of 
horses.25 Londoners could travel around the city by hackney cab soon after 1600.26 Furthermore, 
Peter Edwards writes, “By the end of the seventeenth century coachmasters had established a 
national network of coaching services, running throughout the year and at fixed times.”27 Fifth 
and finally, Edwards shows that horses were increasingly subjected to ill treatment over the early 
modern period. The practice of gelding horses became significantly more popular in England 
                                                
20 Thomas, Man and the Natural World, 26. 
21 Joan Thirsk, Horses in Early Modern England: For Service, for Pleasure, for Power 
(University of Reading, 1978), 12-3, 15-6, 26; Peter Edwards, Horse and Man in Early Modern 
England (London: Continuum, 2007), 7-8, 180. 
22 Thirsk, Horses in Early Modern England, 26-7; Edwards, Horse and Man, 7-8, 180. 
23 For a useful and accessible account of the horse’s evolution, see Stephen Budiansky, The 
Nature of Horses: Exploring Equine Evolution, Intelligence, and Behavior (New York: Free 
Press, 1997), especially 16-38. 
24 Edwards, Horse and Man, 183-5, 209. 
25 Edwards, Horse and Man, 213. 
26 Edwards, Horse and Man, 226. 
27 Edwards, Horse and Man, 233. 
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during the 17th and 18th centuries.28 In addition, horses were broken and forced to mate at 
younger ages, despite the warnings of agricultural and equestrian manuals.29  
In sum, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, the horse becomes increasingly 
prominent in what Rosi Braidotti would call England’s “zooproletariat.”30 As Edwards writes, 
“Mankind exploited horses in numerous ways, to the extent that early modern society would not 
have functioned very effectively without them.”31 England was particularly notorious for its 
treatment of horses,32 which were well on their way to becoming the preferred beasts of burden 
as Swift composed Gulliver’s Travels. Horses would continue to be especially conspicuous 
victims of human cruelty in the generations after Swift: Harriet Ritvo remarks that horses were 
“the most frequent victims of prosecuted offenses against the animal protection laws” that were 
instituted in the 19th century.33  
Well before horses receive legal protection, however, Swift perceives the exploitation of 
horses to contradict with the horse’s reputation as the noblest animal. When Swift exposes this 
contradiction in part 4 of Gulliver’s Travels, he implicitly critiques the representation of horses 
in natural histories, which tend to use equine nobility to justify the exploitation of horses, as 
though the natural histories deem the treatment of horses to be consistent with the high 
admiration that horses conventionally receive. 
Although Gulliver suggests that the similarity of horses to houyhnhnms ennobles horses 
and entitles them to better treatment from their English masters, nobility is already one of the 
                                                
28 Edwards, Horse and Man, 46-7. 
29 Edwards, Horse and Man, 49, 242-3. 
30 Rosi Braidotti, “Animals, Anomalies, and Inorganic Others,” PMLA 124.2 (2009), 528. 
Provocatively, Braidotti’s neologism acknowledges animals as an exploited socioeconomic class. 
31 Edwards, Horse and Man, 241. 
32 Thomas, Man and the Natural World, 100. 
33 Harriet Ritvo, The Animal Estate: The English and Other Creatures in the Victorian Age 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), 145. 
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most essential characteristics of the horse in natural histories of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Indeed, the idea of the noble horse is so enduring that it survives two revolutions in the 
study of living things in this period and appears with surprising continuity in such representative 
and important works as Edward Topsell’s Historie of Foure-Footed Beastes (1607), Joannes 
Jonston’s Description of the Nature of Four-Footed Beasts (1650), and the comte de Buffon’s 
Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière, published in successive volumes beginning in 1749. 
Only with Buffon, and then only inconsistently, does the nobility of the horse create the 
unorthodox ethical obligations that Gulliver feels. For earlier natural historians and often for 
Buffon, as well, equine nobility works paradoxically to justify the exploitation of horses as 
laborers. 
The first revolution in the study of living things occurs less than 20 years before Swift’s 
birth; the second, during his lifetime. According to William Ashworth, Renaissance natural 
historians “see an animal as a symbol, a character, in some greater language of nature.”34 This 
“emblematic” paradigm of natural history is characterized by “the belief that every kind of thing 
in the cosmos has myriad hidden meanings and that knowledge consists of an attempt to 
comprehend as many of these as possible.”35 Like Michel Foucault, Ashworth locates a shift to a 
new paradigm of natural history at the publication of Joannes Jonston’s Description of the 
Nature of Four-Footed Beasts in 1650.36 For Foucault, Jonston’s natural history marks the 
transition from viewing living creatures as symbols for interpretation to viewing them as objects 
                                                
34 William B. Ashworth, Jr., “Emblematic Natural History of the Renaissance,” in Cultures of 
Natural History, ed. Nicholas Jardine, James A. Secord, and E. C. Spary (Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 36. 
35 William B. Ashworth, Jr., “Natural History and the Emblematic World View,” in Reappraisals 
of the Scientific Revolution, ed. David C. Lindberg and Robert S. Westman (Cambridge, 
England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 312. 
36 Ashworth, “Natural History and the Emblematic World View,” 317. Ashworth points out that 
Foucault mistakenly dates Jonston’s text to 1657 rather than 1650 (330 n. 41). 
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for systematic classification.37 Ashworth offers a similar account of this paradigmatic shift: 
“naturalists abandoned the entire associative framework and began to focus on description and 
anatomical investigation, with the ultimate goal of a natural system of classification.”38 The 
second revolution in the study of living things occurs inside this classificatory paradigm. As 
Phillip Sloan argues, Carolus Linnaeus inaugurates a significantly new stage in natural history in 
1735 when he becomes the first scientist to place human beings among the other animals in a 
taxonomic scheme.39 
Remarkably, both admiration of the horse’s nobility and justification of the horse’s 
servile role survive these considerable disruptions in the practice of natural history. This 
conjunction is foregrounded, though not recognized as paradoxical, in the opening paragraph of 
Topsell’s entry on the horse.40 He declares, “we must needes account it the most noble and 
necessary creature of all foure-footed-beasts, before whom no one for multitude and generality of 
good qualities is to be preferred, compared or equaled, whose commendations shal appeare in the 
whole discourse following” (281). Topsell also writes that the horse has “a singular body and a 
Noble spirit, the principal wherof is a louing and dutifull inclination to the seruice of man” (281). 
Elisabeth LeGuin has claimed that “Characterizations of horses as noble and quasi-human” arise 
                                                
37 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1994), 128-9, 144-5. 
38 Ashworth, “Emblematic Natural History of the Renaissance,” 35. 
39 Phillip Sloan, “The Gaze of Natural History,” in Inventing Human Science: Eighteenth-
Century Domains, ed. Christopher Fox, Roy Porter, and Robert Wokler (Berkeley; Los Angeles; 
London: University of California Press, 1995), 118, 121. 
40 Ashworth takes Conrad Gesner’s Historia animalium (1551-8) as his primary example of the 
“emblematic” paradigm because of its unrivalled popularity. See “Emblematic Natural History of 
the Renaissance,” 17. In a dedication, Topsell acknowledges his reliance on Gesner: “I have 
followed D. Gesner as neer as I could, I do professe him my Author in most of my stories.” See 
The Historie of Foure-Footed Beastes (London: printed by William Jaggard, 1607), ix. I have 
assigned Roman numerals to Topsell’s unnumbered pages of prefatory materials, beginning with 
the title page. Subsequent citations appear in text. 
 
198 
from their “extremely resourceful resistance to subjection, a quality long associated with moral 
integrity in humans.”41 For Topsell, in contrast, the nobility of the horse consists in its happy 
obedience to human beings, not in freedom from servitude. When he calls the horse “the most 
noble and necessary creature,” Topsell yokes together praise of the horse’s nobility and a claim 
about its value to humans, as though the exploitation of horses is entirely consistent with equine 
nobility. 
 This conception of the horse depends on Topsell’s interpretation of the creation story in 
Genesis. In this respect, Topsell resembles the many early modern writers who find theological 
justifications for the exploitation of animals.42 The account of creation in Genesis lists three 
types of terrestrial animals: “cattell, and creeping thing, and beast of the earth.”43 Claiming to 
follow Genesis, Topsell suggests a rudimentary classification of the terrestrial animals into three 
groups, with “cattell” classified as “Iumentum” (v). This category dates at least to the fourth-
century Basilius, who, a fourteenth-century follower explains, “calleth tame beastes Iumenta, and 
sayth, that they be beastes graunted and ordeyned to vse and to helpe of mankinde.”44 As “the 
most noble and necessary creature of all foure-footed-beasts,” the horse is the foremost member 
of the jumenta, an entire class of animals that God has created specifically to perform labor for 
humans. 
 Even though Jonston’s Description of the Nature of Four-Footed Beasts marks the shift 
from an interest in animal symbolism to a more recognizably modern interest in scientific 
                                                
41 Elisabeth LeGuin, “Man and Horse in Harmony,” in The Culture of the Horse: Status, 
Discipline, and Identity in the Early Modern World, ed. Karen Raber and Treva J. Tucker (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 184. 
42 Thomas, Man and the Natural World, 17-25. 
43 Gen. 1:24 (Authorized Version, 1611). 
44 Quoted in Erica Fudge, Perceiving Animals: Humans and Beasts in Early Modern English 
Culture (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002), 93. 
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classification,45 Jonston represents the horse much as Topsell does. While Topsell organizes his 
entries alphabetically by animal, Jonston explains in a preface that his natural history proceeds 
according to a sophisticated classificatory scheme that organizes animals into increasingly small 
groups based on their anatomical similarities.46 Despite Jonston’s effort at systematic 
organization, concerns other than those of objective science determine the placement of the horse 
at the beginning of his natural history. Jonston writes, “Wee begin with the Horse, which hath 
the preeminence among the labouring beasts, called jumenta from juvando, or helpfulnesse” (1). 
Jonston’s assertion that the horse “hath the preeminence among the labouring beasts” perpetuates 
the conception of the horse’s unrivaled nobility, as does his decision to give the horse pride of 
place in the sequence of entries in his natural history. Singling out the horse as the foremost 
member of the jumenta, Jonston also recapitulates theological arguments for the exploitation of 
horses—in spite of his supposed dedication to the objective classification of animals. 
Although Buffon’s work post-dates Gulliver’s Travels, his incoherent treatment of equine 
nobility and servitude contrasts instructively with Swift’s sharp delineation of hypocrisies in the 
human-horse relationship. Buffon continues the tradition of foregrounding the human/horse 
relationship well beyond the rise of interest in the human/ape relationship, which increasingly 
preoccupies Europeans in the eighteenth and succeeding centuries.47 As Sloan explains, Buffon 
                                                
45 Ashworth, “Emblematic Natural History of the Renaissance,” 35. 
46 John Johnston, A Description of the Nature of Four-Footed Beasts, trans. J. P. (Amsterdam: 
printed for the widow of John Jacobsen Schipper, and Stephen Swart, 1678), vii. I have assigned 
Roman numerals to Jonston’s unnumbered pages of prefatory materials, beginning with the title 
page. Subsequent citations appear in text. 
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Outang, sive Homo Sylvestris (1699). See Apes and Ape Lore in the Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance (London: The Warburg Institute, The University of London, 1952), 336. On the 
new prominence of the ape in discussions of the human/animal relationship in the eighteenth 
century, see also Laura Brown, Fables of Modernity: Literature and Culture in the English 
Eighteenth Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 225-31; and Laura Brown, 
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rejects the approach of Linnaeus, who classifies humans with apes, and instead organizes living 
things according to their degree of familiarity to humans: “The creatures closest to man in terms 
of this ‘relational’ epistemology are those of most immediate epistemological acquaintance—the 
familiar domestic animals and plants near to us in our own locality and climate.”48 Considering 
the increasing dependence of early modern Europeans upon horses, it should not be surprising 
that Buffon’s natural history proceeds from the entry on the human to the entry on the horse, 
with only a general discussion of animals and a more specific introduction to domesticated 
animals in between the two entries.  
 Compared with Topsell’s and Jonston’s works, Buffon’s natural history displays 
considerably more ambivalence about the exploitation of horses as laborers. Instead of using the 
biblically inspired category jumenta to classify the horse and other domesticated animals, Buffon 
enjoins the natural historian to distinguish carefully between the natures of animals and the 
identities that they develop under domestication: in the section titled “Of Domestic Animals,” 
Buffon writes, “it is the duty of the naturalist to examine them with care, and to distinguish those 
facts which depend solely on instinct, from those that originate from education; to ascertain what 
is proper to them from what is borrowed; to separate artifice from Nature; and never to confound 
the animal with the slave, the beast of burden with the creature of God.”49 Implicitly rejecting the 
concept jumenta, which does make an animal’s identity as “beast of burden” coincide with its 
identity as “creature of God,” Buffon introduces the possibility of critiquing not only the 
                                                                                                                                                       
Homeless Dogs and Melancholy Apes: Humans and Other Animals in the Modern Literary 
Imagination (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), especially 27-63. 
48 Sloan, “The Gaze of Natural History,” 129-30. For Linnaeus’s classification of humans 
alongside primates and—more oddly—sloths and anteaters, see 121. 
49 Georges Louis Leclerc, comte de Buffon, Natural History, General and Particular, trans. 
William Smellie, 2nd ed., vol. 3 of 9 (London: printed for W. Strahan and T. Cadell, in the 
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treatment of domesticated animals but also the institution of domestication itself. 
Following the method outlined in “Of Domestic Animals,” Buffon’s entry on the horse 
distinguishes the wild horse from the equine subject of domestication—often in ways that reflect 
unfavorably on the exploitation of horses as laborers. To discover the horse’s nature, Buffon 
considers horses that have become wild again in the new world: 
Examine those horses which have multiplied so prodigiously in Spanish America, 
and live in perfect freedom. Their motions are neither constrained nor measured. 
Proud of their independence, they fly from the presence of man, and disdain all 
his care. They search for, and procure the food that is most salutary and agreeable. 
They wander and frisk about in immense meadows, and collect the fresh 
productions of a perpetual spring. Without any fixed habitation, or other shelter 
than a serene sky, they breathe a purer air than in those musty vaults in which we 
confine them, when subjected to our dominion. Hence wild horses are stronger, 
lighter, and more nervous than most of those which are in a domestic state. The 
former possess force and dignity, which are the gifts of Nature; the latter have 
only address and gracefulness, which are all that art can bestow. (308) 
While Buffon’s admiration of wild horses develops earlier conceptions of horses as noble, the 
passage seems to reject assumptions that serving humans befits equine nobility. Buffon’s 
inference that wild horses feel “Proud of their independence” attributes to horses a nobility that 
becomes explicit at the end of the passage, where Buffon admires the “dignity” of horses. The 
attitude of “disdain” that wild horses take toward humans not only provides further evidence of 
equine nobility but also dramatizes the inconsistency between that nobility and domestication.  
Especially because of the extent to which Buffon admires wild horses, he seems to 
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lament their domestication when he writes, “The slavery of the horse is so ancient and so 
universal, that he is rarely seen in a natural state” (307). Buffon’s description of the domesticated 
horse emphasizes the indignities of equine exploitation: 
When employed in labour, he is always covered with the harness; and, even 
during the time destined for repose, he is never entirely delivered from bonds. If 
sometimes permitted to roam in the pasture, he always bears the marks of 
servitude, and often the external impressions of labour and pain. His mouth is 
deformed by the perpetual friction of the bit; his sides are galled with wounds, or 
furrowed with cicatrices; and his hoofs are pierced with nails. (307) 
Although these intimations of equine suffering anticipate Bentham’s approach to animal welfare, 
the passage also criticizes the treatment of horses by contrasting the domesticated horse’s many 
“marks of servitude” with the wild horse’s nobility.  
In Buffon’s strongest assertion of the horse’s nobility, he suggests that the horse resents 
its subhuman status: “He elevates his head, as if anxious to exalt himself above the condition of 
quadrupeds. In this noble attitude, he regards man face to face” (329). This striking image, in 
which human and horse confront one another “face to face,” suggests that the exploitation of 
horses is inappropriate to their human-like nobility. 
In many other passages, however, Buffon reverts to the claim of the earlier natural 
histories that the horse is a natural servant for humans. Despite his characterization of wild 
horses, Buffon also declares “horses to be naturally of gentle dispositions, and much disposed to 
associate with man” (313). Buffon even insists that horses “seem uniformly to prefer bondage to 
liberty” (313). This claim is impossible to reconcile with admiration of wild horses and tragic 
portrayals of domestication in other passages of Buffon’s text. 
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For Louise E. Robbins, Buffon provides an important example of newly incoherent 
attitudes toward animals in eighteenth-century France. She writes, “Alongside language lauding 
domination and domestication, a contradictory strain became widespread in the eighteenth 
century—often in the very same texts—that portrayed animals as victims of the human race and 
exalted the freedom and independence of wild creatures.”50 The new trend included sympathy for 
the servile existences of domesticated animals and admiration for the nobility of wild or 
incompletely domesticated species, such as the elephant.51 Robbins’s work enables us to 
understand Buffon’s incoherent treatment of the horse as a local example of “seeming 
contradictions” that “were not peculiar to Buffon” but rather “pervaded the literature on 
animals.”52 Furthermore, Robbins suggests that “the good master and happy servant model” can 
account for some inconsistencies in eighteenth-century attitudes toward domestication: 
“According to this model, animals would be content in a subservient position as long as they 
were properly handled.”53 
Robbins provides important contexts for Buffon’s treatment of the horse, but I would 
suggest that the horse occupies an especially paradoxical position by the eighteenth century 
because the long tradition of representing the horse as noble contrasts so dramatically with 
increasing exploitation of horses as beasts of burden over the early modern period.54 While 
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Topsell and Jonston do not worry that the exploitation of the horse might not befit its nobility, 
Buffon’s text betrays signs of anxiety about the inconsistency between admiration of horses and 
their treatment by humans, especially when Buffon imagines that the horse’s up-turned head 
signifies its noble desire to transcend “the condition of quadrupeds” and claim the dignity usually 
reserved for the bipedal human. Likewise, contradictions between the horse’s reputation and its 
treatment become almost impossible to ignore when Buffon writes, “the manners of a horse 
originate entirely from his education, which is accomplished by a care and industry bestowed by 
man upon no other animal; but he is amply rewarded by the perpetual services of this noble and 
laborious creature” (313). The pairing of “noble and laborious” as attributes of the horse verges 
on irony, as does the fact that the noble horse is the primary object of human efforts at 
domestication. 
Asserting that admiration of equine nobility entitles horses to ethical treatment, Gulliver’s 
final perspective on horses critiques common tendencies to admire the horse’s nobility while 
justifying the exploitation of horses as laborers. Deliberate and forceful, Gulliver’s critique 
contrasts markedly with the incoherent perspective of Buffon’s later text. Admittedly, Gulliver is 
also an object of satire—not only because he misidentifies horses with houyhnhnms but also 
because he ignores the horse’s own reputation for nobility as he claims that horses are ennobled 
by their resemblance to the houyhnhnms. Laughter at Gulliver’s seeming ignorance, though, 
ultimately redounds on the natural histories; for if horses themselves are supposed to be such 
noble beings, then they also deserve more dignified treatment. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
University Press, 2008), 6, see also 126. In contrast, my argument shows how horses, as a 
species, occupy a paradoxical position. For Landry’s reading of Gulliver’s Travels in relation to 
ideas about Eastern horses, and ideas about differences between Western and Eastern treatment 
of horses, see especially 123-48. 
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Teachable or Reasonable?: A Debate about Equine Intelligence 
 
An equestrian manual by William Cavendish anticipates Swift by recognizing the 
contradiction between equine nobility and the exploitation of horses, but unlike Swift, Cavendish 
fully endorses the subordination of horses to humans. Born near 1590, Cavendish was a patron of 
literature, music, and science; a prominent Royalist general in the English Civil War; and an 
internationally renowned trainer of horses.55 In 1658, he published a French equestrian manual, 
La méthode nouvelle et Invention extraordinaire de dresser les chevaux, which eventually 
appeared in English translation as A General System of Horsemanship.56 According to Karen 
Raber, Cavendish’s scientific aspirations distinguish his equestrian manual from those of other 
early modern writers, except for Antoine de Pluvinel.57 Cavendish’s manual also has special 
historical interest because he is early modern England’s preeminent horse trainer, the only one to 
command respect abroad as well as in England.58 These circumstances make Cavendish’s 
perspective on horses—and especially on equine intelligence—uniquely authoritative and 
valuable. 
Cavendish makes his crucial statement on equine nature in a section entitled “The 
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Epitome of Horsemanship.” He writes, “The horse being, after man, the most noble of all 
animals (for he is as much superior to all other creatures as man is to him, and therefore holds a 
sort of middle place between man and the rest of the creation) he is wise and subtile; for which 
reason man ought carefully to preserve his empire over him, knowing how nearly that wisdom 
and subtility approaches his own.”59 Cavendish shares with the natural historians the conception 
of the horse as the noblest animal, but he treats the horse’s nobility as a threat to human 
dominance, not as a justification for the exploitation of horses. Although Cavendish recommends 
the maintenance of human authority, he perceives that authority as fragile. While the nature of 
the horse guarantees human authority for the natural historians, it challenges the stability, if not 
the legitimacy, of that authority for Cavendish. 
Cavendish’s acknowledgement of the horse’s “wisdom and subtility” illuminates the role 
that intelligence plays in conceptions of the horse as the noblest animal. In the natural histories, 
admiration of the horse’s teachableness contributes to impressions of equine nobility; yet natural 
historians differentiate equine intelligence from human reason and imply that equine intelligence 
is valuable in so far as it suits horses for service to humans. Topsell characterizes the horse in the 
following manner: “the naturall constitution of a Horsse, is whot and temperate. Whot, because 
of his Leuity, and Velocity, and length of life; temperate because he is docible, pleasant, and 
gentle towardes his maister and keeper” (329). Choosing not to imagine a horse without a human 
“maister,” Topsell claims that the horse is naturally “docible”—that is, “Apt to be taught; 
teachable, docile; submissive to teaching or training, tractable.”60 Jonston makes similar claims 
for horses when he writes, “Unto their inward sences, their witt, teachablenesse, memory, love, 
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and faithfulnesse towards their masters, chastity, and courage doe belong” (4). Buffon praises the 
horse as “Uniformly obedient” in the first paragraph of his entry (307), but with characteristic 
ambivalence, he subsequently writes that gelding produces “gentleness, tranquility, and docility” 
in horses (378). 
In the mid-seventeenth century, the significance of the horse’s teachableness becomes a 
major point of contention between Cavendish and Descartes. In the history of European 
philosophy about animals, Descartes is well-known for viewing animals as machines.61 In a letter 
to Cavendish dated 23 November 1646, Descartes offers an account of animal training consistent 
with this view of animals.62 Descartes primarily addresses the case of the talking bird because of 
his belief that thought reveals itself only in “words, or other signs that are relevant to particular 
topics without expressing any passion.”63 Nevertheless, Descartes includes the horse among his 
cast of remarkably teachable—but nevertheless unthinking—animals:  
If you teach a magpie to say good-day to its mistress, when it sees her approach, 
this can only be by making the utterance of this word the expression of one of its 
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passions. For instance it will be an expression of the hope of eating, if it has 
always been given a titbit when it says it. Similarly, all the things which dogs, 
horses, and monkeys are taught to perform are only expressions of their fear, their 
hope, or their joy; and consequently they can be performed without any thought.64  
In this account of a magpie’s training, the magpie has learned not to perform a greeting but to 
express its hunger automatically by the words “good-day.” Although the “mistress” may delight 
in the illusion that the magpie welcomes her arrival, the magpie’s “good-day” has no more 
significance than an inarticulate squawk, or any vocalization prompted by the mechanical 
workings of the passions. Once Descartes has addressed the case of animals capable of imitating 
human speech, he even more confidently dismisses the intelligence of other commonly trained 
animals, such as “dogs, horses, and monkeys,” who lack the human capacity for language in far 
more obvious ways than magpies. 
Cavendish, in contrast, not only acknowledges the intelligence of horses but asserts that it 
is the same in quality—and quite close in quantity—to human intelligence. Contradicting 
Descartes’s account of animal training, Cavendish makes the following assertion about the horse:  
If he does not think (as the famous philosopher DES CARTES affirms of all 
beasts) it would be impossible to teach him what he should do. But by the hope of 
reward, and fear of punishment; when he has been rewarded or punished, he 
thinks of it, and retains it in his memory (for memory is thought) and forms a 
judgment by what is past of what is to come (which again is thought;) insomuch 
that he obeys his rider not only for fear of correction, but also in hopes of being 
cherish’d. But these are things so well known to a complete horseman, that it is 
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needless to say more on this subject. (12) 
Cavendish agrees with Descartes that “hope of reward” and “fear of punishment” motivate 
animals; but he argues that reward and punishment can only affect the horse’s behavior because 
they provoke rational thought. The parenthetical asides noting manifestations of equine 
“thought” give the impression of Cavendish administering corrections to Descartes, the subject 
of the first parenthetical aside, and the passage thus suggests that Descartes, no less than the 
horse, requires instruction from the trainer. 
Rejecting Descartes’s belief that rationality is coterminous with language, Cavendish 
writes, “Altho’ horses do not form their reasonings from the ABC, [...] they draw their 
reasonings from things themselves” (12). In his evaluation of equine intelligence, Cavendish 
attributes little importance to the linguistic limitations of horses. Indeed, despite the prominence 
of language in human education, evoked by Cavendish’s reference to “the ABC,” he compares 
the horse to a human pupil in his treatise’s first paragraph: “the horse is dress’d in the same 
manner that children are taught to read. The horse is taught first to know, and then by frequent 
repetition to convert that knowledge into habit. It is in like manner in what men learn” (11). 
While Descartes and the natural historians distinguish the horse’s teachableness from the 
human’s rationality, Cavendish’s recognition of the horse as a pupil makes rationality consist in 
the teachableness that humans and horses share. 
Although Cavendish concedes that “the horse [has] less understanding than his rider” 
(105), he regards equine rationality as a matter of fact when he asserts “that a horse’s reason is to 
be wrought upon” (13). Cavendish also addresses “the Logicians distinction of reasonable and 
unreasonable creatures” (131), which, as Crane has shown, features the horse and influences 
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Swift during his composition of Gulliver’s Travels.65 Expressing contempt for “the Logicians,” 
Cavendish declares, “were they as good horsemen as scholars, they would have made another 
distinction” (131). As he claims that “horsemen” understand horses better than “scholars” do, 
Cavendish rejects commonplaces about the differences between human and equine intelligence. 
Cavendish’s belief in the similarity of humans and horses entails an attitude toward 
equine exploitation that differs significantly from that of the natural historians. Rejecting the 
conception of the horse as the human’s natural servant, Cavendish writes, “subjection is not 
agreeable to a horse, nor to any other creature that I know; not even to men, who obey only 
because they cannot help it” (142). He also writes, “Force subdues men, as well as beasts. If the 
wisest man in the world were taken by a savage people, and put to draw in a cart proportion’d to 
his strength, and if he were beaten when he refused to do his duty, would not he draw just as a 
horse does when he is threaten’d?” (12). Cavendish tests common justifications for the 
exploitation of horses as laborers by imagining “the wisest man in the world” in the position of 
the beast of burden. Cavendish does not invert the human/horse hierarchy, for the human serves 
“a savage people,” not a species of rational equines like Swift’s houyhnhnms. Nevertheless, this 
imaginary scenario invites humans to identify with equine experience and drives home 
Cavendish’s point that docile obedience is a rational response to exploitation and punishment—
not an aspect of the horse’s noble nature. 
Cavendish does not recommend the emancipation of the horse from human rule; but his 
acknowledgment of the human-like qualities of the horse does seem to entail ethical treatment 
for horses. He declares, “The whole therefore is to make the horseman and his horse friends, and 
bring them to will the same thing” (105). This ideal of interspecies friendship departs 
                                                
65 Crane, “The Houyhnhnms, the Yahoos, and the History of Ideas,” 245-9. 
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significantly from orthodox perspectives about the qualitative differences between humans and 
animals.66 A relevant and arguably influential passage from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 
declares, “there can be no friendship, nor justice, towards inanimate things; indeed not even 
towards a horse or an ox, nor yet towards a slave as slave. For master and slave have nothing in 
common: a slave is a living tool, just as a tool is an inanimate slave.”67 For Aristotle and his 
followers, humans can neither befriend animals nor be morally accountable for their treatment of 
animals because humans and animals are qualitatively different kinds of beings. Even if 
Cavendish supports rather than challenges the hierarchy of human over horse, his regard for the 
horse as a potential friend to the human makes the horse a being that deserves much better 
treatment than a “living tool” that can be used without compunction. 
 
The Human-Horse Relationship in “A Voyage to the Country of the Houyhnhnms” 
 
 When Gulliver returns to England from Houyhnhnmland, he adopts a posture of 
friendship toward horses similar to the one envisioned by Cavendish.68 Gulliver, however, 
elevates horses to a more fully human status: 
The first Money I laid out was to buy two young Stone-Horses which I keep in a 
good Stable, and next to them the Groom is my greatest Favourite; for I feel my 
                                                
66 Thomas discusses the belief of early moderns that animals are qualitatively different from, and 
absolutely inferior to, humans under the heading “human uniqueness.” See Man and the Natural 
World, 30-6. 
67 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackham, ed. T. E. Page, The Loeb Classical 
Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 497. 
68 In “Before the Houyhnhnms: Rational Horses in the Late Seventeenth Century,” Betsy 
Bowden presents evidence that Swift may have read Cavendish’s equestrian manual and quotes 
passages that she deems especially relevant to Gulliver’s Travels. See Notes and Queries 39 
(237), no. 1 (1992): 38-40. Whether or not Swift knew of Cavendish’s text, it provides many 
points for comparison with Swift’s treatment of the horse. 
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Spirits revived by the Smell he contracts in the Stable. My horses understand me 
tolerably well; I converse with them at least four Hours every Day. They are 
Strangers to Bridle or Saddle, they live in great Amity with me, and Friendship to 
each other. (244) 
Although Gulliver’s purchase and keeping of these two horses testify to their subordination, he 
does not subject them to the treatment that horses usually receive. Instead of exploiting horses as 
laborers, Gulliver talks with them. His choice of “Stone-Horses” registers his objection to the 
practice of castrating horses. Similarly, his decision not to subject his horses to “Bridle” or 
“Saddle” implies that he regards even riding a horse as an inappropriate form of exploitation.  
 Talking with his horses “at least four Hours every Day” and declaring that they 
“understand me tolerably well,” Gulliver seems comically indifferent to their intellectual and 
linguistic deficiencies as he accords them a status usually reserved for the human. Nevertheless, 
part 4 of Gulliver’s Travels ultimately suggests that admiration of equine nobility entitles horses 
to better treatment, regardless of whether they can reason or speak. Swift dramatizes the 
hypocrisy of exploiting the noble horse as a beast of burden by having Gulliver describe the 
treatment of English horses in the context of an inverted horse/trainer relationship with the 
houyhnhnm master and by implicitly contrasting justifications for the exploitation of horses with 
the more logically consistent justifications for the exploitation of yahoos. 
 Swift positions Gulliver in an inverted horse/trainer relationship over the course of his 
initial interactions with the houyhnhnms. In his first encounter with a houyhnhnm, Gulliver 
expects the houyhnhnm to be a normal horse and comports himself accordingly: “I took the 
Boldness, to reach my Hand towards his Neck, with a Design to stroak it, using the common 
Style and Whistle of Jockies when they are going to handle a strange Horse” (190). Since 
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Gulliver compares himself to “Jockies”—that is, horse-traders or horse-racers69—he may intend 
to ride or otherwise tame the houyhnhnm. Indeed, Gulliver subsequently expresses his desire for 
the houyhnhnm “to let me ride upon his Back” (192). Gulliver and the houyhnhnm reverse roles, 
however, when Gulliver attempts to quit the interaction: the houyhnhnm, “observing me to steal 
off, neighed after me in so expressive a Tone, that I fancied myself to understand what he meant; 
whereupon I turned back, and came near him, to expect his farther Commands” (191). As 
Gulliver responds to the houyhnhnm’s call and puts himself at the houyhnhnm’s disposal, he 
takes the position of a docile horse in relation to a human handler. The inversion of the 
horse/trainer relation in this scene is especially dramatic and unmistakable because it follows 
Gulliver’s failed attempt to use rudimentary techniques of horse-handling on the houyhnhnm.70 
 Tracking the changing names by which Gulliver designates this houyhnhnm, the first one 
that he meets, also demonstrates that Gulliver adopts the posture of horse to trainer in relation to 
the houyhnhnm.71 Before mounting evidence of houyhnhnm rationality forces Gulliver to 
abandon his preconceptions about equines, he simply calls the houyhnhnm “a Horse” (190). 
Upon the arrival of another houyhnhnm, Gulliver distinguishes them from each other by color: 
the first houyhnhnm becomes the “Dapple-Gray” (191) or “grey Steed” (191); the second is the 
                                                
69 The Oxford English Dictionary, Online ed., s.v. “jockey” (entry dated 1989). 
70 In a similar reading of this scene, Wintle argues that the houyhnhnm interacts with Gulliver 
like a human buying a horse, thus inverting Gulliver’s initial approach to the houyhnhnm. See “If 
Houyhnhnms Were Horses,” 9-10. 
71 Gene Washington’s different analysis uses Gulliver’s names for and descriptions of the 
houyhnhnms as evidence that Gulliver progresses through “three stages” of perspectives on 
them. “Natural Horses à the Noble Horse à Houyhnhnms,” Swift Studies: The Annual of the 
Ehrenpreis Center 3 (1988), 95, but see 91-5. Washington believes that the houyhnhnm master 
in particular belongs to a cultural tradition of the “noble horse,” which Washington defines as a 
horse, usually grey, who “does not perform labour” (94). Showing that natural histories attribute 
nobility to horses in general and treat nobility as consistent with exploitation, I come to different 
conclusions, especially about the houyhnhnm master’s outrage at the treatment of English horses, 
which Washington briefly relates to his concept of the “noble horse” (95). 
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“brown Bay” (191). The word “Steed,” which designates a mount,72 betrays Gulliver’s 
conception of the houyhnhnm as a domestic animal. Furthermore, when Gulliver distinguishes 
the two houyhnhnms by their colors, he participates in discourse about horse coloration, which 
Topsell, but not Cavendish or Buffon, regards as an indicator of a horse’s quality and 
serviceability (Topsell 295-6; Buffon 359; Cavendish 20).73 These names for the houyhnhnms 
are thus typical of the ways that Europeans talk about horses; in particular, they reflect an 
interest in the utility of equines to humans. 
  As the surprisingly rational behavior of the houyhnhnms erodes Gulliver’s 
preconceptions, he continues to call them horses but begins to concede to them some of the 
supposedly unique attributes of the human. After arriving at the houyhnhnm’s home and 
observing his relations with his servants, Gulliver calls him the “Master Horse” (194), a title that 
acknowledges his membership in a complex society with socioeconomic gradations and 
institutions analogous to those of English society. Gulliver observes that the houyhnhnms keep 
many of the same domestic animals that the English keep, such as asses, dogs, and cows (194). 
He also notes that the houyhnhnms employ yahoos to perform tasks that horses perform in 
England: “About Noon I saw coming towards the House a kind of Vehicle drawn like a Sledge 
by four Yahoos. There was in it an old Steed, who seemed to be of Quality” (196). Betraying 
enduring prejudices about equines, Gulliver refers to the visitor as a “Steed” even though the 
yahoos, not the houyhnhnms, are clearly the means of transport. Nevertheless, Gulliver attributes 
“Quality,” or high socioeconomic status, to the visitor,74 and he admires the “great Civility” with 
                                                
72 The Oxford English Dictionary, Online ed., s.v. “steed” (entry dated 1989).  
73 Pointing out that Gulliver always refers to the houyhnhnms by their coloration rather than by 
proper names, Wintle claims that he never overcomes his tendency to view them as horses. See 
“If Houyhnhnms Were Horses,” 13. 
74 The Oxford English Dictionary, Online ed., s.v. “quality” (entry dated June 2010).  
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which the master houyhnhnm entertains his guest (196). According to Thomas, early moderns 
regard “polite education, ‘civility’ and refinement” as important indices of the human’s 
superiority to the animal;75 therefore, Gulliver credits the houyhnhnms with a human-like status 
by acknowledging that they posses customs of politeness. Furthermore, S. E. Whyman relates, 
“By the late seventeenth century, calling upon one’s friends in a carriage became an important 
expression of London sociability.”76 Therefore, the arrival of a houyhnhnm in a yahoo-drawn 
carriage not only challenges Gulliver’s notions about the proper relation between anthropoids 
and equines but also drives home the similarities between houyhnhnm society and English 
society in 1710, the year of Gulliver’s fourth voyage (Swift, Gulliver’s Travels 187). 
 As long as Gulliver continues to assimilate the houyhnhnms to the familiar category 
“Horse,” however, he recognizes parallels between houyhnhnms and humans without giving up 
the notion that he, as a human, occupies a privileged position in the human-equine relationship. 
While the phrase “Master Horse” suggests that houyhnhnms have social distinctions comparable 
to those of Europeans, it also suggests that houyhnhnm society consists of mere horses, from 
whom humans remain distinct and to whom humans remain superior. In the moment that 
Gulliver begins to refer to the aristocratic houyhnhnm as “my Master” (198), he no longer 
considers himself a human observer of a society of horses, and he gives up his culture’s 
hierarchy of human over equine. Indicating the importance of this change in appellation, Gulliver 
inserts a parenthetical acknowledgement of it: “(for so I shall henceforth call him)” (198). Only 
now, as Gulliver begins to receive instruction in houyhnhnm language and to assimilate to 
houyhnhnm society, does he revoke his classification of the houyhnhnms as animals and 
subordinate himself, a human, to their non-human authority.  
                                                
75 Thomas, Man and the Natural World, 37.  See also 36-41. 
76 Quoted in Edwards, Horse and Man, 216. 
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Despite the influence of houyhnhnm language on Gulliver’s re-evaluation of houyhnhnm 
intelligence, the phrase “my Master” invests the aristocratic houyhnhnm with the authority of not 
only the school-master but also the horse-trainer, whom Cavendish compares to a school-master 
when he writes, “the horse is dress’d in the same manner that children are taught to read” (11). 
Interpreted in this way, the phrase “my Master” locates Gulliver in an inverted human-horse 
relationship at the same time that it evokes a model of the human-horse relationship in which the 
capacity for language is relatively unimportant for distinguishing humans from animals. While 
horses do not receive the same instruction in language that Gulliver receives, comparing Gulliver 
with Cavendish’s depiction of the horse as a pupil strengthens the impression that Gulliver has 
entered an inverted horse/trainer relationship with the aristocratic houyhnhnm. 
 Gulliver’s description of the mistreatment of horses in England works to expose the 
contradiction between equine nobility and the exploitation of horses because it occurs within the 
context of this inverted horse/trainer relationship. Gulliver narrates his conversation with the 
houyhnhnm master: 
I owned, that the Houyhnhnms among us, whom we called Horses, were the most 
generous and comely Animal we had, that they excelled in Strength and 
Swiftness; and when they belonged to Persons of Quality, employed in 
Travelling, Racing, or drawing Chariots, they were treated with much Kindness 
and Care, till they fell into Diseases, or became foundred in the Feet; and then 
they were sold, and used to all kind of Drudgery till they died; after which their 
Skins were stripped and sold for what they were worth, and their Bodies left to be 
devoured by Dogs and Birds of Prey. But the common Race of Horses had not so 
good Fortune, being kept by Farmers and Carriers and other mean People, who 
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put them to greater Labour, and fed them worse. I described as well as I could, 
our way of Riding, the shape and use of a Bridle, a Saddle, a Spur, and a Whip, of 
Harness and Wheels. I added, that we fastned Plates of a certain hard Substance 
called Iron at the Bottom of their Feet, to preserve their Hoofs from being broken 
by the stony Ways on which we often travelled. (203)77 
Gulliver begins by admitting that Europeans believe the horse to be superior to other domestic 
animals; and he says, “I owned,” to take embarrassed responsibility for the treatment of horses 
that he subsequently describes, as though he perceives an inconsistency between admiration of 
horses and their degradation by humans. 
 Swift exaggerates this impression of inconsistency when the houyhnhnm master takes the 
treatment of horses as an affront to his own equine nobility. The houyhnhnm master responds to  
Gulliver with “some Expressions of great Indignation” (203). Gulliver later relates, “it is 
impossible to represent his noble Resentment at our savage Treatment of the Houyhnhnm Race, 
particularly after I had explained the Manner and Use of Castrating Horses among us, to hinder 
them from propagating their Kind, and to render them more servile” (204). The “great 
Indignation” and “noble Resentment” of the houyhnhnm master dramatize a contradiction 
between the horse’s reputation as the noblest animal and the treatment that horses typically 
receive from humans. While Swift creates the houyhnhnms by extrapolating from conceptions of 
the horse as noble, Swift turns representations of the horse against themselves by having an 
exaggeratedly noble equine condemn the use of other equines as beasts of burden. The outrage of 
the houyhnhnm master thus exposes a discrepancy in discourse about horses, which tends to 
admire equine nobility while justifying equine exploitation. 
                                                
77 Thomas finds this passage such a compelling representation of the contemporary treatment of 
horses that he quotes it in Man and the Natural World, 100. 
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 Gulliver’s speech also recommends better treatment for horses because he delivers it 
from the new position that he has adopted in his initial encounters with the houyhnhnms: the 
position of the horse in relation to the trainer. After recounting his reluctance to tell the 
houyhnhnm master about the exploitation of horses, Gulliver writes, “he insisted in commanding 
me to let him know the best and the worst: I told him, he should be obeyed” (203). The word 
“commanding” recalls the scene in which Gulliver first adopts the posture of the obedient horse 
by awaiting the houyhnhnm master’s “Commands” (191). The recurrence of the word 
“command” places Gulliver’s description of the exploitation of horses in the context of his horse-
like subordination to an equine master. This positioning of Gulliver and the houyhnhnm master 
as horse and trainer causes the human to occupy the subordinate place of the horse and calls on 
the human to justify the treatment of horses to an equine authority, who represents the equine 
nobility that cannot be reconciled with the exploitation of horses.78 
In his society’s defense, Gulliver resorts to the argument that the horse’s teachableness 
differs qualitatively from the rationality of humans and houyhnhnms. Of horses, he admits, “they 
were indeed sensible of Rewards and Punishments; but his Honour would please to consider, that 
they had not the least Tincture of Reason any more than the Yahoos in this Country” (204). 
Gulliver takes Descartes’s position exactly: horses have passions that render them teachable, 
responsive to “Rewards and Punishments,” but they utterly lack “Reason,” a capacity distinct 
from and superior to mere teachableness. Once again, however, Gulliver’s positioning as a horse 
and the positioning of the houyhnhnm master as a trainer undercuts justifications for the 
                                                
78 Wintle offers another explanation for the ethical obligations that Gulliver’s description creates. 
Claiming that Gulliver’s description constitutes “the first full life history of a horse in literature,” 
she argues that the narration of equine experience in a form with which humans can identify 
implicitly extends “an invitation for the reader [...] to feel a sense of moral responsibility—to 
recognise human responsibility for animal suffering.” See “If Houyhnhnms Were Horses,” 13-4. 
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exploitation of horses as laborers. 
Like the horse of the natural histories, Gulliver receives praise for his remarkable 
intelligence at the same time that his admirer credits him with only teachableness, not rationality. 
Gulliver reports the houyhnhnm master’s initial evaluation of him: “He was convinced (as he 
afterwards told me) that I must be a Yahoo, but my Teachableness, Civility and Cleanliness 
astonished him; which were Qualities altogether so opposite to those Animals” (198). Even as 
Gulliver’s intelligence impresses the houyhnhnm master, he labels it “Teachableness” to 
distinguish it from rationality, which he assumes to be an exclusive property of the houyhnhnm. 
Likewise, Gulliver reports that the houyhnhnm master wonders “how I was taught to imitate a 
rational Creature” (199). Even as he acknowledges Gulliver’s resemblance to “a rational 
Creature,” the houyhnhnm master regards that resemblance as a function of Gulliver’s 
teachableness, not rationality. Because they occur in the context of an inverted human/horse 
relationship, remarks about Gulliver’s teachableness satirize commonplaces about equine 
intelligence.79 By imagining the linguistically capable Gulliver in the position of the horse, Swift 
exaggerates arguments that discount equine intelligence and, like Cavendish, redefines language 
as a form of the teachableness that humans and horses share. 
Swift’s text does not allow the distinction between teachableness and reason to manage 
the proximity of equine and human intelligence, as it does for Descartes and the natural 
historians. Richard Nash, who relies exclusively on the natural history of John Ray, offers the 
following explanation of the relevance of the horse’s reputation for teachableness to part 4 of 
Gulliver’s Travels: “repeatedly, descriptions of Gulliver and the Yahoos are filtered through the 
                                                
79 For a comparison of the houyhnhnm perspective on Gulliver to European perspectives on 
parrots, see Philip Armstrong, What Animals Mean in the Fiction of Modernity (London: 
Routledge, 2008), 20-1. I prefer to emphasize Gulliver’s positioning as a horse. 
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lens of Ray’s foremost quadruped, the horse. [...] Frequently in the fourth voyage, human and 
Yahoo reason is questioned in terms of the equine/Houyhnhnm category of ‘docillimum.’”80 
While Nash implies that the houyhnhnms differ from humans in conceptualizing intelligence in 
terms of teachableness instead of rationality, I argue that the houyhnhnms distinguish their own 
rationality from Gulliver’s teachableness and thereby assume a perspective analogous to that of 
Descartes and the natural historians, who distinguish the horse’s teachableness from the human’s 
reason. Swift subjects arguments about equine teachableness to satire by recasting them from the 
houyhnhnm’s perspective on Gulliver, whom readers know to be rational according to orthodox 
definitions of the human. The houyhnhnm’s misconstrual of Gulliver’s intelligence introduces 
the possibility that humans have similarly misconstrued the horse’s intelligence, especially 
because Swift so explicitly locates Gulliver and the houyhnhnm master in a horse-trainer 
relationship. 
Despite this suggestion that humans have underestimated equine intelligence, the ethical 
claims of horses in part 4 of Gulliver’s Travels rest less on the ontological status of horses than 
on inconsistencies in the human-horse relationship. Indeed, Gulliver’s claim about the 
ontological status of horses does little to excuse or even to address the hypocrisies that have 
become so conspicuous in his conversation with the houyhnhnm master. Swift further criticizes 
these hypocrisies through his portrayal of the yahoos, who perform many of the tasks that horses 
perform in England. While natural historians praise horses for their teachableness and for their 
noble willingness to serve humans, the houyhnhnms regard the yahoos as almost entirely 
“indocible” (228) and “averse from Labour” (235). One houyhnhnm explains that the 
houyhnhnms have “brought them [the yahoos] to such a degree of Tameness, as an Animal so 
                                                
80 Richard Nash, Wild Enlightenment: The Borders of Human Identity in the Eighteenth Century 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2003), 109-10. 
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savage by Nature can be capable of acquiring; using them for Draught and Carriage” (229). 
Gulliver comes to a similar conclusion about yahoo nature: “By what I could discover, the 
Yahoos appear to be the most unteachable of all Animals, their Capacities never reaching higher 
than to draw or carry Burthens” (224). These justifications for the exploitation of yahoos indicate 
that the tasks of the beast of burden befit only the most unintelligent and ignoble animals. The 
houyhnhnms have rarely, if ever, made any species other than the yahoo perform the role of the 
beast of burden—not even the ass, which one houyhnhnm describes as “a comely Animal, easily 
kept, more tame and orderly, without any offensive Smell, strong enough for Labour” (229). 
Comparing the remarkably teachable horse with “the most unteachable” yahoo suggests that 
Gulliver and the houyhnhnms underestimate the intelligence that the yahoos display in 
performing the tasks of the beast of burden, but it also points out contradictions in European 
attitudes toward horses: if horses are supposed to be noble and teachable animals, then it is 
logically inconsistent and ethically problematic to employ them—as the English increasingly 
did—for menial tasks, such as “Draught” and “Carriage.” 
 
Conclusion 
 
Swift’s treatment of equine nobility identifies a contradiction in the discourse about 
horses that most other writers, such as the natural historians and Cavendish, do not perceive. For 
Topsell and Jonston, the nobility of the horse is entirely consistent with its exploitation. Writing 
after Swift, Buffon occasionally considers equine nobility to conflict with the horse’s servitude 
to humans, but Buffon does not elaborate this theme fully or consistently. As we have seen, he 
defends human supremacy by recapitulating the argument that horses are natural servants for 
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humans. Cavendish offers an alternative interpretation of equine nobility when he claims that the 
proximity of horses to humans threatens human dominance. Cavendish somewhat anticipates 
Swift by decoupling the conception of the horse as noble from the conception of the horse as a 
servant, and Cavendish’s debate with Descartes anticipates the animal-welfare movement’s 
interest in the ontological status of animals. Cavendish, however, does not regard the 
subordination of horses as an ethical problem or as a form of hypocrisy. Indeed, he declares, 
“man ought carefully to preserve his empire” (122). 
Writing in the wake of a dramatic increase in the exploitation of horses, Swift critiques 
typical discourse about horses when he re-deploys ideas about equine nobility in order to present 
them in contradiction to the use of horses as beasts of burden. Swift’s approach to animal welfare 
places less emphasis on the ontological status of animals than on hypocrisies involved in the 
treatment of horses, in particular. Ultimately, this approach would not prove influential for the 
rise of the animal-welfare movement, which has depended on the ontological premises evident in 
Bentham’s famous question about animal capacities for suffering. Nevertheless, just as studying 
modern proponents of animal welfare sets in relief a distinctive, pre-modern approach in 
Gulliver’s Travels, studying Swift’s satire exposes a possible limitation of the modern approach. 
Instead of focusing so exclusively on claims about animal ontologies, which have been difficult 
to prove to skeptical audiences, modern thinkers might also look for inconsistencies between 
beliefs about animals and their treatment. As Swift’s example demonstrates, identifying such 
contradictions can produce arguments for improving the treatment of at least some animals—
arguments that need not wait for questions about animal ontologies to be posed, much less 
resolved. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
BECOMING HOUYHNHNM: 
PARODY OF CIRCE’S TRANSFORMATIONS IN GULLIVER’S TRAVELS 
 
 When Gulliver begins to affiliate himself with equines instead of humans near the end of 
Gulliver’s Travels, he recapitulates the Gryllus figure’s characteristic preference for a non-
human existence—but without ever experiencing transformation. The first intimation of 
Gulliver’s resemblance to Gryllus occurs when Gulliver declares his intention to spend the 
remainder of his life in Houyhnhnmland. Gulliver writes, “I had not been a Year in this Country, 
before I contracted such a Love and Veneration for the Inhabitants, that I entered on a firm 
Resolution never to return to human Kind, but to pass the rest of my Life among these admirable 
Houyhnhnms in the Contemplation and Practice of every Virtue; where I could find no Example 
or Incitement to Vice.”1 Gulliver not only recapitulates Gryllus’s preference for a non-human 
existence by affiliating himself with non-humans but also provides a version of Gryllus’s 
argument that animals surpass humans in the classical virtues. 
Furthermore, Gulliver begins to behave in characteristically equine manners, which 
suggests that Gulliver desires an equine form to suit his admiration of and identification with the 
houyhnhnms. Gulliver reports the reactions of his fellow Europeans to these equine behaviors 
upon his return to England: “my Friends often tell me in a blunt way, that I trot like a Horse; 
which, however, I take for a great Compliment: Neither shall I disown, that in Speaking I am apt 
to fall into the Voice and manner of the Houyhnhnms, and hear myself ridiculed on that account 
                                                
1 Jonathan Swift, Gulliver's Travels, ed. Albert J. Rivero (New York: Norton, 2002), 218. 
Subsequent citations appear in text. 
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without the least Mortification” (235). Although Gulliver claims to admire the houyhnhnm 
culture, especially its morality, he does not merely embrace houyhnhnm values but also attempts 
to re-make his body upon an equine model as he approximates the quadrupedal locomotion of 
the houyhnhnms and imitates their characteristic vocal productions. 
While Gulliver never experiences transformation into a horse, Swift dramatizes 
Gulliver’s new identification with an equine rather than human community by contrasting 
Gulliver’s comportment toward his family, especially his wife, with his attitude toward his 
horses. Of his reunion with his wife and children, Gulliver writes, “I must freely confess the 
sight of them filled me only with Hatred, Disgust and Contempt, and the more by reflecting on 
the near alliance I had to them” (244). Immediately after recording his disgust at his reunion with 
his family, Gulliver explicitly identifies two horses as his most cherished companions:  
The first Money I laid out was to buy two young Stone-Horses which I keep in a 
good Stable, and next to them the Groom is my greatest Favourite; for I feel my 
Spirits revived by the Smell he contracts in the Stable. My Horses understand me 
tolerably well; I converse with them at least four Hours every Day. They are 
Strangers to Bridle or Saddle, they live in great Amity with me, and Friendship to 
each other. (244) 
While humans, except for the groom, repulse Gulliver, he claims that a relation of “Amity” exists 
between himself and his horses, which once again affiliates him with equines rather than 
humans, including even his family. In sharp contrast to his lengthy conversations with horses, 
Gulliver barely endures discourse with his wife. Near the end of his narrative, he confides, “I 
began last Week to permit my Wife to sit at Dinner with me, at the farthest End of a long Table, 
and to answer (but with the utmost brevity) the few Questions I ask her” (249). While Gulliver 
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finds it painful to hear his wife’s answers to questions that he himself has posed, he enjoys the 
companionship of horses so much that he spends four or more hours with them each day. The 
distance that he maintains between himself and his wife likewise contrasts with his proximity to 
horses in their stable. 
 Arguing that Gulliver experiences a frustrated desire for transformation, I offer an 
alternative to approaches suggesting that Gulliver departs from humanity in a significant way. 
Deleuze and Guattari describe a state of “becoming-animal” that obeys a “principle of proximity 
or approximation” but that amounts to more than “a resemblance, an imitation, or, at the limit, an 
identification.”2 As an example, they discuss “wolf-children,” in which case “It is useless, then, 
to raise the objection that the dog-child only plays dog within the limits of his formal 
constitution, and does nothing that another human being could not have done if he or she had so 
desired” (273-4). By Deleuze and Guattari’s own admission, the ambiguous yet, they insist, real 
state of “becoming-animal” differs from a true human-animal transformation: “There is a reality 
of becoming-animal, even though one does not in reality become animal” (273). An account of 
Gulliver in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms might suggest that he experiences a becoming-
houyhnhnm, that his equine behaviors test or even transcend the limits of his human identity. 
Jonathan Lamb has interpreted Gulliver in a similar manner in an essay on stories about 
alienation from humanity. Lamb identifies Gulliver as an example of a character who undergoes 
the “metamorphosis that arises from unlimited sympathy with animals.”3 Although Lamb relates 
                                                
2 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. 
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 272, 237. 
Subsequent citations appear in text. 
3 Jonathan Lamb, “Gulliver and the Lives of Animals,” in Humans and Other Animals in 
Eighteenth-Century British Culture: Representation, Hybridity, Ethics, ed. Frank Palmeri 
(Aldershot, England; and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 177. Subsequent citations appear in 
text. 
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his approach to Hardt and Negri’s work on “anthropological exodus” (170), his claim that 
Gulliver experiences a human-horse transformation has affinities with Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept of “becoming-animal.” Lamb believes that Gulliver departs significantly from humanity 
“by becoming as far as is possible a horse” (170). Lamb calls this change a “transformation” 
(170) or “metamorphosis” (177), and he credits Gulliver with “knowledge of what it is like to be 
a horse” (175). Remarking that “Gulliver’s friends deem him like a horse only in the sense that 
he performs horse” (176), Lamb suggests that their view of Gulliver is unsatisfactory, just as 
Deleuze and Guattari are unsatisfied with the explanation “that the dog-child only plays dog.” 
This approach suggests that Gulliver is not quite human after his experiences among the 
houyhnhnms.4 
My argument, in contrast, places Gulliver’s Travels in the Plutarchian tradition of 
transformation narratives, in which context Gulliver appears not to depart significantly from 
humanity, whereas earlier analogues of Plutarch’s Gryllus, who are transformed in accordance 
with their desires, do. Swift invokes the literary tradition of metamorphosis when Gulliver 
mistakes the houyhnhnms for transformed humans near the beginning of part 4. Initially baffled 
by the surprisingly rational behavior of the island’s equines, Gulliver relates, “I at last concluded, 
they must needs be Magicians, who had thus metamorphosed themselves upon some design” 
(191). Although Gulliver ultimately rejects this hypothesis, it implicitly invites readers to 
consider Gulliver’s narrative in relation to the tradition of transformation narratives. Indeed, part 
4 of Gulliver’s Travels conforms to a remarkable degree to Gareth Roberts’s criteria for “a 
Circean narrative configuration.” His list of Circean formal elements includes “arrival by sea in a 
                                                
4 Philip Armstrong similarly claims that Gulliver departs from humanity at the end of part 4: 
“Gulliver […] is no longer human; neither has he become an animal, properly speaking.” What 
Animals Mean in the Fiction of Modernity (London: Routledge, 2008), 10-1. 
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strange land” and the transformation of male humans into “very particular sorts of domestic 
animals,” by which Roberts means not only pigs but also “beasts of burden, especially asses,” 
which he finds to be more typical of later Renaissance versions of the Circe story.5 Although no 
character experiences transformation in “A Voyage to the Country of the Houyhnhnms,” 
Gulliver entertains the prospect of human-horse transformations upon his initial encounters with 
the houyhnhnms and eventually seems to desire transformation so that he can be an equine 
instead of a human. These references to transformation all involve horses, which, as domestic 
animals and beasts of burden, meet Roberts’s criterion for the kind of animals that Circe stories 
feature, even though Roberts remarks the prominence of pigs and asses, rather than horses. 
Swift may have encountered the Plutarchian tradition of transformations, in particular, in 
a variety of sources, such as Plutarch’s original dialogue “Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti” or book 2 
of Spenser’s Faerie Queene, but a new English translation of Gelli’s Circe also became available 
in 1702, just 24 years before the publication of Gulliver’s Travels. This translation by Thomas 
Brown is an important event in the history of the English reception of Gelli’s Circe, for it had 
previously been available in only one English version, translated by Henry Iden almost 150 years 
earlier in 1557.6 At the very least, the publication of a new translation of La Circe suggests that 
there was broad interest among early eighteenth-century English readers in stories about humans 
who would rather belong to another species, such as Swift’s Gulliver and all of Gelli’s 
transformed animals except the elephant. At the most, Swift may have composed part 4 of 
                                                
5 Gareth Roberts, “The Descendants of Circe: Witches and Renaissance Fictions,” in Witchcraft 
in Early Modern Europe: Studies in Culture and Belief, ed. Jonathan Barry, Marianne Hester, 
and Gareth Roberts (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 194. 
6 According to Robert Adams, “Gelli’s Circe has been three times translated into English: by H. 
Iden (1557); by Brown (1702); and by H. Layng (1744).” See Adams’s introduction to The Circe 
of Signior Giovanni Battista Gelli of the Academy of Florence, trans. Thomas Brown and Robert 
Adams, ed. Robert Adams (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), xlix. 
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Gulliver’s Travels with La Circe, perhaps as recently translated by Thomas Brown, in mind.7 
Indeed, there is a striking resemblance between Gulliver, a human who wishes for the shape of a 
horse, and Ulysses’s equine interlocutor in La Circe, who explains, “While I was a man, I liked 
my condition well enough, and had a very low opinion of beasts; but now I have tried their way 
of living, I am resolved to live and die a horse.”8 Gulliver never receives the transformation that 
he desires, but he shares with this possible literary predecessor the preference of an equine 
existence to a human one, which makes them both analogues of Plutarch’s Gryllus, whether or 
not Swift knew of Gelli’s horse or intended Gulliver to resemble him. 
Although Gulliver continues a literary tradition that originates with Renaissance 
appropriations of Plutarch’s Gryllus, Gulliver also departs from the model of earlier Gryllus 
figures in ways that redound satirically on key elements of the tradition. By making Gulliver 
desire to be a horse, a particularly admired animal, Swift makes Gulliver’s preference for a non-
human existence more sympathetic or understandable than that of Spenser’s Gryll, who has a 
more conventionally contemptible desire to be a pig. Indeed, evidence that Swift has deliberately 
substituted the horse for the pig suggests that Gulliver’s admiration of equines may function to 
expose the anthropocentric use of pigs in earlier Circe stories, as discussed in chapter three. 
Swift has further complicated his Gryllus figure’s desire for transformation by inventing a 
species of rational equines. In general, earlier narratives imagine transformations between 
relatively distinct states of human and animal, but transformation into a houyhnhnm would not 
                                                
7 Although Robert Adams doubts that La Circe or Brown’s recent translation had any significant 
influence on Gulliver’s Travels, it is difficult to dismiss the resemblance that he notes between 
an Italian phrase of Gelli’s horse, “ne dire tal volta quello che non è,” and the memorable 
houyhnhnm phrase, “to say the thing that is not.” See Adams, introduction to The Circe, xlvii-
xlviii. 
8 Giovanni Battista Gelli, The Circe of Signior Giovanni Battista Gelli of the Academy of 
Florence, trans. Thomas Brown and Robert Adams, ed. Robert Adams (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1963), 113. Subsequent citations of this edition appear in text. 
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cause Gulliver to cross any ontological boundary. Gulliver desires but does not receive this 
superfluous transformation, which seems to imply criticism of the way that earlier narratives, 
such as Gelli’s dialogues and Spenser’s Faerie Queene, achieve closure by bringing mental 
affiliation and physical form into correspondence, according to common beliefs about the 
significance of bipedal and quadrupedal forms. Despite the existence of magic in part 3 of 
Gulliver’s Travels, part 4 has no Circean figure who can grant Gulliver’s wish for an equine 
form.9 Swift especially highlights the use of transformation to resolve earlier narratives by 
sending an untransformed Gulliver back to his human community, with whom Gulliver enacts a 
paradoxical version of the Gryllus figure’s typical forgetting of humanity as he attempts to 
affiliate himself with the houyhnhnms while constantly recalling his human identity. Gulliver’s 
Travels thus satirizes premises entailed by the use of transformation to resolve debates about 
human and animal existences in earlier texts.  
 
Human-Horse Transformations 
 
 Swift has developed a relatively anti-anthropocentric Plutarchian narrative by making 
Gulliver desire to be an equine, a particularly admired animal, rather than a pig, the animal that 
the relatively contemptible Gryllus figures of Spenser and Milton desire to become. Swift calls 
attention to the substitution of horses for pigs in his ironic Circe story by having Gulliver remark 
the absence of pigs among the fauna of Houyhnhnmland. Wishing to counter his houyhnhnm 
teacher’s opinion that yahoos are the only animals that like to be dirty, Gulliver comments,  
                                                
9 I am grateful to Laura Brown and Ian Duncan, who have encouraged me to clarify my claim 
that Gulliver’s transformation is thwarted by pointing out the conspicuous absence of Circe from 
part 4. 
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I could have easily vindicated Human Kind from the Imputation of Singularity 
upon the last Article, if there had been any Swine in that Country, (as unluckily 
for me there were not) which although it may be a sweeter Quadruped than a 
Yahoo, cannot I humbly conceive in Justice pretend to more Cleanliness; and so 
his Honour himself must have owned, if he had seen their filthy way of feeding, 
and their Custom of wallowing and sleeping in the Mud. (222) 
This passage renders conspicuous Swift’s exclusion of pigs from the island’s fauna.10 That 
exclusion seems especially significant because Swift has populated the island with many other 
familiar domestic animals, including dogs (194), cats (228), cows (194, 231), and asses (194, 
229). The passage moreover invokes conventional interpretations of the pig as a symbol of 
dirtiness, gluttony, laziness, and other corporeal vices, which earlier writers, especially Spenser 
and Milton, use to condemn humans who prefer to be animals. 
 By making the virtuous houyhnhnms unfamiliar with pigs, Swift not only implies that 
equines have taken the place of pigs in his version of the Circe story but also reprises symbolic 
distinctions between horses and pigs from natural history. In particular, Swift draws upon animal 
symbolism from the paradigm of natural history that William Ashworth has called 
“emblematic.”11 In this paradigm, which Michel Foucault elucidates in his discussion of 
Renaissance views, natural sympathies exist between some living creatures while others are 
                                                
10 For a comparison of yahoos to pigs, see Sarah Wintle, “If Houyhnhnms Were Horses: 
Thinking with Animals in Book IV of Gulliver's Travels,” The Critical Review 34 (1994), 7-8. 
11 William B. Ashworth, Jr., “Natural History and the Emblematic World View,” in Reappraisals 
of the Scientific Revolution, ed. by David C. Lindberg and Robert S. Westman (Cambridge, 
England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 305, 312-3, 328 n. 26; William B. 
Ashworth, Jr., “Emblematic Natural History of the Renaissance,” in Cultures of Natural History, 
ed. Nicholas Jardine, James A. Secord, and E. C. Spary (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 36. 
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antithetical beings.12 Topsell, whose Historie of Foure-Footed Beastes (1607) conforms to this 
paradigm, treats the horse and the pig as antithetical creatures. He writes, “This also in stabling 
of your horsses must be avoided, namely the sties of Swine, for the stinke, the breath, the 
gruntling of hogs, is abhominable for horsses, and nature hath framed no simpathie or concorde 
betwixte the noble and couragious spirite of a horsse, and the beastlie sluggish condition of a 
swine.”13 Finding the pig more “beastlie” than the horse, Topsell portrays the horse as a “noble” 
aristocrat, the pig as the most animalistic of the animals. While Topsell praises the horse’s 
“couragious spirite,” he reviles the pig for its “sluggish condition”; and he claims that horses 
cannot tolerate the presence of such inferior animals. Swift seems to have observed Topsell’s 
warning against sheltering horses near pigs by populating the imaginary island of 
Houyhnhnmland with many species of domestic animals except for pigs. 
Swift’s substitution of horses for pigs complicates the evaluation of Gulliver’s desire for 
transformation. Many earlier Gryllus figures want to forsake their humanity in order to become 
pigs. Even when these figures make persuasive arguments for the superiority of the animal state, 
the moral value of their desires for transformation is relatively unambiguous to anyone who 
accepts the conventional symbolic interpretation of the pig. Plutarch’s Odysseus tells Gryllus, 
who prefers remaining a pig to becoming a human again, “You have become infected with 
strange and completely perverted notions. Or was it rather an inclination to swinishness that 
conjured you into this shape?”14 Spenser’s Palmer comes to a similar conclusion about Gryll: 
                                                
12 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1994), 23-4. 
13 Edward Topsell, The Historie of Foure-Footed Beastes (London: printed by William Jaggard, 
1607), 303. Subsequent citations appear in text. 
14 Plutarch, “Beasts Are Rational,” trans. and ed. William C. Helmbold, in Plutarch's Moralia, 
vol. 12, The Loeb Classical Library (London and Cambridge, Mass.: William Heinemann; 
Harvard University Press, 1957), 986. 
 
232 
“The donghill kinde / Delightes in filth and fowle incontinence: / Let Gryll be Gryll, and haue his 
hoggish minde.”15 Although Milton’s Comus transforms the heads of his victims into those of 
many different animals, the Attendant Spirit compares them all to pigs when he says that they 
“roll with pleasure in a sensual sty.”16 Even as humans, these Gryllus figures allegedly have the 
properties of pigs, such as “swinishness” or a “hoggish minde,” and their indulgence in corporeal 
vices resembles the “filth and fowle incontinence” of pigs. From the perspective of the Attendant 
Spirit, the debauched revelries of Comus’s victims amount to living in the domestic pig’s 
characteristic environment, the “sty.” In these Circean narratives, the pig provides the central 
figure for the moral depravity of humans who desire to be animals. 
In contrast, influential seventeenth- and eighteenth-century treatments of the horse 
describe it as the noblest animal. The opening paragraph of Topsell’s entry on the horse declares 
the horse “the most noble and necessary creature of all foure-footed-beasts, before whom no one 
for multitude and generality of good qualities is to be preferred, compared or equaled” (281). An 
equestrian manual by William Cavendish not only repeats this claim about equine nobility but 
also explicitly positions the horse as the animal nearest to the human: “The horse being, after 
man, the most noble of all animals (for he is as much superior to all other creatures as man is to 
him, and therefore holds a sort of middle place between man and the rest of the creation) he is 
wise and subtile; for which reason man ought carefully to preserve his empire over him, knowing 
how nearly that wisdom and subtility approaches his own.”17 The horse likewise seems to 
                                                
15 Edmund Spenser, The Faerie Queene, ed. A. C. Hamilton, Hiroshi Yamashita, and Toshiyuki 
Suzuki (Harlow, London, New York, et al.: Pearson Education, 2001), book 2, canto 12, stanza 
87, lines 6-8. 
16 John Milton, Comus, in Complete Poems and Major Prose, ed. Merritt Y. Hughes 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003), page 91, line 77. 
17 William Cavendish, A General System of Horsemanship, 2 vols. (London: printed for J. 
Brindley, 1743), 122. Subsequent citations appear in text. 
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approach human status in a statement by Buffon: “He elevates his head, as if anxious to exalt 
himself above the condition of quadrupeds. In this noble attitude, he regards man face to face.”18 
Buffon’s image suggests that human and horse are almost equal, not only because the horse 
meets the human’s gaze instead of bowing its head in deference but also because Buffon believes 
that this posture expresses the horse’s aspiration to transcend “the condition of quadrupeds,” as 
though the horse wants to claim human-like status and perhaps even to walk upright. 
Because of the polar opposition between the noble, human-like horse and the reviled, 
bestial pig, it is more difficult to criticize Gulliver for desiring to become an equine than it is to 
criticize Spenser’s Gryll and other characters in more traditional narratives for desiring to 
become pigs. Providing further evidence that the desire to become a horse is relatively—and 
perhaps uniquely—sympathetic, Gulliver’s desire to become a houyhnhnm extends a pre-
existing tradition in which admiration of horses motivates desires for transformation. Although 
the earlier works treat human-horse transformation as a somewhat comical prospect, they also 
suggest that the horse’s especially admired status among animals makes the desire for 
transformation into a horse relatively plausible. 
In the opening of The Apology for Poetry (1595), Philip Sidney recalls a conversation 
with John Pietro Pugliano, who served the Emperor Maximilian as “an esquire in his stable.”19 
After extolling horsemanship, Pugliano delivers an encomium on horses themselves: 
Then he would add certain praises, by telling what a peerless beast the horse was, 
                                                
18 Georges Louis Leclerc, comte de Buffon, Natural History, General and Particular, trans. 
William Smellie, 2nd ed., vol. 3 of 9 (London: printed for W. Strahan and T. Cadell, in the 
Strand, 1785), 329. 
19 Philip Sidney, The Apology for Poetry, in The Longman Anthology of British Literature, 2nd 
ed., ed. David Damrosch, vol. 1B, The Early Modern Period, ed. Constance Jordan and Clare 
Carroll (New York et al.: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers, 2003), 969. Subsequent 
citations appear in text. 
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the only serviceable courtier without flattery, the beast of most beauty, 
faithfulness, courage, and such more, that if I had not been a piece of a logician 
before I came to him, I think he would have persuaded me to have wished myself 
a horse. (969) 
In Sidney’s account, only conventional distinctions between humans and animals save him from 
desiring transformation into a horse. Noting that the horse appears as the standard example of an 
irrational animal in logic textbooks, such as Porphyry’s influential Isagoge of the 3rd century 
CE, R. S. Crane has argued that Swift inverts commonplace definitions of humans as rational 
animals and horses as irrational animals by inventing the houyhnhnms, a species of rational 
equines.20 As “a piece of a logician,” Sidney has presumably read commonplace definitions of 
humans and horses in logic textbooks, and he implies that recalling them enables him to prefer 
humanity to animality, in spite of Pugliano’s idealization of the horse. Only the logical 
commonplaces contravened by the houyhnhnms prevent Sidney from fully anticipating 
Gulliver’s desire for an equine form. 
 Although Sidney ultimately prefers humanity over animality, admiration of horses 
propels Sidney, like Gulliver, toward the possibility of transformation. Admitting that Pugliano’s 
enthusiasm for horses might “have persuaded me to wish myself a horse,” Sidney affiliates their 
conversation with the literary tradition based on Plutarch’s “Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti,” in 
which characters are transformed in accordance with their beliefs about human and animal states. 
As Pugliano urges Sidney to view the horse as “a peerless beast,” Pugliano rehearses 
commonplace conceptions of the horse as the noblest animal. Such notions make a desire for 
                                                
20 R. S. Crane, “The Houyhnhnms, the Yahoos, and the History of Ideas,” in Reason and the 
Imagination: Studies in the History of Ideas, 1600-1800, ed. Joseph Anthony Mazzeo (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 243-50. 
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transformation into a horse relatively understandable, in comparison, for instance, with Gryll’s 
desire to be a pig in Spenser’s Faerie Queene. Even though the claim that Sidney barely avoids 
desiring to become a horse seems comical, the prospect of a human-horse transformation 
emerges somewhat plausibly from conventional admiration of horses. 
 This comic yet plausible connection between extolling horses and desiring transformation 
appears again in one of Ben Jonson’s poems, dedicated to the horse trainer William Cavendish.21 
After five heroic couplets on Cavendish’s skill with his horse, Jonson’s speaker effuses, “Nay, so 
your Seate his beauties did endorse, / As I began to wish my selfe a horse.”22 According to the 
speaker, Cavendish’s “Seate,” an equestrian term for riding skill,23 enables recognition of the 
horse’s “beauties,” which in turn inspire the speaker with a desire to be a horse. The speaker 
does not make this comment casually; rather, he places these lines prominently at the midpoint of 
the poem, as the sixth of ten heroic couplets. The speaker begins the couplet, and the second half 
of his poem, by exclaiming, “Nay,” which sounds like “neigh,” suggesting that he, like Gulliver, 
expresses admiration of horses by imitating their characteristic vocalizations. 
 Of course, the fact that the speaker desires to be not a horseman but a horse seems 
laughable. Furthermore, the speaker provides further reflections on his desire to be a horse that 
redound ironically on the socioeconomic status of poets: 
  And surely had I but your Stable seene 
  Before: I thinke my wish absolv’d had beene. 
  For never saw I yet the Muses dwell, 
                                                
21 On Cavendish’s fame as a horse trainer, see Peter Edwards, Horse and Man in Early Modern 
England (London: Continuum, 2007), 83. 
22 Ben Jonson, “An Epigram. To, William, Earle of Newcastle,” in The Poems of Ben Jonson, ed. 
Bernard H. Newdigate (Oxford: Shakespeare Head Press, 1936), page 166, lines 11-2. 
Subsequent citations appear in text by line number. 
23 See The Oxford English Dictionary, online ed., s.v. “seat” (entry dated 1989). 
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  Nor any of their houshold halfe so well. (13-6) 
Remarking the relative luxury in which Cavendish’s horses live, Jonson makes his desire for 
transformation the occasion for a self-deprecating comment about poets. Nevertheless, the 
admirable horse motivates a desire for transformation in ways that most other animals could not. 
It is difficult to imagine that a pigsty, for instance, could inspire the comical yet plausible envy 
that Jonson confesses at the sight of Cavendish’s stables. Furthermore, Jonson specifies that he 
desires transformation prior to his tour of Cavendish’s stables, so that he sustains a connection 
between admiration of horses themselves and the desire for transformation. Admiration of horses 
makes Sidney’s and Jonson’s desires for transformation seem understandable and plausible, 
unlike Gryll’s desire to be a pig, which seems contemptible and misguided. 
 Perceived proximity of human and horse motivates a similar treatment of human-horse 
transformations in an equestrian manual by Cavendish. Even though Cavendish does not imagine 
a human who desires transformation, the nearly human intelligence of horses propels Cavendish 
toward this hypothetical scenario: “If the wisest man in the world were put into the shape of a 
horse, and retained his superior understanding, he could not invent more cunning ways (I 
question if so many) to oppose his rider, than a horse does” (142). Cavendish offers a Homeric 
treatment of transformation, in which human form but not mind changes, but he does not use 
transformation to dramatize the discrepancy between human and animal intelligence. Instead, he 
claims that a true horse is indistinguishable from a transformed sage, except that a horse might 
be more capable than a sage of thwarting a human master. 
This view of the horse as a transformed sage recapitulates a theme from an earlier 
passage, which also dramatizes equine intelligence by placing “the wisest man in the world” in 
the horse’s position: “If the wisest man in the world were taken by a savage people, and put to 
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draw in a cart proportion’d to his strength, and if he were beated when he refused to do his duty, 
would not he draw just as a horse does when he is threaten’d?” (12). This passage presents the 
typical behavior of work horses as rational responses to their treatment; indeed, even “the wisest 
man in the world” would behave in the same way.  
When Cavendish recasts this theme by imagining a human-horse transformation, he 
offers an intensified dramatization of his belief that horse intelligence approximates human 
intelligence: “The horse being, after man, the most noble of all animals (for he is as much 
superior to all other creatures as man is to him, and therefore holds a sort of middle place 
between man and the rest of the creation) he is wise and subtile; for which reason man ought 
carefully to preserve his empire over him, knowing how nearly that wisdom and subtility 
approaches his own” (122). Although this statement estimates equine intelligence beneath human 
intelligence, unlike passages comparing horses favorably with “the wisest man in the world,” 
Cavendish’s view of the horse as the animal most similar to the human underlies his treatment of 
human-horse transformations, which has a reciprocal relationship with treatments by Sidney and 
Jonson. Whereas Cavendish’s human-horse transformation asserts that horses have human or 
possibly even super-human levels of intelligence, Sidney and Jonson’s desires to become horses 
emerge relatively understandably, in comparison with desires to be other types of animals, from 
the human-like status of horses. Cavendish inverts the logic linking admiration of horses with 
human-horse transformations in a way that shows why desires to be horses are relatively 
justifiable.  
 
Human and Houyhnhnm Forms 
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When Gulliver desires transformation into an equine, he is in distinguished literary and 
equestrian company. Gulliver’s desire for transformation differs from that of his predecessors, 
however, because Swift has extrapolated from conceptions of the horse as the noblest animal in 
order to create the houyhnhnms, a species of fully rational equines. Since the houyhnhnms have 
intellectual abilities that equal or possibly rival those of humans, Gulliver’s transformation into 
an equine would not necessarily entail crossing an ontological boundary between human and 
animal. Indeed, Gulliver’s affiliation of himself with the houyhnhnms enacts a version of 
colonial narratives of “going native” in which the non-Europeans have non-human shapes. 
Imagined in a context with rational non-humans, Gulliver’s thwarted desire for a non-human 
form functions to satirize assumptions about the human shape that have subtended earlier 
transformation narratives, especially the assumption that the human’s bipedal form expresses the 
human’s unique intellectual abilities. 
Gelli’s Circe provides an example of a treatment of the human shape as inseparable from 
the human’s supposedly unique mental or spiritual faculties. In the final dialogue, the 
philosopher Aglaphemus explains the significance of the human shape after giving thanks to the 
creator for his transformation from an elephant back into a human: “I begin to believe that this 
first cause, loving man above any of his other creatures, as his nobler posture sufficiently 
declares, will not bring him to the same end as the other animals, who have no share of 
understanding and so no knowledge at all of the first cause, as man has” (178). Aglaphemus not 
only distinguishes the human and animal forms by referring to the human’s “nobler posture” but 
also implies that the human’s bipedal form is inextricable from other points of human 
superiority: the human alone has “understanding” and “knowledge” of the creator. Indeed, 
Aglaphemus believes that the human’s bipedal form “declares” the superiority of the human: the 
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creator has given the human alone a bipedal form in order to show that he has endowed the 
human with special intellectual abilities. 
La Circe introduces the ontological distinction between bipedal human and quadrupedal 
animal at the beginning of the work and sustains it in the final dialogue in a way that seems to 
endorse Aglaphemus’s enthusiasm for the human shape. When Circe proposes to restore 
humanity to any of her victims whom Ulysses can persuade of human superiority, Ulysses asks, 
“But how shall I be able to know their minds, since as beasts they can neither understand my 
speech nor answer it?” (11). Circe acknowledges ontological differences between humans and 
animals when she responds that she will use magic to enable the animals to engage Ulysses in 
debate: “Never fear that, for I will restore to them their speech” (11). Ulysses then asks, “And 
shall they be able to discourse as rationally as they could do when they were men?” (11). Circe 
answers, “Yes, indeed, for as I changed them into beasts, so by my means they shall be restored 
to all the knowledge they had as real men” (11). Circe compares the magical act by which she 
restores her victims’ mental faculties to the original magical act by which she has transformed 
them into animals, as though the return of speech and reason might entail a second 
transformation. The speaking and reasoning animals do not, however, qualify as “real men”—
and not just because they lack the human shape. Although Circe promises to restore “all the 
knowledge” of her transformed victims, Aglaphemus tells Ulysses that he regains his 
“knowledge” of religion only upon his return to human form: “as soon as I became man again, I 
felt it spring in my mind, almost like a natural property” (178). As an alternative to a reading in 
which Circe duplicitously breaks her promise to give back “all the knowledge” of her victims, I 
argue that the separation of the religious capacity from the human’s bipedal form is 
inconceivable in the world of La Circe. 
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In my assertion that the fetishization of the human form is an important aspect of early 
modern anthropocentrism, I depart from the argument of Erica Fudge in her book Brutal 
Reasoning. According to Fudge, early modern Europeans believed in “a physically invisible 
difference between humans and animals”: recognizing anatomical similarities between humans 
and animals, they maintained that the rational soul distinguished the human. Although Fudge 
quotes a 1582 redaction of Platonic attitudes about the upright posture of the human, she 
dismisses arguments about the distinctively human shape because “even when the human 
physique was invoked to reiterate distinction this physical difference was always merely a sign 
of the other, more significant, mental division.”24 I suggest instead that the overvaluation of 
various properties of the human body—the treating of the human body’s characteristics, such as 
erect carriage, as signs of human intellectual superiority—constitutes a fetishization of form that 
is important to understanding the early modern period’s attitudes toward humans and animals in 
general and to interpreting Swift’s satire in particular. 
It is useful to locate this cultural phenomenon in relation to Locke’s Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding, which uses a hypothetical human-animal transformation in order to 
refute common prejudices about the human shape. Locke refers disapprovingly to the 
overestimation of the significance of the human form when he writes, “’Twill perhaps be said, 
that no Body thinks that the Shape makes any thing immortal, but ‘tis the Shape is the sign of a 
rational Soul within, which is immortal. I wonder who made it the sign of any such Thing.”25 
The subsequent paragraph introduces a transformation narrative to develop the argument: 
                                                
24 Erica Fudge, Brutal Reasoning: Animals, Rationality, and Humanity in Early Modern England 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 7-8. 
25 John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, 4th ed. (1700), ed. Peter H. 
Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), book 4, chapter 4, section 15, page 571. 
Subsequent citations appear in text. 
 
241 
To shew that according to the ordinary way of Reasoning in this Matter, People 
do lay the whole stress on the Figure, and resolve the whole Essence of the 
Species of Man (as they make it) into the outward Shape, how unreasonable 
soever it be, and how much soever they disown it, we need but trace their 
Thoughts and Practice a little farther, and then it will plainly appear. The well-
shaped Changeling is a Man, has a rational Soul, though it appear not; this is past 
doubt, say you. Make the Ears a little longer, and more pointed, and the Nose a 
little flatter than ordinary, and then you begin to boggle: Make the Face yet 
narrower, flatter, and longer, and then you are at a stand: Add still more and more 
of the likeness of a Brute to it, and let the Head be perfectly that of some other 
Animal, then presently ‘tis a Monster; and ‘tis demonstration with you, that it hath 
no rational Soul, and must be destroy’d. Where now (I ask) shall be the just 
measure; which the utmost Bounds of that Shape, that carries with it a rational 
Soul? (book 4, chapter 4, section 16, page 572). 
At the same time that Locke uses a transformation narrative to ridicule the idea of a 
correspondence between the human form and the capacity for reason, he does argue that the 
human form plays the crucial role in defining the human species: 
And whatever is talked of other definitions, ingenuous observation puts it past 
doubt, that the Idea in our Minds, of which the Sound Man in our Mouths is the 
Sign, is nothing else but of an Animal of such a certain Form: Since I think I may 
be confident, that whoever should see a Creature of his own Shape and Make, 
though it had no more reason all its Life, than a Cat or a Parrot, would call him 
still a Man; or whoever should hear a Cat or a Parrot discourse, reason, and 
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philosophize, would call or think it nothing but a Cat or a Parrot; and say, the one 
was a dull irrational Man, and the other a very intelligent rational Parrot” (book 
2, chapter 27, section 8, page 333). 
Locke claims that physical form trumps all other considerations in distinguishing species from 
one another: a human without reason remains a human; a philosophical animal remains an 
animal.26 In a later discussion of the human, Locke writes, “’tis the Shape, as the leading Quality, 
that seems more to determine that Species, than a Faculty of Reasoning, which appears not at 
first, and in some never” (book 3, chapter 11, section 20, page 519). Even though Locke 
attributes such importance to shape, he does not fetishize the human form, by my criteria, 
because he does not make the human shape symbolic of the mental faculties normally reserved 
for the human, as his transformation narrative makes clear. Dissociating reason and physical 
shape, Locke can imagine the existence of two categories of beings besides rational humans and 
irrational animals: irrational humans and rational animals. 
Swift’s houyhnhnms resemble Gelli’s transformed humans because they, too, possess 
animal bodies and human capacities for rational speech, but no magic is necessary to make the 
houyhnhnms speak or talk. While Gelli’s Circe must use magic to enable conversation between 
humans and animals, the houyhnhnms have their own language, which Gulliver learns through 
mundane strategies for language acquisition: “I pointed to every thing, and enquired the Name of 
                                                
26 Laura Brown also concludes that Locke defines the human solely by its proper shape in her 
reading, which focuses on the parrot. She writes, “‘Man’ acquires his identity as an animal ‘of a 
certain Form’ by means of his simultaneous separation from and identification with the rational 
parrot, whose possible proximity to man as an ‘intelligent rational’ being makes him the test case 
for human identity.” Fables of Modernity: Literature and Culture in the English Eighteenth 
Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 247. Brown supports this argument by 
analyzing an anecdote, related by Locke, in which a parrot engages in dialogue with a human. As 
Brown demonstrates, the parrot’s approach to human rationality leaves only the distinction of 
shape between the two species (247-9). For different conclusions about Locke’s definition of the 
human, see Armstrong, What Animals Mean in the Fiction of Modernity, 20. 
 
243 
it, which I wrote down in my Journal-Book when I was alone, and corrected my bad Accent, by 
desiring those of the Family to pronounce it often” (198). Indeed, Gulliver learns the language of 
the houyhnhnms just as he learns the language of the Lilliputians, Brobdingnagians, and other 
peoples that he encounters during his travels. 
Not only their language but also their characteristic concerns distinguish the houyhnhnms 
from horses, whom they physically resemble.27 In a study of talking animals in fables, Frank 
Palmeri identifies a genre of “anti-allegorical fables,” in which the talking animals are not 
merely figures for human beings: “they do not speak as human beings might in a comparable 
human situation; rather, they express what might be the moral judgments of the animals about 
their treatment by humans. The animals in these self-critical fables speak from the subject 
position of their species.”28 Unlike the animal speakers in these fables, the houyhnhnms do not 
verbalize the perspectives and experiences of horses, for the houyhnhnms have never heard of 
horses—or the Europeans who exploit them—before Gulliver’s arrival. Because the concerns 
and interests of the houyhnhnms are not those of horses, the houyhnhnms should not be regarded 
as talking animals, but as a species of rational beings with—in defiance of anthropocentric 
assumptions—equine forms.29 
                                                
27 R. S. Crane offers a critical precedent for distinguishing houyhnhnms from horses and yahoos 
from humans by treating the houyhnhnms and yahoos “as two concrete species of animals: 
existent species for Gulliver, hypothetical species for us.” “The Houyhnhnms, the Yahoos, and 
the History of Ideas,” 243. 
28 Frank Palmeri, “The Autocritique of Fables,” in Humans and Other Animals in Eighteenth-
Century British Culture: Representation, Hybridity, Ethics, ed. Frank Palmeri (Aldershot, 
England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 83-4. 
29 Compare my argument with that of Armstrong, who discusses the houyhnhnms’ “displacement 
of rationality from the human form” and concludes, “Gulliver’s fourth voyage is the satirist’s 
most extended disruption of the relationship between the human body and language as a marker 
of rational thought.” What Animals Mean in the Fiction of Modernity, 10, 20. Arguing that the 
houyhnhnms (and yahoos) defy contemporary human/animal distinctions, Armstrong writes, 
“They are something more like Locke’s ‘shape of an ass with reason’, which the philosopher 
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In addition to language, the houyhnhnms have an autonomous culture that resembles 
European culture in many ways. For instance, their social structure is organized hierarchically 
into relations of master and servant. As Gulliver observes when he admires the houyhnhnm 
master’s “great Civility” (196), the houyhnhnms also have customs of politeness. Keith Thomas 
has argued that early moderns regard “polite education, ‘civility’ and refinement” as important 
indices of the human’s superiority to the animal.30 Further underlining the similarity of 
houyhnhnms to humans, the houyhnhnms are governed by “a Representative Council of the 
whole Nation” that convenes at regular intervals (227). Thus, the houyhnhnms not only govern 
themselves but also relate to time in a planful way that, Fudge shows, early moderns associate 
exclusively with humans.31 Finally, the houyhnhnms have domesticated many of the same 
animals that Europeans keep, such as asses, dogs, cows, and cats (194, 228), though not—as 
previously noted—pigs (222). 
Swift may even have indicated that his rational equines have a human-like status in his 
name for the species. In the Norton edition of Gulliver’s Travels, Albert J. Rivero notes the 
resemblance of the words human and houyhnhnm even though he believes that houyhnhnms 
sounds like “whinnims.”32 Unconventionally but ingeniously, Armstrong offers an alternative 
pronunciation, one that “suggests the reversal” of human and horse: “‘Houyhnhnm,’ presumably, 
should be pronounced like the word ‘human’ (with the final consonants swapped).”33 Especially 
                                                                                                                                                       
insists must be considered ‘different from either that of man or beast . . . a species of an animal 
between, or distinct from both’” (10). 
30 Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: A History of the Modern Sensibility (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1983), 37, but see also 36-41. I discuss the topic of “civility” at several points 
in this chapter. Thomas’s context for it is relevant throughout. 
31 Fudge, Brutal Reasoning, 21-4. 
32 Albert J. Rivero, ed., Gulliver's Travels, by Jonathan Swift (New York: Norton, 2002), 192 n. 
5. 
33 Armstrong, What Animals Mean in the Fiction of Modernity, 8. 
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if Armstrong is correct, Swift has named his rational equines by altering the word human, as if to 
emphasize the challenge that the houyhnhnms pose to the contemporary concept of the human. 
Swift exposes European assumptions about the human form in Gulliver’s initial 
encounters with the houyhnhnms. In order to account for the behavior of these rational, horse-
like beings, Gulliver proposes two hypotheses, which he entertains in alternation. The first 
hypothesis concedes the human monopoly on reason but positions the houyhnhnms as animals 
who must have proportionately more intelligent human masters. The second hypothesis, which 
we have already encountered, proposes that the houyhnhnms are humans who have transformed 
themselves into horses by magic. While the first hypothesis credits the houyhnhnms with some 
intelligence, it still refuses to promote them to the status of the human because they lack the 
distinctively human form. The second hypothesis, meanwhile, resorts to magical explanations so 
that Gulliver can continue to fetishize the human form, even in the confrontation with non-
human beings who display all of the intellectual properties of the human. While both of the 
hypotheses attempt to salvage Gulliver’s belief in human superiority, Gulliver seems to prefer 
the second hypothesis—the hypothesis about transformation—in those moments when he feels 
most threatened by the similarity of the houyhnhnms to humans. 
Before he meets the houyhnhnms, Gulliver regards reason as an exclusive prerogative of 
the human form. Observing what appears to be a conference between two horses, Gulliver 
reports, “I was amazed to see such Actions and Behaviour in Brute Beasts, and concluded with 
myself, that if the Inhabitants of this Country were endued with a proportionable Degree of 
Reason, they must needs be the wisest People upon Earth” (191). Because of their equine shape, 
Gulliver initially assumes that the houyhnhnms are normal horses, whom he classifies among the 
“Brute Beasts.” Commonly applied to animals as early as 1475 and as late as 1849, “brute” 
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means “Wanting in reason or understanding.”34 Whether or not that adjective accurately 
describes horses or other animals, it certainly cannot apply to the houyhnhnms, as their “Actions 
and Behaviour” demonstrate to Gulliver. Gulliver therefore decides to credit the houyhnhnms 
with a small amount of reason, but only so that he does not have to promote the houyhnhnms, 
who seem rational, to the human’s place—so that he can continue to suppose that the hierarchical 
relationship of human over horse that exists in England also prevails on the island. Despite their 
seemingly rational behavior, Gulliver refuses to acknowledge the houyhnhnms as “the 
Inhabitants of this Country.” He reserves the dignity of that phrase for a human population 
which, he imagines, must surpass the houyhnhnms in intelligence to the same degree that English 
humans surpass horses.35 
As the houyhnhnms inspect and discuss Gulliver, he begins to suspect that they possess 
more than the modicum of reason with which he has credited them. In fact, their “various 
Gestures, not unlike those of a Philosopher” (191), provide evidence of intelligence comparable 
to that of not just any human being but specifically the “Philosopher,” the figure who represents 
the unique potential of human intellect in transformation narratives including Gelli’s Circe, 
where the only creature to return to human form is a philosopher (157). Gulliver’s previous 
hypothesis, which metes out reason to humans and animals in “a proportionable Degree,” seems 
                                                
34 The Oxford English Dictionary, online ed., s.v. “brute” (entry dated 1989). 
35 Gulliver’s encounter with the houyhnhnms poses a crisis in terminology similar to one that 
would ensue, Mary Midgley imagines, upon the discovery of aliens. Considering the semantic 
territory covered by person, Midgley writes, “How complete is its link with the human bodily 
form? What, for instance, about intelligent alien beings? Could we call them persons? If not, then 
contact with them—which is certainly conceivable—would surely require us to coin a new word 
to do the quite subtle moral job which is done at present by ‘person.’” Slightly later, she notes, 
“C. S. Lewis, describing a planet where there are three distinct rational species, has them use the 
word hnau for the condition which they all share.” Utopias, Dolphins, and Computers: Problems 
in Philosophical Plumbing (London; New York: Routledge, 1996), 111. Gulliver displays 
similarly anthropocentric prejudices in his resistance to recognizing the houyhnhnms as the 
island’s “Inhabitants” or as “a People” (see below). 
 
247 
inadequate to account for the fully fledged reason that the houyhnhnms display. 
Judging from Locke’s already cited remarks about parrots and cats, he would simply 
regard the houyhnhnms as philosophical horses. Gulliver, in contrast, refuses to dissociate reason 
from the human form. Instead, he reasserts the human monopoly on reason by regarding the 
houyhnhnms as humans who have transformed themselves into horses. Gulliver explains, “Upon 
the whole, the Behaviour of these Animals was so orderly and rational, so acute and judicious, 
that I at last concluded, they must needs be Magicians, who had thus metamorphosed themselves 
upon some design” (191). Gulliver has already witnessed magic in Glubbdubdrib, so magical 
explanations have some plausibility within Gulliver’s Travels. Nevertheless, Gulliver resorts to a 
magical explanation so that he need not attribute a human capacity for reason to beings that look 
like mere “Animals.” According to the transformation hypothesis, the houyhnhnms are humans: 
they are not equine beings with human-like intelligence but human beings with magical 
disguises. The hypothesis thus upholds human superiority to animals. 
The houyhnhnms decide to take Gulliver to an aristocratic household, and in spite of 
mounting evidence of the houyhnhnms’ rationality, Gulliver vacillates between his original 
hypotheses. As he approaches the houyhnhnm habitation, Gulliver says that he “began to be a 
little comforted, and took out some Toys, which Travellers usually carry for Presents to the 
Savage Indians of America and other parts, in hopes the People of the House would be thereby 
encouraged to receive me kindly” (193). Not believing that beings shaped like horses can build 
houses, Gulliver expects to meet “the People of the House,” the human beings whom the horses 
serve. Invoking narratives about encounters between European explorers and non-European 
peoples, Gulliver prepares—quite deliberately—to play the role assigned to him by these 
narratives. His prejudices about the houyhnhnms’ shape blind him to the fact that he has already 
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encountered the natives of the island. His belief that humans are superior to animals and his 
conception of the horse as a domesticated animal make him expect that equines, regardless of 
their intelligence, must necessarily have human masters. 
When Gulliver enters the house and observes houyhnhnms “employed in domestick 
Business” (193), he returns even more explicitly to his first hypothesis. Gulliver remarks, “They 
seemed but ordinary Cattle, however this confirmed my first Opinion, that a People who could so 
far civilize brute Animals, must needs excel in Wisdom all the Nations of the World” (193). 
Although the houyhnhnms perform household tasks that only humans perform in England, their 
physical resemblance to “ordinary Cattle,” to the domesticated horses of England, convinces 
Gulliver that the houyhnhnms must have human masters. When Gulliver sees the houyhnhnms in 
the place of humans, he does not acknowledge their mental capacities as equal to those of 
humans. Instead, Gulliver regards the houyhnhnms as “brute Animals” whose remarkable 
behavior testifies less to their own intellectual capacities than to the admirable “Wisdom” of the 
“People” who have trained them. Gulliver does not perceive the houyhnhnms as his intellectual 
equals, either: even if they possess some reason, the houyhnhnms remain inferior to both 
Englishmen and the conjectural humans of the island. 
Even so, Gulliver becomes increasingly troubled by the prospect of horses that perform 
all of the functions of human servants. He confesses, “that a Man of Quality should be served all 
by Horses, was beyond my Comprehension” (194). What is even further beyond Gulliver’s 
comprehension is that equine beings might be worthy of recognition as “a People”—that the 
houyhnhnms have reason and a civilization of their own in which they figure as the men, even 
the men “Of Quality.” So that he need not recognize non-human beings as “a People,” Gulliver 
once again invokes a magical explanation: “I then absolutely concluded, that all these 
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Appearances could be nothing else but Necromancy and Magick” (194). Gulliver does not 
explicitly mention transformation here, but he clearly suspects that some type of magical deceit 
accounts for the incongruity between the houyhnhnms’ equine forms and their human-like 
rationality. In fact, Gulliver fails to acknowledge houyhnhnm rationality because of a magical act 
of his own: the investment of the human shape with a phantasmatic symbolic value. 
In none of his previous voyages has Gulliver doubted the rationality of the peoples that 
he has met because they have all possessed recognizably human forms, despite any physical 
differences from Gulliver, such as differences in size. Making this point explicit, Gulliver 
eventually tells the houyhnhnm master that his “Ship was made by Creatures like myself, who in 
all the Countries I had travelled, as well as in my own, were the only governing, rational 
Animals” (202). When Gulliver reflects on the relativity of size in the account of his visit to 
Brobdingnag, where the inhabitants are twelve times larger than him, the human form constitutes 
the unacknowledged ground for Gulliver’s comparisons of Lilliputians, Europeans, and 
Brobdingnagians: “It might have pleased Fortune to let the Lilliputians find some Nation, where 
the People were as diminutive with respect to them, as they were to me. And who knows but that 
even this prodigious Race of Mortals might be equally overmatched in some distant part of the 
World, whereof we have yet no Discovery?” (73). As he extrapolates from his experiences in 
Lilliput and Brobdingnag, Gulliver draws a series of analogies in which Lilliputian, 
Brobdingnagian and European exchange positions. Gulliver is a Lilliputian to the 
Brobdingnagians but a Brobdingnagian to the Lilliputians. If a conjectural “People” of 
proportionately smaller size than the Lilliputians and proportionately larger size than the 
Brobdingnagians exist, then the Lilliputians are Brobdingnagians from the perspective of the 
smaller people just as the Brobdingnagians are Lilliputians from the perspective of the larger 
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people. 
Gulliver could extrapolate even further, but the important point is that what enables the 
series of substitutions is the human form shared by Lilliputian, Englishman, and Brobdingnagian, 
regardless of size.36 Gulliver does not privilege any one perspective—the European perspective, 
for example—as the standard from which the others deviate. To Gulliver, the Lilliputians may be 
small humans and the Brobdingnagians may be large humans, but Gulliver is the small human to 
the Brobdingnagians and the large human to the Lilliputians. No one group of people—
Lilliputian, Brobdingnagian, or English—defines the size proper to the human. 
Gulliver’s encounter in the fourth voyage with a species of rational non-humans 
illuminates the role that the human form has played throughout the first three voyages: it has 
trumped all differences among the foreign peoples that Gulliver has encountered, such as 
differences in size, and has made them all recognizable to Gulliver as human. I would go so far 
as to suggest that Swift has organized Gulliver’s voyages deliberately so that the Travels 
culminates with the exposition of the fetishization of the human form in Gulliver’s initial 
hypotheses about the houyhnhnms. In this sense, part 4 is central to the meaning of Gulliver’s 
Travels. 
The houyhnhnms, moreover, turn out to have beliefs about themselves that invert the 
biped/quadruped binary: that is, they fetishize the equine form. Therefore, Gulliver and the 
houyhnhnms pose reciprocal dilemmas to one another.37 In the encounter between human and 
                                                
36 For a different view of a Brobdingnagian as a “nonhuman giant,” see Lamb, “Gulliver and the 
Lives of Animals,” 170. 
37 My claim about the reciprocal perspectives of humans and houyhnhnms is consistent with the 
observations of several other critics. Crane writes, “The world of animals in Houyhnhnmland, in 
other words, is divided by the same basic differences as the world of animals in Europe. Only, of 
course [...] it is a world in which the normal distribution of species between ‘rational creatures’ 
and irrational ‘brutes’ is sharply inverted, with horses [...] in the natural place of men, and man-
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houyhnhnm, there is an opportunity for Gulliver and the houyhnhnms to debunk prejudices about 
bipedal and quadrupedal forms in their respective cultures: just as Lilliputian, European, nor 
Brobdingnagian defines the size proper to the human, neither human nor houyhnhnm defines the 
shape proper to a rational being. Gulliver, however, adopts the perspective of the houyhnhnms 
and even desires an equine form to match his new perspective, in spite of the discovery that 
reason does not depend upon possessing a human or equine form. By having Gulliver enact a 
thwarted version of narratives about Gryllus figures who desire non-human shapes while making 
Gulliver’s desire emerge from admiration of another rational being, Swift intensifies his satire of 
beliefs in symbolic correspondence between physical form and spiritual or intellectual qualities. 
Gulliver provides a glimpse of the houyhnhnms’ self-conception when he defines their 
name for themselves. Gulliver explains, “The word Houyhnhnm, in their Tongue, signifies a 
Horse, and in its Etymology, the Perfection of Nature.” (199). When Gulliver translates 
“houyhnhnm” as “horse,” he suggests that the houyhnhnms define themselves by their 
characteristic shape, just as Locke defines the human as “an Animal of such a certain Form.” 
Furthermore, just as Locke finds the resemblance of the human to the ape too insignificant to 
qualify them as one species—as Brown argues, Locke’s definition of the human “assumes a 
                                                                                                                                                       
like creatures [...] in the natural place of horses.” “The Houyhnhnms, the Yahoos, and the 
History of Ideas,” 244. Richard Nash writes, “the Houyhnhnms clearly try to frame him 
[Gulliver] in their own system of natural philosophy, only to be troubled by this quality [his 
rationality]. For in Houyhnhnm natural philosophy, the Yahoo is not so much an ape or orang-
outang, but is instead a ‘nonhorse.’” Wild Enlightenment: The Borders of Human Identity in the 
Eighteenth Century (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2003), 110. Armstrong writes, 
“From the Houyhnhnm point of view, Gulliver’s ability to speak signifies only a partial and 
subordinate rationality, precisely because it is inappropriately separated from its natural—that is, 
equine—bodily form.” What Animals Mean in the Fiction of Modernity, 20. Armstrong argues 
that Gulliver occupies the same problematic position for the houyhnhnms that the parrot 
occupies for Europeans (20-1). 
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separation between man and ape”38—so the houyhnhnms distinguish themselves from another 
equine, the ass, even though the physical resemblance of the two species presumably accounts 
for one houyhnhnm’s admiration of the ass as “a comely Animal” (229).39 
The houyhnhnms do not, however, regard their possession of both an equine form and 
rationality as a mere coincidence. Fancying themselves “the Perfection of Nature,” the 
houyhnhnms believe that there is some special connection between their bodily form and their 
capacity for reason. Their fetishization of the equine form becomes especially obvious in their 
interactions with Gulliver. Gulliver records the houyhnhnm master’s reaction to the news that 
humans dominate equines in Europe:  
He said, if it were possible there could be any Country where Yahoos alone were 
endued with Reason, they certainly must be the governing Animal, because 
Reason will in Time always prevail against Brutal Strength. But, considering the 
Frame of our Bodies, and especially of mine, he thought no Creature of equal 
Bulk was so ill contrived, for employing that Reason in the common Offices of 
Life. (204) 
Initially, the houyhnhnm master seems willing to admit that reason could manifest itself in a 
human form just as well as an equine one. The very fact that he can consider “Reason” as an 
abstraction, as he does when he figures the relationship between Europeans and horses as a 
contest between “Reason” and “Brutal Strength,” suggests that the houyhnhnm master may not 
fetishize form. Ultimately, however, the houyhnhnm master claims that the human form does not 
befit a rational mind. He does not merely find fault with humans for lacking the physical strength 
                                                
38 Brown, Fables of Modernity, 246. 
39 It is interesting that human natural historians, in contrast, regard other anthropoids as ugly (e.g. 
Topsell, Historie of Foure-Footed Beastes, 4). 
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to carry out the dictates of reason, for he objects to the human’s “Bulk” less than to the fact that 
it is “ill contrived.” The description is vague, but something about the arrangement of Gulliver’s 
body makes it difficult for the houyhnhnm master to imagine it as a habitation for reason. 
A plausible referent for the phrase “ill contrived” is Gulliver’s bipedal form, which 
differentiates Gulliver not only from the houyhnhnms but also from the yahoos, to whom the 
houyhnhnms and Gulliver often compare humans. According to Gulliver, the houyhnhnm master 
includes his bipedal form in a list of Gulliver’s other physical faults: 
it was manifest I had neither the Strength or Agility of a common Yahoo, that I 
walked infirmly on my hinder Feet, had found out a Contrivance to make my 
Claws of no Use or Defence, and to remove the Hair from my Chin, which was 
intended as a shelter from the Sun and the Weather. Lastly, that I could neither 
run with Speed, nor climb Trees like my Brethren (as he called them) the Yahoos 
in this Country. (219) 
Betraying a quadrupedal bias, the houyhnhnm master describes Gulliver’s only two feet as 
“hinder Feet.” Since he regards Gulliver’s manner of walking as precarious or even sickly, it 
seems likely that Gulliver’s bipedal posture accounts, to a large extent, for the houyhnhnm 
master’s doubts that beings like Gulliver can possess reason. In this respect, the houyhnhnm 
master contradicts early modern perspectives conflating human rationality and bipedal form. 
When the houyhnhnm master first discovers that Gulliver wears clothes, he claims to be 
less interested in Gulliver’s physical form than in his intellectual capabilities. Gulliver relates the 
houyhnhnm master’s sentiments: “he was more astonished at my Capacity for Speech and 
Reason, that at the Figure of my Body, whether it were covered or no” (201). While the 
houyhnhnm master’s indifference to Gulliver’s body might seem to contradict the argument that 
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the houyhnhnms fetishize form, the houyhnhnm master’s surprise at Gulliver’s “Capacity for 
Speech and Reason” depends upon equine-centered prejudices.40 According to the houyhnhnms, 
Gulliver should be “a brute Animal” (198) because he lacks a houyhnhnm’s characteristic form, 
which is supposed to be a symbolic expression of houyhnhnm mental capabilities. Even if the 
houyhnhnm master claims indifference to Gulliver’s body, his surprise at Gulliver’s displays of 
reason betrays his fetishization of the equine form. 
In the encounter between Gulliver and the houyhnhnms, there is an opportunity for 
European and houyhnhnm to reconceptualize themselves and their relation to animals. In 
particular, both Gulliver and the houyhnhnms should find it difficult to continue to fetishize their 
own forms after meeting each other. In an early conversation between Gulliver and his 
houyhnhnm master, it seems possible that both parties will recognize the limitations of their own 
perspectives. When the houyhnhnm master questions Gulliver about his boat, Gulliver’s answer 
compares the houyhnhnm perspective on yahoos with the human perspective on horses without 
privileging either perspective: 
I went on by assuring him, that the Ship was made by Creatures like myself, who 
in all the Countries I had travelled, as well as in my own, were the only 
governing, rational Animals; and that upon my Arrival hither, I was as much 
astonished to see the Houyhnhnms act like rational Beings, as he or his Friends 
could be in finding some Marks of Reason in a Creature he was pleased to call a 
Yahoo, to which I owned my Resemblance in every Part, but could not account 
for their degenerate and brutal Nature. (202) 
                                                
40 Armstrong offers a similar reading: “From the Houyhnhnm point of view Gulliver’s ability to 
speak signifies only a partial and subordinate rationality, precisely because it is inappropriately 
separated from its natural—that is, equine—bodily form.” What Animals Mean in the Fiction of 
Modernity, 20. 
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The perspectives of the houyhnhnms and of Gulliver appear not equally valid but equally flawed; 
for just as the houyhnhnm defies easy categorization as human or horse for Gulliver, so Gulliver 
defies easy categorization as houyhnhnm or yahoo for the houyhnhnms. To account for the 
anomaly posed by the houyhnhnms, who “act like Rational Beings” in spite of their equine 
shape, Gulliver would have to de-fetishize the human form. To resolve the reciprocal dilemma 
posed by Gulliver, who displays “Marks of Reason” in spite of his self-confessed “Resemblance” 
to a yahoo, the houyhnhnms would have to de-fetishize the houyhnhnm form. With the new 
recognition that the world includes not just humans and horses or houyhnhnms and yahoos but 
all four species, Gulliver and the houyhnhnms should no longer be able to believe that their 
respective forms represent their rationality. 
 The houyhnhnms, however, ultimately assimilate Gulliver to the yahoo category; as the 
houyhnhnm master explains, the houyhnhnm government even bases their decision to exile 
Gulliver on their construction of Gulliver as a yahoo: “the Representatives had taken Offence at 
his keeping a Yahoo (meaning myself) in his Family more like a Houyhnhnm, than a Brute 
Animal” (235). Gulliver, meanwhile, does overcome his anthropocentric perspective—but only 
to adopt the analogous species-centered prejudices of the houyhnhnms. Providing a parenthetical 
explanation of the word “Yahoo,” Gulliver seems to imply that the houyhnhnm council has made 
a mistake about his identity; however, he subsequently appears to have adopted the houyhnhnms’ 
perspective to such an extent that he agrees with their identification of him as a yahoo and with 
their decision to banish him: “I knew too well upon what solid Reasons all the Determinations of 
the wise Houyhnhnms were founded, not to be shaken by Arguments of mine, a miserable 
Yahoo” (236). 
Wishing for transformation into a houyhnhnm, Gulliver rejects his former view of the 
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bipedal form in favor of the houyhnhnm view of the quadrupedal form, in spite of the fact that 
both views have been invalidated by the encounter of human and houyhnhnm.41 Gulliver 
functions as an ironic Gryllus figure because he believes that he, no less than earlier figures who 
desire to be animals, requires transformation when he is already ontologically similar to a 
houyhnhnm. 
 
Gulliver’s Incompletely Forgotten Humanity 
 
 Gulliver relates that he has begun to affiliate himself with the houyhnhnms not long 
before he recounts his exile from Houyhnhnmland, as though Swift intends to test the 
implications of Gulliver’s identification with equines by sending him back to his human 
community. Even though Gulliver does not receive the transformation that he desires, he 
displays a version of the forgetting of humanity that characterizes earlier Gryllus-like figures.  
For instance, in Spenser’s Faerie Queene, Guyon condemns Gryll: 
See the mind of beastly man, 
That hath so soone forgot the excellence 
Of his creation, when he life began, 
That now he chooseth, with vile difference, 
To be a beast, and lacke intelligence.42 
As Gulliver takes a houyhnhnm-like perspective on his fellow Europeans, he similarly seems to 
                                                
41 As Richard Nash observes, “One of the ironies of book 4 hinges on the ease with which 
Gulliver is taught (more accurately, trained) by Houyhnhnms, while the Houyhnhnms 
themselves remain stubbornly resistant to learning from Gulliver anything that contradicts what 
they already ‘know.’” Wild Enlightenment, 110. Nash cites Gulliver’s eventual self-identification 
as a yahoo as a local example of this general trend (115). 
42 Spenser, The Faerie Queene, book 2, canto 12, stanza 87, lines 1-5. 
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have forgotten his human past, especially his European education. Gulliver’s forgetting of 
humanity is ironic, however, because his attempts to affiliate himself with the houyhnhnms 
betray signs that Gulliver simultaneously recalls his human past, often in ways that motivate 
more intense disavowals of his human identity and community. In this way, contextualizing 
Gulliver within the tradition of transformation narratives about humans who prefer to be animals 
generates a new reading of Gulliver’s disturbing alienation from other humans at the end of his 
travelogue. While earlier Gryllus figures become animals and seem to forget their humanity, 
Gulliver’s frustrated desire for transformation manifests itself in claims to have forgotten 
humanity that paradoxically rely on memories of Gulliver’s human past, often because of details 
that Gulliver seeks to suppress. These paradoxical claims sustain Swift’s satire of the idea, on 
which Gulliver remains fixated, that physical form and reason have a symbolic correspondence. 
Gulliver’s meeting with Captain Pedro de Mendez and his crew, Gulliver’s first 
encounter with Europeans after his departure from Houyhnhnmland, serves as an instructive 
example of Swift’s dramatization of logical inconsistencies in Gulliver’s attempt to maintain the 
houyhnhnm perspective, especially because the scene parallels Gulliver’s initial encounter with 
the houyhnhnms, when anthropocentric prejudices have prevented him from recognizing the 
houyhnhnms as human-like beings. Just as the sight of equines in conversation has once 
surprised Gulliver because of his belief in the irrationality of all non-human animals, he now 
marvels at the prospect of conversation among humans: “When they began to talk, I thought I 
never heard or saw any thing so unnatural; for it appeared to me as monstrous as if a Dog or a 
Cow should speak in England, or a Yahoo in Houyhnhnm-land” (241). Likewise, Gulliver has 
admired the “great Civility” (196) that the houyhnhnm master shows to a dinner guest. Now, 
when Captain Pedro de Mendez offers Gulliver a meal in his cabin, Gulliver “wondered to find 
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such Civilities from a Yahoo” (241). Finally, just as Gulliver has once credited the houyhnhnms 
with only a small degree of reason, the captain’s example now causes Gulliver to modify his 
houyhnhnm-derived belief that all creatures other than houyhnhnms are irrational: he “spoke so 
very movingly, that at last I descended to treat him like an Animal which has some little portion 
of Reason” (242). In each of these three instances, Gulliver regards fellow Europeans in the same 
way that he has initially regarded the houyhnhnms.  
Of course, an obvious fact prevents Gulliver’s houyhnhnm-centered perspective from 
corresponding exactly to its homologous human-centered equivalent. When Gulliver first arrives 
on the island, his expectations about equine behavior derive entirely from his knowledge of 
horses. Even though those expectations betray anthropocentric prejudices, Gulliver at least has 
the excuse that he has never previously encountered the houyhnhnms and so has never 
confronted such a startling contradiction to his anthropocentric beliefs about the differences 
between bipeds and quadrupeds. Gulliver could not excuse his surprise at the behavior of the 
Europeans at the end of part 4 in the same way: when he turns his newly adopted, houyhnhnm-
centered gaze upon Don Pedro and his crew, he has intimate knowledge of the European 
community as one of its former members. 
Swift emphasizes this discrepancy. For instance, while Gulliver claims to feel the same 
surprise at the conversation among Don Pedro and his crew that he has felt at a conversation 
among houyhnhnms, Gulliver already knows Portuguese. In fact, Gulliver remarks, “I 
understood that Language very well” (240). When Gulliver first hears a houyhnhnm speak, he 
can plausibly claim to doubt whether the houyhnhnm is making sounds typical of horses or 
“speaking to himself in some Language of his own” (190). As a fluent speaker of Portuguese, 
though, Gulliver already knows, prior to his encounter with Don Pedro’s ship, that the 
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Portuguese are capable of language. He can only feel surprise at the conversation among Don 
Pedro and his crew if he suppresses his memories of Europe, but Swift dramatizes the fact that 
Gulliver remembers his European past by having him boast about his command of Portuguese.  
 Swift creates a similar paradox by having Gulliver introduce himself to the Portuguese 
sailors as “a poor Yahoo, banished from the Houyhnhnms” (240). Even if Gulliver has come to 
think of himself as a yahoo, he must know that the words “yahoo” and “houyhnhnm” have no 
significance in Portuguese. By identifying himself in the houyhnhnms’ terms, Gulliver not only 
expects the Portuguese to be familiar with the houyhnhnm language but also seems to forget the 
European conceptual categories that he supplants by using the houyhnhnms’ terms. He seems 
less interested in making himself intelligible to the Portuguese than in taking the perspective of a 
houyhnhnm. Despite having once held European beliefs about equines and humans himself, 
Gulliver acts as though he is ignorant of the European perspective and of the inscrutability of the 
terms “houyhnhnm” and “yahoo” to his audience. At the same time, and with the exception of 
these two terms, Gulliver speaks to the sailors in Portuguese, a language that he has learned 
during his former life as a member of the European community.  
 Gulliver’s fluency in Portuguese signals that he has not forgotten his homeland and his 
former European perspective as entirely as he claims, and so does his choice of creatures with 
which to compare the Portuguese. According to Gulliver, the conversation with the Portuguese 
“appeared to me as monstrous as if a Dog or a Cow should speak in England, or a Yahoo in 
Houyhnhnm-land” (241). Gulliver has chosen the dog and the cow as examples of English 
creatures that do not speak, but Houyhnhnmland has dogs and cows that do not speak either 
(194). The only animals that speak in Houyhnhnmland but not anywhere else are equines. If 
Gulliver wants to contrast England and Houyhnhnmland, as his sentence construction suggests, 
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then he should choose the horse as his example of an animal from England. The fact that 
Gulliver does not choose the horse, the seemingly inevitable example, once again dramatizes the 
way that the memory of his former perspective, which Gulliver tries to suppress, interferes with 
the integrity of his current perspective. He knows from firsthand experience, as the houyhnhnms 
themselves do not, that horses differ quite remarkably from houyhnhnms, but now Gulliver so 
fervently desires to resemble the houyhnhnms that he suppresses the most shocking difference 
between Houyhnhnmland and England: the difference in the linguistic capabilities of their 
equines, which has shocked Gulliver himself upon his arrival in Houyhnhnmland.  
 Other ways in which Gulliver replays his first encounter with the houyhnhnms in his 
meeting with Don Pedro and his crew also betray an implausible forgetting. Gulliver has never 
seen equines invite their friends to dinner, so the houyhnhnms’ politeness surprises him in a way 
that Don Pedro’s should not. Gulliver has presumably shared many meals with Europeans; 
therefore, he has already participated in the meal-time “Civilities” (241) at which he now claims 
to marvel.  
Finally, when Gulliver credits Don Pedro with “some little portion of Reason” (242), he 
recapitulates a hypothesis that he has originally made about the houyhnhnms, the hypothesis that 
unusually intelligent equines must have human masters of proportionally greater intelligence. To 
apply this hypothesis to Don Pedro, though, Gulliver has to suppress the memory of his self-
conception as a European. He has to forget the perspective from which the behavior of the 
houyhnhnms once seemed so surprising and from which Don Pedro’s behavior would appear 
unremarkable. Gulliver’s explanation for Don Pedro’s deviation from typical yahoo behavior 
closely resembles his first explanation for the houyhnhnms’ deviation from typical horse 
behavior, but the hypothesis becomes more problematic in its application to Don Pedro because 
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Gulliver seems to forget the perspective that generated the original hypothesis. If he has 
fetishized the human form out of ignorance, he now fetishizes the equine form without this 
excuse. In all of these ways, Gulliver displays an incomplete or frustrated forgetting of his 
European past. 
Similar contradictions inhere in Gulliver’s description of the reunion with his family. 
Gulliver writes, “I must freely confess the sight of them filled me only with Hatred, Disgust and 
Contempt, and the more by reflecting on the near Alliance I had to them” (244). Gulliver’s 
feelings of “Hatred, Disgust, and Contempt” for humans resemble the feelings that yahoos excite 
for the houyhnhnm master, who remarks that the yahoos have a “strange Disposition to Nastiness 
and Dirt, whereas there appears to be a natural Love of Cleanliness in all other Animals” (222). 
Gulliver likens himself to the houyhnhnms by equating humans with yahoos and reviling both 
species, but his expression of emotion also betrays his ineradicable difference from the 
houyhnhnms: he hates humans “more” than the houyhnhnms can because of his “near Alliance” 
with them. At the same time that Gulliver imitates, even surpasses, the houyhnhnms in hatred of 
yahoos and humans, his excess emotion betrays the memory of his affiliation with humans.  
Similarly, Gulliver relates, “As soon as I entered the House, my Wife took me in her 
Arms, and kissed me, at which having not been used to the Touch of that odious Animal for so 
many Years, I fell in a Swoon for almost an Hour” (244). Gulliver’s faint seems to signal that he 
feels an involuntary revulsion for humans, a revulsion at least as authentic as that of the 
houyhnhnms. He accounts for the traumatic impact of his wife’s embrace, however, by 
explaining that he is no longer accustomed to physical contact with her. That explanation betrays 
the fact that Gulliver has memories of his wife that should enable him to view her as something 
other than an “odious Animal.” He may claim, “when I began to consider, that by copulating 
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with one of the Yahoo-Species I had become a Parent of more, it struck me with the utmost 
Shame, Confusion and Horror” (244); but this expression of regret is also a reminder of a former 
perspective from which fathering children seemed desirable. 
After recounting his fainting spell, Gulliver explains that he has continued to abhor 
humans over the five years that have passed since his reunion with his family: “During the first 
Year I could not endure my Wife or Children in my Presence, the very Smell of them was 
intolerable, much less could I suffer them to eat in the same Room. To this hour they dare not 
presume to touch my Bread, or drink out of the same Cup, neither was I ever able to let one of 
them take me by the Hand” (244). In his initial encounters with the houyhnhnms and in his 
meeting with Don Pedro, meals have afforded Gulliver with opportunities to observe the 
“Civility” of beings that he regards as irrational. While meal-time civilities have thus far been 
occasions for acknowledging the rationality of others, Gulliver claims to experience his most 
intense revulsion for his family during meals. Even once he allows his wife to join him at the 
dinner table, he must take the following protective measure: “the smell of a Yahoo continuing 
very offensive, I always keep my Nose well stopt with Rue, Lavender, or Tobacco-leaves” (249). 
During the meal, Gulliver neither notes the civility of his human companion nor displays the 
civility that he has admired in the houyhnhnms or Don Pedro. He claims that he has not been 
“able to let” a family member hold his hand, as though he has attempted to overcome his 
revulsion for humans but has nevertheless continued to perceive his family from the houyhnhnm 
perspective. At the same time, Gulliver fails to recognize that he behaves with less civility than 
his wife, whom he reviles as an irrational yahoo, even though he has taken civility as a sign of 
rationality in the past. While his houyhnhnm-like revulsion for humans has proved to be 
enduring, Gulliver’s refusal to re-evaluate his wife’s rationality is surprising, not only because of 
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his memory of her but also because of his quite different reflections on the behaviors of 
houyhnhnms and humans at prior meals. 
Gulliver claims to hope that he will overcome his aversion to humans, but even that claim 
is undermined by his unsuccessful attempt to suppress the memory of his human past. He writes, 
“although it be hard for a Man late in life to remove old Habits, I am not altogether out of Hopes 
in some time to suffer a Neighbour Yahoo in my Company without the Apprehensions I am yet 
under of his Teeth or his Claws” (249). Gulliver intends this statement to indicate that his 
aversion to yahoos is involuntary and irresistible: he has “Hopes” of overcoming the fear of 
yahoos, but in spite of his efforts, he remains unable to feel comfortable or even safe in their 
presence. He explains the recalcitrance of his fears by invoking commonplaces about the 
difficulty of changing “old Habits,” especially at an old age. When Gulliver makes this claim at 
the age of approximately 60, he has feared yahoos for less than ten years.43 Compared with the 
amount of time that Gulliver has thought of himself as a human and prided himself on his 
humanity, his aversion is a new rather than an old habit. Furthermore, even if this aversion does 
qualify as a somewhat old habit, he has acquired it in his early fifties—at an age not much 
younger than the age at which he now claims to be unable to alter it. If Gulliver can alter his 
perspective as radically as he supposedly has in Houyhnhnmland, then he could presumably alter 
his attitudes and behaviors again. As much as he might like to conceal the recent date of the 
change in his perspective, Gulliver cannot forget the long years during which he has held human-
centered rather than houyhnhnm-centered views. Gulliver’s enduring memories of humanity 
belie his attempts to adopt the houyhnhnm perspective. 
                                                
43 Based on Gulliver’s account of his life in the opening pages of his travelogue, he seems to be 
about 38 when he begins his first voyage in 1699 (15-6). His fourth voyage begins in 1710 and 
ends in 1715, and he writes his account five years later (187, 244), which brings him to the age 
of approximately 59. 
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Spenser’s Gryll receives an animal form to correspond with the forgetting of his 
humanity: “Let Gryll be Gryll, and haue his hoggish minde,” is the Palmer’s verdict.44 In 
contrast, Gulliver can neither forget his humanity nor receive the change of form that he desires. 
Indeed, an analysis of Gulliver’s desire for an equine form demonstrates that it is riven by the 
same contradictions as the other aspects of his newly adopted houyhnhnm-centered perspective. 
Gulliver writes: 
By conversing with the Houyhnhnms, and looking upon them with Delight, I fell 
to imitate their Gate and Gesture, which is now grown into an Habit, and my 
Friends often tell me in a blunt way, that I trot like a Horse; which, however, I 
take for a great Compliment: Neither shall I disown, that in Speaking I am apt to 
fall into the Voice and manner of the Houyhnhnms, and hear myself ridiculed on 
that account without the least Mortification. (235) 
According to Gulliver, his characteristically equine manners of moving and speaking have 
originated in his admiration of the houyhnhnms, and they signify his proximity to the 
houyhnhnms. Gulliver’s use of the verb “to fall to” indicates that he has acquired his new 
mannerisms by accident, but he clearly prides himself on his resemblance to equines. Having re-
made his bipedal human body on the houyhnhnm model, Gulliver maximizes the correspondence 
between his identification with the houyhnhnms and his physical form even though he never 
transforms into an equine. 
 As Gulliver knows, however, his equine behaviors have a different significance for the 
members of his European community. As Thomas notes, injunctions against animal-like 
behaviors appear frequently in early modern conduct manuals, such as the important De civilitate 
                                                
44 Spenser, The Faerie Queene, book 2, canto 12, stanza 87, line 8. 
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morum puerilium of Desiderius Erasmus.45 Erasmus singles out the horse in particular for 
unflattering comparisons in remarks such as “It is unfitting that some laughing neigh like a 
horse” and “drink not like a swill-bottle, not supping or smacking with the lips like a horse.”46 
Erasmus urges readers to follow norms of manners by comparing the bad manners of humans to 
the characteristic behaviors of animals. According to Thomas, “Erasmus’s decisively influential 
textbook on civility had made differentiation from animals the very essence of good table 
manners, more so even than differentiation from ‘rustics.’”47 Likewise, Gulliver’s friends think 
that they need only point out Gulliver’s resemblance to a horse in order to bring him to the 
embarrassed self-recognition that will motivate him to correct what they perceive as violations of 
the code of manners. 
Gulliver finds the comparisons of himself to an equine just; but they do not persuade him 
to modify his comportment because he has a secret referent for his equine behaviors: the 
houyhnhnms, of whom his fellow Europeans remain ignorant. Gulliver knows how his peers 
interpret his equine movements and vocalizations because he has shared their European 
education; but he nevertheless decides to take their censure of his characteristically equine 
behaviors as “a great Compliment.” His imitation of the houyhnhnm form is structurally similar 
to his use of houyhnhnm terms in his conversation with the Portuguese sailors: Gulliver ignores 
European norms of intelligibility at the same time that he betrays memories of the European 
perspective. Instead of concluding from European and houyhnhnm perspectives that form is 
incidental to rationality, Gulliver persists in walking and talking like a houyhnhnm because he 
                                                
45 Thomas, Man and the Natural World, 37. 
46 Desiderius Erasmus, De Civilitate Morum Puerilium, trans. Robert Whittington, 2nd ed. 
(London: Imprinted by John Byddell, 1540), 11, 30. I have assigned numbers to Erasmus’s 
pages, beginning with the title page. 
47 Thomas, Man and the Natural World, 37. 
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mistakenly thinks that having an equine body would make his identification with the 
houyhnhnms and his separation from humans complete. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Part 4 of Gulliver’s Travels develops themes from the tradition of Plutarchian narratives, 
but in ways that mark the end of that tradition’s ability to offer a compelling account of the 
human/animal relation. Whereas earlier works use magical transformations so that characters 
who want to be animals can become animals, Swift gives Gulliver a desire for a non-human 
existence while portraying Gulliver as enduringly human. Gulliver’s departure from the pattern 
of earlier Gryllus figures perhaps reflects a shift from Renaissance to Enlightenment definitions 
of the human. For instance, while Pico’s definition of the human as “self-transforming” imagines 
a correspondence between mental states and physical forms,48 Locke imagines a transformation 
of the human in order to suggest that no necessary relationship exists between mental attributes 
and physical shape. In the Renaissance, Fudge argues, acknowledging human superiority is an 
important element of human identity.49 Perhaps for Swift, desiring a non-human existence seems 
to be merely a type of human experience, common not only to the typical Gryllus figures of the 
Plutarchian tradition of transformations but also to the characters who have preceded Gulliver in 
imagining, but not experiencing, transformation into an equine.  
                                                
48 Giovanni Pico, “Oration on the Dignity of Man,” trans. Elizabeth Livermore Forbes, in The 
Renaissance Philosophy of Man, ed. Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and John Herman 
Randall, Jr. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950), 225, but see also 226. 
49 Fudge, Brutal Reasoning, 24-7. 
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EPILOGUE 
 
THE AFTER-LIFE OF THE CIRCE NARRATIVE: 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE ISLAND OF DOCTOR MOREAU 
 
Although I argue that Swift’s parody in part 4 of Gulliver’s Travels represents an 
endpoint for the Plutarchian tradition of transformations, it continues to shape conceptions of 
humans and animals in a much later work, H. G. Wells’s Island of Doctor Moreau. In this novel, 
the scientist Moreau has changed animals into human-like creatures through vivisection, but the 
protagonist Prendick initially suspects that Moreau has changed humans into animal-like 
creatures. Through a crucial allusion to Milton’s Comus, Wells affiliates Prendick’s suspicions 
with the Circean tradition and positions Moreau’s scientific experiments in opposition to magical 
transformations of humans into animals. Although this opposition seems to distinguish Moreau’s 
experiments from Comus’s transformations, it also invites comparison of Wells’s novel with the 
Circean tradition. Despite an apparent disavowal of the literary tradition of magical human-
animal transformations, the novel often imagines humans and animals in terms derived from that 
tradition, providing an example of the way that the literary tradition of transformations may 
continue to haunt ostensibly scientific paradigms of the human/animal relation. 
The allusion to Comus occurs just after Prendick mistakes the vivisected puma for a 
transformed human and begins to fear that he may become Moreau’s next experimental subject. 
Of Moreau and his assistant Montgomery, Prendick writes, “These sickening scoundrels had 
merely intended to keep me back, to fool me with their display of confidence, and presently to 
fall upon me with a fate more horrible than death, with torture, and after torture the most hideous 
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degradation it was possible to conceive—to send me off, a lost soul, a beast, to the rest of their 
Comus rout.”1 With this allusion, Wells suggests that Prendick’s interpretation of the human-
animal hybrids as former humans has been shaped by his reading of Milton’s Comus, in which a 
male Circe figure, to whom Prendick compares Moreau and Montgomery, transforms the heads 
of humans into those of animals. When Prendick accuses Moreau of changing humans into 
animals before a crowd of the human-animal hybrids, Prendick relates, “They seemed, as I 
fancied then, to be trying to understand me, to remember something of their human past” (67). In 
previous chapters, I have identified the forgetting of humanity as a key motif in the Plutarchian 
tradition of transformations. Prendick would have encountered this motif in Comus, in which the 
Attendant Spirit complains that Comus’s victims 
Not once perceive their foul disfigurement, 
But boast themselves more comely than before, 
And all their friends and native home forget, 
To roll with pleasure in a sensual sty.2 
Prendick interprets Moreau’s hybrid creatures in terms derived, in part, from Comus when he 
believes that they have forgotten their former humanity. Furthermore, Prendick’s fears of 
transformation may include the fear that he, like Comus’s victims, would ultimately forget his 
human identity and develop the Gryllus figure’s characteristic preference for his new state. 
The literary origin of Prendick’s fears seems especially striking because Prendick prides 
himself on his scientific education: “I had spent some years at the Royal College of Science, and 
                                                
1 H. G. Wells, The Island of Doctor Moreau, ed. Patrick Parrinder (London: Penguin, 2005), 52. 
Subsequent citations appear in text. 
2 John Milton, Comus, in Complete Poems and Major Prose, ed. Merritt Y. Hughes 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003), page 91, lines 74-7. Subsequent citations appear in text by page 
and line numbers. 
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had done some research in biology under Huxley” (29). Prendick even compares himself with 
Moreau when he reflects, “Yet surely, and especially to another scientific man, there was nothing 
so horrible in vivisection as to account for this secrecy” (35). Paradoxically, Prendick eventually 
draws conclusions based on transformation literature in spite of his scientific pretensions. 
Prendick’s account of his encounter with the swine people provides further evidence for 
the influence of Comus and other transformation literature by using piggishness to represent 
animality in general and by making symbolic distinctions between biped and quadruped. Early in 
the novel, Prendick witnesses a ritual of three swine people: 
Suddenly, as I watched their grotesque and unaccountable gestures, I perceived 
clearly for the first time what it was that had offended me, what had given me the 
two inconsistent and conflicting impressions of utter strangeness and yet of the 
strangest familiarity. The three creatures engaged in this mysterious rite were 
human in shape, and yet human beings with the strangest air about them of some 
familiar animal. Each of these creatures, despite its human form, its rag of 
clothing, and the rough humanity of its bodily form, had woven into it, into its 
movements, into the expression of its countenance, into its whole presence, some 
now irresistible suggestion of a hog, a swinish taint, the unmistakable mark of the 
beast. (42) 
Although Prendick has not yet expressed fears that Moreau has been transforming humans into 
animal-like creatures, such a transformation narrative seems incipient in Prendick’s speculation 
that animal traits have been “woven into” the human-shaped creatures. The description of the 
creatures as having “a swinish taint” likewise suggests that formerly human beings have been 
imbued with animal qualities. Indeed, Prendick continues, 
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I stood overcome by this realization, and then the most horrible questionings 
came rushing into my mind. They began leaping into the air, first one and then the 
other, whooping and grunting. Then one slipped, and for a moment was on all 
fours, to recover indeed forthwith. But that transitory gleam of the true animalism 
of these monsters was enough. (42) 
It is no coincidence that Prendick’s encounter with the swine people, in particular, precipitates 
“the most horrible questionings” that eventually culminate in the accusation that Moreau has 
transformed humans into animals. Indeed, Wells links the two scenes by having Prendick repeat 
the reference to “a swinish taint” when he accuses Moreau of giving humans “some bestial taint” 
(66). The idea that “true animalism” manifests itself in quadrupedalism and, more specifically, in 
piggish qualities has an influential precedent in the tradition of transformation stories. As we 
have seen, Ovid’s Metamorphoses influentially contrasts the rational human with quadrupedal 
animals, who “behold the ground with grovelling eye.”3 Perhaps because the pig seems to be the 
most characteristically “grovelling” animal, many writers, including Plutarch and Spenser, have 
compared irrational or depraved humans with pigs, in particular. The use of human-pig 
transformations to represent all human-animal transformations is particularly striking in Comus, 
the Plutarchian text to which Wells’s novel explicitly alludes, for the Attendant Spirit says that 
all of Comus’s victims, who have the heads of diverse animals, “roll with pleasure in a sensual 
sty” (p. 91, l. 77). Wells’s episode with the swine people thus provides further evidence that 
Prendick’s suspicions about the beast people are shaped by his familiarity with transformation 
literature, especially Comus. 
                                                
3 Arthur Golding, trans., Ovid's Metamorphoses, ed. Madeleine Forey (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2002), book 1, line 97. Subsequent citations appear in text by book and line 
numbers. 
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As Moreau corrects Prendick’s misconceptions, Wells presents Moreau’s experiments as 
the inverse of Comus’s transformations. When Prendick accuses Moreau and Montgomery of 
changing humans into animals before a crowd of the human-animal hybrids, Prendick continues 
to assimilate Moreau’s experimental subjects to the transformed humans of Comus. Prendick 
yells, “They were men—men like yourselves, whom you have infected with some bestial taint, 
men whom you enslaved, and whom you still fear” (66). After Moreau convinces Prendick to 
come inside for an explanation, however, Prendick realizes, “The creatures I had seen were not 
men, had never been men. They were animals—humanized animals—triumphs of vivisection” 
(70-1). Moreau’s experiments represent the inverse of Comus’s transformations because Moreau 
changes animals into human-like creatures whereas Comus changes humans into animal-like 
creatures. Wells dramatizes the inversion of Prendick’s perspective on the hybrid creatures by 
echoing but negating the accusation, “They were men—men like yourselves,” in the admission, 
“The creatures I had seen were not men, had never been men.” Moreover, the phrase “triumphs 
of vivisection” affiliates the hybrid creatures with scientific experimentation, in sharp contrast to 
magical transformations, like those effected by Comus. 
 Moreau’s explanation represents a pivotal moment in the novel, in which the tradition of 
magical transformations is disavowed in favor of a relatively modern, scientific perspective on 
humans and animals. Even Moreau’s ostensibly scientific account of his experiments, however, 
bears signs of the influence of the tradition of transformation stories. Moreau tells Prendick, 
“These creatures you have seen are animals carven and wrought into new shapes. To that—to the 
study of the plasticity of living forms—my life has been devoted” (71). Moreau seeks the power 
of transformation through a mastery of surgical techniques, but his library, which Prendick has 
previously examined, reflects not only his scientific approach but also possible literary 
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inspirations. Moreau’s library contains, Prendick notes, “an array of old books, chiefly, I found, 
surgical works and editions of the Latin and Greek classics—languages I cannot read with any 
comfort” (32). Homer’s Odyssey and Ovid’s Metamorphoses probably number among the 
ancient works that appear alongside the surgical guides. Indeed, Moreau boasts, “It’s not simply 
the outward form of an animal I can change” (72), as though he recalls that Homer’s Circe 
changes only the bodies of humans into those of animals: “the minds within them,” explains 
Homer’s Odysseus, “stayed as they had been / before.”4 Moreau repeats his higher claims for 
vivisection in response to Prendick’s astonishment that the vivisected creatures can speak: “He 
said that was so, and proceeded to point out that the possibilities of vivisection do not stop at a 
mere physical metamorphosis” (72). This account of Moreau’s experiments affiliates his practice 
of “vivisection” with a literary tradition of “metamorphosis,” especially because of the use of 
that word. Since Moreau seems to imply that his transformations differ from the merely physical 
transformations of Homer’s Circe, his ostensibly scientific experiments seem to participate in the 
Plutarchian tradition of transformations. 
Although Moreau’s account of his experiments develops modern biological perspectives, 
especially that of Darwin’s Origin of Species, by affiliating the human with the ape, Moreau also 
recurs frequently to motifs or themes from the Plutarchian tradition of transformations. After 
Moreau describes his early, failed experiments on “man-making” (75), he explains that he has his 
first success with a gorilla: “Then I took a gorilla I had, and upon that, working with infinite 
care, and mastering difficulty after difficulty, I made my first man. All the week, night and day, I 
moulded him. With him it was chiefly the brain that needed moulding” (76). Moreau’s 
implication that gorillas are especially similar to humans belongs to evolutionary biology’s view 
                                                
4 Homer, The Odyssey of Homer, trans. Richmond Lattimore (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), 
page 158, lines 240-1. 
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of the human/animal relation, which the narrative endorses by choosing a gorilla to become 
Moreau’s “first man,” as though this transformation is easier for Moreau to achieve than other 
animal-human transformations. Prendick relays some of Moreau’s similar remarks about another 
simian: “the great difference between man and monkey is in the larynx, he said, in the incapacity 
to frame delicately different sound-symbols by which thought could be sustained” (73). As noted 
in previous chapters, defining a boundary between human and simian represents an approach to 
considering the human/animal relation that becomes widespread in the eighteenth century.5 
Evolutionary biology, of course, provides Wells with more recent reasons to emphasize the 
human/ape relation. 
When, however, Moreau explains that his human-gorilla hybrid “began with a clean 
sheet, mentally; had no memories left in his mind of what he had been” (76), the Plutarchian 
motif of forgetting intrudes upon Moreau’s seemingly modern and scientific account. Initially, 
Moreau suggests that the hybrid creature has the mental state that humans originally have in the 
Enlightenment philosophy of John Locke, who compares “the Mind” to “white Paper, void of all 
Characters, without any Ideas.”6 The subsequent invocation of a Plutarchian view of mental 
transformation as forgetting—having “no memories” of a past identity—suggests that Moreau’s 
modern, scientific enterprise of “man-making” continues to be shaped by the tradition of magical 
transformations. Likewise, when Moreau makes the point that he can alter minds as well as 
                                                
5 As previously mentioned, H. W. Janson dates this approach to Edward Tyson’s 1699 Anatomy 
of a Pygmie. Apes and Ape Lore in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (London: The Warburg 
Institute, The University of London, 1952), 336. And once again, on the new and increasing 
prominence of the ape in eighteenth-century conceptions of the human/animal relation, see Laura 
Brown, Fables of Modernity: Literature and Culture in the English Eighteenth Century (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2001), 225-31; and Laura Brown, Homeless Dogs and Melancholy 
Apes: Humans and Other Animals in the Modern Literary Imagination (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2010), especially 27-63. 
6 John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, 4th ed. (1700), ed. Peter H. Nidditch 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), book 2, chapter 1, paragraph 2, page 104. 
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bodies, he gives a telling animal example: “A pig may be educated” (72). The unexpected 
reference to pigs, which recalls the earlier episode with the swine people, seems inconsistent 
with Moreau’s relatively modern, scientific remarks about mental similarities between humans 
and simians and indicates the enduring influence of transformation literature, especially Comus, 
in which the pig functions as a synecdoche for all animal species and as a symbol for 
intemperance. Moreau’s ambition to educate the pig, who presumes to teach Athena in the 
proverb discussed in chapter three, may represent another way in which Moreau hopes to 
improve upon the transformations of Circe figures: Moreau intends for his science to conquer 
even the gap between the human and the pig, conventionally imagined, as we have seen, to be 
recalcitrant and intemperate. Still, transformation literature shapes that supposedly scientific 
aspiration. 
The influence of transformation stories also accounts for an inadequately explained 
aspect of Moreau’s experiments: his idealization of the human form. Moreau claims to be 
committed to “the study of the plasticity of living forms,” but in truth, he seems more 
specifically committed to transformations of quadrupeds into bipeds. Prendick invites Moreau to 
remark on this discrepancy:  
But I asked him why he had taken the human form as a model. There 
seemed to me then, and there still seems to me now, a strange wickedness in that 
choice. 
He confessed that he had chosen that form by chance. ‘I might just as well 
have worked to form sheep into llamas, and llamas into sheep. I suppose there is 
something in the human form that appeals to the artistic turn of mind more 
powerfully than any animal shape can. (73) 
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Moreau hides or is himself unaware of the extent to which his transformation project is 
determined by distinctions between quadrupedal animal and bipedal human, as conceived 
throughout the tradition of transformation stories.  
Other passages in the novel likewise perpetuate an association of bipedalism with the 
unique mental abilities of the human. When the beast people recite their Law, they begin, “Not to 
go an all-Fours; that is the Law. Are we not Men?” (59). The fact that the command to walk 
upright appears first in the litany suggests a view of bipedal locomotion as fundamental to 
human identity. Significantly, Prendick perceives the “true animalism” of the swine people only 
when one falls “on all fours” (42). Despite Moreau’s unconvincing claim that sheep-llama 
transformations would have been equally interesting, his animal-human transformations repeat 
the quadruped-biped distinction from the transformation tradition. Indeed, they reinforce that 
distinction, for the creatures gain or lose human-like mental abilities in accordance with their 
degree of bipedalism. Thus, when the beast people begin to revert to animals, Prendick observes, 
“My Dog Man imperceptibly slipped back to the dog again; day by day he became dumb, 
quadrupedal, hairy” (123). The bipedal form thus continues to function in Wells’s novel as a 
symbol of the human’s unique intellectual properties, despite Moreau’s seemingly modern 
remarks about the small differences between humans and simians. 
Prendick, too, recurs to beliefs about the symbolic significance of the human form at the 
end of the novel. Like Gulliver, Prendick feels alienated from humanity after his encounter with 
beings that fail to conform to his expectations about bipeds and quadrupeds. Upon his return to 
England, Prendick explains, “I could not persuade myself that the men and women I met were 
not also another, still passably human, Beast People, animals half-wrought into the outward 
image of human souls; and that they would presently begin to revert, to show first this bestial 
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mark and then that” (130). Prendick’s fetishization of the bipedal form is evident in the phrase 
“outward image of human souls,” which suggests that a relationship exists between the human 
shape and an intangible property of the human, ensoulment. Indeed, what Prendick finds most 
disturbing is the possibility that seeming humans might not have human natures. These creatures 
would reveal their inhumanity, upon reversion, through the appearance of “first this bestial mark 
and then that,” and earlier remarks make it clear that Prendick regards quadrupedalism as a 
particularly significant indicator of animality. 
 To assuage his fears, Prendick explains, “I spend many of the clear nights in the study of 
astronomy. There is, though I do not know how there is or why there is, a sense of infinite peace 
and protection in the glittering hosts of heaven. There it must be, I think, in the vast and eternal 
laws of matter, and not in the daily cares and sins and troubles of men, that whatever is more 
than animal within us must find its solace and hope” (131). This passage, which appears in the 
novel’s final paragraph, betrays a debt to the transformation tradition in its suggestion that 
contemplation of the heavens distinguishes humans from animals. In Plato’s Timaeus, 
quadrupeds are originally humans who are transformed when they forsake religion, astronomy, 
and philosophy.7 Ovid’s narrator claims that the creator gives humans a bipedal form so that they 
may “mark and understand what things were in the starry sky” (1.100). Similarly, Gelli’s 
Aglafemos claims to regain the capacity for religion simultaneously with the human form.8 The 
conclusion of Wells’s novel thus repeats earlier statements linking the bipedal form with the 
supposedly unique heavenward aspirations of the human. No less than Moreau’s ambition to 
                                                
7 Plato, Timaeus, in Timaeus and Critias, trans. and ed. Desmond Lee and T. K. Johansen 
(London and New York: Penguin, 2008), 90, but see 88-91. 
8 Giovanni Battista Gelli, Circes of John Baptista Gello, Florentine. Translated out of Italion 
into Englishe by Henry Iden (Imprinted at London in Poules Churchyarde, at the signe of the 
holy ghost by John Cawood, printer to the Quenes Majestie, 1557), 293-4. I have assigned 
numbers to the pages of this edition, beginning with the title page. 
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change animals into humans, Prendick’s reactionary attempt to locate a securely human identity 
in astronomical pursuits is shaped by the treatment of the human’s bipedal form in earlier 
transformation literature. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this dissertation, I have identified a coherent yet overlooked tradition of transformation 
literature about human or formerly human characters who want to be animals. These characters 
are based on Gryllus, who chooses to be a pig rather than a human in Plutarch’s innovative re-
telling of Homer’s Circe episode. A Plutarchian literary tradition of Circe stories originates in the 
Renaissance with Giovanni Battista Gelli’s Circe (1549), continues with works such as book 2 of 
Edmund Spenser’s Faerie Queene (1590) and John Milton’s Comus (1634), and concludes with 
Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels (1726), in which Gulliver’s frustrated desire for 
transformation into a houyhnhnm represents a newly complicated and parodic version of the 
typical Gryllus figure’s desire to be an animal. Distinct from a transformation tradition based on 
the Circe episode in Homer’s Odyssey, the Plutarchian tradition functions as a literary vehicle for 
arguments about the human/animal relationship across the sixteenth, seventeenth, and early 
eighteenth centuries.  
Variously bolstering or challenging human-centered assumptions, these arguments 
emerge from the Plutarchian literary tradition’s re-deployment of representations of animals in 
natural histories. Indeed, I have repeatedly argued that Plutarchian works oppose natural 
history’s views of animals to forms of anthropocentrism, evident in philosophy and in human-
animal relationships, as they establish the meaning of the human-animal transformations that 
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they feature so conspicuously, especially at their endings. In the final dialogue of Gelli’s Circe, 
for instance, Gelli seems to contrast Renaissance philosophies of human nature with natural 
history in order to dramatize the extent to which contemporary beliefs about elephants must be 
falsified in order to produce the very enthusiasm for human superiority that Aglafemos, 
ironically, expresses upon his transformation from elephant to human. Natural history’s 
treatment of the pig, meanwhile, provides a context for understanding how Spenser and Milton 
deploy commonplace, denigrating comparisons of humans to pigs in order to promote negative 
evaluations of characters who want to be animals (in the case of Spenser’s Gryl) or animal-like 
creatures (in the case of Milton’s animal-headed beings). Although Spenser’s and Milton’s 
contributions to the Plutarchian tradition endorse anthropocentric views, their use of 
contemporary beliefs about pigs sets in relief the oppositional relationship between forms of 
anthropocentrism and natural history’s views of animals in other Plutarchian works. Drawing on 
conceptions of the horse as a particularly noble animal in order to create an imaginary species of 
rational equines, Swift generates both a pre-modern argument for the better treatment of horses 
and a parody of the Gryllus figure’s typical desire for an animal existence. Refusing to conclude 
part 4 of Gulliver’s Travels with a human-animal transformation, as in the Plutarchian works of 
Gelli and Spenser, Swift seems to mock the Plutarchian tradition’s use of transformation as a 
literary device for resolving debates about humans and animals. 
The meaning of the ending of Gulliver’s Travels emerges from its relationship to earlier 
works in the Plutarchian tradition. Indeed, I have demonstrated throughout this dissertation that 
full appreciation of individual Plutarchian works depends upon locating them within the larger 
tradition of transformation literature in which they participate. A compelling interpretation of 
Gelli’s dialogue with the elephant must recognize that Gelli has expanded Plutarch’s dialogue 
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about a pig who refuses to return to humanity into a series of dialogues in which ten animals 
recapitulate Gryllus’s decision to remain an animal and the final animal, the elephant, 
dramatically but perhaps too predictably inverts this pattern by accepting an opportunity to return 
to humanity. Furthermore, comparing Gelli’s dialogues with the later Plutarchian redactions of 
Swift and Milton illuminates the role of the pig in the tradition. As we have seen, Gelli and Swift 
focus attention on admired animals and avoid the reviled pig, which seems to enable them to 
develop less anthropocentric interpretations of human-animal transformations, or of the desire 
for such transformations. Viewing Gulliver’s Travels in relation to the Plutarchian tradition also 
generates a compelling new interpretation of its ending: Gulliver’s paradoxical alienation from 
other humans, including his family, becomes intelligible as an incomplete, and therefore ironic, 
version of the forgetfulness of humanity for which earlier Gryllus figures are often criticized. 
Thus, this project on transformation literature and natural history improves our 
understanding of many literary works, including such canonical works as The Faerie Queene and 
Gulliver’s Travels. Furthermore, the example of H. G. Wells’s Island of Doctor Moreau suggests 
that fantasies about human-animal transformations may continue to play an unacknowledged or 
insignificantly appreciated role in figurations of the human/animal relation—well after Swift’s 
parody signals an end to the overt appeal of the Plutarchian tradition’s conventions. As the above 
reading of Wells’s novel suggests, the literary tradition about humans who want to be animals 
may have had a powerful and lasting influence on the imagination, especially the imagination of 
human and animal beings. 
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